This is Democracy – Episode 188: Ukraine

This is democracy, a podcast about the people of the United States, a podcast about citizenship, about engaging with politics and the world around you. A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues and how to have a voice in what happens next. Welcome to our new episode of this is democracy today.

We’re going to revisit, um, the terrible, uh, Russian invasion and war in Ukraine. We’re going to revisit the events of the last, uh, three plus weeks. And we’re going to revisit those events with, uh, one of the, or most experts of these issues. Someone who we’ve talked to many times before, someone who in his, uh, prior discussion with us.

Just about three weeks ago really gave us a foundation, uh, for understanding this terrible moment, uh, that we’re in. This is of course, uh, professor Michael Kimmage. Michael is a professor of history at Catholic university of America in Washington, DC. He’s also a fellow at the German Marshall fund. And chair of the advisory council of the Ken Institute at the was Woodrow Wilson center in Washington, DC.

Um, Michael, in addition to as many academic achievements also has a great deal of policy experience from 2014 to 2017, he was the, um, Member of the policy planning staff for the secretary of state of the United States, uh, the member who had the Russia Ukraine portfolio. So Michael was deeply involved in these issues from the time of the Russian invasion.

OFIA through, uh, the beginning of the Trump administration. Michael has published widely on the history of the region and the history of American policy making as well as social life and culture related to these issues among his many books, um, is the conservative turn Lionel trilling Whitaker chambers in the lessons of anti communism.

And most recently the abandonment of the west, the history of, of an idea. In American foreign policy, Michael has published a number of important articles recently in foreign affairs, as well as other locations on the current conflict he’s been interviewed widely by national public radio and elsewhere.

Uh, we’re just fortunate, Michael, that you’re willing to spend a little time with us and with our listeners. Thank you for joining us, Michael.

Before we turn to our discussion with Michael, we have of course, uh, Mr. Zachary series, uh, poem. What is the title of your poem today for Mario PO? Okay. So this is for the city under siege in Southern Ukraine? Yes. Okay. Let’s hear it. I think you were standing next to me at a carnival, except it was a funeral and everyone was laughing except us.

Everyone was laughing except us. I think you were standing next to me in the field, across the river, looking into the city, as they marched in, in the clip from the security camera in the elevator, they are jostled together, pulled up the floors with their guns. It wasn’t raining, but you and I could feel the do gather in our socks.

The sky was gray until it wasn’t. And you bent over wheezing in the dust. And I held your hand as you opened your mouth and let the air out. I think you were standing next to me in a theater, except it was a bomb shelter and everyone was crying except us, everyone was crying except us. I think you were standing next to me in the field, across the river, watching the apartment buildings explode like bells chiming out the hour.

There are 12 now going off and up into the sky. It must be midday. I think you were standing next to me in the theater, except it was a bomb shelter. And we had written children in big white letters. We had written children in big white letters and still they waited somewhere above the clouds with their Chiney and their clarinet to blow us all the way up to eternity.

And later much later. I think you were standing next to me at a funeral, except it was a grand parade and everyone was laughing. Even us, everyone was laughing, even us. It’s very moving. Zachary. What is your poem about? My poem is really about the sort of absurdity of the violence that’s unfolding on the streets of cities like Mario Bo and many others, unfortunately, across Ukraine, uh, the sort of indiscriminate violence and horror that’s inflicted on civilian populations, uh, that really exemplifies, uh, how terrible this war and war in general is.

uh, I think that’s, uh, the, the necessary place to start. Uh, Michael, I, I think this is, uh, almost an unanswerable question. I’m gonna ask it anyway. How should we sitting in the United States or sitting in Western Europe? How, how should we understand? What’s happening in Ukraine, uh, from the perspective of Ukrainians, I, I know news reporters are journalists of all kinds are trying to give us that sense, but, but I, I feel quite distant from what’s happening there.

How, how can, how can we bridge that distance? How can we understand what’s happening? Well, uh, I think we can begin in terms of understanding this, uh, experience by emphasizing how. Unexpected. It has been, of course, uh, this is a conflict that dates back to 2014, if not to earlier periods of tension and conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

So the very fact of conflict is not novel and the, and it’s not, uh, in and of itself surprising. Uh, but the war began on the 24th of February, uh, with a government, uh, that’s now duly and rightly celebrated for its courage. Bravery and leadership, but with a government that was saying that the war was not gonna.

Happen. Uh, and I think like any of us, all of us in some ways, uh, it’s very difficult to imagine the cataclysmic, uh, and it’s very difficult to imagine it coming, uh, abruptly into your life. But that’s precisely what happened to Ukrainians very early in the morning of the 24th, uh, of February. So without preparation, without the psychological preparation that does come in the case of some wars.

This war has descended upon Ukraine. Uh, and you know, I think there are two further things about it that are, uh, shocking for Ukrainians. You know, Ukraine is, uh, a very large country, both population wise and territorially, and the war is concentrated. More in the south, the east and the north, uh, than it is in the center of the country or in the west.

But it is a war that touches all of Ukraine. So unlike the conflict in 2014, uh, which was devastating results in the death, I believe of some 14,000 Ukrainian citizens that was still by comparison to localized. This is, uh, something that’s happening on the territory of the entire country. And you’ve HADS.

