This is Democracy – Episode 304: Russia-Ukraine War Update

This is Democracy, a podcast about the people of the United States, a podcast about citizenship, about engaging with politics and the world around you.

A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues and how to have a voice in what happens next. Hello, and welcome to our latest episode of This Is Democracy.

I’m Zachary Suri. Today we will return to a topic that we’ve discussed repeatedly on the show, um, the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. Um, when we first spoke with our guests today, um, just hours after Russian forces, uh, began advancing towards Kyiv, we had no idea that we would still be discussing the war, let alone speaking of an independent Ukraine nearly three and a half years later.

But things have changed a lot since then, not least of all, with the new Trump administration. So joining us to discuss, uh, the latest developments and what we can expect in the coming months, uh, in Ukraine is our good friend Michael Kimmage. Um, Michael is a professor of history at Catholic University of America in Washington, and the once former and future director of the Kennedy.

Um, from 2014 to 2017, Michael served on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff at, uh, the Department of State where he held the Russia Ukraine profile and his latest book Collisions the War in Ukraine, and the origins of the new global Instability has become the book on the ongoing war. Uh, he joins us today, uh, from Vinia Lithuania.

I think. Uh, thank you for joining us, Michael. Such a, such a pleasure to be back with you both. Well, and of course joining us as well is, uh,

professor Jeremy Siri. Hello. Good to be with both of you and I’m looking forward to our conversation, Zachary and Michael. Wonderful.

Um, I want to read, uh, today actually from the poem from the first podcast we did on the invasion, uh, with Michael back in February, 2022.

Um, this will be a little embarrassing for me, but I think it might actually be a very. Interesting place to start, especially as a way of, of reflecting on how our expectations have changed in the last three and a half years. Um, and how, um, perhaps, uh, the story is quite different from how we imagined in February of 2022.

Um, and I think also the ending feels particularly appropriate, um, given the 80th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima Nagasaki, which falls this week. So here is the first part of a poem called Our Ukrainian Love Story. In my mind, we would’ve met in Kyiv, along the NEPA, and we would’ve walked the beaches.

Yes, I know it is winter and it is all probably frozen over, or at least colder than ice, but I still think I could fall in love with you there. In my mind, we would’ve stood under the statues and cathedrals and monasteries and laughed because it had all turned to dust before. Yes, it will be dust again and probably, if not yesterday, tomorrow, if not tomorrow, then an hour from now.

But I still think I could fall in love with you there. We’d find a park in an old neighborhood and sit maybe even as the guns were rolling in. In my mind, we would’ve met in Kyiv, and you would’ve looked me in the eyes without flinching, and I would return the favor. Yes, what can it possibly be worth, this falling in love in a park?

But I would like our love story to end a true tragedy, not just a war poem. In my mind, we would’ve met in Kyiv, along the nepa, you and I, walking between real people, holding onto reality and realness. And realistic reifying. Repetitious. Indecency, yes. Wouldn’t you say it’s indecent to fall in love before the war?

Before anyone can twist it and make it seem trite or stupendous or patriotic? Wouldn’t you say it’s indecent? In my mind, we would’ve met in Kyiv, in a cafe just before all this, maybe yesterday, and maybe inadvertently we could fold a thousand paper cranes. Um, reading that poem, I’m sort of brought back to the world of February, 2022.

Um. One that feels quite different from our own, not least because it’s no longer winter, but instead the height of August. But, but Michael, doesn’t it feel like a completely different world? Did, did you even expect to still be talking about an independent Ukraine uh, in August of 2025 when we spoke back then?

It doesn’t indeed feel like a very different world. And your poem does such a wonderful. Job of bringing us back with the repetition of the word real in reality to what is in effect or what was then in effect, the I reality of it all, the extreme and horrifying novelty in ways that we’ve discussed over the past years.

Um, there is this concern, I think, that I have, I think that many of us have, uh, about, um. Growing dead, uh, and growing indifferent to this war because it’s dragging on, uh, for such a long period of time. And that would’ve been completely unthinkable in February, 2022 when I think all of us were full of, uh, emotion.

Uh, and it’s also looking at it from an American vantage point, uh, not a Ukrainian vantage point, but an American vantage point. The political shifts here have been pretty profound from 2022, uh, to 2025, and, and now on the verge of, of 2026 in terms of where the war, uh, is, is heading, uh, into its fourth year.

