This is Democracy – Episode 311: US-Latin American Relations

 This is Democracy, a podcast about the people of the United States, a podcast about citizenship, about engaging with politics and the world around you. A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues and how to have a voice in what happens next.

Welcome to our new episode of This Is Democracy.

Today we are going to talk about US Latin American relations. We’re going to focus on one of the most important and enduring crises of US Latin American relations, the Cuban Missile Crisis, which everyone knows about. And then we’re gonna also talk about the legacies of that moment for our own moment today, when the United States appears to be, uh, in a major crisis with Venezuela.

We are fortunate to be joined by, uh, someone who I think is doing, uh, the most important and groundbreaking work on US Latin American relations. Uh, this is professor uh, Renata Keller. She’s an associate professor of history at the University of Nevada Reno. Uh, thank you for joining us, Renny.

Thanks for having me.

Renata Keller, uh, is an accomplished author. This is the second book that she has recently published. Her first book was called Mexico’s Cold War, Cuba, the United States, and the Legacy of the Mexican Revolution. It’s a wonderful book that grew out of her dissertation, written, I’m proud to say, at the University of Texas at Austin.

Go

Longhorns. Go Longhorns, and, uh, Rennie’s new book. The book I encourage everyone to read. I just finished it a couple of days ago and it really, really is a book that makes you think, think more broadly about the Cuban Missile Crisis and about the impact of the United States and the region. Uh, this new book is called The Fate of the Americas, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Hemispheric Cold War.

Before we get into our discussion of, uh, Rene’s fantastic work and its, uh, relevance for us today, uh, we’re going to start, I think almost by necessity, uh, with Bob Dylan today. Uh, often we have a, a poem from, uh, Mr. Zachary, but today we’re gonna, we, we don’t have Mr. Zachary’s poem. He’s with us on the podcast, of course, but, um, we have instead Bob Dylan not quite as good as, as one of your poems, Zachary, right?

Sure.

Uh, so we have Bob Dylan, uh, and this is from one of, uh, my favorite Bob Dylan songs. I have so many. Um, this is called Masters of War. This was originally written by Bob Dylan in late 1962 in the days and weeks after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and then first recorded in early 1963. So here we’re getting, uh, this.

Extraordinary artist’s reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis. And, um, if he had Renny Keller’s book, then he would’ve been reacting to that too, I’m sure. So here we have, uh, the first three stanzas of this incredible song about the Cuban Missile Crisis. Come you Masters of War, you that build the big guns, you that build the death planes you that build all the bombs, you that hide behind the walls, you that hide behind the desks.

I just want you to know, I can see through your masks, you that never done nothing but build to destroy. You play with my world like it’s your little toy. You put a gun in my hand and you hide from my eyes and you turn and run farther when the fast bullets fly. Like Judas of old, you lie and deceive a world war can be won.

You want me to believe? But I see through your eyes and I see through your brain, like I see through the water that runs down my drain Renny as, uh, as a scholar of the Cuban Missile Crisis and a scholar of US Latin American relations. How do you think about Bob Dylan’s angry words in the context of that moment?

But

that is also one of my favorite, uh, songs that he wrote. And no surprise, right, because I studied the crisis. But I think he actually expresses a lot of what a lot of people in Latin America were feeling. This, um, this outrage that, uh, that the United States was even contemplating nuclear war. Um.

Without consulting them, with risking their lives for what a lot of people argued was capitalist gain. Uh, there were congressional debates in Chile where people were saying these exact same things. That this is all about capitalism and US imperialism, and that if there is a war, there’s, there’s not going to be any winners.

We’re all going to lose a nuclear war.

O. One of the things that was really interesting to me in your book was to think about the different kinds of reactions in different countries. It’s really not fair to say there was one reaction to the crisis in this incredibly diverse region. How do you think about some of the different reactions from some of the different countries, uh, in the region?

Yes. That was one of my main. Initial findings when I started this project was that there was a huge range of reactions, and that’s what drove my curiosity through, you know, a decade of research was finding out all the different ways that people responded. Some people, um, cited enthusiastically with the United States.