Uh, in Lavi and other Western Ukrainian cities. And of course, uh, as Zachary has eloquently, uh, mentioned you have the, uh, horrific siege in, in PLE and, uh, and you know, substantial violence across much of the country. So there’s this scale of it. That is a shock to Ukrainians. Uh, I have no doubt. Uh, and then the third and final point I would make on this account to try to understand, um, As you admirably wish to do Jeremy, the psychology, the feeling of what it is to go through this war, uh, is, uh, the brutality that’s being directed toward civilians.

Uh, Zachary, you put that in your poem, uh, very, uh, very appropriately. Uh, this is not a war that knows any boundary or border. Between civilian and military, uh, targets. You had the strike on a shopping mall in key of either yesterday or, uh, or today, uh, you had as, as Zachary notes, the bombing of the, uh, of the theater, uh, in inal and countless other, uh, atrocities in humanitarian.

Disasters that have directly affected the lives, uh, of, uh, Ukrainians, uh, in, in, in, in every respect and, you know, the final point that we could make. And I know that everybody is aware of this, but is the number I believe is between eight and 10 million now of displaced peoples internally displaced people, uh, and of refugees.

And that’s of of course, a suffering, uh, that’s a consequence of this war, uh, that is, uh, being felt very, uh, acutely across the country. And, and at the moment throughout Europe, I, I think one of the difficult things to understand is the, the seeming paradox between the, the profound. Uh, personal suffering of Ukrainians that, that we’re seeing.

And Zach, we referred to this as well. The, the, the bombing of facilities that have children. And then for example, uh, and at the same time, what seems like the incredibly stout, courageous resistance of Ukrainians. So they’re suffering and re resisting at the same time. And, and it seems to me it’s. Our, our mind wants us to go in one direction or the other in understanding this, how, how do you understand the connection between those two Michael?

Well, I think that we might wanna begin here with the Russian war aims, uh, and they began as we discussed in an earlier, uh, you know, version of this, uh, of this program began with a very unrealistic assumption that in short order, Through lightning strikes and through intimidation, uh, that the government could be toppled in Ukraine, uh, and that the CRE would be able to install, uh, a puppet partition in the country, or perhaps redesign the whole thing politically, uh, with a quick military invasion.

Uh, that was a. Uh, a foolish military plan, uh, and it’s been shown as such on the, uh, on the battlefield, but of course, Putin being put in, he hasn’t given up, uh, and he hasn’t recalibrated and backtracked, uh, in a fundamental way. He’s still trying to achieve his political M aims through military means, uh, in Ukraine, but now his goal, uh, in the agony of the Russian war effort.

Is to break the back of the Ukrainian people. And so the strikes on civilians, uh, we might wanna question the word indiscriminate. Uh, they correspond to a kind of political and military logic. They’re meant to instill fear. Uh, they’re meant to instill despair. Uh, they’re meant to get Ukrainians in, in, in, in a kind of local regional sense to surrender in the city of Mar and elsewhere.

And of course they’re meant to get. Uh, the government, uh, to yield, uh, whatever that might mean, uh, in the eyes of Vladimir Putin. So. The resistance of Ukrainians comes, I think from multiple sources, but first and foremost, it is an effort to respond, uh, to that policy, to that strategy, uh, of getting a countries as to submit very simply by not submitting, uh, and it’s as much a psychological message to Russia, uh, as the intimidation is a psychological message, uh, to Ukraine.

So that’s one very important aspect. Uh, the other is that. When you see those parts of Ukraine that so far have been occupied by Russian forces, uh, it is clear. It is apparent that those people living under the occupation, uh, have absolutely no desire to live under occupation and will resist. So even after the battles in a local sense have been fought in, won by the Russian military, they will resist the political outcome, uh, of occupation.

So there’s a desire of course, to see the war. One, uh, or, you know, sort of managed, uh, on the Ukrainian side and for that resilience and fighting back, uh, and resistance is crucial. And then there is the appalling political prospect of living, uh, as a kind of Russian colony, uh, under Russian dominion. Uh, and that’s not a fiction at the moment or a.

Uh, a possibility, uh, or potentiality for some Ukrainians, that’s a reality. Uh, and so their two resistance has its own, uh, special significance. So it’s between Warren politics. This question of resistance in Ukraine, uh, and its, uh, of the essence for, uh, the survival of their nation. So in part inspired by the Ukrainian resistance we’ve seen in many ways, at least an incredibly, an incredible symbolic show of solidarity from many Western countries.

I mean, if you go around any major city of the United States, you’ll see countless Ukrainian flags, to what extent has the support of the west, uh, been material in this conflict and, and actually made a for the Ukrainians. Well, there is a time and a place to be critical of Western policy. And it’s a discussion that we could have.

Um, we could have it this evening, or we could set aside another time to do it and go back to 2014 and look at the mistakes that were made and, and there, and there were many, uh, and there are ways in which. The west did the wrong thing. And there were the ways in which the west did at times too much. And there are many ways in which the west did, uh, too little that is necessary.

