This is Democracy — Episode 301: War in Iran

2025-06-24_this-is-democracy_master
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This is Democracy,

a podcast about the people of the United States, a podcast about citizenship,

about engaging with politics and the world around you.

A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues and how to have a voice in what happens next.

[00:00:42] Jeremi: Welcome to our new episode of This Is Democracy.

This week we are going to talk about, um, the issue, which, uh, is all over our news today. It’s an old issue, but it’s now been made new again. Uh, this is the issue of Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and the concerns that has raised, uh, for Israel, for the United States, for many other countries. In the last few days, uh, Israel began a series of military strikes on Iran, which were then followed up by American military strikes, uh, aimed specifically at Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Uh, we’re gonna talk about why this happened, how we came to this moment, how we understand this moment. Not just from a strategic perspective, but also for the future of democracy in, in various regions of the world. And then think a little bit about where we might be going. This is yet another war in our contemporary world.

We’ve talked a lot about the Ukraine War on this podcast, and now there’s another war we have to talk about. Um, we’re joined by one of my favorite, uh, and most distinguished, uh, writers. On this topic, uh, this is Steven Simon. He’s a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington, dc.

He’s also a visiting professor at Dartmouth College and has been a visiting professor at various other major universities. He served for over 20 years in the State Department and on the National Security Council covering Middle East issues. He’s written a number of books and important articles. I just want to highlight, um, his most recent book, a book that is very prescient for the moment we’re in.

It’s called Grand Delusion, the rise and Fall of US Ambition in the Middle East. It was published in 2023. It’s a book I’ve signed a couple of times already to students. It provides really a panoramic history of, uh, American foreign policy in the Middle East from Jimmy Carter, uh, through um, Barack Obama.

And is very insightful about, uh, in Steven’s terms, the, the deluded aims the United States has had, or the, the limits of American power that have repeatedly surprised American presidents, uh, and American citizens operating in this region. Uh, Steven, thank you so much for joining us today. This is all mine.

Great to have you on. Uh, before we get started, we have of course, uh, Mr. Zachary’s, uh, scene setting poem. What’s the title of your poem, Zachary? The Stars. The Stars. Let’s hear it.

[00:03:12] Zachary: It has been hard of late to see the stars. The city lights nocturnal the haze that settles over us in pockets of humidity. It has been hard of late to breathe the air below the streets.

It’s warm and smells of must. The late nights and the mornings are the same. It has been hard of late to find the sea, the smoke from the horizon. Crowds the coast like Beachgoers blowing up on the sands. It has been hard of late to see the stars. The sky is so full of rockets. The air is so full of ash.

It has been hard of late to see the stars. Our eyes. So full of dust. So full of tears.

[00:03:55] Jeremi: Hmm. Very moving poem. Zachary, what is your poem about?

[00:03:59] Zachary: My poem is about, um. The way in which this sort of geopolitical conflict occurs when people are just sort of living their ordinary lives and how strange it it is to see these images of skies and Tel Aviv or Iran lit up by rockets and interceptors and.

The sort of exchange of fire between both sides becomes this weird kind of light show in the sky.

[00:04:23] Jeremi: Right, right. Fireworks of a diabolical kind in many respects. Mm-hmm. Stephen, I think that’s a good place to, to turn to you. Uh, first of all, are you surprised by the moment we’re in right now of Israel undertaking these, uh, extensive strikes in Iran and the United States joining them in the way the United States has?

[00:04:41] Steven Simon: Uh, no, I’m, I’m not. What we’re watching the Israelis do in Iran now is something that the Israelis have been preparing to do for, you know, 10 or 15 years now, and they’ve been approaching. You know, the problem very systematically. Uh, and what we’re seeing is the fruition of, of, uh, this, um, uh, longstanding program.

Deep Strike is, is the idiomatic translation of, into English. And Hebrew was a little bit different, but the, um, but, but the Israelis have invested, uh, a huge amount in it. And, um, they, for some reason, uh, yeah, which I haven’t. Really grappled with, yet they, they refrained from putting it into motion, um, until October 7th, really.

Uh, and, and October 7th was as we know, a deranging event in a lot of ways. And, um, I. Uh, and, and it opened the door, uh, to, um, uh, to Israeli thinking about, uh, well, maybe this is the time to unleash this thing that we have created. Uh, and in the process, uh, they have come to, uh, dominate in a sense Lebanese.