That’s, that’s an astonishing thought. And so not only is the longevity of the war startling, uh, but the shifting world around Ukraine is startling, uh, as well. And so in so many ways, the ground has shifted beneath our feet. Um, why is it you think that Ukraine has been able to survive so long despite, um, what we all thought was going to be an overwhelming onslaught from, from Russia?

And, and do you think the prospects are good that it will continue to be able to resist the Russian invasion? Yes. I think that the word victory would be. Inept at the moment, it would be premature. Uh, it would really be misleading in terms of Ukraine being on the road to victory because in territorial terms, that’s not the case.

Uh, and Russia is an exceptionally difficult adversary to defeat in Ukraine and Russia is not really defeatable, uh, in Russia, uh, itself. But, you know, victory is only one, uh, way of approaching what a war. Means, um, I think that Ukraine has demonstrated, uh, a set of capacities, uh, that indicate that Ukraine rather like Russia is, uh, undefeatable, uh, in this context that Russia will not and cannot, uh, win this war.

But before we talk about Russia, which is of course the other side of the equation, let’s focus in on why Ukraine has survived for so long and will, in my view, continue to survive. Uh, in, in perpetuity. Uh, the simplest answer is the morale and the conviction, uh, of the UK Ukraine of the Ukrainian people. I think that that was an issue that we touched on all the way back on the first day, the first 24 hour cycle, uh, of the war.

It was apparent, uh, even then, uh, secondly, uh, the, um, uh, willingness of Ukraine to fight a defensive war, which is what Ukraine is currently compelled. To fight. There’s no other war that Ukraine can fight now unless it were to mobilize massively and even then, uh, uh, an offensive war to take back Crimea and Eastern Ukraine would be really, uh, tough.

Uh, and so Ukraine has to live with the consequences of a defensive war where Russia is in some ways just continuing to pummel and pummel the civilian population, uh, of Ukraine. But it is also extremely important to point out that Ukraine is largely succeeding. Uh, in fighting a defensive war, it holds roughly 80%, uh, of its own territories, and it has slowed Russia to a series of costly, uh, and meaningless territorial gains, which is really a sign of success.

Uh, in a defensive war. And so that, I think would be the second point. The third and final point I would make in terms of Ukraine’s success, and this takes us back to, you know, to Texas and to Washington DC and to the United States, is that Ukraine has maintained really against the odds. Uh, both a transatlantic and a global coalition, uh, of support.

Uh, and so we’ve seen in the German election over the last couple of, uh, months, a new German chancellor who is much more supportive of Ukraine than the previous German chance chancellor had been. Um, you know, we see a European Union and a Europe that remains highly committed to Ukraine’s defense and security.

We see Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea. As a set of countries in the Indo-Pacific that are, uh, also strongly behind Ukraine. And I know that we’ll get to the United States and there are lots of complexities in the US position, uh, at the present moment. But in a way, the dog that hasn’t barked in the Trump second term, uh, would be the US abandonment of Ukraine.

That’s simply not happening in the last couple of weeks. Uh, the Trump White House is going almost in the. Opposite direction. And so Ukraine has sustained itself. It’s not something that just happens, you know, because other countries wish it to happen. It’s something that happens, the sustenance of Ukraine from abroad, uh, because Ukraine makes it happen.

And so that puts Ukraine, I think, in a quite good long-term, uh, position. Don’t wanna exaggerate the point, because there’s a lot of suffering. Uh, that’s reminiscent of the poem that you wrote three and a half years ago, Zachary, uh, about this conflict and that deserves its, its due and its, its, its, uh, its place in this conversation.

Uh, but there are deep structural factors that allow Ukraine, uh, to survive, uh, until the present moment. And I think really to survive indefinitely.

Uh, Michael, one of the things that struck us, uh, three and a half years ago when we discussed the, uh, Russian invasion of Ukraine was the brutalization, uh, of, uh, of, uh, people in places in Ukraine that occurred in those early days.

And, uh, what has surprised me is that the level of brutality has only increased, um, and, and increased in ways that I think were unimaginable to us three and a half years ago. Um, why do you think that’s happened and what, what effect has that had?

[00:10:44] Intro: Well, I think the brutality is, is, is one of the essential features, uh, of the war and it reverberates in so many different.

Uh, directions. Let’s start on the Russian side as to why it’s tolerated, or perhaps in some instances, many instances actually, uh, encouraged. Um, I think it’s a sign of frustration on the Russian side. That’s one answer to the question of why Russia has prosecuted such a brutal war. So Russia actually, if it were to.

