This is Democracy – Episode 284: Ukraine War

00;00;05;29 – 00;00;10;27
Intro
This is democracy. A podcast about the people of the United States. A podcast about citizenship. About engaging with politics and the world around you. A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues and how to have a voice in what happens next.

00;00;22;07 – 00;00;50;26
Jeremi Suri
Welcome to our new episode of This Is Democracy. Today we are joined by an old friend and frequent contributor to our podcast, one of our favorite, guests, Doctor Michael Kimmage. He is, among many other things, as our listeners know, an expert on the war in Ukraine, someone who’s been following the events there and in the wider, wider geopolitical frame.

00;00;50;26 – 00;00;57;02
Jeremi Suri
He has been following these events very closely for the last three years now. Michael, thank you for joining us again.

00;00;57;04 – 00;00;59;05
Michael Kimmage
Great to be back with you both.

00;00;59;07 – 00;01;28;23
Jeremi Suri
As our listeners know, Doctor Michael Kimmage is a professor of history at Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. he’s also a fellow of the German Marshall Fund. He’s on the advisory council for the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center in D.C. this semester. He’s also at the American Academy in Berlin. Between 2014 and 2017, Michael served on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff at the US State Department, where he handled the Russia Ukraine portfolio.

00;01;28;26 – 00;01;46;17
Jeremi Suri
Most important, Michael’s the author of four wonderful books that I recommend to all of our listeners. the first is The Conservative Turn, Lionel Trilling, Whittaker Chambers and the lessons of Anti Communism. I was thinking the other day, Michael, that, the era of McCarthyism doesn’t seem as distant anymore, does it?

00;01;46;20 – 00;01;48;28
Michael Kimmage
Well, that’s true.

00;01;49;01 – 00;02;10;24
Jeremi Suri
Michael’s second book, In History’s Grip Philip Roth’s Newark trilogy. his third book, deeply relevant for our discussion today, the abandonment of the West, the History of an Idea in American Foreign Policy, and then his most recent book that I highly recommend to all of our listeners today, a book I have assigned to graduate students, and to many other audiences.

00;02;10;24 – 00;02;36;16
Jeremi Suri
And it’s always been greeted with, really very positive responses, to a very negative subject, but nonetheless very, very positive responses to the analysis. Michael’s most recent book is Collisions The Origins of the War in Ukraine and the New Global Instability. Michael’s also written, approximately 7000 articles for Foreign Affairs recently on the topic and many other, many other important publications.

00;02;36;16 – 00;02;38;26
Jeremi Suri
So, thank you again for joining us, Michael.

00;02;38;28 – 00;02;41;01
Michael Kimmage
Wonderful to be back.

00;02;41;03 – 00;02;50;17
Jeremi Suri
Zachary, you’re going to start us off with your scene setting poem is, as always, what’s the title of your poem today? The village. The village. Okay, let’s hear it.

00;02;50;19 – 00;03;17;17
Zachary Suri
On the corner of the street in the village, an old woman walks her shopping basket, knowing already where the market is. Knowing already where the land mines are. Well, in the big house, in the big city far away, they’re speaking of the village, asking how many soldiers they have left and how much food remains for winter. Well, on the street corner she walks past the ruined apartment blocks and the entrances to bomb shelters, and the sidewalks overgrown with grass.

00;03;17;20 – 00;03;38;02
Zachary Suri
While in the ministries they talk and toss around the names. She’s always known the village and its neighborhoods, her school house with its nest of guns and on the street corner she sees a little boy walking towards her. Am with worry each movement until he passes her, and she begins to cry.

00;03;38;05 – 00;03;43;09
Jeremi Suri
Very personal and moving. Zachary, what is the real message of your poem?

00;03;43;11 – 00;04;11;22
Zachary Suri
I think the message of the poem is how strange it is, I think, to to to live in a, in a place that one has no one’s entire life. And then to see that sort of very vocal geography become the subject of these giant children, vertical forces and the kinds of things that world leaders will talk about. I mean, most of the territory that’s being fought over in Ukraine today, these are small villages and small cities, that, you know, are on the front pages of newspapers worldwide.

00;04;11;25 – 00;04;17;14
Zachary Suri
and I trying to understand in this poem what that must be like for someone who’s from one of these.

00;04;17;16 – 00;04;25;03
Jeremi Suri
Right, to be caught in the crosshairs. In a sense. Yeah. Yeah. Michael, is that is that an accurate way to think about this war right now?

00;04;25;06 – 00;04;50;24
Michael Kimmage
I think it’s a very accurate way of thinking about, thinking about the war and in, in some, in a sense, also the the title of the village. I mean, it’s very much a war of villages at the moment. although the horror of the war descends certainly upon Ukrainian city is northwest, east and south. I mean, the real misery of the war, I think is, is is is going from village to village and locality to locality.

00;04;50;24 – 00;05;15;14
Michael Kimmage
And it’s one of the for the, for, for Zachary to turn our attention in that direction because one of the hardest things is just a kind of general statement. One of the hardest things to grasp of this war is that it is relentlessly, ruthlessly, horrifically local, to the village street and, and the village store, and at the same time, unfathomably global, and the intersection of those two things is, I find analytically the hardest thing to capture about this war.

00;05;15;14 – 00;05;20;17
Michael Kimmage
The hardest thing to, to figure out about this war.

00;05;20;20 – 00;05;43;20
Jeremi Suri
And, Michael, how do we understand the current status of the war? What you’ve just described, so eloquently has been the case for years now. Right? It’s it’s been a war of villages. It’s been a war of family suffering. It’s been a war of, of inches in the world’s worst way. all how do we understand where we are in this war right now, in late 2024?

00;05;43;22 – 00;06;12;26
Michael Kimmage
Well, it’s a war that has it’s never had a simple geometry to it, this war, but it has an increasingly complicated, geometry and complicated geography, as well. So on the 6th of July in this year, Ukraine initiated an offensive in the province of Russia itself. and although the Russians have been clawing back territory there in the last couple of weeks, that remains very much under Ukrainian, control or a part, of course, remains very much under Ukrainian control.

00;06;12;26 – 00;06;37;25
Michael Kimmage
So that’s one, part of this war on the battlefields of Ukraine. Russia has been making small but fairly steady, advances. That’s the story of the last, six months. in addition, as we’ve talked about many times before on this program, Russia’s attack on the civilian infrastructure, especially energy, has been intensive. and Ukraine stands before a very, very difficult winter.