Politics. They’ve established a sphere of influence in Syria, and now they have, um, uh, essentially subdued, uh, Iran, uh, uh, you know, militarily, obviously not politically in any sense, but, but regime changes is certainly, um, you know, on their, on their to-do list. For Iran, it’s there. You know, it’s their objective and it has to be their objective, uh, for reasons that we can talk about.

But I, I, I think it’s, um, uh, it’s an imperative, uh, for Israel from is, from Israel’s perspective. It’s a, uh, it’s an imperative and that, that the United States, I. Um, joined in, uh, doesn’t surprise me in the least. Um, what, what’s so interesting is the, uh, about the US involvement and is the way in which it reflects the, uh, the subordination of, of the United States to Israel’s, um, strategic objectives in the region.

That’s fascinating.

[00:07:05] Zachary: Um, on, on paper at least, it, it, it looks in this moment, like Iran might be at its weakest in a long time, at least in many decades with its proxies in, in Lebanon, um, and around the region, uh, reduced, uh, by Israeli military force and now with potentially, uh, catastrophic strikes on its nuclear program.

Do you buy that argument about Iranian weakness?

[00:07:31] Steven Simon: Uh, yes, I do. I’d say, um, uh, but I never believed that they were strong. Uh, and it’s, uh, one of the reasons why I’ve been so skeptical about the thrust of US policy, let alone, you know, Israeli policy toward Iran because, uh, you know, they, they don’t strike me as a powerful state, um, objectively.

Uh, if you, I mean, if you just look at secular factors, um. Uh, you know, they’re not, you know, that they’re not a very impressive, uh, country by most metrics and certainly not militarily. It’s got no, um. Uh, power projection capability. It does so through, um, uh, you know, ragtag, uh, proxies and the, um, uh, the gains that it had made using its proxy forces over time, uh, have been equally unimpressive.

Uh, so, um, uh, anyway, but from that, from that perspective, from that standpoint, um, uh, the, um. The vulnerability, uh, of Iran, uh, to this Israeli onslaught, which again they’ve been preparing for, for a long time, uh, is, uh, is completely unsurprising.

[00:08:53] Jeremi: Hmm. A and so. What had I Iran done knowing as you did that Israel was planning for this, that I think there was an open secret.

Netanyahu had been publicly calling for, uh, Israeli military action against Iran for, for a long time, since Brear presidents were in office in the United States and often mm-hmm. The United, the United States has said no. What did Iran do to prepare for this? Or did it not prepare for this?

[00:09:23] Steven Simon: That’s a, that’s a terrific question, and I don’t, I don’t know the answer because at look, looking at the, at the. At the surface of, uh, of Iranian activity prior to, um, you know, this latest phase in its conflict with Israel and the United States, uh, there was very little that it did or could do apart from stockpiling a lot of ballistic missiles and assuming, uh, that those ballistic missiles would deter.

Um, uh, Israeli or American, um, uh, uh, aggression and, and, and I think they, they really believed in the invulnerability of Hezbollah. Uh, and, and they relied on Hezbollah as a kind of strategic deterrent, uh, to, um, uh, to Israeli or, uh, or American, uh, military, uh, operations directed against, uh, Iran or, or, or its nuclear program.

But it turned out that Hezbollah itself was something of, of a paper tiger. And, and the Israelis approached them, uh. Over time, uh, covertly in a, in a, in an utterly ruthless way that that culminated in the pager attacks. And, and, and those, those attacks decimated, uh, the mid-level. Um. Echelon, command echelon, the, uh, the technocrats, uh, and administrators and and lower level commanders in, in Hezbollah throughout Lebanon, uh, severely injuring, um, 3000 of them, I mean, with dis disabling, you know, injuries.

And, and, and then they, they wiped out the chain of command, including the head of Hezbollah. It, it, it was really quite extraordinary. And, uh, you know, the old joke about, you know, you know, no, no one expects the Spanish Inquisition. Well, you know, no, no one expected this tornado of violence that, that the Israelis were able to, uh, un unleash.

And I, and I, and I’m sure that the Iranians and, and Hezbollah both were, um. We’re surprised by the Iranian capacity.

[00:11:50] Zachary: What about the Iranian nuclear program, uh, the sort of ostensible cause of the latest round of violence between Israel and Iran? Um, how real do you think the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon was and how real does it remain after these strikes?

