This is Democracy – Episode 275: Ukraine War

Intro: This is democracy, a podcast about the people of the United States, a podcast about citizenship, about engaging with politics and the world around you, a podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues

and how to have a voice in what happens next.

Jeremi Suri: Welcome to our new episode of This is Democracy. This week, amidst all, uh, the discussion of American domestic politics, we are going to focus on international affairs again, and on an old topic, a topic that’s been with us for a few years now, but a topic that remains as urgent and as significant to all elements of politics and strategy in our world today as it has ever been.

Jeremi Suri: That is the war in Ukraine. Which has entered, uh, another phase of escalation. It’s hard to believe that that’s the case, but has entered another phase of escalation, in particular, with, uh, the incursion of, uh, Ukrainian forces now into Russia, into the Kursk region of Russia, in, uh, early August. of 2024. Uh, this is a strategy pursued by the Ukrainians to, uh, take the war to Russia and try to put Russia on the defensive after months of apparent Russian gains in Ukraine.

Jeremi Suri: And it has only, of course, escalated this, this terrible, terrible war. Uh, we are joined today by our good friend and, uh, someone who was, was already a leading scholar in Mensch, but has really distinguished himself, I think, in a way that I, I, I. deeply admire, uh, in bringing, uh, scholarly acumen. And integrity and, and integrity in his search for facts and an effort to really articulate and elucidate those facts for others.

Jeremi Suri: This is our friend and frequent guest, uh, Professor Michael Kimmage. Michael, thank you for joining us today. Such a pleasure to be back with you both. As many of our listeners know, Michael Kimmage is a professor of history at Catholic University of America in Washington, D. C. Uh, he has now been a fellow at so many institutions, I cannot really list them all, but he is a prominent figure both in U.

Jeremi Suri: S. The U. S. think tank world, the Woodrow Wilson Center, and many other locations, as well as think tanks, uh, across, uh, Europe and elsewhere. He was a member of the policy planning staff at the U. S. State Department from 2014 to 2017, where he had the Russia Ukraine portfolio. And he’s the author of numerous, highly regarded books.

Jeremi Suri: The one I want to, uh, highlight today is his most recent book, Collisions, which I think is one of the very best histories of the war in Ukraine. It’s, of course, a war that continues, so it’s a, it’s a, not only a contemporary history, it’s an ongoing history. And I, I expect, Michael, you’re just writing new chapters as we speak,

yes?

Well, not literally, but of course they are unfolding before our eyes, so it’s it’s it’s you know It is conceivable that one could write a sequel to this book. Certainly. Well, I

Jeremi Suri: I’m sure you will and in many forms actually Before we turn to our discussion of the war in Ukraine. We have our poem from mr.

Jeremi Suri: Zachary Suri, of course What’s the title of your poem today Zachary?

Bloodstains

Jeremi Suri: Okay, let’s hear it.

It has been years of war, of blinding light, of waking up to sirens knowing why, of waking up in trenches in the night, or shelters miles from the burning sky. It has been years of war, of snow turned red, of waking up to count the stolen things, of waking up to mourn and grieve the dead, the children flying up On angel’s wings, it has been years of war, a year of war, and we are tiring of our sympathy.

So look away and try now to ignore the pain of people who are not as free. It does no good. The hurt will still remain. The blood’s still there when we ignore the stain.

Jeremi Suri: That’s a very

rootful poem, Zachary. What is your poem about? Um, my poem is about how easy it is, um, to become numb to violence, uh, particularly when there’s so many wars ranging around the world.

Uh, in particular, it’s also about the pain, uh, and the devastation wrought by what has in Ukraine been, I think, more than a decade of conflict, uh, with Russia. Um, and what that does to a society. Um, but also, um, what it says about us, if we can’t pay attention and acknowledge and, uh, speak to that.

Jeremi Suri: Michael, you’ve been so closely following and connected to this war, uh, from February of 2022, if not earlier, of course, uh, do you feel a certain numbness about this?

I think it’s a very important point. I think we might distinguish between two kinds of numbness. There’s in a way the numbness of the experts. Uh, of whom I suppose, uh, I’m one, uh, and a somewhat grotesque risk of reducing what is a war, um, on human bodies, uh, exactly as Zachary’s poem, uh, outlines of reducing that to battlefield strategies and, uh, you know, sort of charts and graphs, uh, that are, of course, apropos of a war of attrition.

Uh, but don’t at all do justice to the reality of this war. Uh, and I think I do at times feel that and I kind of sense that in my colleagues, but there’s also the numbness of the general public people lulled by the, you know, rhythms of daily life who have the privilege of being far from the battlefield or who just get distracted or taken up by lots of Uh, lots of other issues, you know, sort of, um, the, the, the more quotidian, less consequential news of the, uh, news of the day.

And I think it would be, um, a disservice to say that, uh, this numbness is not an important factor now in our political life here in the United States, but also I think in Germany, uh, and, uh, in many countries that are pretty significant, uh, supporting the Ukrainian. So it’s an aesthetic point in a way in the poem, but I would also say that it’s a political point and one of the real conundrums.

of a long and lengthening war. So, um, you know, Zachary’s poem, I think it’s, it’s the subject, right, right, right at the core.

Jeremi Suri: Are the Ukrainians, Michael, becoming numb to the war? Are they losing their morale? I mean, we were all struck, I think also stunned, After the initial Russian invasion with the degree of esprit de corps and commitment to defense by Ukrainians, some living in Ukraine, some living outside of Ukraine, who returned to Ukraine.