00;06;37;25 – 00;06;57;21
Michael Kimmage
That’s people who are far from the front lines will experience those, difficulty ease. And as if that weren’t enough to grasp in terms of the nature of the battlefield or the nature of the conflict, we have the introduction of troops from North Korea. And then apparently, according to the Financial Times, soldiers from Yemen have just entered the conflict, as well.

00;06;57;21 – 00;07;16;06
Michael Kimmage
So these are not numbers to probably change the ultimate course of the war. The dynamic of the war. but there too, we see, that what, at the beginning had been Ukraine’s war, is now unambiguously the world’s war. I don’t mean by that to say that this is a world war in the kind of World War one, World War two, sense.

00;07;16;06 – 00;07;33;27
Michael Kimmage
It’s not, but, but it’s very much the World war. And previously, I think one had discussed that in terms of consequences. Right. The war is generating inflation. That’s making fertilizer and food prices higher. and, you know, forcing Russia to scramble to create economic connections all over the world. In the world, the war was global that way.

00;07;34;00 – 00;07;52;10
Michael Kimmage
But now it’s global in a more, immediately military way. and that’s been a development of the last, month. Really. and, you know, that too complicates the the lines of conflict, the nature of the conflict. and not that we’re there yet in our conversation, but the whole matter of conflict resolution.

00;07;52;13 – 00;08;06;26
Zachary Suri
Could you help us understand the scale of the losses on both sides in this conflict? What kind of toll has this conflict taken on, Russian society, on Ukrainian society, and obviously financially and the rest of Europe as well?

00;08;06;28 – 00;08;29;13
Michael Kimmage
Well, the, Russian side, we can we can kind of start there. And unfortunately, all of the numbers, including the Ukrainian numbers, are, you know, sort of hard to verify. And, you know, there’s a bit of fog of war here, in terms of what the ministry is announcing the numbers and, how accurate they are. But on the Russian side, it’s not easy to determine by any means the losses.

00;08;29;15 – 00;08;48;19
Michael Kimmage
but one of the dynamics of the last couple of weeks has just been incredible expenditure of human life and very small pieces of territory. So it is true, if Putin wants to tell the story of the war is one of Russian momentum on the battlefield. That’s not false. but I’m glad you asked the question, Zachary, because the sacrifice is being made on the Russian side.

00;08;48;21 – 00;09;14;04
Michael Kimmage
for the sake of those advances is, immense. Now, I can’t quite recall the number of internally displaced people in Russia, since July, but it’s it’s substantial. I don’t know, maybe it’s around 100,000 or maybe more. of people in course province who have been, displaced by the war. But it remains the case. And this is a key point on the Russian side, because it’s a political point that the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg are very much insulated from all of this.

00;09;14;04 – 00;09;38;26
Michael Kimmage
They’re certainly insulated from direct attacks from Ukraine, but they’re also insulated from the casualties and the sacrifices, for the most part, which have been outsourced, to the regions and to the poorest precincts of, of Russian society. So it is possible as a middle class Russian, as an urban class, urban Russian, to pretend that the war isn’t happening or to, to live your life without too much, visual evidence that this terrible war, is taking place.

00;09;38;26 – 00;10;01;09
Michael Kimmage
So, you know, in that sense, Putin is able to manage I think the politics of the war can neutralize some of the the populations he might be worried about in terms of political resistance or, or confrontation. So the Russian side is, is bad, especially if you’re, you know, one of these poor people has been conscripted into fighting and forced to fight, but very unevenly distributed.

00;10;01;09 – 00;10;30;01
Michael Kimmage
The pain of the war is very unevenly distributed. in Russia now, on the Ukrainian side, it’s a story that I think we’re all kind of familiar with him. And you have millions upon millions of IDPs, internally displaced people. You have millions of people who have left the country point blank, since the beginning, especially women and children, who are living in Europe and, and, and elsewhere, and Ukraine faces, you know, to go beyond the point of this is being just this being simply costly for Ukraine.

00;10;30;03 – 00;10;51;12
Michael Kimmage
Ukraine faces a really acute manpower crisis at the present moment. and it’s lost a lot of soldiers, to be sure. and Ukraine is trying to balance the demography of the war in the following way. President Zelensky has been very reluctant to go down below the age of 40, and especially 30, to recruit soldiers because he wants Ukraine to have a future.

00;10;51;12 – 00;11;20;24
Michael Kimmage
He wants the economy to have a future, the society to have a future. And so he’s trying to keep it away. The the youth of Ukraine, somewhat distant from, the terrible losses that are occurring, at the front. But that’s not working to Ukraine’s military advantage, at the, at the present moment. And that, of course, is a problem that’s compounded somewhat by the IDPs and the refugees and such that kind of flux of population that you’ve experienced or Ukraine has experienced, since the start of the war in terms of civilian casualties in Ukraine.

00;11;20;24 – 00;11;39;14
Michael Kimmage
It’s not that the numbers are astronomically high. but it is important to note that, you know, there’s hardly a day that passes without a Russian attack on a shopping mall, a hospital, you know, a place that’s, you know, just a civilian, place. And, you know, it’s it’s maybe ten people who die, 20 people who die, 30 people who die.

00;11;39;17 – 00;11;56;06
Michael Kimmage
And that’s, of course, bad enough on its own terms. But it also means that if you live in Ukraine anywhere, you know, Lviv, Kiev, other places, you have to live with the fear of something like that, that could, that could happen to you. So, it’s it’s not that the suffering of the war is especially evenly distributed throughout the Ukrainian society.

00;11;56;06 – 00;12;11;18
Michael Kimmage
There are distinctions and gradations, but it’s, of course, utterly impossible in Ukraine to live without an awareness of the war and without a feeling for, for the price. And so there’s an asymmetry, quite a few asymmetries, between Russia and Ukraine, on exactly this point.

00;12;11;21 – 00;12;35;06
Jeremi Suri
Right. It sounds like both societies, Russian and Ukrainian society, are suffering at a level that’s very hard for us to understand and get a get our hands around, but in different ways. And certainly the personal suffering and the devastation of Ukraine has been much greater. Most of the war, 99% of it is being fought on Ukrainian territory, obviously.

00;12;35;08 – 00;12;46;19
Jeremi Suri
is it fair, Michael, to call this a stalemate? Are we in a kind of 1915, 1916 moment when we have stalemated armies in Europe during World War one?