Um, you know, there’s, this is not a moment for self congratulation. When you see a war of this kind, uh, there should be introspection and self-criticism on the part of the us and of the west. How did we get to this point? How did we get here? That’s a to. But that being as important as it is, uh, I think it’s necessary at the moment to underscore the successes, uh, of Western policy over the last couple of weeks, for sure.

Uh, but also going back, uh, over the last couple of months. And so, um, you know, I would really list, uh, three, uh, three things here. We have, uh, diplomacy, we have intelligence and we have. A military dimension to Western policy, and it is keeping I think Ukraine alive, uh, for the time being and also for the foreseeable future.

So one substantial success was to align a large group of nations into a kind of ad hoc coalition that is first and foremost, trans Atlantic. These are the countries with the great equities in Ukraine. Uh, but it’s not just transatlantic. It includes South Korea. It includes Australia. It includes Japan.

Includes Singapore. Uh, and there are a number of other countries that are committed to sanctions, uh, and to working, uh, for the sake of Ukraine, uh, for its, uh, security and for its future prospects. And I have no doubt when the war is over, uh, that these will be the countries that will be first in line to provide financial assistance and to begin the reconstruction of the country.

So that foundation has been set. I think American leadership has played a role, but there’s just a lot of will on the part of these countries to do something and to work together. Diplomatically that really matters on the other hand, you know, not on the other hand, but, uh, in addition, uh, the intelligence, the way in which the Biden administration has used intelligence, uh, has in the public domain.

Consistently pulled the rug out from the Russian narrative, uh, and prevented Putin from dominating the information space as he has in previous periods, uh, to very dramatic effect. Uh, and, uh, at the same time, I think covertly, this is not something I have any knowledge of, but I think covertly, there’s a very helpful flow of information going from the us probably mapping and, uh, targeting and such that’s going from the us to Ukraine.

Uh, and so they have on their side. Uh, the intelligence capacities of, uh, a very considerable, uh, superpower. And I think that matters greatly in the war effort. And then finally, you know, probably most importantly in terms of a more than symbolic. So show of support for Ukraine, you have all of the military assistants, uh, and that ranges from Turkish drones to.

You know, to stinger missiles and, and, and javelins, uh, and to increasingly sophisticated, uh, air defense, uh, systems that are being, uh, brought, uh, to the Ukrainian military and of course, ammunition and money and equipment and other things as well that are necessary for military, uh, to function. So the heart and soul of the story is the force, uh, and the energy of the Ukrainian military.

Uh, but the backing that’s being given is crucial, not just to morale, but to it’s very functioning, uh, and I think is showing real results on the battlefield. So the west is doing quite a bit, uh, and that’s a story that needs to be told, uh, and, uh, understood as a, as a key element of the conflict. And, and just building on those really insightful comments, uh, Michael, how, how should we understand the day to day then?

I mean, one of the other complications looking at the maps every morning on the, on this, on the news, and then following them on countless sites is things are not moving very much at all. Um, and it seems like every day is more of the same. But what does that mean? Uh, how do we understand what’s happening day to day as, as military history, as military affairs?

Well, let’s start, uh, on the, uh, on the Russian side. Uh, and, uh, you know, I think it’s, it’s clear that in the north, around Kiev, uh, and also in the east, uh, so this would be around the city of har, uh, in the east that the, the Russians have stalled. And that, uh, the territory that they threatened to conquer and to conquer rapidly at the very outside of the war.

And I think everybody, it wasn’t just, uh, the hub, uh, analyst in the Kremlin. But I think everybody had this fear or this, this, this, uh, scenario in mind, uh, that at the beginning of the war, uh, the Russians could surround Kiev. Uh, they could take enormous amounts of, uh, territory. They could sort of move past or surround the cities, uh, and in, in that manner, Cut them off, uh, or take them.

And that simply, uh, has not happened. Uh, and part of this is a story of incompetence, bad logistics, low morale, uh, foolish military planning, uh, on the Russian side. Uh, and part of it is a strategy on the part of the Ukrainians that at the beginning phase of the war, they sort of fell back and took more defensive positions in that forced.

Uh, Russian, uh, you know, troops and, and, and material out into the open, uh, where it was very vulnerable to, uh, to, to Ukraine attack. And so that, that has really stalled the advance, uh, of the Russians in the north, uh, and in the east and makes the political goals of this conflict as the Russians have defined them, uh, Really very remote.

Uh, it’s not a question of being able to partition the country or to control, uh, the country as a whole at all. For Russia. It is a very partial set of territorial gains, uh, in those parts of the country that matter most, uh, strategically to Russia, the south is a somewhat different story. Uh, Uh, and I think there, there are a couple of ominous notes, even if the news of the last couple of days hasn’t demonstrated large Russian, uh, advances, uh, and you know, there’s, I think a concern about a possible encirclement, uh, of Ukrainian troops in the Southeast of the country, uh, in the, in the Dobo where there’s been very fierce hiding, uh, back and forth between Ukrainians, uh, and Russians.

And of course the siege of. Uh, is, uh, extremely brutal. Uh, but that’s the one city that the Russians are closest to, uh, to taking after the city of Kwan had been taken, uh, about a week and a half or two weeks, uh, ago. So the slowness in the north and the east, there’s a bit more movement, uh, in the south, I think with the Ukrainians have really achieved militarily.