Take the brutality away. Uh, it would be a very, very pathetic war, uh, on the Russian side. Uh, brutality is of course, pathetic in its own right. But, uh, what Russia’s doing is, you know, at the cost of hundreds of lives a day, advancing a few inches on the battlefield, uh, and not altering the strategic nature of the war because Ukraine has pinned it, uh, to this 20% of the territory that Russia, uh, occupies.

Russia is. Vanishingly distant from taking any of Ukraine’s major cities. That’s a theme that we’ve discussed over the years. Uh, and it’s really a stalemated war on the Russian side. So out of frustration, Russia lashes out because it can, uh, and sends drones and, you know, glide bombs and, and, uh, and missiles, uh, into Ukrainian cities, uh, to degrade the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine to instill terror, uh, et cetera.

But, uh, it really is a sign. Uh, of, uh, of desperation. Secondly, on the Russian side, uh, it is a war that is being fought by a dictatorship. I think without the Putin dictatorship, you wouldn’t have, uh, the war, uh, and the historical record. Jeremy, I think is pretty clear on this point, uh, that when dictatorships fight wars, it’s no holds barred.

There’s no investigative journalism, there’s no court of appeals, there’s no rule of law. And so the brutality of war as such becomes, uh, intensified. Uh, in dictatorships and that’s, you know, when you look at the language that Putin and others in the Kremlin used to describe Ukraine and Ukrainians, uh, that itself is a kind of brutality and that is mirrored and reflected, uh, on the, uh, on the battlefield.

Um. A third point to make is a point about, uh, Ukraine, uh, itself. Uh, and this is, um, a point that really goes against Russian interest in the war, but I think if there were any ambiguity in Ukraine, and it’s a big diverse country, so there are different regions and language groups and, and religions, et cetera.

But if there were any ambiguity in Ukraine about giving up or yielding to Russian pressure or exchanging. Uh, the difficulties of war for the, um, the conditions of occupation. If there were doubts in the minds of Ukrainians. The brutality, uh, I think keeps them. Sort of very, very focused on the need to fight the war, uh, and on the need, uh, to prevail.

So that’s, you know, over time is gonna be very hard to explain on the Russian side why Russia, which is fighting a political war, it’s trying to achieve certain political objectives, has fought such a brutal war. And the brutality of that war has really made Russia’s political objectives some kind of control over Ukraine.

Uh, or demoralization of the population that’s made those objectives, uh, impossible to, uh, to realize. So the brutality is front and center with this war. It’s, it’s, uh, something that Zachary, you’ve spoken about, written about in many of your, uh, poems. I think we still don’t know enough about this in a kind of eyewitness, uh, personal testimony sense, uh, outside of, uh, Ukraine.

But it’s, it’s, it’s, it’s not just a. Humanitarian story. It’s an essential aspect of both the political and the military story of this war. That makes sense. Tell us about the Ukrainian side, especially three and a half years into this brutal war. Um, you, you, you, you mentioned the sort of remarkable stability of public opinion in Ukraine, but there do seem to have been some signs of late that maybe there’s some, not wavering, but there there are, there’s dissatisfaction with the current government.

Is, is that accurate? How would you describe the sort of current state of the war effort in Ukraine? Definitely, I mean, there’s definitely dissatisfaction. Uh, it would be shocking if there. Weren’t. Uh, and I think the dissatisfaction follows from a military strategic reality, but also from politics, you know, high politics, but, um, you know, politics as such.

Uh, and in the military domain, uh, Ukraine, FACHE is a huge challenge, which is how to motivate. Society and soldiers to fight when you really can’t take back Crimea? Not this year, not next year, not the year after. Uh, how do you fight when you can’t expel all the Russian soldiers from the donbas? And in a different sense, how do you fight when you don’t control the airspace?

Neither side of the war controls the aerospace. Uh, and Russia is able to infiltrate and to cause all of the havoc that we’ve just been, uh, talking about. And that’s. You know, maybe preventable down the road in terms of better air defenses. I’m sure that there are techniques to, to work through, uh, but it’s not a given.

Uh, and so, you know, every soldier I think really wants to fight for victory, understandably. Uh, and that’s just very elusive. Uh, and, uh, you know, we can understand the structural factors behind that and the constraints and the limitations, and that speaks to some of Russia’s military strengths, not just.