Jeremi Suri: The Russians fled Russia, Ukrainians returned to Ukraine to fight. Uh, do you see a change in Ukrainian morale?

You know, I think that you can follow reporting about public opinion in Ukraine in the, in the following way, that over the last six to 12 months, there’s been a growing willingness. This has been documented by.

You know, different journalists, not a exact science, but it’s between anecdotal and, uh, and surely factual in this case. But there’s been a shift toward, um, some desire in Ukrainian politics, uh, to put an end to the war. Uh, Zelensky has articulated this. We know that for the next peace conference, Ukraine organized one over the summer.

At the next peace conference, Russia will be among the, uh, invitees. And what had been a bit taboo at the beginning of the war, you know, sort of discussions of. Compromises or concessions made to end the war that’s less of a taboo now And I think that that’s happening from the bottom up in ukrainian politics ukrainian life, but also happening to a degree on the Elite level and that’s you know entirely I think to be expected two and a half years into a war that is as brutal Uh and as far ranging as this one, but I suspect to put this point in a somewhat broader context That this is a footnote, this change to the overall dynamic of the war because, you know, Ukraine is demonstrating as much willingness to fight now as at the beginning of the war.

And I know that we’ll get to the Ukrainian move into Kursk Oblast or Kursk region, the Kursk region of Russia. I know that we’ll get into that in further detail in a moment, but it’s very much what that offensive signifies. So even if the offensive fails militarily, and it may, it’s Uh, even if it doesn’t pay big strategic or political dividends for Ukraine, it is an extremely important demonstration that Ukraine is not going into some kind of passive crouch, uh, and it’s just not waiting for the days to tick by and for some kind of inevitable fatalistic end to come.

Ukraine is still taking this war very much into its own hands and playing an active role. So I would want that to be identified as the major story, uh, and that’s a remarkable story given the price Ukrainians are paying for this. Uh, for this conflict and the war weariness, which is certainly real and no doubt growing and, and, and mounting that the war weariness is there, uh, but to me is still, uh, and significantly the secondary story.

Do you think the reality of that war weariness helps explain the Ukrainian decision to invade, uh, parts of Russia to invade Kursk Oblast? Is it a sort of effort to get a better negotiating position? I don’t think the negotiating position argument makes too much sense. too much sense to me, or it doesn’t make sense to me in the immediate military and political context of, uh, of the war.

Russia will negotiate an end to the war if they can get big territorial concessions. And I don’t think that Ukraine is going to accept that deal. So, you know, the premise, uh, that, you know, if, you know, If concessions equal, you know, a thousand square kilometers of territory, if, if Ukraine has a bit of course, maybe it’s eight hundred meters, a thousand square meters, or eight hundred square meters of, uh, square kilometers of, uh, of territory, I don’t think that that really does much for Ukraine or makes, you know, a significant contribution to it.

to Ukrainian objectives at the, uh, at the present moment. So I don’t see negotiating as such, uh, as part of this, although that could change and that could be part of the future picture, uh, of the war. I think it’s much more exactly as you’re asking about Zachary, uh, a demonstration, uh, and a demonstration of will, uh, a demonstration of Creativity, uh, a demonstration of moving forward in a certain way.

Uh, and Ukraine was beginning to resemble before this, you know, incursion into, into chorus, Ukraine was beginning to resemble a boxer. Who’s just getting hit and hit and hit. Uh, and this boxer has incredible strength and it has a lot of endurance, but you are starting to sense that if the fight goes for another four or five rounds, that at a certain point, the boxer is going to.

Start to stagger and fall and this is a way of hitting back and that I think is an immensely significant gesture We could say it’s only symbolic, but I think we would be In a sense unwise if we would say that symbolism isn’t important to war and symbolism isn’t important To sustaining morale. It’s enormously significant in Uh, in those areas.

So I think it’s a symbolic act. Uh, and I think it’s actually correct, uh, as a, uh, as a symbolic act. But I don’t think that there is, at the moment, a kind of logical scheme of negotiation. And, you know, we can go into this point in greater detail if you wish. But I do think that any Ukrainian plan to trade territory for peace Uh, is probably a self defeating plan in the sense that Russia will take it, pocket it, and re invade at a certain point, and I think, you know, Zelensky and his, his staff are absolutely, uh, aware of that, so I would situate the war elsewhere, or rather not the war, I would situate this, this incursion elsewhere.

Before we get more into the, the significance of this incursion, um, particularly in its impact on Russia, I wanted to ask, um, what is the significance and the potential impact of Ukraine’s, at least, um, strategic retreats on the battlefield in Eastern Ukraine to maybe put it politely. Um, and that began before the incursion and seemed to have continued, uh, even as the incursion has advanced.

Um, how significant are those? How much of a threat does that pose to the Ukrainian war effort? Well, the threat resides, I think the threat resides in the, in the momentum, uh, that Russia has, uh, and that in and of itself is quite a dangerous. Circumstance. Russia has been on the offensive on the advance really for the last six to eight months.

And so the whole conversation that we had in the summer of 2023 about the Ukrainian counteroffensive, is this going to break open the war? Might Ukraine retake Crimea? All the kinds of, you know, thought balloons that went up in the spring of 2023. All of that is very much in the past and in the background now as Russia is on the offensive.