And this is absolutely fundamental and will be fundamental to the negotiations that are ongoing and are probably going to intensify. Uh, in the short term, what the Ukrainians have achieved is, uh, a true capacity to delay, uh, the advance of, uh, of the Russian armies. They are buying. Time for their government.

Uh, they’re buying time for the defensive Kia for, um, you know, the positioning of troops and booby traps and all kinds of, uh, things that are gonna make it a very difficult city for, uh, the Russians to take. Uh, and each day that the war passes for Russia. There’s great expense. There’s very considerable casualties, uh, and death us on the Russian, uh, on the Russian side and the politics.

Uh, I don’t think Putin is anywhere near. You know, being toppled or being, uh, even resisted that much on the Russian side, but each day that this war takes on, uh, it becomes costlier and more difficult to sustain, uh, for Russia. So, you know, Jeremy, you know, very well, the history of Vietnam and the question of time and how time played ultimately onto the, into the hands of the north Vietnamese.

I wonder if there’s not a similar that at work, uh, in the territory of Ukraine at the moment. Um, and you mentioned, uh, the sort of potentiality, the possibility of a sort of homegrown resistance to Putin within Russia. How should we understand the role of the Russian people themselves? Uh, in this story? I mean, there are, there are stories of, of, of, of probably not ordinary Russians, but the prominent, uh, anti Putin, Russians, uh, moving abroad to avoid.

The sort of repression, the intensified repression at home. How, how should we understand that space? Yes. That’s a very significant story. It’s in the tens of thousands now of Russians who have left for Turkey or for, uh, or for Europe or in some cases to. Uh, to central Asia or to the south caucuses. Uh, and you know, this is very substantial brain drain.

Uh, these are more educated, uh, more skilled Russians who have the ability to leave. And don’t like what they see at the moment, uh, in, in Russia. And this is certainly a loss, uh, a loss for the country. I think put his attitude may be good riddens to these people it’s really very possible, but for the country at large, it’s certainly a very, uh, it’s a very negative development.

There were. Protest at the very beginning of the war. I don’t know if they’ve exactly petered out or if, uh, their oppression has gotten to the, uh, have gotten to the protestors. But, uh, I haven’t seen too much evidence of a protest movement in the last week. Uh, or 10 days, there’s a, you know, great complex dialogue going on on social media, within Russia and outside of Russia where different views are being aired.

I think we all saw the, the newscast where a, uh, a member of the first channel, uh, enacted a very interesting, uh, gesture of protest, uh, about the mendacity in manipulativeness, uh, of Russian media. And I think all of that is ongoing, but I wouldn’t. Wanna be too, um, optimistic in the short term about the prospects of resistance, uh, in Russia, what Putin has shown over the course of the, uh, of the war?

Uh, still a little bit less than a month old. Uh, this particular war is that he is very willing, perhaps even eager. Uh, to enact very, very stringent structures, uh, of repression. Uh, and so you had the banning of, of Facebook today, for example, uh, and that’s of a piece with a lot of, uh, persecution of independent media, uh, in Russia.

I think it’s really possible to say that there’s not officially speaking, formally speaking, uh, uh, in independent media left in Russia, and then we’ve seen many cases of, uh, Intimidation legal intimidation, physical intimidation of people who are protesting even to use the word war now, uh, is sort of publicly, uh, unacceptable.

And I think that there is a climate of fear. Uh, that’s developing that, uh, you say the wrong thing, something bad, uh, could happen to you. I don’t know how. Much longer Putin can continue turning the screws, uh, of repression. But if it becomes a question for Putin of turning Russia into North Korea or losing the war, uh, I have no doubt that he will try.

He will attempt to turn Russia into, into North Korea sounds very bleak. It feels very bleak. Um, but that feels to me like the tunnel that we’re looking down at the moment. And, and so you don’t see a way in which, uh, Putin would retreat. You don’t see that as a prospect. I think if, if we use the word retreat, no.

Uh, I think he is. And, uh, maybe I didn’t make the point emphatically enough in the, in, in the military discussion that we were having a moment ago. I think he’s really losing this war and I think he’s losing it on the one hand politically. In an almost absolute sense. I just think that his political objectives are receding now beyond, uh, the horizon.

In fact, the very thing he was trying to, to, to prevent a sort of Western oriented unified Ukraine is the very thing that he’s creating by the war. So it’s a mathematically counterproductive endeavor. Uh, I point inside. And I also think that he’s losing. Uh, the war itself, not just the politics of the war, uh, but the war war, uh, and that’s a loss that will take a long time to play out.

Uh, but will I think be, uh, the almost inevitable result of the planning, uh, and the kind of strategy that Putin developed, uh, for the war. But I also don’t think that he is going to retreat or the allow that word to be applied, uh, to whatever he does, uh, in, in, in Ukraine. Um, He does have lots of military firepower that he can bring in, uh, to this conflict.

You know, God forbid, uh, he does it, but it’s not unthinkable that he could use biological, chemical, uh, or nuclear weapons. And of course the Russian air force is sizable and there are lots of ways in which he can just continue applying, uh, pressure. Uh, so the question is when. The continuing to apply pressure becomes, uh, less, uh, valuable, less, uh, profitable for Putin, uh, than, uh, cutting his losses and trying to, uh, come to some kind of, uh, accommodation.