00;12;46;22 – 00;13;06;11
Michael Kimmage
I don’t think so. and it’s always been a hard, hard word to apply to this, to this war because of the flux and fluidity, of the battlefield. I guess in a very basic way, it could be true in that what Russia has not managed to do over the last six months is to make any kind of strategic progress, on the war, for the Russian side.

00;13;06;11 – 00;13;25;07
Michael Kimmage
So, that, you know, indicates a kind of stalemate. And, of course, Ukraine is very, very far from going on the counter-offensive. The last counter-offensive of Ukraine was the summer of 2023. and I know, of course, we’re going to get to the American election and where US policy may go, but, it’s not as if Ukraine is gearing up for a, for a counter-offensive.

00;13;25;07 – 00;13;57;29
Michael Kimmage
They don’t have the manpower and they don’t have the material, at the, at the moment. But, you know, there is the course question, which is very much in play. that’s, another aspect of the war that’s not stalemated, but I think, also what you need to overlay into the war at the present moment. And it’s not exactly a Ukraine story, it’s more a Russia West story, is that you’ve seen a pretty considerable escalation over the last month that, permission has been granted for Ukraine to use certain kinds of missiles, attack, storm shadows, etc., on Russian, territory, on Russian soil.

00;13;57;29 – 00;14;26;24
Michael Kimmage
And then Russia just fired, a very high tech missile into Ukraine, basically a kind of shot across the bow that suggests the conflict could become, nuclear, which I don’t think it will, but, nevertheless, it’s it’s, you know, it’s it’s it’s hard not to pay attention to these forms of symbolic, action and communication. And so, interestingly, although you might imagine in the period between the, you know, election and the installation of a new president, that there would be, a kind of low, you’ve seen the opposite.

00;14;26;24 – 00;14;46;08
Michael Kimmage
You seen the West being willing to list some of the restrictions on its support to Ukraine. and you’ve seen Russia responding with certain kinds of escalation, of, of its own. and in that sense, I think it’s really difficult to speak about, stalemate. Now, maybe this is the rush to get to negotiations and everybody is struggling to get position.

00;14;46;08 – 00;15;02;22
Michael Kimmage
And so it’s, it’s it’s a kind of tactical, temporary escalation or maybe not, but, you know, the trend line in terms of weaponry and intensity of conflict is not even is a trend line that that goes up and has been going up really since February 2022. And the conflict began.

00;15;02;24 – 00;15;14;25
Jeremi Suri
And it would seem, Michael, that, Russia has much more capacity for escalation now. Right, with the the weapons they’re using. and then as you mentioned before, bringing in foreign soldiers. Yes.

00;15;14;27 – 00;15;39;18
Michael Kimmage
That’s true. I mean, I don’t know if there are too many weapons, non-nuclear weapons that Russia has failed to use or has been shy about using or reluctant to use, of course, been waging a very unhampered and very brutal war since, since the beginning. So, you know, Russia has driven this to the max, already, and, you know, has to decide now whether it would go kind of a category above in terms of, of weaponry.

00;15;39;18 – 00;15;59;18
Michael Kimmage
But there are a lot of risks and dangers to Russia. if it were to, if it were to do so, and it is very interesting to speculate about the turn to foreign fighters to, to, to non-Russian soldiers, in the conflict. I think you can read it in two ways, and I wouldn’t be overly confident about either one, but you can read it as desperation.

00;15;59;18 – 00;16;20;26
Michael Kimmage
And of course, this line of argument has been put forward that Putin is is on the ropes. you know, there’s inflation in Russian, economy. There’s, you know, discontent with the war, and manpower problems on the Russian side. And so they’ve asked North Korea to help out in this regard. And if the reports are true about, you know, Yemeni soldiers, the same from, the same from Yemen.

00;16;20;28 – 00;16;44;13
Michael Kimmage
but, you know, the opposite argument or a different argument is that what what matters with the soldiers is really not so much the advantage they give, to Russia. What matters is the demonstration effect, that this is a signaling to other powers that they can jump in and get involved if they if they wish to, either because they have a stake in the conflict or because they want to get certain things from Russia in return.

00;16;44;13 – 00;17;06;18
Michael Kimmage
But it’s also Putin’s way of thumbing his nose at the West, which is not going to send its uniformed soldiers, into the conflict for fear of escalation. So it’s leader of the absurd in a certain way for fear of escalation. That’s not going to happen on the western side with Ukraine. but Russia is perfectly comfortable doing this with, outside powers, and, and, and using these outside powers for Russia’s war effort.

00;17;06;21 – 00;17;26;03
Michael Kimmage
and I think that that demonstration effect is, is, is in its own ways. It’s kind of powerful, to, to, you know, confront the West about limitations the West has chosen. And if Russia really has a target audience there, it’s probably not in Washington or in Berlin. The target audience is probably in Kiev. Like, look, you know, we’re able to enlist other countries in the struggle directly.

00;17;26;10 – 00;17;37;05
Michael Kimmage
You guys are only, in the struggle on your own, and can’t get other countries to jump in, on your behalf. And so that wouldn’t be desperation. That would be something quite, quite different.

00;17;37;07 – 00;18;05;18
Zachary Suri
What do you think the mood in Kiev is at the moment? you mentioned the sort of long term, impossibility, or at least short term possibility of a counteroffensive. And, the sense that the war will probably continue for a long time. Is there is there yet, renewed pressure, for a negotiated settlement or is the mood still very much one else fighting until victory?

00;18;05;20 – 00;18;29;02
Michael Kimmage
I think the, mood in Kiev is a bit contradictory. So from my friends who are going, everybody comes back kind of daunted by how hard the war is. how hard of the stage, the war has, has reached, and at the war weariness that’s there, you know, on the front lines, among civilians, etc..

00;18;29;02 – 00;18;52;06
Michael Kimmage
We’re now on the verge in February of next year, will be, looking at the three year anniversary of this conflict. So it’s a long war, and, with many, many brutalizing effects, on the, on the, on the, on the people of, of Ukraine. And so when you put the situation in that framework, in that context, it is definitely different from the first year of the war in Ukraine.

00;18;52;08 – 00;19;14;10
Michael Kimmage
And there is a growing receptivity to some kind of negotiated end or, or, you know, different approach that would minimize the, minimize the fighting that speaks to the emotions that people have about the war, and probably also to the sense that the war has lost its time horizons, that if you can’t imagine a counter-offensive for Ukraine, it’s very hard to imagine winning.