Um, all the governments of Latin America voted unanimously. In the organization of American States to set up, to set up the quarantine and, um, approve this idea that they didn’t want nuclear weapons on Cuba. Pretty much everyone. And the governments are in, you know, the executive branches of Latin American governments agreed on that.

But when you look beyond that, there was a huge amount of disagreement about whether Cuba should be allowed to have these weapons. A lot of people argued that they were defensive weapons, just like Castro said that Cuba was clearly under attack and should have the right to defend itself. Um, whereas other people said, no, you’re increasing the danger for everyone in the hemisphere.

Um, this is unacceptable to have these weapons and you, so you get divisions among the Latin American countries and within Latin American countries, whereas you get huge protests in contrast to what we see in the United States. There were a couple major peace protests. But in Latin America, they were huge and they were all over the place.

And in some cases they devolved into riots, like in Bolivia. Um, I was shocked to find out that more Bolivians died as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis than Cubans. And that’s because they also felt invested in the outcome. And it played, the crisis played into these existing divisions within Latin American societies like Bolivia and.

Kind of ignited the, these conflicts that had been simmering for a long time.

Zachary.

Yeah. How closely did the United States and the Soviet Union watch public opinion in Latin America? Did they care at all what people in the region thought of, of the conflict?

That’s a great question. We know more about what the United States was doing, um, based on availability of US records, and they definitely were watching what was going on in Latin America.

I read the, the Kennedy tapes, which was, uh. It’s a transcription of secret recordings that Kennedy kept during his meetings in the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It’s an amazing resource, and in these meetings of the executive committee of the National Security Council or or excom, they were discussing what was going on in Latin America, even before they decided to set up the quarantine.

They were concerned, how is this going to look in Latin America? Are people going to see this as just the latest episode of US Imperialism? Uh, could the missiles in Cuba destabilize the balance of power in the region? Could it give Cuba like equal power as the United States since they also would then have nuclear weaponry that they could use to kind of throw their weight around?

And then during the crisis, they were discussing reactions in Latin America and they were worried when they saw these riots and these. Very strong responses among Latin American publics against their own governments. They’re worried about stability in Latin America and worried that this crisis could spin out.

And destabilize countries like Mexico and Brazil and Bolivia. And so they were very closely following what was going on in Latin America. And then on the Soviet side, we do have evidence that they were also watching what was going on in Latin America, and they were aware of. Clearly the o the OAS vote that had been all over the news.

And they also knew which OAS countries were actually participating in the quarantine around Cuba. A lot of countries, um, offered their air bases and their naval bases. Some countries like Argentina and Venezuela even sent destroyers to participate in the quarantine. And the Soviets knew that a lot of countries were participating and were, um, uniting against Cuba.

I am glad you brought up the Kennedy tapes, uh, Renny. ’cause, uh, as you say, they’re an extraordinary resource. Uh, we have recordings and transcripts, uh, from basically every one of the meetings of this special committee of his closest advisors that President Kennedy put together during the two weeks of the crisis.

The editors of one version of the Kennedy tapes, uh, Philip Zuko and Ernest May are among a group of historians who have seen the Cuban missile crisis as a great triumph for Kennedy. Um, not because of the danger that came with it, but because of the ma the way they believe he managed, uh, managed. Uh, this.

Communications with the Soviet Union, managed communications with the American public, and negotiated out of this crisis that could have gone to nuclear war. You don’t seem to have the same heroic view of the Kennedy administration. I’d love to hear your thoughts on how your view differs from what I think is that more conventional view.

Mm-hmm.

That’s a good point. I, I would say that yes, I do differ a little bit from that conventional view. While I do also recognize that, uh, we came very close to nuclear war and I’m grateful. That Kennedy and Khrushchev decided to step back from the brink. Uh, I do see it as not as much of a clear victory.

Uh, if when you look at the results for Latin America of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it brought a lot of death and destruction for decades to come. I mentioned Argentina earlier. That’s a, an example of a country that as a result of the Cuban missile crisis, became a lot closer. To the United States, especially in terms of military relations.

And there was one military leader in particular, Juan Carlos Nia, who came to the attention of the United States during the missile crisis. He was the head of the army and he very enthusiastically supported the United States. During the crisis, he organized, uh, 3000 man unit that could be deployed in case of a land invasion.