The Russia stalemated position, but some of the innate military strengths that Russia has. Uh, and that’s enormously difficult and that’s just not a problem that Zelensky or anybody else. Uh, can solve. It’s something that has to be lived with. And that too is a frustrating aspect, uh, of this problem.

Beneath that is a separate problem, uh, on the Ukrainian side, and this is that the country has been under martial law for three and a half years. Zelensky is a skilled political leader. He’s charismatic. I think his heart is in the right place. He’s done, you know. Incredible service, Churchillian service, uh, to the cause of Ukrainian statehood and, and, and nationhood, et cetera.

I think that’s the story we all know about you, about Zelensky, and it’s true. Um, you know, but Zelensky has as, as politicians will some uglier sides. Um, you know, I’m not sure he’s eager for there to be a lot of political competition. Uh, it’s not to say that he likes the war or likes martial law, but. Um, it does serve some of his, you know, maybe uglier political, uh, instincts.

And, uh, you know, there’s just a way in which, uh, wars strengthened governments. They, you know, put a lot of power in the hands of chief executives. Uh, and a bit of that, I think has gone to. Lansky’s head, are we facing a kind of hostile takeover of Ukrainian democracy? No, that’s not the story that’s, uh, playing out before our eyes, but, you know, do Ukrainians feel a sense of frustration about.

Not being able to vote, not being able to weigh in, not being able to question or challenge some of zelensky strategic, uh, decisions. And are there other figures around Zelensky who are not especially popular, uh, in Ukraine? All of that is, uh, the case, uh, and uh, it is a mounting set of pressures within the Ukrainian polity.

Uh, and uh, it’s an issue to pay very close, uh, attention to no tipping point in sight. Uh, but these mounting pressures, uh, and given how long this war is at this point destined to be, uh, it’s um, it’s one of Ukraine’s vulnerabilities.

[00:18:16] Jeremi Suri: Uh, on the topic of Zelensky, uh, Michael, uh, it’s hard not to think about, uh, that strange and really horrible meeting he had with, uh, president Donald Trump in the White House just a few months ago when they, in essence, began yelling at each other, uh, in the Oval Office with JD Vance.

Um, I, I don’t know, chiming in as a kind of echo chamber for Donald Trump. Um. What, what should we think of this relationship between Zelensky and Trump? It seemed as if Trump was hostile at first and favorable toward Putin, but now that seems to have shifted. Uh, is that a reality, that shift? How do we understand this relationship?

[00:18:59] Intro: It’s symmetrical. What’s happened? I think, uh, and there will be many future chapters that won’t resemble where we are at the current moment, but it’s symmetrical in that. Uh, Zelensky has learned, uh, how to deal with Trump not flawlessly. There’s no flawless way of dealing with a person whose mind is as changeable, uh, as Donald Trump’s.

But Zelensky has learned, uh, and the features of his learning are, I think as follows, that he’s foregrounded certain. Practical interests, uh, or practical interest perhaps in quotation marks. And this would be minerals and rare earths, which Ukraine has put forward, uh, as, uh, a part of deal making between the United States, uh, and Ukraine.

A kind of payoff or a deliverable, uh, for the war. Uh, and that is clearly something that has, um, you know, evoked sympathy, uh, or evoked the interest on the part of, uh, of, uh, of Donald Trump. Uh, I think that Zelensky has also learned at pretty high costs, given the meeting that you referenced that, that it’s not worth it to be publicly critical of Trump.

There’s a lot of frustration in Ukraine about the United States and about Trump. Us going back and forth and not su supporting Ukraine to the degree that Ukrainians would want. Uh, and I can understand why Zelensky would be tempted to express that discontent and frustration, but he’s reigned himself, uh, in, uh, and thirdly, I think in Zelensky case, he sort of followed a, you would know Jeremy better than I, as his son Sue, who said, when your enemy is failing, don’t get in the way of that, uh, that failure.

There is that sort of quote that’s out there, and I think Zelensky has learned that. Uh, precisely

[00:20:39] Jeremi Suri: Michael. Precisely, right?

[00:20:41] Intro: Yeah. And so Zelensky has learned in a way, not always to make himself the story, which I think is hard for Zelensky. ’cause a bit like Trump. He’s a, he is a media guy and he comes from the world of entertainment and he wants to be the story.

Uh, but that’s not only, not, not particularly useful. He’s kind of created this open space. And so. Speaking symmetrically, you know, in the various ways that Zelensky has learned to frame the US Ukrainian relationship as one of interests and impart to flatter Trump and just not to get in his way. Uh, Putin has not, uh, you know, taken to heart any of those lessons, nor would he.