Uh, there is a very intricate diplomatic dance going on now between Ukraine and Russia, between Zelensky, uh, uh, and put in. And as I see it, Trying to be as rational as possible. in a situation that feels pretty irrational, but as I see it, I think there are incentives on both sides to come to the table. Uh, and if Putin can emerge from this, uh, with a win, uh, with what he can call a win, uh, he has a lot of reasons, uh, to try to cut his losses, militarily, politically, uh, and, uh, and economically, and it will just be up as a really how much he’s willing and able to.

Uh, to compromise, but that’s, I think how it ends not, uh, in an explicit retreat, but in some accommodation that both sides can, uh, accept. And I’m not convinced that this is impossible. It, it does seem that it’s harder every day though, Michael, right? I mean it, as you say, the Ukrainians every day have time on their side.

If they can. Hold back, the Russians they’re able to, um, in a sense, acquire more battlefield strength each day. Um, and it seems the source of Ukrainian strength is their unity and their commitment to resist Russia. So that, that would seem to make it nearly impossible for Zelinsky to seed any territory to put.

I suppose that’s correct. But I think that, you know, uh, uh, it’s, uh, It’s it’s of the essence to do something, uh, that moves in that direction for, uh, for Zelensky he’s created a very, very powerful wartime spirit. He’s maybe you could say he’s created, uh, Ukraine, uh, in, in, uh, in his contemporary, uh, configuration.

Uh, and he’s done so through Val and that valor has been. Uh, has been replicated, uh, on the battlefield, but the war is destroying the country. Uh, and you know, we’ve just now I think begun to think through some of the consequences of, of, of the war on, on Ukrainian agriculture, which matters for Ukraine also matters for a lot of other countries that, uh, consume, you know, grain that’s grown, uh, in, uh, in Ukraine, the devastation of the Ukrainian city, starting with Marial, uh, and moving on to other.

Uh, places is really, uh, is really horrific. Uh, and you know, there becomes a kind of human incentive on Zelensky side. To try to put an end to it. Uh, and he has to be aware. He has to know all of us have to know that on the battlefield alone is not gonna be where Ukraine triumphs. Uh, it’s gonna have to be some combination of the assistance that the west is providing, uh, the achievements that they’ve made militarily and very Def, uh, diploma.

Miss. I agree with you, Jeremy. I don’t see a formula for how it’s done. I don’t know how Zelensky manages the domestic politics, if it comes to real concessions about Crimea, uh, or the Don boss. But, uh, I don’t think it’s a sustainable war for Ukraine over the course of two, three years or two, three years of this kind of suffering is gonna reduce the country to.

Ashes and to, and to rubble. So he has to work within that timeline as best he can. It’s a, it’s an impossible task. I know. Uh, and try to see if there isn’t a way of balancing the military imperatives as the situation with the diplomatic imperatives of some kind of sustainable piece. It’s impossible, but it has to be possible, right?

No, I, I understand a hundred percent, but whats me, um, and then we’ll try to get more optimistic after this questions.

It would be a, a perfectly reasonable strategy. I don’t know if it would be a successful one. It would be a reasonable strategy for Zelinsky to try to, instead of work towards concessions, to work toward actually trying to widen the conflict himself to bring the United States and NATO forces in. Um, this was of course the strategy that the nationalists in on had for a time, right.

To try to. Provoke a conflict with mainland China that the United States would get involved in. And, and, and as you know, one of the concerns the United States had in 1960s was to actually restrain our own ally. Uh, this is a very different scenario, but, uh, in, in a certain way, um, Linsky has rallied the Ukrainians.

Uh, the people to, to, to resist Russian repression and the, the, the risk of any Russian repression through concessions might be greater in the eyes of Ukrainians and the risk of widening the war and bringing in NATO. I’m sure you’re right. Uh, from, uh, from his point of view, um, Zelensky has, has made these sort of despairing statements recently about NATO, which I think, uh, don’t suggest he’s naive on the question of NATO.

I think he’s trying to shame. NATO and NATO members into, uh, doing more he’s given all of these Churchillian and stirring speeches to various parliament, including, uh, us Congress, where he’s made a case, not for getting these countries into the war, but, uh, made a case for, for doing as much as possible.

And also again, kind of shaming, uh, his listeners, uh, there’s been a dust step between Zelensky and the government of Israel. And the last couple of days about, uh, analogy Zelensky has made to the Holocaust, which, um, You know, uh, I think, uh, the Israeli government hasn’t, uh, been willing, uh, to endorse, uh, and, uh, it is, uh, of course true.

I mean, in a way it’s been the Ukrainian desire since 2014 to have a real treaty ally. On its side to join NATO, to get those kinds of guarantees and to get those kinds of, uh, of commitments. So I agree. I think that from his vantage point, that would be a powerful solution to the problem of what to do next.

Uh, and you know, you had Poland floating the idea over the last 48 hours of a, uh, sort of peacekeeping mission, uh, to, to Ukraine that would’ve been, uh, really Poland entering the war, Poland and NATO member state. Uh, and that idea was shot down by the. Bond administration. So I think that you’re right about Zelensky.