00;19;14;12 – 00;19;34;14
Michael Kimmage
And if you can’t imagine winning, what it feels like as a forever war, kind of endless war on the Ukrainian side. And that’s a huge problem for Ukraine’s morale. I don’t know Jeremy well enough, the history of the First World War in this regard, but it was a very long war. But I don’t think that many of the sides felt like victory was impossible or unachievable, and they’re going to have to live with 20 years of trench warfare.

00;19;34;16 – 00;19;58;02
Michael Kimmage
but, if there was that feeling in the First World War, I think it would have had political consequences. But what makes the situation, you know, contradictory in Kiev is that when people are presented with the options that could be concessions, that Putin would accept to end the conflict. There’s very little enthusiasm for these options, for these particular concessions that could be the foundation for a negotiated settlement.

00;19;58;02 – 00;20;20;04
Michael Kimmage
So I think, you know, nobody really knows what Putin is driving for, but, for example, some formal recognition of the four provinces of Ukraine, the southern provinces of Ukraine that Russia claims, are it’s and according to the Russian constitution are, our mother Russia, not to mention Crimea. I don’t think that Ukrainians will be willing to formally recognize those or sort of formally hand them over to, to Russia.

00;20;20;04 – 00;20;41;07
Michael Kimmage
And even more controversial than that for Ukrainians would be imposed neutrality and the demilitarization of Ukraine, which I do think would be Russian terms, probably categorical Russian terms for ending the, the conflict. So in a sense, what Ukraine would have to do to appease Russia in this case is to concede a lot of territory and then make Ukraine very vulnerable to invasion, in the future.

00;20;41;07 – 00;21;07;08
Michael Kimmage
And you can understand why that would appeal to Putin. but you can also easily understand why, for Ukrainians, those are not conditions they can accept. So psychologically the appetite is there. The hunger is there for an end to the conflict. That’s a new development of the last six months, or maybe over the last year, but none of it falls into line, in terms of politics and actual diplomacy, for a platform of actions that Ukraine could develop that would, that would end the conflict.

00;21;07;08 – 00;21;27;03
Michael Kimmage
And it’s it’s clear that Russia is going to make this as difficult as possible. It’s not as as impossible as possible, for, for Ukraine. So, so, you know, Putin and it goes back to the question about costs on the Russian side. Putin is certainly still able to drive a hard bargain. and perhaps, as we’ve already discussed, to escalate in the, in the future.

00;21;27;03 – 00;21;30;24
Michael Kimmage
So I would say, practically speaking, no end in sight.

00;21;30;27 – 00;21;53;11
Jeremi Suri
Why are the Ukrainians trying to escalate right now? as you discussed already, using, missiles to fire deeper into Russian territory, various other things that the Biden administration had limited the Ukrainians who are doing before. And now it appears that Washington has given them a green light in the months before the the transition in Washington.

00;21;53;18 – 00;22;00;09
Jeremi Suri
What what what advantage to the Ukrainians see? What advantage does Zelensky see in escalating on his side?

00;22;00;12 – 00;22;22;03
Michael Kimmage
Right. Well, I think that you know, for Ukraine, the argument is pretty simple. I mean, they’re on the ropes at the moment, and I think they just want as much firepower as possible. And anything that will turn the dynamics of the war more, in their direction. And a lot of the stuff that’s been granted in the last week or the last two weeks is stuff that Ukrainians have been asking for and for for a long time.

00;22;22;03 – 00;22;39;08
Michael Kimmage
So it’s not a kind of a new posture or position in Ukraine. It’s just they’ve been really successful at getting some of these requests. granted. But I think hovering in the background of all of this is, of course, what the Trump administration is going to do about Ukraine. and there are concerns, of course, in Ukraine about what that’s going to look like.

00;22;39;08 – 00;23;06;03
Michael Kimmage
And so a bit of an extra firepower at the moment is useful. It’s also a bit more for the Trump administration to pull back away from if they if they make that decision. So it doesn’t quite force the hand of the new incoming administration in Washington. But it all sorts of dynamics somewhat. But I think what really matters with the, with the weaponry is not really, the practical benefits it gives Ukraine in the short term and not whatever it does to the incoming Trump administration.

00;23;06;03 – 00;23;26;02
Michael Kimmage
The practical payoff of this decision on the part of the Biden White House is really what it’s enabled with the Europeans, because Germany especially tends to walk, you know, ten feet behind the US when it comes to the war. and France and Britain are not entirely different. So you did see a change in policy in France and Britain when it came to using, you know, missiles, long range missiles on Russian soil.

00;23;26;04 – 00;23;48;17
Michael Kimmage
and it’s it’s as if the Biden administration, I think, wanted to open that door. and even if he has to bow out, which he does in the third week of January 2025, he does so having given Europeans a bigger suite of, of military options, and that, you know, seems like a very sensible thing to do at this juncture in time, given the uncertainties of American foreign policy, for the next four years, really?

00;23;48;19 – 00;23;57;04
Jeremi Suri
And what do you expect from the new American administration? And maybe even more important, Michael, what do the Ukrainians expect?

00;23;57;07 – 00;24;26;13
Michael Kimmage
So Ukraine is a little bit surprising in some ways, in this regard. in that, you know, you do have a whole set of statements from JD Vance and from Donald Trump that are skeptical about Ukraine winning the war, that are skeptical about the war, itself, that suggest or strongly suggest the US is spending too much money on Ukraine and needs to win this down because of domestic political priorities and concerns about security, the security situation in the Indo-Pacific.

00;24;26;13 – 00;24;54;26
Michael Kimmage
So you have all of that. I think we’re all very aware of that. That’s was the stuff of the campaign that’s very much on record. We go back and look at JD Vance, his New York Times article about the war in Ukraine, to get the most relevant data points. and of course, that does create a lot of concern in Ukraine about, about what’s going to happen, and whether the Trump administration will go over the heads of the Ukrainians to negotiate with, with Russia, which is not, you know, what Ukraine has wanted from, from the beginning.

00;24;54;28 – 00;25;12;05
Michael Kimmage
and, you know, I think there could be concern as well in Ukraine that the Trump administration will simply be hard to read and on this issue that the, you know, statements could be contradictory or just difficult to, to discern. And that, of course, makes life more difficult for Ukraine. How can it plan? How can it do its budgeting?