[00:12:09] Steven Simon: Well, the threat of, of an Iranian nuclear weapon, uh. Was Containable, uh, at one point through negotiation. And that was, uh, you know, the thrust of the Obama administration’s effort to, um, negotiate this joint, um, uh, uh, co coordinated plan of action. I forget the exact, uh, J-C-O-P-A,

[00:12:37] Jeremi: right?

[00:12:38] Steven Simon: JC, yeah, the J-C-P-O-A.

The. Um, the P five plus one, uh, deal, um, with, uh, with Iran over its nuclear program. And, and, okay. Just for our

[00:12:49] Jeremi: listeners, Stephen, that that was the deal that the Obama administration concluded with the Iranian government that I think, uh, where the Iranian government promised for 10 years, uh, not to move toward building a nuclear weapon in return for, uh, lifting of some sanctions and things of that kind, correct.

[00:13:05] Steven Simon: But for an additional five years, uh, after that, that, that 10 year, um, sunset, uh, if you will, the agreement obligated Iran to, um, abide by some very serious and intrusive inspection mechanism.

[00:13:22] Jeremi: Yes, yes, yes.

[00:13:24] Steven Simon: Which, which would’ve, you know, created, uh, serious obstacles to, uh, an Iranian sprint for a bomb. You know, if they, if they chose to do that, the minute that the 10 year phase of this agreement, um, uh, elapsed, right?

So. You know, it was, it was a pretty good agreement and it bought the signatories a lot of time. Uh, but, uh, but anyway, the, the United States squandered that and, and, uh, president Trump in his first term, uh, withdrew the United States from that agreement. But that agreement, it should be noted, uh, allowed, uh, Iran to conduct enrichment of uranium, uh, on its own soil.

Up to a level of 3.67%, which is, uh, the kind of, uh, enriched fuel you need to run up, you know, either a power or or research reactor, but it’s not enough to fuel a nuclear weapon. Right. Uh, it’s, it’s, it’s well below that, uh, that level in fact. So, um, the Iranians cut what they wanted, a degree of sanctions relief, um, plus enrichment on their own soil.

A fuel cycle is what is what people call it. And, and, and everybody was, uh, everybody was, was reasonably. Um, and, but manageably unhappy with the deal. It didn’t give, uh, the United States, uh, and the, you know, everything that the United States wanted, there were things that were simply left out of the, uh, you know, negotiations, uh, including, uh, missile proliferation.

[00:15:03] Jeremi: Right.

[00:15:04] Steven Simon: And, you know, we’re kind of seeing the results of that play out now in the missile war between Israel and, uh, and, and the uni Israel and, and Iran. And between Iran and, and Qatar. Now, uh, a, a small country on the, on the Arab side of the Gulf, where the United States has a large air base, uh, which was targeted by the Iranians using these missiles.

So, you know, that wasn’t, that wasn’t, um, dealt with. And, and the Iranians, uh, you know, were, um, uh, were, were not going to sign up to some kind of. A hundred year deal, uh, on, on nuclear issues. Uh, but, but such a deal would’ve been unusual in the annals of diplomacy in any case.

[00:15:49] Jeremi: Correct.

[00:15:49] Steven Simon: You know, agreements are generally of shorter duration.

There’s a sunset, and then the parties have the option of, uh, reentering the agreement, renewing it, or renegotiating it or, or, or walking away from it. If, if that’s what they chose to do under whatever, uh, circumstances. Um. Uh, prevailed at, at that moment. So, um. You know, it was a good deal, but, uh, but the, the Republicans really hated it.

Uh, and, and, and many people, uh, anticipated that if, um, uh, if the Republicans, uh, were in the White House, um, you know, following the Obama administration, that they would walk away from it. And, and, and, and sure enough they did. But in the meantime. Because, uh, the, um, uh, the Iranians regarded themselves as unshackled, um, uh, from their, uh, obligations under the agreement by the us, withdrawal from it, um, they accumulated a fairly large stockpile in the interim of, um, uh, enriched uranium.

Uh, that was good enough to fuel a nuclear weapon. Hmm. And a, they accumulated enough for about nine or 10 weapons. Um, and, and it was, it, it was sitting there. Um, mostly in Isfahan in this storage facility, which the, um, uh, in this most recent conflict, the Iranians had the foresight to empty out before it could be struck.