Trying to pull the us to pull NATO as much as possible, uh, onto the side of Ukraine and perhaps onto the battlefield itself. It does seem to me that Biden has been quite clear and explicit, uh, about not wanting things to develop, uh, in that direction. Uh, and you just have seen emphatic statement. after emphatic statement from president Biden about this not being a war for NA and not being a war into which the United States, uh, can enter.

And I don’t doubt Biden’s sincerity on this point. Uh, for a moment. So I do worry about certain accidents, you know, perhaps if the Russians start bombing the convoys, the aid convoys, which, uh, love Roth was suggesting Russia was on the verge of doing perhaps that would push this into being, uh, a wider war.

Uh, and one could also contemplate in the desperation of the Russian war effort that they might, uh, in engage in missile attacks on Poland or, or, or elsewhere. Uh, as a way of provoking this outcome themselves, I’m not sure how , you know, prudent or intelligent or, or wise that would be on the, on the, on the Russian side to give Zelensky what he, uh, what he may be hoping for.

But I think the discipline is, is there for the most part on the Western side, not to go down that, not to go down that road, but, um, as the humanitarian toll, uh, another scenario Jeremy and Zachary could be that. Uh, public opinion starts to shift. It becomes more, uh, in favor of direct military, uh, engagement, but then it is up to leaders of, you know, Germany and, and, and Britain and France and the United States, uh, to lay out very clearly what their intentions are, uh, and what the strategic logic would be behind, uh, uh, uh, a chosen, uh, sort of endorsed, uh, escalation of the conflict.

And there, again, I’m just sort of doubtful that it would go. Uh, in that, uh, in that, in that, uh, direction. Right. Right. And, and of course the historical analogy for public opinion, pushing, uh, the United States or its uh, European allies. I into military direct military intervention, the historical analogy would in some ways be the wars in Yugoslavia.

Right. And the ways in which over time pressure on bill Clinton led United States to the controversial bombing of Belgrade, uh, during the war. Um, absolutely. Um, uh, what do you think the United States should do? Michael? What, how can we, um, use our vast resources and now in a sense, uh, renewed influence within the Western Alliance, how can we use that to try to push towards some, some ceasefire, some, some end to this conflict of some kind.

Well, first of all, I think that we should continue doing what we’re doing. Uh, I think that in an era of social media where the images coming to us are so horrific, uh, and so disturbing, uh, that it creates certainly a me and I know in many people around me, a desire to see this. To see an input to all of this as quickly as possible as absolutely, uh, as possible.

But, you know, as we know, as students of the, of the cold war, Uh, in a nuclear age, rapid solutions to conflicts and tensions among nuclear powers, uh, are fundamentally undesirable. And so one thing that we have to cultivate in ourselves, you know, we, we, the public , we, the, uh, we, the members of our democracies, what we, one thing we have to cultivate in ourselves is patients, uh, uh, and we’ve set in motion, very, very robust sanctions vis V Russia, that will have a real effect, but it’s not gonna be overnight.

We have the pep to have the patients, uh, to see that out. If it is a war of attrition, in a matter of, uh, Ukraine holding out against Russia, then their two patients in time is gonna be very, uh, important. Uh, all of the diplomatic efforts are to the good, all of the military assistance to Ukraine, uh, is to the good, uh, all of the political speeches and the political support, the solidarity.

Uh, is to the good, and let’s have a certain confidence that having marshal this very considerable array of forces, uh, in favor of Ukraine, that it’s gonna really have an effect, uh, and let’s stick with it, uh, and not become nervous and jumpy about trying to go. Uh, and look into these sort of short term solutions to this terrible, uh, and horrific problems.

That’s the first point I would make. The second point I would make, and I have full confidence that the Biden administration will do this is that if it comes to the Ukraine, making concessions and doing things that are difficult for Ukraine and making life a little bit, it easier for Russia than any of us would like at the moment.

If that’s the decision that they make, if Zelensky sort of comes to the table and says, we’ll sell Carmia to Russia, or we’ll give them a piece of the Don boss or will agree not to join NATO, uh, in return for a cease fire or for peace. If, if that’s Lansky’s choice and they seem to have the backing of his population, we should support him.

We should give them really a lot of leeway when it comes to the diplomacy. And if they’re not comfortable making those choices and wanna stick out and maintain as much of their independence and sovereignty and autonomy as possible, we should support them there. So we should really read them. Uh, read what they’re up to diplomatically and politically, uh, and we should give them, uh, a wide, uh, a wide birth and, and, and, and maintain that, uh, and maintain that support.

And then very finally the sort of third point when it comes to the diplomacy, I think it’s clear who the major actors are in this diplomatic ad hoc coalition, but let’s see if there aren’t through subtle processes of persuasion, negotiation, and diplomacy. Let’s see if there aren’t some interesting ways of widening, uh, This coalition.

I think that there may be opportunities with China, uh, in this regard. I really don’t think that China likes this war. It’s not gonna give the United States, you know, an extra inch when it comes to American leadership. Uh, but perhaps there are very, you know, sort of behind the scenes ways in which China could be nudged, uh, over, onto the side.