00;25;12;05 – 00;25;39;05
Michael Kimmage
How can it do its strategic planning? if it doesn’t know where Washington is, is, is is trending. But it’s not as if there’s blanket disappointment about the election of Trump in Ukraine. what I’ve heard from many people is that Ukrainians were frustrated with, President Biden and apparently with Jake Sullivan for, in their view, moving too slowly to provide various weapons systems and to assist Ukraine, and in a different sense, for being too predictable and too readable.

00;25;39;12 – 00;26;08;23
Michael Kimmage
And so there is, I think, a kind of optimism or there’s a certain amount of hope in Ukraine that Trump will be more unpredictable, and that perhaps, his toughness, such as it is, will be, you know, an advantage in terms of dealing with, with Putin. and so it’s as if, you know, Ukrainian, the, you know, calculus at the moment is as if it’s worth rolling the dice because the current situation, the status quo is not good for Ukraine.

00;26;08;25 – 00;26;29;02
Michael Kimmage
and could spell out Ukraine’s long term, loss of the war. And so Trump is that roll of the dice and you kind of hope it comes up double sevens or something like that. To continue the metaphor, but, there’s that view in Kiev, as as well, and maybe a sense that Zelensky is good at dealing with Trump and that he’s persuadable.

00;26;29;02 – 00;26;51;15
Michael Kimmage
And, you know, I think also the Rubio Waltz appointments, might be regarded also with a with a bit of enthusiasm or a bit of hope in this, in this respect. So we’re all trying to read the tea leaves, the three of us and, in many countries, Ukraine included. And you can kind of read the tea leaves with enough ambiguity to, to, to perhaps think in two ways about, about what’s going to happen.

00;26;51;15 – 00;26;55;20
Michael Kimmage
The worst case scenario, and the not so bad case scenario.

00;26;55;22 – 00;27;20;09
Jeremi Suri
But any, hope for Trump helping Ukraine must be about some kind of settlement, right? It’s hard to imagine the Trump administration committing to continued long term military support on the scale we’ve seen in recent years, and it’s hard to imagine Germany and other European countries continuing in that way. Is that accurate?

00;27;20;11 – 00;27;51;03
Michael Kimmage
I’m not so sure. you know, I think, let me just try to, to given away the, a sort of, maybe more unexpected answer to the, to the question. But what you suggest may, of course, that, you know, kind of come to pass, but, I think on the US side, I don’t think it’s going to be easy, easy at all, for the Trump administration to make diplomatic progress on the war, which is to say, to approach a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

00;27;51;09 – 00;28;12;27
Michael Kimmage
The nature of the problem is extremely, extremely hard, to deal with the problem of arriving at a negotiated settlement to the war to demand some point of view about the territorial configuration of Ukraine. And I just haven’t seen any of that from the Trump administration yet. Are they going to concede territory? Are they not going to concede territory if they do concede territory, does that come with security guarantees for Ukraine?

00;28;13;00 – 00;28;34;01
Michael Kimmage
or not? These are big questions. I don’t think the US can kind of waltz in and try to solve the problem without having a position on those questions. And, I don’t think that, the Trump team is, is, is there yet? I also think, as a matter of process, it’s going to be hard, you know, to develop the expertise necessary, to come up with a solution to the, to the, to the problem.

00;28;34;01 – 00;28;53;19
Michael Kimmage
Where’s the group of people that can kind of do that at the moment? And, you know, if they’re not there now and if they’re only there in six months, maybe that’s too late. I think there are a lot of ways in which the US is an important variable in the war in Ukraine, but it’s not the most important variable to the extent that it can just Richard Holbrooke style kind of end the war, in Eastern and Central Europe.

00;28;53;19 – 00;29;13;29
Michael Kimmage
I don’t know if that’s in the capacity of any American president, whether Trump, Biden, Harris, or anywhere else. So if you take that as a given or as a likelihood, then you can sort of ask the question about Trump administration policy toward Ukraine is really what happens when the phase of diplomacy doesn’t pan out. And there I’m not convinced that, the US just turns around and leaves.

00;29;13;29 – 00;29;29;10
Michael Kimmage
I don’t think it would be in the strategic interest of the, of the US. And I do think it’s possible that the Trump administration could at that point, consider certain modes of escalation. That’s a Biden administration would not have, have accepted. So I do think that there’s a path to that. I’m not saying that this is, you know, 75% likelihood.

00;29;29;10 – 00;29;49;01
Michael Kimmage
I’m just saying it could happen that way. and nothing at the moment is really mandated on the European side. you know, I think that there’s a lot of stuff that Europe can do that’s not contingent and dependent on the United States. Again, I don’t see the US as such a powerful variable in all of this, but parts of Europe to watch.

00;29;49;03 – 00;30;09;11
Michael Kimmage
If the Trump administration would really try to wash its hands of of support for Ukraine and either try some kind of, you know, Hail Mary negotiation with Putin or just focus on other issues. The part of Europe to watch is Scandinavia, the Baltics and Poland. And this is not a small or insignificant part of Europe. Poland is now spending 4% of its GDP on defense.

00;30;09;14 – 00;30;36;25
Michael Kimmage
Baltic republics are on the smaller side, but they’re deeply, deeply committed to Ukraine. and of course, Finland and Sweden, you know, freshly minted, NATO members, but also Norway, all have borders with Russia or are very close to Russia and really feel that there’s something existential about what’s happening in the war. So I don’t think that these countries just bow down and, and turn tail, if the US changes its policy, I think maybe they double down, and send in soldiers and in the uniform soldiers into the conflict or something like that.

00;30;36;25 – 00;30;55;18
Michael Kimmage
You get a kind of group within Europe that, takes a different tack and then, you know, France, the UK, Germany assistance. They wish to assist, because they also have a strategic interest in Ukraine. not losing. And so it no longer becomes the NATO framework, which, would not be good for the transatlantic relationship. But I don’t think it’s one of just quiescence.

00;30;55;20 – 00;31;20;23
Michael Kimmage
and folding up the tent if if the US is not, any longer as committed or if the US is is is is sort of objectively uncommitted to, to Ukraine. So I think that, you know, just the scenario of Western support ending, under any circumstances, in the, in the, in the first 2 or 3, four years of the, of the Trump administration, the Trump administration, part two, I don’t think it happens.

00;31;20;26 – 00;31;37;29
Michael Kimmage
and I think Russia, maybe, as it has so often in this war, be very hubristic about where it stands at the moment. Is that, okay? Trump is elected and everything is going our way. and, you know, AfD and DSW and other parties are going to come to power in Europe and Europe and the US are going to give up on Ukraine.

