This is Democracy – Episode 263: China’s Domestic and Foreign Policy

[00:00:00] Intro: This is Democracy. A podcast about the people of the United States. A podcast about citizenship. About engaging with politics and the world around you. A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues. And how to have a voice in what happens next.

[00:00:23] Jeremi: Welcome to our new episode of This is Democracy.

This is a very special episode because we’re joined by a good friend and a colleague and wonderful world leading expert, Sheena Chestnut Gritens. She is, of course, an expert on China and East Asia and the relations of that region to the United States and wider parts of the world. And today she’s going to talk to us about changes in China.

How China as a society is changing before our eyes and what that means for the wider world, in particular U. S. policy, but also the Asian region and elsewhere. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, where she directs UT’s Asia Policy Program.

Uh, Sheena, thank you so much for joining us today.

[00:01:11] Sheena: Well, thanks for having me. It’s great to be able to talk about these issues with you.

[00:01:14] Jeremi: Professor Greitens is also a non resident scholar with the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She’s the author of a number of books. Uh, her first book, Dictators and Their Secret Police, is really a groundbreaking study of the politics of international security and how they’ve changed.

Uh, particularly with regard to internal security issues and repression in places like Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Her second book is on the politics of the North Korean diaspora. and the intersection of also between security, authoritarianism, repression, and diaspora politics. And she’s completing a new book, which I am certainly excited to read, on how internal security concerns affect Chinese grand strategy.

Before we get to our conversation with Sheena Greitens, of course we have, uh, Mr. Zachary’s scene setting poem. What’s the title of your poem today, Zachary? Far away. Far away. Let’s hear it.

[00:02:09] Zachary: Between us lies a churning sea. And our fair share of history, of wars we’ve suffered and fought, of what’s been lost and what’s been bought.

And between us lies an open ocean, and more than many, a preconceived notion of who exactly stands on the other side, of what floats above and neath the tide. And so, too, do politicians words soar over like fluttering birds, the waves between you and me, the cargo ships on the darkening sea. But sometimes, naively, I wonder, if all might fall asunder, if we could only stand and see, my hand touching yours, and yours touching me, a bridge of sorts across the sea.

No, it is a silly thing to say. The other shore is far away.

[00:03:01] Jeremi: I love the poem, Zachary. I love the feeling of the ocean, the geography, and the topography of your, of your poem. The oceanography of it, I guess I should say. What is your poem about? My

[00:03:11] Zachary: poem is about the paradoxes and the dissonance between the reality of the close connections between the Chinese people and the American people, um, of our economies, our cultures, our educational institutions, our populations.

But the way that sort of contrasts with the adversarial political relationships and how it can be sort of disconcerting or a little discombobulating to think in sort of both spaces about the connections between the two countries at a very sort of basic humane level, and then the political adversarial relationships, which often seem inevitable or sort of prone to conflict.

Right. Right. How difficult it is to square the two.

[00:03:52] Jeremi: Is that a good place to start, Sheena, that the tensions between the connections among peoples, but yet the adversarial politics between the United States and China?

[00:04:01] Sheena: Yeah, I think that’s a great place to start. Um, and I was actually thinking, Zachary, when I was listening to your poem, which I am a big fan of, I really enjoyed the chance to hear it, um, of the work by a historian who I had the opportunity to learn from in college named Gordon Chang, not the person who wrote the, uh, coming fall of China or whatever that book is called.

But there’s another historian at Stanford, um, called Gordon Chang, who has written some really terrific books about Asian immigration to the United States and in particular, the long standing. cultural historical ties. Um, they go back, you know, not just decades, but much longer in American history. And growing up on the West coast, that history was sort of much more interwoven in the geography of things you could see growing up as a kid and state history and things like that.

Um, but it really, your poem really kind of called, called that, that paradox to mind of, um, you know, countries that have had, long historical interaction across a range of spheres, but where there really is an intense geopolitical competition and a real divide in the two political systems. One, you know, the United States, um, a democracy that, that tries to be a leader among global democracies, um, and has been for, for, um, You know, much of the past century and China, which is, is today the world’s most powerful autocracy.

Um, and so there’s the geopolitical tension and there’s the tension between these two very different political systems. I think it’s a great thing to highlight at the start.