Uh, of this, uh, of this coalition, uh, and that would be very meaningful indeed. Uh, if it were uh, to happen. So let’s not foreclose the diplomacy and think that we have the team and everybody’s gonna stay on the team. And it’s only about this team. Let’s see if we can maybe get a few more members, uh, of the international community, uh, onto this team, uh, and, and let the at drive the process as well.

So mostly I think we should just stay the course, uh, but be diplomatically open-minded, uh, and see if there aren’t new. Avenues for diplomatic creativity. Uh, what about, uh, a sort of kissing Jerry and shuttle diplomacy, um, sending secretary of state Lincoln or some other Envoy to meet with Putin and then meet with, uh, Zelinsky, uh, and try to work out some deal on the model of, of course, of what Kissinger did after the 1970 in the middle east.

I’m not sure. I mean, it, it, it sounds like an interesting idea to me. I, I, I, I, I don’t see too many. Uh, indications that that’s, that’s what Russia wants in this situation. So at the very beginning, there were feelers put out by Israel. Uh, Turkey has sort of offered to play this role. I know China has offered to play the role, uh, of the, uh, of the mediator, but ideally it would be a country or, you know, sort of practically speaking.

It would probably be a country. that has good relations with Ukraine, uh, which is something that you can save for Turkey and Israel, uh, and a country that has workable relations, uh, with, uh, with Russia and the hard thing for the us. Although. In some ways what you’re suggesting Jeremy would be just right, because without the us, none of it is really gonna work for Russia because they think of the us as, you know, the prime mover of, of, of politics on the other side of the barricades.

Uh, but, um, you know, I just, I just wonder if the us, uh, can manage it because the us is so much on the side of Ukraine. Uh, in this, uh, in this conflict, so maybe better to outsource, uh, in this case, the diplomacy to another power, we could sort of go back in time and think of, uh, uh, of Teddy Roosevelt in 1905, uh, trying to get out of the summer heat from Washington DC and taking things up to Portmouth New Hampshire, right.

Uh, and helping to resolve the, or, or really resolving the, the military conflict between Japan. And Russia. And that was, you know, the United States, a kind of par new, uh, power on the periphery of the international system that could play the role of mediator and probably it’s a country like that, uh, that could accomplish more than the us could at the moment diplomatically.

No, that makes a lot of sense. And, and Russia, Japanese war is such a good analogy, cuz that was also a, a very deadly, brutal conflict that, that. Really ended in a stalemate a as in fact, most wars do, right, Michael, I mean, that’s part of the issue here, right? We have this image of one side of cha attaining victory, but most wars end, um, with the messiness, the stale mate, the, the chaos that, that Carl on clouds, butts and others described.

Yes. I think that this one is almost destined to end, uh, in AAL may, maybe we could have entertained the thought in the first week of the war that Russia would achieve an outright victory. That looks very remote to me. And, and Ukraine is not gonna be able to expel the Russian military for its territory, or at least not all of the Russian military.

From its talent territory. So a Salate is, is, is, is almost inevitable. We could also add, just to go back to your previous question, we could also add Finland to the list as a, as a country that might be able to go in between Ukraine and Russia. Sure, sure. Zachary, um, I know you’ve been following these events closely as have many of your peers.

Uh, I know that it’s been emotional for you also, as it has been for many of your peers, um, listening to Michael’s descriptions of what’s happening. Are, are, are you drawn to, um, some hope here? Do you think this is a topic where, uh, your generation can maybe draw some lessons and, and, and, or are we sort of going back in the sense of back to the, the, the worst of the past here?

I, I think, unfortunately that we probably are going back to some of the worst of the past. I think it’s, it’s too easy, um, to see this, um, conflict within the sort of old framework of, of, of how we as Americans view the world, whether it’s through the lens of world war II or the cold war or, or, or entirely different.

And I think part of the problem is that we, we don’t understand, um, The, the new tools that are available to us, the new tools that, that our government, that other governments, uh, allied with our government are using to, to, or are leveraging to help the Ukrainians in this conflict. And I think we also have as a country, a very poor understanding of the power of diplomacy.

And I hope that maybe, uh, that the end of this conflict, the peaceful end of this conflict could, uh, be a symbol of, of the power of diplomacy and, and the, the power of, of, of, of talking. Uh, instead of fighting you, you have found an optimistic silver lining there. I, I like that. Michael, last question to you.

Do you, do you share that hope that there’s some, some belated, but positive learning that’s occurring through this terrible ordeal? I think we’re, we’re far from that, uh, at the moment, uh, we’ve been reminded, uh, if it was possible to forget, uh, of the horrors of war, uh, and there is, uh, there is value in that, uh, I suppose, although it’s, it’s, it’s, it’s a hard to feel that value, uh, in the, uh, in the immediate sense, uh, We are exactly as Zachary says, struggling to come to grips, to understand with the nature of the nature of our political moment, uh, whether the key thing in this crisis, this is what historians will have much better insight into 50 year and a hundred years from now.

Whether the key thing is social media in this crisis, perhaps it will galvanize out of global public opinion in a way that will result in Russia’s, uh, defeat. Um, You know, perhaps the key element of the crisis is going to be drone warfare, uh, in ways that just redesign and remake, uh, the battlefield in unpredictable ways.