I think that Putin is too arrogant and he thinks Russia’s too important to, to do any of those things. Uh, and so Putin has. Led Donald Trump by the nose. Uh, and kind of, you know, flattered Trump’s willingness to be a peacemaker, eagerness to be a pace peacemaker without providing anything of substance, uh, to Trump.

And so Trump will declare a cease fire and Russia the next day will, you know, bomb a civilian center, uh, in Ukraine. There’s that. Uh, and then there’s also, and I think that this is maybe the most important aspect of the story. Uh, a willingness in Russia, maybe it’s not Putin, but a willingness in Russia, uh, to mock both Donald and Melania Trump.

And so you see quite a bit of this on Russian media. You know, I think this plays to the image of, of, in Russia, of, of Putin as the kind of responsible discipline, strong man in the US as this, you know, zany clown show. Uh, but I think that that’s gotten back, uh, to, uh, to Trump and it hasn’t, uh, sat well with, uh, with President Trump.

So it’s interesting, you know, Zelensky and Putin are both. In a way trying to win out in, in the competition for Trump’s affections. Uh, and Zelensky has shown himself to be vastly, uh, more competent at that. And I think that Zelensky began, sort of takes us back to that Oval office meeting. Zelensky began at a pretty big disadvantage.

You know, I think Trump came to power the second term, sort of thinking that he didn’t like Zelensky and, you know, has never been a great fan of Ukraine. So. You know, most of the, the betting, uh, the betting in Washington at the beginning of the second Trump term was that Putin was gonna come out ahead.

And that just hasn’t, uh, that hasn’t come to pass, but it’s as much, um, Zelensky capabilities as it is, uh, Putin’s deficiencies that’s driving this. Could you say maybe a little bit more about, um, Trump’s role in all of this and maybe the sort of potential change of heart or change of mind that we’ve been seeing over the last few days?

Particularly on the question of tariffs. I mean, just, uh, this week he announced, um. Sudden tariffs on India for continuing to purchase Russian gas after spending much of the election denouncing the Democrats for putting tariffs on, on Russia. What, what should we make of, of, of those moves? I think Trump is in a pretty unenviable box, uh, at the moment.

So he was supposed to be the peacemaker and Putin is not gonna give him. Piece. This is a simple way of putting it, but I think it’s true. What, what Putin would accept in Ukraine is Ukraine surrender. Uh, and if Donald Trump could have delivered Volo, mayor Zelensky head to Putin on a silver platter, then we might have seen an end to the conflict on the Russian side.

Um, and perhaps, you know, Trump could have called that peace, uh, but that really, uh, is uh, is not what’s happening. And so, um, it’s impossible for Trump to play the role of the peacemaker. In reality, he can do that, uh, in a kind of theatrical manner. He can present himself in that light. Uh, but that’s not working.

I think Trump being Trump, given how he campaigned, who he is, his base, for him to seriously escalate in Ukraine. Is not an attractive option, nor are the escalatory options that the US had, and this was a dilemma of the Biden administration. They’re not fantastic. You’re not gonna put boots on the ground.

Uh, if you’re an American president, I doubt that you’re gonna wanna engage in nuclear sabril rattling, although there was a touch of that with these submarines that Trump sent to, to, to, to the vicinity of, uh, of Russia. Uh, and, you know, other escalatory options might be, uh, expensive or, or, or, or difficult in their own right.

And allowing Ukraine, for example, to use American weaponry in Russia carries risks for. Uh, for, for the us. Uh, and so Trump can’t really do that. Uh, he can’t be the peacemaker. In theory. He could escalate, but he clearly doesn’t want to. And so what can he do? Uh, and I guess the tariffs, you know, sort of a very natural method of of, of Trump for relating to the outside world.

Uh, become, uh, an option, I suspect with India, that there are other forces and factors at stake than the war in Ukraine. Uh, and it’s still difficult to parse this policy exactly as your question indicates, Zachary, with prior positions of, uh, uh, of President Trump, and you might ask why India and not China, for example, because after all China supplies.

Different kinds of material to, to Russia to use in the war. So if, if the war is the thing, then you would imagine Trump will be going after China. But, uh, but he isn’t. Uh, so somehow India has fallen into the. Uh, into the crosshairs, but I think it’s because Trump is in a box. And then of course trumping Trump.