[00:05:27] Jeremi: And that’s such a helpful way to, to talk about this. I remember, uh, thinking, uh, many, many times as, as I read some of the history of China that you know so much better than I do, how there’s both a special relationship with the United States, as I think Michael Hunt calls it and Gordon Chang also in his book, Friends and Enemies, I think.

But, uh, at the same time, uh, the ways in which, um, there’s also a long history of, of tensions between these societies that, that you and Zachary have highlighted. How does the domestic repression within China, particularly today, something that you’ve written a lot about, how does that domestic repression affect China’s relationship to the wider world?

[00:06:06] Sheena: I think it spills over into multiple areas of life. And that’s particularly been the case under Xi Jinping because he has a concept of security and what he calls national security. You could also translate it as, as state security and sort of regime security. Um, but he has this concept of security that is, he calls it comprehensive and it it is in fact comprehensive.

Um, and he has really securitized all of these different areas of not just Chinese politics. But Chinese social life and sort of the fabric of people’s everyday life and the economy. And so the emphasis on security and in particular the sort of securing the CCP’s role as the ruling party over Chinese society has been something that Xi Jinping has emphasized.

So it’s front and center in China’s domestic politics. But he is also sort of systematically. Securitized and tighten political control over and in many cases outright repression over different parts of Chinese society that then have all of these effects of on the wider world. So when I was in China, um, gosh, I think it was in summer of 2015.

China had just passed an NGO law that required. NGOs to move from being managed by the Ministry of Civil Affairs to the Ministry of Public Security, the police agency. And so that was one example of where foreign NGOs who are operating in China, often doing really interesting work on a whole range of topics from You know, air pollution to legal rights training to, you know, other advocacy issues, um, were gradually turned into a potential security threat.

We’ve seen the same thing with the Chinese economy, where the ministry of state security every couple of weeks now issues a warning about the security and espionage threats from foreign business presence in China. And so all of these areas where China interacts with the wider world, even places that we think of as as Maybe more cultural or economic or educational, um, have been gradually turned into or in China taken over by this security framework.

Um, there’s now an effort to really push national security education in Chinese universities and education down to the elementary school level. So that also affects the academic ties between the two countries. So You know, Xi Jinping’s policies have gradually had that effect on all of these different areas of Chinese life and the ability of the Chinese people to, to have, um, interactions with the, the broader world.

And they’ve also just really shaped China’s image. China has now, I think, a much less favorable image image among big swaths of the global population and, uh, and has a reputation in it and an image in the minds of the United States, but, but other countries as well as being much more repressive. Um, and that’s a change from, you know, a pre pre some of the previous periods when I first started going to China where people were more optimistic about the direction China might have gone.

And so I think. That’s also contributed just to this overall pessimism and tension in China’s relationships with the outside world, but probably particularly with the United States.

[00:09:16] Zachary: Why do you think, um, this period, uh, in the past few years, when China seems to have been more connected with the wilder, wider world than ever before has been sort of followed or, or, or has come in tandem with this, this, um, crackdown on internal dissent and this greater emphasis on, uh, So

[00:09:36] Sheena: I do attribute quite a bit of it to Xi Jinping.

I don’t think, you know, it’s solely one individual. Um, the party did choose Xi Jinping to be the leader. They knew something about his history when he was a provincial leader and something about where they thought he would take China. But I think that he has, Accumulated and centralized power to it to an extent and with a speed that that may have surprised some people inside China.

I can’t really speak for them. So I won’t try. It certainly surprised me outside many outside observers who thought that Xi Jinping might continue. the tradition of reform and opening and even push political reform a bit more. Um, and instead he’s, he’s reverse course. Now I can tell you, you know, we have, um, some signals about the way that he thinks about the world and these concerns that You know, from the, the fall of the, um, communist party systems in, in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, that, you know, Western backed subversion and influence was a contributing factor in the fall of communist rule in those places.

And so one way to view Xi Jinping’s tightening of control over all of these areas where China interacts with the wider world is to try to regulate and control them, to keep them Those vectors of foreign influence from becoming a security threat. Now, many of us would look at that and think that that’s paranoid.

Um, and it has had, you know, really widespread and I would say probably detrimental effect, certainly on academic exchange and probably on its economic performance, but Xi Jinping appears to really. view these things as a potential threat to the security of the Chinese Communist Party and its leadership.