Um, by, by Israelis or, you know, or, or Americans, so that that fuel is out there somewhere. And, and perhaps, you know, people in governments, uh, know where it is. Uh, it’s certainly not public information. And, and it may be, um, uh, it may be that no one, apart from the Iranians know where, uh, where it is right now, but that.

Anyway, the, the accumulation of this material, uh, plus, um, uh, increasing tensions between Iran, uh, and Israel and, and the vast stockpile of ballistic missiles that the Iranians had had acquired, um, really stoked, uh, Israeli threat perceptions.

[00:18:16] Jeremi: Yes. And, and then of course, as you said, the trauma of October 7th, 2023, the, the attack on Israel and the, and the, the, the death and hostage taking of so many Israelis.

It seems the, in some ways, that was an Israeli nine 11. Yes.

[00:18:31] Steven Simon: Yeah. And, and, and, you know,

look, I, you know, I think this. This crisis, I think October 7th. And what happened afterwards, especially in Gaza, has taken some particularly grizzly or gastly, um, uh, you know, directions. But it, it does need to be recalled, I think, or at least understood that. Um, I think the Israelis had just had enough of being told that they were.

Illegitimate. They had no place in the region. They, the, the land they occupied was not their own. Um, and you know, one understands all the historical and ideological, you know, uh, you know, pulsation, um, uh. You know, underlying challenges to, uh, to Israel’s legitimacy. But the fact, the fact is if you’re an Israeli, you, you know, it really gets on your nerves after a while.

And, uh, when it was expressed in the form of this kind of sadistic, I. Hamas, uh, attack of October 7th. I think something in Israel really snapped. And um, you know, that’s not very political sciencey, you know, but, um, you know, there it is. It’s the best, you know, I can do. Uh, at the moment, something did snap and, and, you know, for those, uh.

Uh, cinema aficionados who watched Godfather one. You know, they, they, they took a look around and, and, and they. Turned into, um, you know, Zo with the shotgun and, you know, and they were gonna just take out the heads of the five families. That’s what happened. And the Godfather and the Israelis just said, we’re gonna take out the heads of the five families.

We just can’t deal with this anymore. And, and, and we now have the capacity to do something about it through this investment that, that, that, that we’ve made in. And, and this is Israeli speaking, you know, through the investment that was made in, um, in their depth command, in their deep strike, uh, command.

[00:20:49] Jeremi: Stephen, the, the, your book makes such a powerful argument that time and again, those who have sought a solution. Whatever that solution is to the problems with the region. Camp David with Carter, uh, an Israeli Egyptian agreement, um, later efforts, uh, James Baker trying after the first Persian Gulf War that time and again, efforts to solve the problems in the region as Israel is trying to solve it now, I guess, uh, have failed because of, of the complexity and the determination of various actors to resist these solutions.

Do you see this as a similar moment today? I.

[00:21:28] Steven Simon: Uh, I do, uh, I do, and perhaps, you know, I’m, I’m trapped by my own preconceptions. Um, and I, and, and I guess I need to be, uh, you know, aware of that. But I, I do think we’re looking at, at, you know, at uh, uh, uh, just a repetition of, of past disasters and, and, you know, look at the Israelis for a moment.

So they have, um, established what looks like a kind of hegemonic presence, at least in the northern tier of the Middle East. I. Uh, now y you know, if you’re a political scientist, you’re gonna say, well, you know, you it, you can’t talk about hegemony in this context because the thing about a hegemon is that it’s got affinity groups in the countries that are controls who will do its dirty work for it.

That’s how you know you’re a hegemon. When the, when the, when the country, you control the leadership of that country, they mow the lawn for you. Um, and you know, it’s worth noting that the Israelis don’t have anything like such affinity groups in any of the countries that, uh, that they control or they’re attempting, uh, to control.

They’ve got no friends in Iran. They’ve got no friends in Syria. They’ve got no friends in, uh, in. Uh, in, in Lebanon and, uh, uh, you know, their friends in, in, in Egypt, in, in Jordan, you know, are not, um, you know, they’re,

I, you know, I think they’re reliable, of course, but, uh, uh, I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t call them real affinity groups.

[00:23:24] Jeremi: Yeah. So, so. This is what I worry about Stephen, though. I mean is can Israel survive without affinity groups in the region and in the past, as you pointed out in your book, it’s relied on the us.