You know, at the beginning of the second term it was Canada. At a certain point it was Panama. You know, these sort of countries rotate, uh, in and out of focus and are part of the kind of soap opera of conflict and confrontation that Trump, uh, uses for various purposes, uh, in the White House. So a month from now, you know, it will be another country, I’m quite sure.

Uh, it sort of just happens to be India, but. Shocking. I agree that it’s India. And India because of its, uh, role as a, as a customer for Russian gas and oil.

[00:26:33] Jeremi Suri: Michael, have you been surprised at, uh, the efforts by Europeans, uh, led in part by Germany and Great Britain and France, and you talked about Germany a little bit already.

Have you been surprised by their effort to step in and offer more support as the United States has been less supportive of Ukraine?

[00:26:54] Intro: Yes. Uh, I think this is a really important, uh, story. Uh, I think it’s really important to the eventual outcome of the war. I think it does have an effect on, uh, Ukrainian morale.

Uh, and, uh, you know, I think that, uh. Germany has changed its mentality. I think France and the uk, uh, less so, uh, but Germany is just such a bellwether, it’s such a, a pivotal European, uh, state that it, it, it, it signifies, uh, a great deal and it makes it much more difficult. I think that this could have happened in the absence of French, German, and British leadership, that you could have seen the skeptical countries in Europe and there are quite a few of those.

They might have started to peel away. And they might have said, well, we have the sanction of the White House to really go in a very different direction, not to sanction Russia, uh, to seek out a kind of separate set of deals and all of that. You have the Slovakia, you have the Hungs in Europe, and also just the more in different countries of, uh, of Southern Europe.

So it’s been really important for European unity. Uh, that these key European countries have been so explicit about supporting, uh, Ukraine. So it’s, it’s, it’s really significant, will really matter. And they’re sending a very unified message, uh, to Russia that there isn’t gonna be a backdoor that Russia can walk through to somehow get out of sanctions and normalize with normalized relations with Europe has happened, uh, in 20 14, 20 15.

There’s just one caveat that does have to be added in each European country is a bit. Different. In the French case, there’s a lot of verbalizing about possibly sending troops to Ukraine and, and, you know, driving towards some victor’s conclusion. But, you know, France doesn’t match its rhetoric with, its on the ground, uh, commitment In the German case.

I think, uh, it’s just gonna be a question of how quickly the new chancellor, uh, the Christian Democrat Friedrich Merris, how quickly he can move in a practical way. There’s no doubt what he wants to do, and he’s now commanding a huge amount of resources, uh, a half trillion, uh, dollars, uh, in spending that’s gonna be directed toward military purposes.

But, you know, Germany, um. It has a great economy. It’s an impressive country, but it’s like also a place that could be very bureaucratic, get tied up in red tape, and so you do have to worry in the German case whether you know artillery shells and things that Ukraine needs in the short term will be delivered.

Uh, as quickly as they, uh, need to be. And I think the UK has been pretty consistent and a stalwart supporter of, of, of Ukraine since 2022. But you do see some distinctions there or discrepancies between verbal commitments to Ukraine and um, uh, and, and, and practical commitments. And if we’re on the subject of caveat, there’s of course the issue of EU membership for Ukraine, which is on the horizon, but, but pretty distant.

And then there are issues also with. Ukrainian refugees and humanitarian concerns. And some countries like Poland, uh, you know, are very good on the military front, but they lag behind when it comes to some of the human humanitarian responsibilities, uh, of this situation. But those are quibbles more than they are, uh, caveats.

The overall European trajectory is one, uh, that’s really positive for Ukraine. Thank you that, that’s very helpful, um, to understanding this, this conflict. As we close, I wanted to ask, um, first of all, the obvious question, which is what should we expect in the coming months, which is I’m sure a question that you’re terrified of as a commentator on this, when the situation seems to change so rapidly.

Particularly in these complex international negotiations. Um, but also what are the sort of big lessons we should draw from these three and a half years, um, as we think about what the coming months will look like. So I don’t think that the coming months are going to bring any. Particularly dramatic changes.

It is often announced from the Trump White House that in 12 days or 50 days or two weeks, something dramatic is gonna happen. Uh, and maybe, you know, there’ll be a massive set of sanctions, uh, that the Trump White House will enact for, for, for, for the sake of punishing Russia or drawing the war more quickly to a close, even if that comes to pass, and I’m pretty skeptical, I’m not sure it will change.