And that, you know, he had enough ability to, to outline this vision and then has accumulated more and more power to be able to execute it. And so at this point, you know, it really is a system. That has centralized a fair amount of power in one individual leader who has spent 10 years developing this vision and appointing personnel who believed in it.

So I think it’s pretty baked into the political system and into all of the senior party leadership at this point.

[00:11:44] Jeremi: Has the very difficult experience China had with COVID. And the economic, uh, slowdown, as well as the demographic collapse of the population, I think by 2050, right, the population will be half of what it was in, in 2000.

Have those factors contributed to the repressive instincts and actions of the regime?

[00:12:04] Sheena: You know, it’s hard to say before there was this, you know, again, in the sort of pre Xi Jinping era, or for the first few years of his rule, there was this belief that the party In the minds of the party, the party thought that they had to maintain a certain level of economic growth, and therefore economic openness, in order to keep social and regime stability.

And so, one of the things that sort of people, you know, outside observers thought could be guaranteed continued openness, at least to a certain point in the Chinese economy and Chinese society, Was this idea that that was conducive to social stability and Xi Jinping appears to think about these things somewhat differently, where he’s willing to accept a lower growth rate and to, you know, pay the cost, at least for a while of zero covid.

The economic costs, um, because he believed that doing anything else would be too destabilizing from a social stability standpoint. So, he appears to be willing to take a hit on economic performance, so to speak, in order to, to keep Um, political and security control, and that does make him a bit different than some of the previous generations of Chinese leaders.

But the challenges you’re identifying are very real. Um, I mean, these are, these are real challenges, and there is a point at which lack of economic growth and unemployment and things like that could start to have a negative effect on social stability. And so the question is, is Xi Jinping going to have the information necessary to recognize when that’s happening?

And is he going to be willing to run the risk of solving that problem if it, if it could introduce other risks that he’s, he seems to have been more concerned about.

[00:13:43] Zachary: And in that context, how should we understand China’s increasingly aggressive moves overseas, obviously in the South China Sea, but also across the developing world?

Um, to sort of try and, and, and create a sphere of influence of their own. How should we understand that effort, uh, particularly in the context of sort of past political leadership in China?

[00:14:02] Sheena: Yeah, you know, I think that’s a really important question. And I, again, I was struck in the, the, um, sort of opening of the podcast that, you know, one of the things that we know from political science research is that.

Historically, levels of global democracy are, are higher when the international system or international order is led by a democratic great power or democratic great powers. And in periods where there’s an autocracy or a dictatorship, um, that is at the, the apex of the, of the international system, um, those periods tend to be less friendly to global democracy.

So, so for a podcast, very focused on, on the dynamics of, of democracy, um, I do think the domestic politics of China. You know, history and quantitative political science would tell us that, that this question really does matter for levels of democracy around the world. But I think broadly speaking, Xi Jinping is very, very worried about the international environment being unpredictable.

And he, you know, unlike it’s, we tend to think, well, with greater power, surely China will feel more secure. And Xi Jinping is sort of, in this sense, a traditional Marxist, um, he has a sort of classical, classically dialectical way of thinking about this, where he talks about, well, as opportunities increase and as China approaches the center of the world stage, actually the difficulties and risks get higher, not lower.

And so he, um, is very, I think, concerned about the international environment changing in ways that are unpredictable or he talks about black swans and gray rhinos. Um, in it, that’s his language for describing some of the unpredictability in the current global environment. He’s very worried about those things typically because they could sort of diffuse back into China and create instability at home.

And so a lot of what I think we’re seeing are attempts to, uh, sort of create solutions to global problems or build a security order. That is friendly, not just to China as a country, but friendly to the continued ruling status of the Communist Party. And so, some of, you know, what Xi Jinping is doing lately with security assistance, including to places that have traditional defense cooperation with the United States, is designed to actually, um, you know, do security cooperation on law enforcement and policing.

Which, whether China is sort of explicitly exporting a model of communist control, it, it often isn’t, it is sometimes exporting a model of law enforcement where political policing is, is inextricably tied up with, with normal criminal policing. And so the norm, the potential for security norms in the global environment to change.

And for a security architecture to be created, um, that is not particularly friendly to democracy, not because Xi Jinping wants to make the world autocratic, but because he wants to make it more friendly to the CCP, I think is, is actually quite high. And so a lot of what China is doing seems to be designed to create an international environment that is, That reduces the risk again to the CCP’s hold on power at home.