And then after the crisis, the United States, um. Was appreciative and, uh, especially trained him. Paid a lot of attention to Nia, um, but also the United States signed a military assistance app, uh, military assistance program with Argentina. And Argentina was the, the final country in the Americas to, to really become much more closely aligned militarily with the United States.

And then four years after the missile crisis, Juan Carlos Nia staged a coup in Argentina, a military coup that would usher in. More than a decade of, of other military coups, uh, that brought a death. Um, tens of thousands of people, mostly civilians were, uh, killed or disappeared during Argentina’s dirty war.

And you can trace some of the roots of that back to the Cuban Missile Crisis. And so, yes, I would say the idea that this was a victory or, or a near escape, um. It is not true when you look beyond the United States.

Zachary,

um, why though, do you see the Cuban Missile Crisis in particular as that critical turning point?

Um. I think it, this seems like maybe a larger factor in, in American policy in the region or a larger trend that had already begun.

Mm-hmm.

Or is this, is this in your mind the moment when American policy in Latin America moves away from real efforts to promote democracy and turns instead to, uh, sort of more transactional relationships with undemocratic leaders?

Yes, that’s a great point. So a lot of this builds on preexisting trends, but I do think the missile crisis was an important turning point because it was a moment where everyone shared danger, and it was this moment where everyone had to decide between these kind of. Conflicting values and conflicting priorities.

I focus on themes. Um, in the book that I saw being especially prominent during the Cuban Muscle crisis, these, these weren’t themes that I had gone into the book looking for. Um, but then as I started researching, I noticed that everyone was talking about security and sovereignty and solidarity, and these, these were values that people across the political.

Spectrum and across the Americas we’re all fighting for, but we’re approaching from really different perspectives, um, based on their political alignment or, or where they were literally within the Americas. And so it was a moment where people were forced to really define and prioritize their values. So they had been, you know, seeking security, you know, forever.

We could argue that security is a basic human need. Uh, but then during the missile crisis, people were forced to define, okay, so how do we actually defend security? Do nuclear weapons bring greater security or greater insecurity? Um, and so it was a moment where. Everyone at the same time had to define where they stood.

And so it really clarified for a lot of people what the Cold War meant for them and, and their position in it.

O one of the really interesting, uh, conclusions you draw, and I guess it’s really two conclusions in one, uh, is that on the one hand you say the Cuban Missile Crisis shattered some of the solidarity among Latin American countries.

Uh, you’ve talked about this already, the ways in which different countries reacted to it. Um. At the same time, you make a very powerful argument that the crisis contributed to, uh, the negotiation of the first Nuclear Free Zone treaty, the Treaty of Loca, uh, in 1967, which most people don’t know about.

Mm-hmm. Uh, but created a, a nuclear weapons free zone, which remains the case to, to this day, uh, in, in that region. Um, I, I’d, I’d love to hear you reflect on what brought us from the Cuban Missile Crisis from this moment of horror. To this moment of nuclear disarmament.

Yes. So the crisis, like I said, forced everyone to realize that they were living in a nuclear age and that they were living in the Cold War.

That the Cold War wasn’t just, you know, a far away conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that they could ignore. And so this experience of really experience being at the center of nuclear conflict revealed to a lot of Latin Americans, their vulnerability, their countries. We’re unlikely to get nuclear weapons except for places like Argentina and Brazil.

And so a lot of countries within Latin America said, we don’t want another missile crisis. This, this was too close. And so Brazil and a number of other countries have been pushing before the missile crisis for a nuclear free zone or some kind of agreement. Um, and then Brazil came outta the crisis, um, in.

Um, not with a great relationship with the United States to put it, to put it mildly. Um, and so Mexico actually stepped into the breach and picked up where the Brazilians had left off, and the Mexicans did come out of the crisis with a very strong hemispheric position and relations with the United States.

And so they, um. Started pushing for nuclear weapons free zone and it took about five years. Uh, but they were able to get another country, enough other countries to sign on to establish, uh, the Treaty of Colta Loco in 1967, like you mentioned. And that made Latin America the first nuclear weapons free zone in the world.

And that set a precedent for other regions of the world to set up regional. Um, nuclear weapons free zones, and it, I think it was that experience of coming so close to nuclear war during the missile crisis and, and this feeling of powerlessness that made a lot of people in Latin America willing to change their position and take action.