And so that’s worrisome. Uh, and that’s the way in which this, uh, gamble of Ukraine’s could be, uh, could be counterproductive. But again, I think if you take a somewhat bigger step back and look at the larger picture, you know, Over the last year and a half, Russia has expended unbelievable amounts of materiel and manpower to take two small to medium sized cities.

This is Bakhmut, which I think was about 70, 000 before the war, in its population, and Avdiivka, which I think was about 30, 000 before the war, in its population. And these were sad losses for Ukraine. There’s a lot of human devastation that comes with what Russia did in Bakhmut and Avdiivka. But these are very incremental gains for Russia.

So I think if Ukraine has, in some respects, conceded, uh, you know, Pokrovsk or, or, or, or a few other places where there’s fighting at the moment in the Donbass, uh, for the sake of doing what they did in Kursk, they probably have assessed that these are really incremental gains for Russia. It’s still pretty slow movement, very costly, uh, for Russia.

And these are not big war changing strategic. Uh, development. So it’s painful. Each loss of, you know, each inch of territory lost is painful for Ukraine very much in human terms. Uh, but there’s a larger strategic balance at work here. Uh, and it’s clear that Kiev has assessed that, you know, a bit of territory in the Donbass might mean less, might be worth less, uh, than a pretty big acquisition of territory in Russia proper, in Russia itself.

Jeremi Suri: It sounds, Michael, and this echoes your, your insights from prior discussions, it sounds like this is a classic war of attrition, where small pieces of territory move from one side to the other, but the main lines remain pretty static. Thank you. And the killing continues with very much or very little to show for it.

Jeremi Suri: In fact, uh, does the cursed incursion fit that model? Is it just one more blip in a larger war of attrition or is there something more significant there?

I mean, I think it’s a bit more than a blip certainly. And I think we’ve covered a bit of this ground. Already that wars have a prominent psychological dimension and Ukraine going on the offensive, doing something, uh, really matters.

So, you know, even if in purely military terms, not much has changed by the incursion into Kursk, the psychological dynamic matters pretty substantially. There is another aspect to this, though, that I think makes it more than a blip, uh, two other aspects that make it more than a blip. I think what Ukraine has done, Is, uh, to really extend the line on the Russian side and increase Russia’s headaches in, again, in, uh, in military terms that there’s now an allocation of resources problem in Russia.

That’s a lot bigger than it was before Ukraine’s incursion into course. And I think what Russia has to reckon with is that there may be other such ventures on Ukraine’s part, you know, maybe into Belarus at a certain point, or maybe, uh, around Belgrade where I think there’s been a bit of activity in the last, uh, week or so, or maybe elsewhere on.

Uh, on the line. So Russia, you know, it’s still, I think, smug and arrogant about all of this. That’s very much apparent in the way that Russia was completely unprepared for this. Uh, but you know, Russia is going to have to struggle to manage this line in new ways. And that I think is quite useful for Ukraine.

And then finally, you know, this is not going to topple Putin. Uh, and it might embitter Russians in some ways and make them more attached to the Russian war effort. That’s of course, uh, possible, but it is really a black eye. Uh, to Putin. He wasn’t prepared. Uh, he didn’t do a good job, or his government didn’t do a good job taking care of Russian citizens.

It was a kind of indifference shown to the plight of the over 100, 000 Russians who were evacuated from Uh, the Kursk, uh, region, and of course Putin has been doing something that to my mind has been really foolish over the last year, uh, and that is Putin every couple of months in different kinds of ceremonies, different kinds of settings, is declaring victory, keeps saying it’s around the corner, Ukraine’s about to fold, uh, you know, the West is going to stop supporting Ukraine any day now, uh, you know, victory is going to be ours, and Jeremy, you know better than anybody how this, you know, really damaged the American war effort in Vietnam, the sort of over promising.

Uh, overstating, uh, successes on the ground, and Putin has really been guilty of that over the last year. So, I think in this respect, Ukraine kind of hit Putin in the jugular, uh, that sort of hubris, that sort of overconfidence, and, you know. Putin commands Russian media. Nobody can stop him from saying what he wants to say.

Uh, but I think they’ve chipped away, uh, at this edifice of success. So it’s not a, it’s not the Tet Offensive. You can’t put it in those terms. And Putin is not running for reelection, uh, as Lyndon Johnson was in the, in the, in the winter and spring of 1968. Uh, but it’s not, not the Tet Offensive either. I mean, I think that it has a set of political consequences, which maybe felt Months or even years away from now, uh, that again, render this activity, this action far more than just a blip or far more than just.

Uh, a modest readjustment of, uh, of the line of contact.

Jeremi Suri: Right. And so back to your boxer metaphor, the Ukrainians have taken some punches on the chin, but this is a jab at the Russian solar plexus, which, which will sting and be painful for a long time.

Yeah. And it’s now three weeks in running that Russia has not been able to expel, uh, Ukraine.

Uh, and you know, there is, I think, uh, quite a bit of embarrassment there. Putin is vulnerable politically, not so much on the left, although, you I wouldn’t exactly use these terms left and right for Russian politics there. Uh, you know, it’s a different, uh, spectrum. It’s a different, uh, political culture, uh, but Putin is not vulnerable so much from the Moscow intelligentsia and from Western leading quote unquote liberals in Russia.

There aren’t too many of those people left and, and they’re very reluctant to speak up because of how repressive Russian politics has become. But from the beginning of the war, Russia or Putin rather has allowed a kind of dialogue or debate about the war in. or at least pro military, pro war channels on Telegram and other platforms.