Is that going to be enough? Is that enough of a basis for continued Israeli survival? Well, um,

[00:23:48] Steven Simon: you know, states are really hard to kill. Uh, so, you know, I’m not. I, I guess I’m not, uh, you know, overly concerned about the, the survival, you know, of Israel as a state. I assume it’s, you know, it’s there to stay. Um, there are those, uh, who uh, who argue that, well, you know, it’s a kind of a Malthusian argument that, you know, ultimately.

Uh, the Arab, um, migratory patterns will swamp Israel, that Israel won’t be able to to keep them. To keep them out and, uh, the demographic balance will shift so radically that, well, you know, the Israelis are gonna wind up looking like the Maronites in Lebanon, you know, a a, a small beleaguered community hugging, you know, cities on the coast, uh, and relying on the protection of, uh, foreign powers to, you know, to render them still viable.

Um, and, and the analogy. You know, for, for people who make that, who make that argument is the southern border of the us you know, where the, you know, the, there’s this. Sometimes factual, sometimes imagined, you know, big wave of, of, of migrants coming into the United States that kept be stopped. But see, the thing is, the analogy kind of breaks down because the Israelis, uh, you know, uh, do have manageable borders and they’re not afraid to shoot.

Yeah. Um, so I, you know, I think that they can, they can control all that, the real dangers. Um, uh. Uh, to Israel, I think stem from two, uh, uh, two threats. Uh, the one is that if they keep doing the kinds of things they’re doing, uh, they’ll make, uh.

They’ll, they’ll make enemies in the region that will be determined to, uh, to take revenge.

[00:25:56] Jeremi: Right,

[00:25:57] Steven Simon: right. And, and that’s gonna be a problem for them. And then at the same time, you know, there’s a threat from within. I. Yeah. ’cause the demographic trends, uh, you know, in the country are not favorable. And I’m not talking about the Arab Jewish balance, I’m talking about the balance within, uh, the, uh, the society of Israeli Jews, uh, between the, um, the very Orthodox and, and the secular and, and, and less, less orthodox Jews.

Yeah. And that’s gonna be a problem for that, for the, for the viability of the state over time.

[00:26:32] Jeremi: St. Stephen, we always like to close. Uh, bringing this, this really thoughtful analysis and you’ve, you’ve ca helped capture, as I knew you would, the complexity of this region for us. We always like to close with, you know, something at least that our listeners can look to as a positive way forward.

Are there anything, is there anything positive that we can look toward?

[00:26:59] Steven Simon: Um, it’s a hard one for this region. I know. Yeah. I’m, I’m, you know, I’m, I’m, I’m wasting my, my one minute to, uh, uh, spread light and joy, you know, many airwaves. Um, but, uh, it’s, you know, there are some. Uh, parts of, of, of the Arab world I think, that are gonna, that are doing pretty well and, and will continue to do.

You know, fairly well for, for decades, and I’m thinking of parts of the Persian Gulf, literal, you know, Qatar and uh, uh, United Arab Emirates and, uh, Bahrain, Kuwait, uh, Noman. I mean, I think that they’ll do nicely. And of course, the, the Saudis, you know, will do, uh, extremely well. I think, uh, you know, Iraq shows a lot of promise.

Uh, I’ve, I’ve been there, not I. Um, none of the past year, but, you know, I’ve spent a fair amount of time there and I, and I, uh, I’m impressed actually by how much progress, um, uh, Iraq has made and I’m, and, and I have some, uh. No, I’m hopeful about Iraq’s prospects, and that’s important. It’s a, it’s, it’s got a, a big population.

It’s right in the heart of the Middle East. Uh, and, um, and I, and I, and I do wish them well. I mean, I wish everyone else well, obviously, but the, um, but I think there’s, there’s some hope, you know, for them. Uh, but otherwise I think, uh, you know, prospects are really. Um, uh, are really dim, especially when one takes into consideration the, uh, you know, the tyrannosaurus wrecks outside the door in the form of climate change.

Uh, that’s, you know, that’s gonna be, uh, an commiserating. Prospect, uh, you know, for the Middle East, especially in states that are already in trouble like Syria.

[00:29:05] Jeremi: So, so Steven, this, this, uh, portrait you paint of, uh, a region that, uh, has some areas of progress, but, but continued, uh, conflict and problems. A region where, which will not be free of violence anytime soon in the way you.

You’ve described it. Um, what should the United States do? I mean, you spent much of your career and then your post policy career writing about US policy. What would you advise, uh, this administration if they came to you for advice? I hope they do come to you for advice. What would you advise them to do?