00;31;38;02 – 00;31;44;08
Michael Kimmage
I think you do hear that melody being sung in Moscow at the moment. but I think they could well be deluding themselves on that point.

00;31;44;10 – 00;32;08;01
Jeremi Suri
What would happen, Michael, if, Trump and Putin did as you said before, negotiate over the heads of the, Ukrainians. I’m thinking here of, Kissinger and Lee Duc. So in the early 1970s, the United States negotiating with the North Vietnamese over the heads of the South Vietnamese, despite the resistance of the South Vietnamese, for example. Right.

00;32;08;04 – 00;32;30;19
Jeremi Suri
And so in this case, this would be Trump and Putin organizing some grand bargain, some big deal that Trump could brag about. that would give Putin much of much of what he wants, with maybe consulting at best, Zelensky and others in Ukraine. How would Ukraine respond to that?

00;32;30;22 – 00;32;59;28
Michael Kimmage
That’s a really good, question. Of course. and I wanted to since you mentioned the example of the Vietnam War, I mentioned one other historical example, which is very much on the mind of Ukrainians when they think about this question, which is the absence of a Ukrainian delegation, at the Treaty of Versailles. So there was a Polish delegation and to be sure, at Versailles and Poland got a country, but there was not a Ukrainian, delegation or there was not a successful Ukrainian delegation at the Treaty of Versailles.

00;32;59;28 – 00;33;22;09
Michael Kimmage
And so already at that foundational moment for 20th century Europe, you had, other powers deciding the destiny of Ukraine, which was carved up by Poland and the Soviet Union after the First World War. So, you know, there is a precedent for that sort of thing, certainly, in Europe and not impossible that it could happen. I don’t doubt that the technicalities of such negotiations are possible.

00;33;22;09 – 00;33;48;09
Michael Kimmage
I don’t doubt that it could be a trial balloon that the Trump administration, floats. but I would have a million questions about implementation of Ukraine is not willing to, to, to cooperate. And, you know, the US has leverage over Ukraine, but it doesn’t have complete leverage over Ukraine. But the point that I made a moment ago by Scandinavia, the Baltics and Poland being deeply committed to Ukraine, whether or not the United States, is.

00;33;48;09 – 00;34;09;08
Michael Kimmage
And there’s, of course, the question of Ukraine itself, which over the last two and a half years has built up a really large army and also built up a fair amount of defense, industrial, capacity. so, you know, I don’t know what happens if Ukraine, doesn’t agree, but I’m not sure, at all, that Trump could force Ukraine, into a deal that it doesn’t like.

00;34;09;08 – 00;34;37;01
Michael Kimmage
But even if it could and even if that were, in theory, possible, the question of implementing a deal is hugely important. I don’t know if it’s that hard to sign a deal. I guess you can. You can always do that. But to implement it is really, really important. So if Trump agrees to, the Trump administration agrees to a cease fire, that then just turns out to be an operational pause for Russia, which, you know, Russia signed something and then three months later, it goes on the attack again, that would be a really bad look, for the Trump administration.

00;34;37;01 – 00;34;57;04
Michael Kimmage
And so they would have to think long and hard about implementation. Implementation takes us to the question of security guarantees that the territory that would remain Ukrainian. I assume if there is a deal with Russia to involve some transfer of territory from Ukraine to Russia, but the territory that remains Ukrainian, would have to be defensible. and if it’s not, then it’s really not a negotiated end to the war.

00;34;57;04 – 00;35;23;03
Michael Kimmage
It’s just, a bungled phase of diplomacy between Russia and the United States. That, of course, is eminently possible at any time. but, not equivalent to a negotiated end, to the war. So it has to be done, with the powers of implementation behind whatever the deal is. and there are actually a number of European countries at the moment that are stepping up and thinking about the question of providing peacekeepers and, and doing that security guarantees.

00;35;23;03 – 00;35;40;09
Michael Kimmage
So maybe, if they can be very creative, the Trump administration would have options, in that regard. But it has to be worked through. And finally, I would say in the same way that the U.S. can’t impose outcomes on Ukraine, the US can’t impose outcomes on Europe either. It’s not as if the US can just come in and by fiat, say, this is an end to the war.

00;35;40;09 – 00;36;18;19
Michael Kimmage
It has to be done in consultation. and if the Europeans don’t agree, you know, they, will probably take their own path and take their own, their own course. And so, you know, we’re both Jeremy, you and I, students of diplomacy and diplomatic history. it’s, you know, I think if you think of it in those terms, it’s just, the possibility of success, even in a 6 to 12 month time period, the possibility of success to a hastily, a hastily determined, negotiated settlement and an unenforced or unenforceable negotiated settlement, the possibilities for success are vanishingly small.

00;36;18;21 – 00;36;37;16
Jeremi Suri
Right. And I think a point you make so. Well, Michael, is, and we know this as historians, a conflict like this does not end quickly. And so there’s nothing that the Trump administration can do that will bring this conflict to a quick end. the question is how it ends or if it ends and in what in what way?

00;36;37;16 – 00;36;41;02
Jeremi Suri
But it will be a long, drawn out process. Nothing that will be quick.

00;36;41;04 – 00;37;03;09
Michael Kimmage
Yes. And of course, again, thinking historically, not quite as far back as the Treaty of Versailles. But we do need to think back to the Minsk diplomatic process of 2014 2015. You know, Angela merkel has just published her memoirs in Germany, out this week, and I haven’t read the book yet, but I’m curious to see what she has to say about Minsk, because she was one of its chief negotiators with the then president of France, Francois Hollande.

00;37;03;09 – 00;37;27;29
Michael Kimmage
But this is really, a very, very scary set of precedents that were set in 2014, 2015 for, you know, in a way, exactly the reasons I was laying out a moment ago, Minsk was done really fast, in response to some battlefield setbacks, in Ukraine. So it was kind of suing for peace. And also Minsk. The whole point of Minsk, Minsk diplomacy was to get Russian soldiers out of eastern Ukraine.

00;37;28;02 – 00;37;47;04
Michael Kimmage
and the mechanism that was in place from its diplomacy to work was sanctions, economic sanctions. But it was too little. and Minsk needed some firm military commitment to the Ukrainian side for it to have been a much, you know, two, it would have been even even borderline effective and, and successful. So we have to learn from that history.