This is a new dynamic in Russian life and it’s has that sort of uncontrollable social media quality, but you have to be, you know, sort of on board, uh, with the war. And, you know, Prigozhin last summer took advantage of this to sort of move, uh, at the Putin regime, uh, from the right. And I think here too, Putin has made himself, Uh, vulnerable for, you know, Russian nationalists for, uh, you know, Russians who are extremely enthusiastic, enthusiastic about, uh, the Russian military and the great powers and might, uh, of, uh, Russia as a proto imperium, you know, this is, uh, really awkward.

Uh, so in that sense too, I think Ukraine has made a intelligent, a kind of smart political calculation. He’s hitting Putin really where

Jeremi Suri: Michael, as, as I know you’ve seen and, and understand more deeply than I do, uh, President Zelensky and other Ukrainian leaders have been arguing for a long time that the United States and other, uh, supporters of Ukraine should allow them to take the gloves off, that for too long, uh, President Biden in particular has tried to support Ukraine, but also limit the way Ukraine uses the support it’s receiving from the U.

Jeremi Suri: S. So is not to invade Russian territory. So is not to provoke a wider war. Uh, and there were, of course, months ago concerns about Putin even using nuclear weapons, and we did not want that to happen. Uh, in a recent interviews, Alinsky has said that This is really a sign that the success of the Kursk incursion, that Ukraine should be allowed to act more aggressively, perhaps, as you say, moving into Belarus at some time.

Jeremi Suri: Um, do you agree with that?

I’m not sure I, I do. I think that, um, Biden speaks for the American population probably on this point. Uh, and here I have Democrats and Republicans. And independence in mind, uh, I don’t think that there is any pressure on Biden to go further. In fact, I think if anything, the domestic political situation in the U S suggests that constraints and caution in this regard are probably a reflection of American public opinion.

Now, I don’t think foreign policy is something that has to be done purely in line with public opinion, but I do think that that, uh, that that matters. If we look at the presidential election, and if we think of Harris as a kind of successor to Biden, which I’m sure she would be in Ukraine She’s not facing opponents who are trying to push her further or push the U.

S. further into support of Ukraine. It’s, it’s the opposite dynamic. And again, that’s not essential for policymaking, but I think that is a factor. So I think that this move in military and sort of, uh, political terms, uh, is quite intelligent on Ukraine’s part. But I do think that it carries certain costs, uh, and there are certain problems built into it, uh, that are related to this question of escalation or sort of escalation management.

And it’s not so much that this war is going to pull the US or Europe into World War III. I think that that’s a gross misreading of, uh, of this moment of the, uh, of the war or of the Ukrainian. incursion, but it does complicate a few things. So Ukraine wishes to become a member of the European Union and it wishes to become a member of NATO.

I think Ukraine moving deeper into Russian territory makes all of that a lot more problematic. And it’s not so much that it makes it problematic for Ukraine, you know, Ukraine is trying to win a war, totally understandably, but for countries that are considering a security guarantee to Ukraine, a sort of firm ironclad article five type commitment, that means one thing if Ukraine is defending its territory.

Uh, against a Russian attack, it means something very different if Ukraine is really deeply at war within, uh, within Russia. So, uh, I think in that sense, Zelensky has probably imperiled Ukraine’s prospects of joining the European Union or of joining NATO by doing this. And if Ukraine does more of this, it’s going to get, uh, more complicated.

So I think in that sense, too, for the U. S. and perhaps, you know, sort of Germany, Western European, European partners to be a little bit more on the fence and to be kind of cautious. is probably prudent and wise. I know my position is probably a bit contradictory because I think it makes sense for Ukraine, but I wouldn’t want this to become too overtly or too completely the Ukrainian recipe in the war.

Perhaps pinprick strikes moving here and there, creating uncertainties, creating anxieties in Moscow. That’s valuable with these kinds of incursions. But an all out, you know, sort of big, large scale Ukrainian presence on Russian territory Uh, there are some downsides to that, uh, as well, so I wouldn’t want to leave that out of the conversation.

You mentioned, uh, the upcoming presidential election in the United States, and of course there are also, uh, upcoming elections in, in Germany as well. Um, what do you think the stakes are, uh, in these two elections, in particular in the United States for Ukraine? How high are they? How disastrous would a Donald Trump victory in November 2024 be for Ukraine?

I think, uh, there are, you know, sort of three possibilities with Trump and the middle one is I think the most probable, uh, it’s a summit, it’s going to make for a somewhat boring answer to your question, Zachary, but the sort of first and third, um, possibilities are interesting to contemplate and, and, and quite terrifying to contemplate.

So the first possibility is that Trump really minimizes. support for Ukraine. Uh, there would be a tug of war with Congress, uh, but, you know, choosing Vance as his running mate is a sign that Trump could move in this direction. Uh, and when it comes to Ukrainian air defenses, uh, the U. S. plays an especially important role, but, you know, the U.

S. is the leading provider of military assistance to Ukraine. It does things that the Europeans can’t really replicate or can’t replicate quickly. And so kind of as we saw in the spring and early summer, you know, when the U. S. was not providing aid to Ukraine, uh, at that time, not accidentally, Ukraine’s military situation really deteriorated.

So there’s that. And I think the effect on Ukrainian morale, uh, could potentially be catastrophic. It seems like Europe, U. S. is, is pulling away. And I have no doubt that if the U. S. were to pull away in this sort of first scenario, That countries like Hungary and others, uh, in Europe, maybe Italy, which, you know, under Maloney is pro Ukraine but not, uh, you know, not robustly pro Ukraine, that these countries might start to break as well, break away as well, uh, and go in a more, uh, you know, sort of Russia friendly, uh, direction.