I don’t know if that would benefit Russia or Ukraine more in this conflict, but that seems to me another, uh, possibility. And I think we have a new phase of the conflict that’s upon us. The white house made the announcement day that there should be real concern in this country about cyber, uh, attacks on critical infrastructure.

In the United States. And so that of course would, uh, make us not bystanders in the way that we often feel at the moment, but might make us in very unpleasant ways, uh, participants, uh, in this new kind of war, if that would be the case, uh, a Russian cyber attack on the United States, uh, we would be, uh, in a new world.

There have been cyber before, but not directly between nuclear, uh, power. So perhaps that will be the key, uh, component it’s unpredictable, but let’s. And that a not of optimism because that’s, I, I think always worth, uh, always worth doing. Uh, and if there are new circumstances to this war, which does certainly seem to be the case, technologically militarily, uh, and to a degree politically, then there should be a new kind of diplomacy.

Uh, and we can learn the lessons of the past, uh, of how much, uh, a diplomacy can achieve. And in what manner. But perhaps a new style of diplomacy may emerge from this, a new kind of multilateralism, uh, that may be there. Uh, when the, when the dust settles and the conflict starts to get, uh, resolved or new ways of aligning.

Uh, strategic objectives with diplomatic, uh, engagement, uh, you know, I’m sure the old formulas of the kind that you explored your edited volume, uh, Jeremy on, on, on how diplomacy succeeds. I think those old formulas are gonna all apply, but my guess is that the style may have to be, uh, may have to be new.

So new wars always bring new realities and with the new reality of this war may come. A new kind of diplomacy and, and to those who are able to get there, I just wish them God’s speech . Yes. . I think it’s such a good note to close on because one of the inspiring parts of this conflict is certainly seeing, and you you’ve been eloquent about this, Michael, uh, how, uh, Zelinsky and others have rallied people to, uh, a very difficult.

Fight and, and rallied people at home and abroad rallied members of Congress, uh, who would’ve imagined, you know, both parties would sit together and watch on a movie screen, or it looked like a movie screen, the president of Russia, uh, actually the president of Ukraine. Rallying them to, uh, to a cause. So, so there is a, a publicness to this diplomacy that, that is mediated by technology in new ways and, and appealing to people in new ways.

And I think that’s, that’s certainly something, uh, that all of us can learn from and, and find some hope from right. Technology can be a source of demagoguery, but also a, a source of, uh, democratic inspiration, perhaps. I couldn’t agree more. I mean, there’s something so moving about the contrast between Zelensky and at the moment.

Not just, you know, Putin, the aggressor in Zelensky the defender of his country, but what’s moving to me about it is that Putin has these immense resources at his disposal, you know, FSB, G U SV R you know, sort of the great master manipulator of global politics. Uh, who, you know, turned a screwdriver and, and, uh, reached into American politics in 2016, the magician who can do anything, uh, you know, the KGP operative, uh, extraordinaire, all of that.

That’s an old narrative about Putin and look, he’s there helpless, unable to change minds, unable to tell the story, uh, at a great remove from his own population, uh, and isolated, you know, like a king in his cold marble palace. Uh, and there’s, Zelensky in his bunker with a cell phone. Um, telling a story that, uh, is, you know, moving the minds and the hearts of millions upon millions of, of, of people that’s quite remarkable.

Uh, and it has speaks to the contrast between a story that’s untrue and a story that’s true, uh, and speaks to the contrast between. Thy and courage, but, uh, it’s just remarkable to see in real time and to see with one’s own eyes, but you’re absolutely right. Jeremy, Jeremy, without the technology there, uh, that story wouldn’t be coming to us.

Absolutely. It’s a new kind of populist idealism as a contrast to the sort of populous dystopia that we were talking about just a few weeks ago, completely. Michael. Thank you. Uh, as always you have, uh, shared valuable insights with us. You’ve given us a real framework for understanding what’s happening.

And most of all, you’ve, you’ve helped to make sense of some of the complexity, uh, without, without overriding the, the true complexity of it. And you’ve shared, uh, the dark and the light us. So, Michael, thank you so much for joining us. Well, Zachary and Jeremy, thank you again for the invitation Zachary.

Thank you for your. , uh, you’re beautiful and heartfelt, uh, poem. And I very much look forward to our next conversation and we’ll hope that, uh, uh, that, uh, long suffering Ukraine is in a, is in a better place. The next time we speak well, I’m looking forward to the conversation when we reach some day new, some happy Dayal we hope.

And you can say you predicted it all along. even if you didn’t it’s okay. Just so you predicted it all along.

Zachary. Thank you for your poem. Uh, as, as Michael said, you really, uh, brought part of the war home to us with your, your poetry today, and thank you most of all, to our loyal listeners for joining us for this episode of this is. Democracy. This podcast is produced by the liberal arts, its development studio and the college of liberal arts at the university of Texas at Austin.

The music in this episode was written and recorded by Harris Codini. Stay tuned for a new episode every week you can find this is democracy on apple podcast, cast, Spotify, and Stitcher. See you next time.