00;37;47;06 – 00;38;00;08
Michael Kimmage
that’s the seminar that I would want every incoming policymaker in Washington to take the seminar on what happened in Minsk, women’s diplomacy in 2014 and 2015, and why it didn’t work. Because you really don’t want to, reinvent this dysfunctional wheel.

00;38;00;10 – 00;38;28;23
Jeremi Suri
Right? Right. It’s a key lesson from diplomatic history that diplomacy without, adequate force, is, is not effective in most cases. Zachary, you and and many of your generation, you’ve lived through so much in the last few months and years. There’s one crisis after another. One can think of the Middle East. One can think of, East Asia, of course, our own issues within the United States.

00;38;28;25 – 00;38;40;26
Jeremi Suri
What do thinkers of your generation, young men and women, what are they thinking about Ukraine now? How do they look at the war? Does it match up with what Michael’s describing? Well, what do you think?

00;38;40;28 – 00;39;02;07
Zachary Suri
I think in many ways it does it. I think a lot of young people, like many Americans, are probably either tired of hearing about the conflict or ignoring the conflict entirely. But I also think there’s another, more positive story, which is that American understanding of Ukraine and American connections to Ukraine. I don’t think I’ve ever been as high as they are now.

00;39;02;11 – 00;39;25;15
Zachary Suri
I mean, just personally like at, you know, like there are tons of Ukrainian students, in my year. And I think just having such a visible Ukrainian presence on college campuses, in, you know, American institutions, I think that will have a large impact in the long run. And I do think, at the very least, there’s more of an understanding of Ukraine as a sort of distinct political and cultural.

00;39;25;15 – 00;39;26;08
Jeremi Suri
Interesting.

00;39;26;11 – 00;39;26;22
Zachary Suri
Entity.

00;39;27;00 – 00;39;51;14
Jeremi Suri
Interesting, interesting. Michael, that would be my last question to you. How should we be educating our fellow Americans and and others, our fellow Europeans, about this conflict? Because I do think, what Zachary said at the start of his answer is certainly true. People have and to some extent grown a little tired or a little a little numb to this conflict outside of the region.

00;39;51;16 – 00;40;11;13
Jeremi Suri
And although we have lots and lots of people around us reminding us every day, you know, over time it’s something that’s become less urgent, I think, in the thinking of many people, especially when there are other issues on the table. Right. so, so, so how should we be educating fellow Americans, fellow Europeans, about this?

00;40;11;16 – 00;40;35;14
Michael Kimmage
Well, it’s a it’s a it’s a crucially important, a crucially important question. And, one thing that comes through to me in the history of the region of Eastern and Central European, you know, the story of diplomacy and security in this part of the world over the last 120 years, or maybe over the last several hundred years, is that I don’t know if it’s really a soluble problem, how to figure out a stable order for Eastern and Central Europe?

00;40;35;14 – 00;41;05;28
Michael Kimmage
Certainly nobody has really done it, so far. So I think it’s very important to study the history of the region to understand why that’s the case. Eastern Europe being, you know, in part by contrast with Western Europe, a place with a history of, of nation states, and also a place that, for good historical reasons, has this incredible overlap of populations, languages, religions, ethnicities, which is one of the beautiful things about Eastern Europe in one, you know, frame of reference.

00;41;05;28 – 00;41;27;12
Michael Kimmage
But, has made it incredibly difficult, to figure out in terms of security, peace, order stability, and such. And so in a way that’s tragic for the region. The history of eastern Central Europe is really the history of us as ever. Empires, and the history of Western Europe is a bit more, the history of, of nation states.

00;41;27;12 – 00;41;42;18
Michael Kimmage
And these empires in Eastern and Central Europe have tended to overlap and to get the conflict and to generate wars. And that’s, you know, a dynamic that you see behind both the First World War, the Second World War, and also, in a way, behind the, the Cold War as well. I don’t think that that’s cause for despair.

00;41;42;18 – 00;41;58;19
Michael Kimmage
It’s not that I would want American students or citizens or readers to encounter that history and say, well, this is just an impossible part of the world, right? As as we people feared that would be said about the Balkans in the 1990s, you know, sort of so full of ghosts and fanatics that you’ll never solve the problem. That’s not what I have in mind.

00;41;58;21 – 00;42;16;02
Michael Kimmage
I think that what this does, when you study the history of the region is it tells you not to set the bar too high. if we say that we either succeed in the region, we win. You know, Zelensky, the good guy wins. and we all kind of ride off into the sunset or, you know, it’s just too intractable, too difficult.

00;42;16;02 – 00;42;33;03
Michael Kimmage
Let’s, you know, move on to other conflicts where we think the, the margin of victory is greater. if we make that the two polarities of our, of our understanding or analysis assessment of the situation of eastern Central Europe, not just Ukraine, but the but the whole region will be making a terrible mistake in some ways.

00;42;33;03 – 00;42;53;28
Michael Kimmage
What the US has done over the last two and a half years, and very much with its European allies and partners, of course, is really remarkable. in the face of a brutal Russian onslaught, they have maintained roughly 80% of Ukrainian, statehood. Ukrainian nationhood is is thriving. It’s intact. It’s it’s it’s it’s doing well, you know, that by the standards of the region is a huge achievement.

00;42;53;28 – 00;43;09;25
Michael Kimmage
And so you need to understand the region that you’re dealing with. It’s not going to be like the creation of the NATO alliance in 1949, which is a great achievement of American diplomacy, strategic thinking. but that was achieved in a terrain, in a landscape that was much more conducive to, quote unquote, solving the problem that Eastern and Central Europe is.

00;43;09;25 – 00;43;38;13
Michael Kimmage
So what we need to do is to develop a historical sensibility, which you can do, of course, but just by studying the history of the region, that historical sensibility, in turn, is going to give you, I think, a realistic set of expectations. You’re not going to be totally successful. but you can certainly do better, if, if you pursue wise policies, and that has a lasting and important, impact, and that in turn, you know, sort of takes you to a kind of sense of patience, when it comes to dealing with this stuff.

00;43;38;16 – 00;43;57;16
Michael Kimmage
and I fear at times that Russia has a bit more patience in this regard. Of course, Russia is of the region. Right. And so Russia’s comfort level with the sort of insoluble problems of eastern central Europe is, I think, at times higher, than ours. and I worry about that. But I do think to go back to the core of your question, properly educated about the region, a three quarters victory is great.