In that case, you know, Ukraine’s prospects for outright losing the war become quite a bit greater. That’s, of course, a very, very, um, worrisome, uh, possibility for everybody involved. Second scenario, I think, is just that things kind of go on as before. And I find this the most probable of the three scenarios that I’ll lay out for you, because this is kind of the story of 2016 2020.

You know, Trump talks a big game, especially on the campaign trail, promises that things are going to be very different. He’s often lazy and lacking initiative, or was often lazy and lacking initiative, when he was, uh, in office. He doesn’t want to be perceived as a loser. Uh, you know, um, you know, the kind of practical, uh, efforts that Trump made vis a vis Russia or really the Trump administration, Trump administration made vis a vis Russia were actually pretty favorable to Ukraine from 2016 to 2020.

So no grand bargain, two new countries that enter NATO, you know, tokening a deeper commitment to European or transatlantic security and the provision of lethal assistance by the Trump administration, which really helped Ukraine. In the beginning weeks of the, of the war, so that too I think is possible that it could be a different tone, a different tone of voice, but the policies might actually be pretty similar, uh, in which case, you know, you know, Ukraine would, would, would, would have a bit of wind in its sails, uh, even, uh, in a Trump administration.

But the third scenario, which I think does not get enough attention in our journalism and public debate about the election and about the war, is that Trump could escalate. Not because this is what he wants, or not because this is what he promised, but because he could get on social media and do something that, you know, gets him into an escalatory cycle.

Or because, a little bit like in Syria, Trump signed off on a hit in Syria, a military hit by the U. S. that resulted in the deaths of 300 Russian soldiers or mercenaries. Nobody quite knows who these people were. But there, Trump was willing to escalate on the ground, and I think that that’s, It’s not impossible, uh, in Ukraine.

And maybe that would be good for Ukraine, uh, but if done in a kind of erratic fashion without consultation with allies, without really, really real strategic intent, uh, that could be a really scary, uh, development as well. So doing less and doing more could both be scary. It’s not that doing the same is the perfect recipe.

Uh, but, uh, that’s possible, uh, too. I don’t think that in Germany the bottom is going to fall out, uh, and I don’t think that it’s possible for the far left or the far right to form a coalition on the federal level in Germany in a way that would really change Ukraine policy. So there’s going to be an election this fall, the far right looks like it’s going to do really well in East Germany, but they don’t have the power in these regions of Germany to change German foreign policy, uh, on the war.

So I think Germany is going to stay. More or less where it is. And of course, Germany is behind the curve. That’s the problem with Germany, but you know, it’s not going to be, uh, upended Germany by, by, by elections, I think.

Jeremi Suri: So Michael, as always, you’ve given us, uh, many dimensions to understanding this, this conflict.

Jeremi Suri: And that’s of course what we need to begin to understand it. But, but where do you see it going? I mean, regardless of whether Trump or Harris is elected, regardless of what happens in Germany. Much of what, what determines the course of the war is what’s happening on the ground, right? Uh, it’s not the planners who make the war.

Jeremi Suri: It’s the soldiers who makes the war. Uh, where do you see it going in the next three to six months? What should we expect to see?

I’m going to give you two possible outcomes. And the first is going to be on the pessimistic side. And the second to which I’m more intellectually wedded is going to be On the optimistic side.

I really don’t like how we’ve sort of collectively lost our optimism about this war. Uh, and you know, there, I think again, Jeremy’s poem, right? Tiring of our sympathy is a phrase that he had in the poem is a poem that should really make us, uh, think, uh, I’m tiring, not of our sympathy. I’m tiring of our pessimism about this, uh, about this, uh, about this war.

And so that’s why I want to make this, get the second scenario or sort of second possibility. Uh, across with a certain amount of, uh, of emphasis. The way in which the war could go very badly in the next 6 to 12 months, I think, is not so much a battlefield story. I don’t think it matters all that much how much territory Russia controls.

In the Donbass, now Russia controls about 18 percent of Ukraine’s territory, so even if it’s 19 or 20%, uh, that’s not gonna yield a big difference in the, uh, in the war. The place to look at the present moment is not exactly the battlefield, Uh, the place to look is Ukraine’s electrical grid and Ukraine’s heating capacity because Russia has just been eating away at that and eating away at that.

Uh, and pounding away, uh, to the extent that Ukraine is going to go into the winter. It’s, you know, a lot of cold weather there, uh, and there’s not going to be enough electricity and not enough heating supply to keep people warm, to keep businesses running, uh, to keep things, uh, well lit. Uh, and that could generate another wave of refugees that could really pressure Zelensky to do something.

We’ve talked about war weariness. You know, if Ukraine goes through a really hard winter, I wouldn’t want to say that all bets are off. I don’t think that Ukraine would surrender under those circumstances. But the war could change, and it probably could change precipitously, uh, and quickly. Again, war of attrition, many times in this, in this, in this podcast we’ve talked about the First World War, uh, and how that comes to an end, and the kind of implosion of Germany from within as a result of the embargo, as a result of the war, but it was a domestic political implosion, and I do have concerns in that regard, and they’re winter concerns.