The fundamental nature of the war. I think one of the things that Trump hopefully has realized, although, uh, one wonders, uh, is that US leverage in Ukraine is considerable, but there are lots of limits. Uh, you know, the Ukraine, uh, US is not a direct party to the conflict and there are just things that the US is gonna be, uh, is gonna be reluctant to do.

So if your leverage is li is limited, um. You know, you can’t get huge results on, on, on one side or another of, uh, of, uh, of the conflict. So we need to pay a lot of attention to the US and to the Trump White House. They are pivotal actors, um, uh, in the Trump administration. But, uh, sometimes I fear that we just pay too much attention to, uh, the ups and downs of, of, of what’s happening in Washington because.

You know, the targeting assistance continues. The intelligence sharing continues, the weapons do continue, uh, to flow. Uh, and in a way, what we’ve seen over the last three and a half years is a pretty deep continuity, uh, in US policy, despite all the ruptures that, uh, have been evident, uh, in Washington since, uh, Trump returned in in, in late January 20.

2025. So, you know, I don’t think there are gonna be huge changes there. I don’t think this is debated and, you know, is a bit up for grabs, but I don’t think that there’s gonna be a big Russian breakthrough, uh, on the ground. Um, you know, military analysts like Michael Kaufman observe that this is a four season war.

So it’s not as if there’s a summer season and nothing happening in the winter, but, you know, I think that. Uh, there’ll be a kind of continuity there that Russia will continue perhaps to make small gains, but the war won’t crack. We’ve already talked about Ukrainian politics. There is this pressure and, and, and it’s, it’s not getting easier, but, uh, definitely no breaking point, uh, in Clearview there.

And then the issues that we’ve just discussed with Europe are big, long-term structural issues. Uh, and you know, I think Europe is gonna be. More intensely committed to Ukraine a year from now. And the caveats that we just talked about, will some, in some cases still be, uh, in effect? So I think it’s not that there’s a status quo, but uh, there’s a rhythm to this war in the next six months are gonna be largely within the rhythm that we’ve seen, uh, over the.

Previous, uh, six months, uh, lessons learned. Zachary, that’s a difficult question. That’s not, um, uh, easy to, uh, easy to distill. Um, but the first lesson, uh, is that Russia’s not gonna get there. Uh, in terms of its own, uh, objectives, uh, I think that’s the core lesson, uh, to learn from the last three and a half years because there’s too much risk, I would say, of Defeatism, uh, on the side of countries and, and, and people who support, uh, Ukraine.

Russia’s not gonna get there. Uh, it’s too steep a climb at this point. Uh, even if Russia were to mobilize to the tune of millions of new soldiers, and Russia’s doing decently well with conscription. But, uh, even if Russia were to mobilize, it would take a long time, and I’m not sure even that. Uh, would change and Russia is burning through, uh, a lot of its material.

That’s why it’s had to turn to Iran and North Korea to boost its resources. Uh, and when you look also at the Russian economy, that there are some structural things that are happening on the Russian side that are gonna make the war. More difficult to prosecute. So Russia’s gonna struggle to prosecute this war, and it really is not there in terms of achieving its, uh, political objectives.

Core lesson to learn. Russia fought a war, began a war in February of 2022, that it cannot win. Uh, for reasons that were dimly apparent, I think already back in February, 2022, but I think are much clearer. Uh, at this stage. Um, second lesson, uh, goes back to what you were asking about with Europe. That Europe needs the United States for many reasons, and Ukrainian needs needs the United States for many reasons.

But there’s a lot that Europe can do, uh, on its own, and it’s an oddity of the Trump administration second term, that there’s so much friction between the United States and Europe, and yet. The cooperation is somehow, uh, ongoing. And if we had more time, maybe we could think of lower levels beneath the White House, where that co cooperation between Europe and the United States is flourishing.

I think of a lot of that as the kind of military, uh, Pentagon story, but maybe that’s the subject for another, uh, for another conversation. Uh, and then the third and final lesson is just the need for Ukraine. If it hasn’t gotten to this point already. Uh, but, uh, for Ukraine to reach a stage of what you could describe as strategic maturity, it’s not strategic patience, uh, that I have in mind, but strategic maturity that Ukraine will get there, uh, over time it will survive, it will endure.

Uh, it will integrate gradually into European and I think into transatlantic structures. Uh, but it’s gotta do so without the immediate reward, uh, of victory. And there are lots of countries in the past that have gotten there over time in conflicts with. Mark stronger adversaries, but it demands this kind of strategic maturity that you have to know what you’re fighting for.