[00:17:07] Jeremi: That makes a lot of sense. And it brings us to the obvious question one has to ask, uh, the relationship to Taiwan, uh, which, um, of course, um, Xi Jinping’s government and his predecessors all claimed as their territory and that they refused to see as a separate or even semi independent territory. What, what do you see as their goals in Taiwan?

Are you among those who believe the Chinese are preparing for some sort of military? I

[00:17:36] Sheena: think they, I think it is clear that Xi Jinping believes that Taiwan is part of China and that he has tied Taiwan pretty explicitly to his goal of national rejuvenation for which he set a 2049 deadline. Now, that’s an interesting deadline because it is not actually clear that Xi Jinping will be around to meet that deadline, right?

So in some ways that actually gives him some wiggle room as a leader to have a, A deadline that is sort of visible, but not necessarily, but would allow him potentially to, to, um, say, well, I have, I have carried the torch this far and I’m, I’m handing it to a successor. He’s also made statements though, like, like, um, one that comes up from time to time that, that the Taiwan issue should not just be handed over from generation to generation.

So it’s, um, the timeline here that the CCP has is unclear. They’ve never taken force off the table, but much of Chinese strategy. Seems designed to try to achieve their objectives at a sort of maximal efficiency and conflict and sort of the level of conventional military combat would be tremendously destructive.

[00:18:43] Sheena: For the United States, for China, for Taiwan, for everyone in the region, and for the global economy. And so I, you know, I still think that if China sees a path. To absorb and take over, um, control, political control of Taiwan, maybe in the way that it’s done over time with Hong Kong, um, which it sometimes offers as a model, um, although I don’t think that’s an appealing model to many of the, the, you know, inhabitants of, of Taiwan who are quite used to a very vivid democracy.

Um, but I think if, if the CCP sees a path that, where they can get what they want without the cost of conflict, then sure, they’ll take it. But they’ve also never taken force off the table, and Xi Jinping appears to be pushing his military to be ready sooner rather than later. Now, that may be because he believes they won’t be ready if he doesn’t push, and that they are probably not ready now.

But, um, certainly there’s been a lot of resources and leadership attention devoted to being ready if the CCP decides it’s politically necessary, um, to accomplish their goals.

[00:19:45] Zachary: Um, what should we make of the increasing attention to China in American domestic politics, particularly around Taiwan, and the ways in which an adversarial relationship with China has become a sort of litmus test for American politicians.

What do you make of that sort of changing political relationship?

[00:20:06] Sheena: Yeah, it’s been, you know, really, really an interesting thing to watch unfold because for for a while there was a, um, You know, sort of an economic and a business constituency that that was particularly friendly to China as economic competition has intensified and the perception that China is engaging in unfair trade practices has intensified.

You know, those voices have have have the space for those voices is really narrowed, and I think fewer people are are supportive of those arguments. And so some of of the actions China has taken have really. Removed some of these stabilizing what were stabilizing factors in the cooperative side of the U.

S. China relationship. So what we’ve seen is really a growing bipartisan consensus that China is a problem. Now, you know, I won’t go through every example, but, you know, some of some of the legislation that is proposed is sort of, you know, wiser and has less, I think, unintended consequences than others. And some of it.

Um, you know, focuses on what I view as the high priority issues and some of these things seem like, you know, sometimes marginal issues. But that’s, again, that’s democracy, that’s the way that, um, you know, a messy, large legislature works. That different, you know, legislators get to pick their priorities and make their case to the public and see what sticks and doesn’t.

But I do think that Uh, you know, some of the, and COVID probably contributed to this, but some of the subnational bases of support for, um, for the cooperative, cooperative pieces of the U. S. China relationship have eroded. And China’s behavior hasn’t, hasn’t been helpful in maintaining that, that ballast.

There have been, um, You know, its decision to securitize many aspects of the U. S. China relationship has, um, has been a real contributing factor to the, um, the narrowing of support for cooperation with China, even on issues where it is important and might be in the United States interest, like some of the counter narcotics cooperation, it’s just become a very difficult path.

[00:22:12] Jeremi: Yes. Yes. And, and how should we think about this in the coming of our election in November? Uh, there’s obviously concern about continued Russian interference. Um, certainly Russian trolling and propaganda in the United States. Is there a similar concern you have about China with regard to our election?