Uh, we’re entering the winter of our discontent in that regard, and there’s a lot to worry about there. But here I want to Flip, uh, the switch a bit, uh, and I want to talk about how the war is actually going in some ways in the right direction or could be going in the right direction. So there was a Washington Post article about how before, uh, August 6th, which is the date that, you know, Ukraine entered into Russia in Kursk.

Uh, there was an article about how Ukraine and Russia were beginning to talk about some kind of deal. This was not a, you know, deal about territory or a deal about ending the war, but it was a deal that, uh, You know, if Ukraine would start striking less, Russia’s electrical grid and fuel supply, Russia would do the same, uh, to Ukraine, that there would be a kind of negotiation about not hitting certain kinds, uh, of targets.

I have to say, I find this enormously encouraging because I think it may mean, and I think Russia and Ukraine will return to this at a certain point, uh, August 6th sort of suspended these discussions and negotiations. It may mean that we’re entering the second phase of the war. The first phase of the war is the really active phase with all the, you know, sort of the big battles, set piece battles, big changes on the battlefield.

Second phase of the war may be a phase of the war in which Russia and Ukraine find and agree upon certain rules of engagement, gradually recognizing that neither side is going to get everything that they want. They can’t win the war outright, neither Russia nor Ukraine. But that rules of engagement might be useful.

Rules of engagement would lower the cost for Russia and Russia is paying high costs for this war, even though one can argue that costs don’t matter in Russia. I don’t think that that’s true, but, uh, Russia is paying high costs. And of course, Ukraine is paying immensely high costs for the war. So if we get to rules of engagement to the sort of second stage of the war, I think what we can start to envision is a third phase of the war where the war would begin to minimize.

It would be a grueling. War of attrition still there would be a line of contact that would be fluid. It would still be a war. That’s sort of what I envisioned. I think this war is going to go on for many years to come. But if there are rules of engagement and if the war can be minimized, uh, I think Ukraine can start moving forward as a society and as a country, as a polity.

Uh, in ways that would be material and meaningful, uh, and important. Now, if we say that only victory can make us optimistic about the, uh, about the war, and we’ve got to have it all, uh, I think we’re going to be in a state of permanent frustration. If we can move this war forward from, uh, A brutal war that’s anarchic and very wide ranging to certain rules of engagement to a somewhat contained and minimized conflict.

I think that that’s progress and I think I feel inklings of that at the present moment.

Jeremi Suri: Michael, maybe this builds on that, uh, last scenario, but it does seem to me historically that there are two ways that wars of attrition end. One is the World War I, November 1918 end when one side just collapses from the weight of the war.

Jeremi Suri: Um, and, and as you pointed out, the scary possibilities that could happen with Ukraine, it seems unlikely that Russia will, will, will collapse anytime soon. Um, and it seems unlikely that, uh, Putin will lose power. That doesn’t mean it’s impossible. Uh, but the second way that wars end, and maybe this is what you mean by, um, rules of engagement, one side, usually the aggressor or the initial aggressor.

Jeremi Suri: Decides they don’t want to fight anymore. And usually they don’t, um, admit that they were wrong. In fact, they rarely do, but usually they declare victory and leave, or they declare victory and massively reduce. So I think of the Russians actually in Ukraine, um, uh, in, in, uh, In, in, uh, earlier periods, historically fighting Germans and others, I think of Russia in Afghanistan, uh, in the 1980s.

Jeremi Suri: I think of the United States in Iraq. Um, is that a possible scenario?

Yes, I think it very much, uh, it very much, uh, is. Now, uh, it’s going to be hard for Putin to declare, uh, Um, you know, if he’s not able to claim territories, if these territories are under, uh, under attack, I mean, the politics of it are very tricky, uh, on the Russian side.

And if Russia begins to minimize without visible gains, uh, but I think that’s sort of the destiny to which Russia is content, condemned one way or another, uh, there could be political consequences and it could be difficult. Uh, it could be difficult for Putin, but I think that that’s a really distinct possibility, uh, with this, uh, with this conflict, especially if we start to get certain tacit agreements between Russia, uh, and Ukraine.

And maybe these could be agreements over Crimea, for example. And it’s not that Ukraine would grant Crimea to Russia. That would be really, uh, you know, sort of crazy, and I don’t think that that’s doable with Ukrainian domestic politics, fortunately. Uh, but maybe Ukraine would agree not to attack Crimea, right?

And in return, Ukraine would get certain agreements that Russia would maybe hold off on the, Uh on the city of Kiev, uh, and then you kind of build on that It’s not exactly confidence building measures because I don’t think Ukraine’s going to have a lot of confidence or trust in russia for for many decades or even generations Uh to come but it’s a kind of quid pro quo, you know realpolitik Uh that you know delivers tangible benefits, especially if this is done, you know behind the scenes and kind of secretively Uh, so, you know russia’s concessions wouldn’t have to be openly admitted to uh as concessions But I think that that would simply be a positive A positive step.

And so what we might get, and this is something I could envision five, 10 years from now, are certain forms of normalization for Ukraine, uh, that proceed from that. Now, I think Russia would have to accept if this is the state of affairs that would obtain, uh, that it would not be able to normalize relations with Europe or with the United States under these circumstances, you know, our politics could change hugely and we could completely change our position on Ukraine.

You know, maybe that will happen with the election or that might happen later. But absent that, I think what the U. S. and Europe is going to require of Russia for normalization is a withdrawal from Ukraine, you know, war crimes, tribunals, and reparations. And I don’t think that that’s what Russia is going to deliver.