[00:29:44] Steven Simon: Well, you know, restart. U-S-A-I-D, you know, maybe. Step number one. Um, the, uh, the Agency for International Development was, uh, you know, quite an important, um, uh, you know, component in a larger, you know, multilateral, uh, effort to relieve, uh, you know, uh, poverty and, um, and, and serious, um, you know, economic, uh, and, and, and, and, and health issues.

Worldwide. And, and that’s been, that was a US agency that was disestablished under Doge, the Elon Musk, um, uh, uh, reformatting of, of government, uh, that, that began when Trump came into office, uh, earlier this year. So, um, I, I, you know, the first thing I’d say is, you know, get, get U-S-A-I-D. You know, up and running again.

Um, uh, and the second would be you need to start working with the Saudis and the Emiratis, uh, in, in particular to, um, uh, create, uh, a safety net, uh, for states in the Middle East, societies in the Middle East, populations that are gonna be very hard hit, um, uh, over, over time, especially because of. Of climate change.

Uh, and there are things that those two countries can do, and I think they’d be, they’d be willing to do actually, um, uh, uh, to help out. So that’s, uh, that’s second, third is, um, uh. Continue and intensify what they’re already doing in Syria, which is investing, um, uh, in, uh, Syrian infrastructure. That’s a, uh, that’s a country that’s, um, uh, that was crushed by Civil war, uh, and sanctions, uh, following the Civil War, which made, uh.

You know, both public and private investment in, in Syria, uh, you know, forbiddingly difficult. Uh, you know, from a legal perspective, uh, the Trump administration has, um, uh, I’m happy to report, uh, uh, eliminated sanctions, at least for the time being, uh, on, on Syria. And that’s, that’s had the effect of unleashing some of this investment that the Syrian people really need.

So I think. You know, that’s a, that’s a pretty good, uh, measure that I think the, uh, that, that could be taken, um, beyond this, you know, there, there. Uh, beyond this requires, you know, dealing with, uh, Israel in a, in a somewhat different way than the United States has related to Israel at least recently. And it’s gonna be difficult to do because Israel has succeeded over time in leveraging the structure of American politics in a way that make, um, uh, successive US administrations of either party.

Um. Make it very difficult, uh, uh, for them to, uh, uh, counter, um, Israeli policies which are detrimental to us, interests and perhaps the interests of others. And, um, uh, and, uh, and this, this needs to be rebalanced. Uh, somewhat and, and it needs to be rebalanced, uh, in first to Alleve the humanitarian, alleviate the humanitarian catastrophe in, in Gaza.

And secondly, um, uh, to come to some negotiated resolution of Israel, uh, Israel’s dispute with Iran. It’s a reciprocal dispute. I mean, the Iranians have, have done their utmost, uh, to, uh, elicit. Israeli fear and animosity. Uh, this, this didn’t arise spontaneously within, you know, the Israel psyche. Uh, there were, you know, two, two countries at play here.

And, and the Iranians bear a great responsibility, you know, for, uh, the way in which this crisis has evolved and the way in which they’ve stirred, uh, Israeli fears and then, and then having done so. It tried to build a nuclear weapon so they, um, that that needs to be resolved. It can only be resolved by intensive.

Diplomacy, but the Israelis have to buy into the diplomatic, uh, effort, whatever, whatever diplomatic process the United States would, uh, uh, would undertake on behalf of, uh, both the Iranians and the Israelis and, and, and the region as a whole, because we can already see the war spreading. And that’s a very untoward thing.

So, um, uh. Uh, so I guess that’s, that’s, those are the areas where I focus and already that’s a huge to-do list for Absolutely,

[00:34:46] Jeremi: absolutely. That’s, that’s more than any president has accomplished. Uh, in, in the region. You’re talking multiple camp Davids and, and multiple shuttle diplomacies. Um. Uh, Zachary as a, as a, as a young person who pays close attention to these issues, in part because of your Jewish connection to the region, but also because of your interest and concern about foreign policy and concern about humanitarian issues, is, is what Stephen saying, make.

Does it make sense to you? Is this something that that can motivate young people? ’cause it could only be pursued as a set of policies by an administration if it has some popular support within the United States, right? So, so how, how do you react to that long list of negotiations, compromises, restructuring of relationships that Steven laid out?