And, and I guess, um, that to me is a, is a bridge to where we are today. Um, it, it does seem that in the decades after the Cuban Missile Crisis, there are a number of efforts that are made not only to limit nuclear weapons in the region, but also to limit American and Soviet and other, I guess, Chinese military activity, uh, in the region.

And although the United States is involved in many covert act. Activities supporting, uh, groups like the Contras in Nicaragua invading Grenada. Um, nonetheless, you could argue that we at least avoid another big crisis. Mm-hmm. Like the Cuban Missile Crisis. Uh, but then I look at Venezuela today and I wonder, uh, if you as a historian see certain parallels to the Cuban missile crisis.

Obviously there’s no Soviet. Presence in the region. But, but there is of course, a Russian and a Chinese presence. Mm-hmm. And, um, you know, it does seem as the United States is, is has mobilized the largest force in its southern command, uh, present, uh, and at sea around, um, Venezuela and is using force to destroy, uh, boats, um, rather than interdict.

Boats. Mm-hmm. Uh, on the high seas. Uh, how do you think about this moment in relation to what you’ve just written about?

I think there’s a lot of parallels between our current moment and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Uh, one that jumps out to me is it’s kind of the danger of saber rattling, right? When we look at the causes of the Cuban muscle crisis, I think that one of the main reasons that IV offered nuclear weapons to Castro in the first place was this clear sense.

That Cuba was under attack. You have the Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961. You have Cuba being kicked out of the organization of American States. You have Operation Mongoose in which the United States is organizing all these covert activities, uh, against Cuba, and that sends a very clear message that the United States and the rest of the countries of Latin America do not intend to.

Put up with Castro’s government and they want to undermine it and get Castro out of Cuba. And so I think we can see parallels today in Venezuela where we are taking all these steps to undermine Modelo’s government. I think just like Castro, he is, he is incredibly unpopular, uh, in the Inter-American community.

Um, and, you know, we’re, we’re building up this sense of threat. And what I wonder is this, how is Madero going to react? How are countries like Russia and China is, how are they going to react? And could this escalate into, I’m guessing probably not another nuclear conflict, but it could be very drawn out war if the United States decides to actually militarily intervene in Venezuela and.

The fact that we still live in a nuclear era means that any major conflict, even if it doesn’t appear to be a nuclear one on, on the face or at first, uh, could potentially escalate into one.

Zachary.

Yeah. I want to ask how, how do you think that, um. What, what lessons do you think, um, Americans should be learning from the Cuban missile crisis for this moment?

I know you said the danger of saber rattling, but, but, um, as we, as sort of ordinary Americans as opposed to maybe government leaders or people making decisions, how should we, what, what, what, what sort of different attitudes or different perspectives on this conflict should we bring? Um, learning these lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis.

I think one of the lessons, uh, for everyday people is that their, their voices matter. Um, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, uh, a lot of people in the United States, um. Kind of followed their government leadership. They, there was a lot of this sense of we need to stand united as a country. We need to support Kennedy’s position, support the quarantine.

There wasn’t a lot of criticism in the media. There wasn’t, you don’t see the same kind of huge protests that I mentioned in Latin America, but I think in Latin America it’s a completely different story. And people did feel empowered and they did feel like they were participating in the crisis. And so.

You see not only these big protests, but you see people debating in the media. You see, uh, people in the other wings of the government, um, in, in Senate kind of debating their country’s positions. And I think that that really mattered. It didn’t necessarily help, you know, decide the question of whether there would be.

Missiles in Cuba or not, but it did help influence their own country’s political future. And I think that is an important message that, that we can participate and we can take steps in our own lives to shape what’s going on in our own countries and then that that connects to the rest of the world. I think another important lesson is that we’re not isolated, you know, even.

Even places that our islands are connected very closely to the rest of the world and the rest of the region, and so we can use those connections to our advantage.

That’s very well said, Renny. I, I also wonder if there’s a lesson about the difficulties, perhaps the hazards of regime change. The, the Trump administration is in a long line of American presidents, Democrat and Republican, who have, um, perhaps overestimated the ability of the United States to force someone like Castro, who Kennedy was obsessed with, of course, or Maduro, who Trump seems to be obsessed with.