So even if Russia could minimize the war, which might be in Russia’s interest, they will not be able, Russia will not be able to normalize relations with, uh, with the West. So I think that that’s sort of out of the picture for Russia, but still I can envision this moderation or minimization of the war, uh, and, you know.

Maybe that doesn’t mount as, as, as you’re asking about, uh, Jeremy, maybe that doesn’t mount to Russia kind of declaring victory and In effect, beginning to turn tail and move on to other things.

Jeremi Suri: So, that, that’s very compelling, Michael, and that’s the story of a long war, a long war of attrition, like most wars of attrition, and uh, a long denouement, right?

Jeremi Suri: I, I guess the, the historical insight is that wars of attrition begin, uh, Fast, but they take a long, long time to wind down. And they’re obviously very costly. And as Zachary’s poem points out, filled with bloodstains in all directions. Uh, our final question, it’s, it’s always the question we ask you at the end of our discussions, Michael.

Jeremi Suri: Um, What should we do? In particular, what should the United States do? Uh, if you are, and I hope you will be brought into discussions in December, January of 2024 25 during transition of one kind or another in the White House. What should the United States and what should American citizens be doing right now?

Well, I’ve already staked what I suppose is a somewhat moderate or maybe cautious, perhaps excessively, excessively cautious position when it comes to changing the rules on the weapons that the U. S. provides to Ukraine or on some of the constraints that are attached to the U. S. provision of those, uh, weapons.

Uh, and I think that that’s basically in the American interest. That’s how I see it. And, uh, unfortunately, you know, that might also contribute to a very long war, uh, or take out the possibility, hypothetical possibility that the U S were allow were to allow its missiles to be employed deep in Russian territory, that we could get a quick end to the, uh, to the war.

So I, I would like to think of dramatic new approaches that we could have to the war, but that, to me, is not, uh, one that, uh, that really comes to mind. Um, I think that after the election, and I don’t think that this would happen under Trump, so it’s only advice that could be given to a Harris administration.

There’s one thing that does change for the U. S., or that changes for the White House, and this is that in an election year, uh, the, uh, You know, the white house has to be really concerned about inflation. And the Biden administration, another aspect of the Biden administration’s caution vis a vis this conflict has been a real reluctance to go after Russian gas.

Uh, and oil, you know, there have been sanctions and the market has changed and Europe has shut the door to Russian gas and oil or parts of Europe have shut the door, but the U. S. Has been pretty reluctant to put big sanctions on Russian gas and oil. That means that, uh, you know, a lot of money continues to flow into Russia, you know, from the sale of gas and oil.

Uh, and I think that the Biden administration has been fearful that if it would really go after this, that it would drive up oil prices. In global markets and the result would be inflation back here In the u. s. Now that’s going to still be a situation after the election, but I think there’s probably a year or two of freedom there Uh where the u.

s could change some of its policies and maybe pursue a different kind of economic statecraft And start to squeeze russia. There’s a lot of inflation in russia I think there are a lot of economic vulnerabilities that russia has And this might be a really interesting move to make, but it could only be made, uh, after the, uh, election.

Of course, a Harris administration would have to juggle the domestic concerns with the foreign policy concerns, but I think that that’s something that’s new that could be done. But the other piece of advice I would offer in addition to maybe reconsidering economic statecraft with this war, uh, is, uh, to have self confidence in the policies that have already been put in place by Uh, and in a way not to, you know, I’m going to go back to Jeremy, to Zachary’s poem for a moment, not to tire of our sympathy for, uh, for Ukraine.

And I know that these points have been made a number of times in our conversations, but I do feel compelled, uh, to make them again. So if it’s a Harris administration, you know, the case for supporting Ukraine has to be made, uh, to the American public. You know, I think Harris is a good communicator. Uh, and I think Waltz is a good communicator and they need to get out there and, you know, sort of do the job.

Uh, I don’t think the Biden administration has been brilliant about communicating, uh, the need for sustained sympathy for, for Ukraine. So there’s a domestic political part of this. We’ve talked about this many times before, but this is a good time, uh, in a transition and with a new person in the White House, this is a good time to make the case.

Is the Trump administration going to go out and make the case? You know, probably not, but if they feel the need to continue supporting Ukraine, which I think they would, uh, when they would come to office, uh, then they might be forced to make the case and certainly one could offer the advice that they, uh, that they do so.

But the final point that I want to make, uh, it’s a nice note, I think, on which to conclude our conversation is that we need to see our actions Uh, in helping Ukraine over the last two and a half years, we need to see them as part of a continuum and a trajectory of success. Not as a quick march to victory.

I wish we could do that. I wish we had that with the war. We don’t, and we won’t for quite a long time to come, but there is a continuum and trajectory of success. Ukraine holds on to it. 82 percent of its territory after two years of a huge and brutal war. Ukraine is building up its defense industrial capacity.

Europe is building up its defense industrial capacity. Uh, in ways that are really going to matter in 2025, and the U. S. is building up certain aspects of its defense industrial capacity that are going to be useful for, uh, for Ukraine, you know, artillery shells, uh, and, uh, and other things. Let’s put this into a continuum of policy success, uh, that there’s a lot that we’ve achieved and accomplished over the last two and a half years.

And if we stick with it and we have the patience and we have the self confidence to stick with it over the long haul, uh, that, uh, we’re going to make big headway and we’re going to make real progress. Uh, with this war. Now that’s an aspirational outcome. It’s an aspirational way of looking at the war. We need to have, you know, criticism and an honest conversation about all of the difficulties.