[00:35:30] Zachary: I think so. I think one of the most interesting things to watch has been the sort of split within the Republican party over. Um, Iran, uh, with some of the most far right Republicans expressing concern either over, um, the administration’s failure to get congressional approval for the strikes or, um, the very idea of American involvement in another overseas conflict.

I. Um, I think what that shows is not that those people are right, I don’t think they are, but that, um, but that, uh, the American public is skeptical of American involvement overseas, which I think in some ways can be a positive force if it forces more serious, uh, sort of, uh, planning process and, uh, more serious, um, approach to involvement overseas.

Less sort of willy-nilly assumption of American. Power, um, which I maybe don’t have full confidence in the current administration to oversee, but I think that is a positive force and it’s a step in the right way.

[00:36:28] Jeremi: Do, do you agree, Steven? Uh, last final question. I promise there’s, there’s so much to talk about, but final question for now.

Um, do you agree with Zachary that this split. Among Republicans and split within the United States, I think deeply about whether we should, should remain involved in this region, especially after the difficulties of the Iraq war, that that could actually return to positive use for diplomatic purposes as you laid it out.

Uh,

[00:36:54] Steven Simon: well taking, um, uh, you know, polling data regarding the US strikes against Iran as a kind of a surrogate. Um, uh, it, you know, they show. The, the survey data show pretty clearly that, uh, a majority of Democrats oppose the strikes and, um, a majority, a, a, a, a large majority of Republicans support them. So, um.

It’s not, we’re not really talking about a split, you know, within MAGA or within the Republicans. The real split is between Democrats and Republicans. And, you know, Trump is, uh, you know, politically fairly shrewd and, and he assessed. You know, I think that that, that the MAGA threat, um, you know, as expressed by.

Uh, you know, Bannon and, and Tucker Carlson, uh, and others was, uh, basically trivial, uh, that at the end of the day he controlled maga and, and those guys might have, you know, large followings, um, on, you know, on the web or, uh, or, or what have you. But the fact is his approval ratings were far better than either of theirs.

So, um, you know, from. Uh, so I’m gonna go with, with Trump on this, that, you know, the issue isn’t really with, you know, among Republicans. The issue is between Democrats and Republicans. And that’s gonna play out in interesting ways over time. So, for example, um, if you look at polling, uh. Um, uh, that cuts across, uh, age groups on the one hand and party affiliation.

You know, on the other, uh, what you, what you can see pretty clearly is that younger age cohorts are very skeptical of the US Israeli relationship and don’t have a very high opinion, uh, you know, of Israel. Um. Uh, and that’s, that’s very true. It’s, it’s, it’s, it’s strikingly true among those, um, young Americans who self-identify as, as Democrats, but it’s, it’s, it’s also creeping upward, uh, among young Republicans.

So right now that really hasn’t had much of an effect on anything because, you know, Congress, uh, uh, you know, understands pretty well that young people don’t vote. And in any case, young people don’t have a lot of money. So, you know, um, they’re not gonna pay very much attention to these changes, but. But those young voters, um, you know, in 10 years won’t be so young anymore.

[00:39:38] Jeremi: Right, right. Steve, Steven, you, you’ve touched, you’ve touched perfectly on a theme that runs through all 300 plus episodes of our podcast, which is that, you know, generational change matters and that, uh, a new generation of voters, a new generation of. Uh, people participating in our society and other societies are, even though it doesn’t look that way all the time, they are going to have deep influence, uh, on these policies.

And I think, uh, if nothing else, we’re in a moment of flux. That’s where you started, uh, in describing this moment. And I think that’s where we come out of this. Nothing is set in stone in the Middle East, even though people talk of ancient. Uh, conflicts. Uh, they aren’t ancient conflicts. They’re current conflicts and, and, uh, the history shows us that things can change and are changing in front of us.

This is a conversation we need to conclude now, but we also need to continue because, uh, so many things are changing and the region is so complex. I want to remind our listeners to read your book. Uh, and read your work and follow you and other scholars who are writing about this, uh, in detail. Uh, Stephen Simon’s wonderful book, the Grand Delusion, the Rise and Fall of Us Ambition in The Middle East.

I encourage you all to read that. Thank you Stephen, so much for joining us today. Thanks Jeremy. And thanks Zach. Carry on. Yes. Thank you Zachary, for your, uh, poem about the stars, uh, the strange stars we see in these moments. Uh, and thank you most of all to our loyal listeners and loyal subscribers to our substack for joining us for this week of this is.

Democracy.

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