They’ve overestimated the ability of the United States to overthrow them. What, what would you say about that?

I agree completely. I think there’s a long history of the United States overing, overestimating its abilities to, to determine other countries political regimes, to target specific leaders. Um, you know, in the case of Castro, they tried so many ways to get him out of power, um, up to and including assassination.

And, and invasion, and none of it worked. Um, and Cuba’s a much smaller place than Venezuela. Um, and so I would say there have been very few instances of success, um, in that regard in Latin America. And then there’s a question of what happens next. So even if you do manage to remove a specific leader or change a specific government, like in the case of Chile, what happens next is.

Is the result or the conclusion any better? I would say in most cases, no, that the consequences have been extremely harmful for Latin Americans and for Inter-American relations.

So perhaps it’s an unfair question, but I’m gonna ask you anyway, uh, if we shouldn’t, in your reading as a historian, or if we should at least be cautious about trying to overthrow someone like Castro or Maduro.

And let’s be clear, these are in some ways horrible dictators. Mm-hmm. Uh, what should we do? Should we just accept them in power? What, what, what should we do?

That’s a great question. I don’t, I don’t think it’s unfair at all. I think these are the kind of questions that people should be asking. Um, my opinion is that we should work within regional organizations like the organization of American States.

I think that’s one of the overlooked lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis was that by working with regional allies, Kennedy was able to find to set. The world on a path toward a peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis by taking multilateral action instead of unilateral action. And so that would be my first recommendation was to, would be to work with regional partners.

Like I said, Mado is extremely unpopular within the region, but by taking unilateral action, we are turning potential allies like Columbia against us. Um, instead of working with them against Maduro.

That makes a lot of sense. Um, uh, Zachary, uh, to close, uh, what, what do you think does, does working through regional organizations, um, resonate you think with young people who care about this region?

Does this analysis as a whole does the Cuban whistle crisis and the lessons that Reni has laid out? So, I think so clearly. Do, do they resonate or, or how, how do you think, you know, young, uh. Educated Americans who think about these issues, how do they, how do they approach this?

Well, I’m not sure that, uh, we necessarily have a sense of the Cuban Missile Crisis, uh, in the same sort of visceral sense that a lot of, um, an older generation does, just having lived through it or having lived through the aftermath of it.

Um, and, and having experienced the sort of tension of the Cold War. But I do think that now maybe is the right time to start reevaluating the lessons that we learned from the crisis. Um. And, uh, to think again about what it might mean to both protect American interests in Latin America, but also to promote American values in Latin America.

That makes a lot of sense. That’s, that’s well said. And I think it resonates with, uh, our friend Bob Dylan. Mm-hmm. Getting us to think not of ourselves as Masters of War. Mm-hmm. But I think what Renny is talking about is masters, perhaps, of, of peace. Mm-hmm. And negotiation. And, and I love Renny. I love everything about your book, but I love in particular, the way in which you do.

Take us to the story of, uh, the Treaty of Loko and the efforts to, to build peace in the region after this horrible, horrible crisis and the, the nearness of extinction. Mm-hmm. Um, I really think there’s, there’s a, there’s a lesson in that. Um, I want to encourage all of our listeners to, uh, by Rey’s book and read it.

Uh, the Fate of the Americas, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Hemispheric Cold War. It has a beautiful paperback version that’s already out, so it’s readily accessible and can be read. In all settings. Um, Renny, thank you so much, uh, for joining us and, and sharing your wisdom on our podcast this morning.

Thank you for having me. This was so much fun.

It was indeed. Uh, thank you of course to, uh, Zachary Siri as well, for, uh, participating in the conversation and helping to always, uh, make sure that we are not flying off into never, never land of academic discussion and keeping us grounded in so many ways. Uh, and thank you most of all to our loyal listeners and loyal subscribers to our substack.

Uh, thank you for joining us for this episode of This Is Democracy.

This podcast is produced by the Liberal Arts ITS Development Studio and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Scott Holmes. Stay tuned for a new episode every week. Can. Find this is Democracy on Apple Podcast, Spotify and YouTube.

See you next time.