Uh, but I think that aspirational piece is still, uh, pretty important. Let’s remember what’s been achieved. Let’s, you know, identify that as clearly as possible. Let’s build on it and let’s have the self confidence that if we stick with it, We’ll achieve even more with this war and that the death and devastation, which is the heart and soul of the war, of course, uh, is not something that disillusions us, but something that keeps us on target and on board with the, you know, the larger, uh, and, and ultimate goals that we have with this conflict.

Jeremi Suri: Zachary Michael’s given us, as always, a very realistic and pragmatic way forward with, um, I think it’s fair to say moderate expectations. Realistic hopes and, uh, an underlying call for patience, uh, and continued commitment is, is that compelling? Is that enough for, um, especially younger voters, younger voters who seem to be more engaged, more enthusiastic about elements of, of the Harris campaign?

Jeremi Suri: Now we’ll, we’ll, we’ll this. this perspective, keep people engaged on the issue of Ukraine?

Maybe. I do think that, um, candidates in particularly, um, Democrats who are in favor of continuing support to Ukraine, as I think all of them are, need to be better at articulating this point that it has been a success for the United States, not just in a sort of moral sense of that, our values are being defended.

But also that we’re physically defending ourselves, our allies, and that we’re making very, very strategic gains. Um, I think that’s critical, um, and I don’t think that young people necessarily feel that right now. I think, um, particularly for understandable reasons, particularly with, uh, uh, Israel’s, with the war between Israel and Hamas right now.

a lot of attention among young people on American foreign policy is going, uh, to a different part of the world. And I think, uh, we need leaders who can articulate real solutions to both conflicts. Um, but we can’t forget about Ukraine in that mix.

Jeremi Suri: Michael, just a quick follow up on that before we close.

Jeremi Suri: What, what should we do?

I want to add one quick point there because it’s, it’s difficult, but it’s also important. One of the great success stories of this war is the success in deterring Russia from any kind of incursion or attack. On nato territory now, we might say that russia never had the intention, you know, it’s not deterrence It’s just russian lack of will or russian lack of capacity, but i’m just not sure There’s a lot that we don’t know about this war There’s a lot that we don’t know about russian ambitions and russian planning And in a way nato has been as it was for the duration of the cold war It’s just been superb at doing what it was designed to do Which initially was to deter the soviet union and now of course it’s there to deter russia and it’s been extraordinary at that In a way, NATO has been a hero of this conflict.

I wish it had been more of a hero on the battlefields of Ukraine and wish it had, you know, had really contributed to a quick end to the conflict, but that’s not something that we can, uh, that’s not something that we can point to. But on the, on the side of deterrence, you know, this has just been An absolutely extraordinary moment.

And I think very much, uh, a Biden administration success story. So thinking about the democratic party, one of the things that the party has to learn, and it’s really not easy, uh, is to tell the story of deterrence as a story of success in a way. That’s why you have NATO. That’s why you have something like NATO is to deter Russia, uh, when Russia has become so bellicose.

Uh, and so, uh, and so radical. But it’s sort of like explaining the sound of one hand clapping, right, to, to explain the achievements of deterrence. When you don’t see the effects, uh, that’s when you see the success of deterrence. And that’s, you know, a very, very tricky story to tell. But you know, Democrats have been eloquent in the last couple of days.

They can tell a lot of stories, uh, well, it seems to me that’s one of the clear takeaways from the, from the convention. This is, so this is yet another of the stories that needs to be well told.

Jeremi Suri: I, I think that’s spot on, Michael. I think, you know, one of the challenges is always to explain the events that did not happen.

Yes.

Jeremi Suri: And the important things we’ve done to prevent those things from happening, which could have happened otherwise. And, uh, I, I think that’s one of the real takeaways today. It’s not that the incursion into Kursk has fundamentally changed the war, but as you say, It has shown both, uh, within the allied side, but also to Russia and others that Ukraine, uh, still has very strong legs and is in this war for the longterm and fighting for the right reasons.

Jeremi Suri: And that has to be a story that Americans continue to rally to for the cause of democracy and defending the West, as you say.

Yes? Yeah, that’s, I think, perfectly said.

Jeremi Suri: Michael, as always, uh, you bring, I think, a real, uh, integrity and thoughtfulness to everything you say on this issue. And you’ve really helped me and our listeners understand, uh, this difficult war.

Jeremi Suri: And it’s, it’s long, uh, complicated duration, uh, today and in, in your many prior discussions with us. And of course, in your many writings, thank you, Michael, for joining us today.

Well, this war has brought very little that you could describe as good, but it is a source of, uh, you know, pride and happiness that we’ve had so many of these kinds of conversations over the past two and a half years, and they’re always spurred by Zachary’s wonderful poems.

Uh, and by the great questions the two of you, uh, that the two of you always ask.

Jeremi Suri: I think that’s right, Zachary. Thank you, as always, for your, uh, insightful and thoughtful problem on Bloodstains, uh, this time. Uh, and thank you most of all to our loyal listeners and loyal readers of our Cepstack. For joining us, uh, for every day on the substack and joining us every week for our discussion, and it is a real joy, even though this is a difficult topic to be able to discuss these issues with leading figures and to share that wisdom with a larger audience that cares.

Jeremi Suri: Thank you for joining us. For this week of This Is Democracy.

Outro: This podcast is produced by the Liberal Arts ITS Development Studio and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Harris Codini. Stay tuned for a new episode every week.

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