00;43;57;24 – 00;44;24;23
Michael Kimmage
Even a half victory, is sometimes great. And if you can make it last for ten, 20, 30 years, that’s doing as well as whenever it has in that region. and so don’t set the bar too high. don’t be unrealistic. Don’t assume that solutions that works in other parts of the world in this case, you know, the kind of the solution that was the NATO alliance is necessarily going to work, in, in, in this part of the world, you know, be be careful about that, develop policies that are suited and specific to the, to the region.

00;44;24;23 – 00;44;43;05
Michael Kimmage
And when they don’t fully work out, as they won’t, have the patience to stick with your guns, and to support the territorial and territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, both as a lived reality for Ukrainians. but also as a precedent that’s going to matter hugely, for the future of Europe East, south, north west, etc..

00;44;43;08 – 00;44;56;23
Michael Kimmage
and, you know, if we have enough patience, will, we’ll muddle through with this war, and we can develop that patience through, you know, sort of a careful reading of some of the most extraordinary, fascinating, and, enlightening history imaginable.

00;44;56;25 – 00;45;23;08
Jeremi Suri
Michael, that said so. Well, and there’s so much truth in that. You’re echoing, of course, the wisdom of so many, major diplomatic figures, from Bismarck, through George Kennan and Henry Kissinger, all of whom have have in the sense criticized the American desire for, commitments that are on and off switches where we turn it on and put a 100% effort and then get what we want and then turn it off.

00;45;23;08 – 00;45;44;29
Jeremi Suri
And what you’re saying is it’s actually it’s on and on and on or off switch. It’s not binary support or nonsupport it. It’s about long term commitment and it’s about half measures and, achieving what is achievable, with a, with a larger strategic direction in mind, but a strategic direction that involves decades, not not months and years.

00;45;45;03 – 00;46;07;05
Michael Kimmage
In fact, if I could jump in just for these points, Jeremy, about U.S. foreign policy in this regard, there’s a very instructive example from the history of the early Cold War, and really from from the year 1945, where the US was forced correctly, I think, in terms of what U.S. capacity was, it was forced to accept that there was a Soviet sphere of influence throughout much of Eastern and Central Europe.

00;46;07;05 – 00;46;35;26
Michael Kimmage
That was a consequence of the Second World War. And the Red Army was there, and there really wasn’t much the U.S. could do about it. And the U.S. was also forced to accept that the Baltic republics in 1945 lost their sovereignty and independence and were absorbed directly into the Soviet Union. And yet with the US state and the city of Washington was to keep the three Baltic embassies, as the sovereign property, the territory and property of the Baltic republics, that, you know, in a certain sense, didn’t exist in those years.

00;46;35;28 – 00;46;54;29
Michael Kimmage
and so what it means, I think, in terms of diplomatic or strategic thinking on the part of the US, maybe it was a bit of sentiment and emotion as well. But in terms of diplomatic and strategic thinking, it meant that the US was able to operate on two planes at that moment. They were able to say, well, okay, the strategic situation in Europe is such that we can’t go as far as we would wish, we would want to do more.

00;46;54;29 – 00;47;12;21
Michael Kimmage
We would want to see the Baltic republics independent, you know, democratic, etc. but we don’t have the the power to arrange that outcome today, right now, at the present moment. But we can envision a future where that’s different. and we can, on this other track, think of something, that’s maybe aspirational, better than the present moment.

00;47;12;28 – 00;47;30;03
Michael Kimmage
and we don’t want to give up on that. and we can have a lot of patience. And, you know, those embassy states shut, you know, shuttered in DC for about 40, 45 years. but then, of course, were open when those countries did achieve their independence. And those are the embassies that you would go to today in Washington if you were to go to an event at the Latvian, Estonian or Lithuanian embassy.

00;47;30;03 – 00;47;52;27
Michael Kimmage
So let’s keep that two track thinking alive. You know that you are where you are at the present moment. But, you can imagine things in a somewhat different groove and perhaps in a better groove. and I can’t think of anything that matters more for the war in Ukraine at the present moment. if we succumb to despair, fatalism, or even disinterest, as Zachary is warning about, then the chances of losing this war are so much greater.

00;47;52;27 – 00;48;09;17
Michael Kimmage
So, you know, kind of careful optimism in the background, in the horizon, over the horizon, is essential. And it’s something that for us as, as I’m trying to say, you know, so that that something that the US was able to do, back in 1945 when the Cold War was, you know, engulfing Europe and a lot of things looked really bleak.

00;48;09;19 – 00;48;30;06
Jeremi Suri
Yeah. Realistic compromise with, higher aspirations to continue striving for. Yes, maybe. Maybe that’s really the secret of diplomacy, pragmatism and compromise. But larger goals that are not that are not forsaken. And you gave a great example with the the maintenance of those embassies, what we used to call captive nations. Right, Michael?

00;48;30;07 – 00;48;32;05
Michael Kimmage
Great. Right.

00;48;32;08 – 00;48;54;22
Jeremi Suri
Michael Kimmage, as always, it has been insightful and, really thought provoking to have you on. You’ve not only given us a sense of where this terrible war is right now. You’ve provided a mapping of the geopolitics, and you’ve given us a sense of the many pathways forward, pathways that won’t take us directly to democracy, but hopefully keep hopes for democracy alive.

00;48;54;22 – 00;48;59;28
Jeremi Suri
So, Michael, as always, thank you for lending us your time and insights today.

00;49;00;02 – 00;49;17;22
Michael Kimmage
Well, thank you so much, Jeremy and Zachary, thank you so much for your questions and for taking us mentally to the villages where you know, much of the worst suffering is being felt and reminding us that, words that are words of strategies and doctrines and historical precedents are more than anything more of, a real people. So thank you.

00;49;17;23 – 00;49;20;12
Michael Kimmage
You know, Zachary, for taking us to that exact space.

00;49;20;15 – 00;49;43;27
Jeremi Suri
Yes, yes, Zachary, you’ve reminded us yet again that it takes a village in so many ways. and so thank you for your poem and your insights, Zachary. Thank you most of all, to our loyal listeners and loyal subscribers to our Substack for joining us for this episode of This Is Democracy.

00;49;43;29 – 00;49;47;08
Outro
This podcast is produced by the liberal arts its development studio, and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Harris Codini. Stay tuned for a new episode every week you can find This Is Democracy on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher. See you next time.