Uh, and it’s not the parade down the main street of the capital city, but. Uh, it’s something else. And that’s, uh, a really pivotal lesson for, for Ukraine to, if not to learn, I think people know they have to internalize it.

[00:36:36] Jeremi Suri: Mi Michael, if I might just, uh, sneak in a final question just following on that. I mean, you’re describing a war of attrition, uh, at a mature Ukraine in a war of attrition, but all wars of attrition do eventually end.

How does this end?

[00:36:52] Intro: I think it ends with Russian soldiers on. Let’s imagine 15 to 20%, maybe even more, uh, of Ukrainian territory. So Crimea, uh, Eastern Ukraine. Um, there will be some line between Ukraine and Russia and that line will run somewhere on Ukrainian, uh, territory, and that’s gonna be very painful for Ukraine.

Uh, to live with, but I think there will be, and I suspect my memory is not quite sharp enough, but I suspect we’ve gone over arguments similar to this in previous episodes, but always good to revisit them. I think that there will be a reciprocal set. Uh, of arrangements that stem from Ukrainian capacities and from a kind of Russian exhaustion that don’t lead to a treaty that is signed or a formal conclusion to the war, uh, but to its fundamental minimization, uh, that Ukraine will have enough capacity to inflict harm on Russian soldiers or on Russian territory through drones and through other mechanisms, uh, that Russia will be incentivized.

Um, uh. To scale back the war, uh, and perhaps even to pretend that it doesn’t exist without admitting defeat and without removing its soldiers from, uh, from Ukraine. That’s gonna create a lot of problems for Ukraine. It’s not gonna be a normal country as it would wish to be, as I would wish it to be, as the three of us would wish it to be with no war and with complete territorial integrity and sovereignty.

And yet I do think that that 80% of the country. Uh, that will be freed from the violence of the war, will make its journey, uh, into Europe, and I think that Europe will have the empathy. Necessary to deal with the complexities of this. So it’s not like, you know, taking Hungary or Poland into the European Union and into the NATO alliance.

It’s not gonna work that way. We’re all gonna be in the US uh, when we have reasonable leadership, uh, and uh, with European partners and allies. We’re gonna have to be very, very creative about that kind of, uh, arrangement. ’cause it’s not gonna resemble. Um, you know, the old stories, it’s not gonna resemble the old structures.

They’re gonna be new structures that are gonna have to be fashioned, and they may well be, those new structures may well be unique to. Uh, to Ukraine. Uh, but those structures will be very important for, uh, Ukrainians to give a sense of purpose to the war that it will be integration, uh, into these, uh, larger structures.

Uh, and I do think that that is, uh, that is doable. We too, I mean, we could put it this way by way of conclusion, we need our own kind of strategic, uh, maturity, uh, in this regard that you can take a three quarters victory in this case, uh, and. You can really make that work. Uh, and you can aim for that. Uh, and you can also be content with that because, and this takes us, I think, sort of full circle, three quarters victory relative to where we were on that dismal day, February 24th, 2022 when we all spoke.

So o bleakly about what had happened and what seemed to be coming three quarters. Victory is not a little, it’s a lot. Uh, and so to learn to see that and to, and to be content with that and to aim for that, uh, would be, I think strategic maturity. Uh, on our side. So I don’t find that, uh, an unbearably, pessimistic view of the war.

It’s not the outcome that I would like to see personally if I could dictate events, but, uh, I think it’s one we can live for and more importantly, it’s one we can have as a kind of goal, uh, uh, an objective that we can put on on our, on our to-do list, our collective to-do lists, uh, and then, uh, sort of gun for that.

Um, thank you so much for joining us, Michael, and for giving us such a, such a fascinating and nuanced, um, perspective on the, on the ongoing conflict. Well, and thanks so much to you both Jeremy and, and, and Zachary, and thanks as ever, Zachary, for the evocative and lyrical words that, um, remind us that when we think about this word, we do so both with the the head and the heart.

Wonderful. And, uh, as always, thank you to all our listeners for joining us for this episode of This Is Democracy.

This podcast is produced by the Liberal Arts ITS Development Studio

and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin.

The music in this episode was written and recorded by Scott Holmes. Stay tuned for a new episode every week You can find This is Democracy on Apple Podcast, Spotify and YouTube.

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