[00:22:32] Sheena: Yeah. You know, I’m not an expert on, um, on foreign election interference. Um, so I’ll, I’ll focus more on the piece I know well, which is that China is very open about some of the strategic narratives that it propagates in the world, um, about the United States as being hypocritical as the United States, not being the, you know, the United States vision of democracy is not being effective in solving key social challenges.

Um, that’s one of the things you’ll hear about. about the fentanyl crisis is that, you know, this is a failure really of the American democratic and domestic governance system. That’s again, the CCP strategic narrative about this. And, you know, a lot of that is, is quite open. Um, and China’s, you know, rhetoric, for example, about, about Ukraine and, um, and what was happening in Ukraine was, you know, sort of most consistent through line in their, their, uh, comments on the Ukraine war for the first, what, year, year and And a couple months was this is NATO’s fault.

This is the fault of an American Alliance system that, um, pursues security for people inside the Alliance and partnership network at everybody else’s expense. And if, you know, this is just, this is all NATO’s fault. And that was very convenient because it also allowed them to make the same arguments about the American Alliance system in their own backyard in Asia.

So there may be malign, um, and covert, uh, election interference efforts. Certainly, there’s, you know, the FBI has issued lots of warnings about transnational repression and Chinese espionage. Um, you know, I’m not in any way dismissing that, that threat, I just don’t have good visibility on it. Um, but we see very clear efforts to de legitimate the American political system pretty openly in Chinese state media and by Chinese diplomats and, and, you know, it’ll be interesting to see how they, they react to the, um, American election, um, particularly the, the presidential election.

Um, but. I have no crystal ball and no idea what’s going to happen in November. So I don’t think I’ll speculate anymore on how they’ll react because I don’t know what’s going to happen here first.

[00:24:35] Jeremi: Exactly right. As scholars, we’ve learned to be very humble about predicting particularly close elections. Uh, and, and in this season, when so many democracies more than ever before in our history.

In the history of the world, so many are going through major, um, election cycles.

[00:24:50] Sheena: Well, lemme just slide one thing too, please. Before that I think we’ll get, we’ll get, um, you know, we’re coming up on an important moment in Taiwan’s democratic history in that Taiwan is inaugurating a new president on May 20th.

And, uh, so, so when President Lai is inaugurated, he is, uh, the successor to, um, tying when, so, so we don’t have a, a party transition. In the presidency, um, and that’s the, the, uh, party in Taiwan that Beijing traditionally likes to deal with a little less, sometimes characterizes pro independence, although that’s really not accurate anymore, um, but he’s from the DPP, and, um, you know, how, Beijing reacts to that moment of democratic transition in Taiwan is going to be really important.

Um, I think that’s probably something that secretary Blinken, uh, discussed during his visit. I don’t have any inside information to suggest that, but I think that’s probably something that he was trying to talk through in advance or prepare for. Um, and make clear that the United States really does not want that to be a destabilizing moment in the region.

Yes. Um, but it’s, you know, again, just, just in terms of democratic transitions around the world, that’s going to be a focal point. And it’s coming up in just a matter of days at this point.

[00:26:03] Jeremi: You’re right. And of course, uh, how that goes, we’ll have reverberations throughout the region quite immediately. So you’ve really brilliantly and so succinctly, uh, outlined so many of the challenges, um, within China and, uh, how those challenges, uh, reverberate out for foreign policy, for U.

S. policy, for, um, the growth and sustenance of democracies around China, in Taiwan, Hong Kong, which I think was a democracy, isn’t any longer because of Chinese influence. Um, what should. Our listeners be thinking about doing themselves. What should they be arguing for? We always like to close, you know, with a way of trying to bring this history, this analysis to contemporary citizenship for those who care about democracy.

What are the things that ordinary citizens should be looking at in particular? And what are the pathways for hope if there are any for citizens in their activism and they’re thinking about these issues?

[00:27:03] Sheena: Oh, wow. That’s really a difficult and important question. Um, I’m trying to think about not giving you a 30 minute, you know, discursive exposition on, on the answer to that, because I think there are, there’s a, um, there’s a lot to unpack in that question.

Look, the U. S. China relationship has always been a mix of conflict and cooperation. Um, right now that the competitive, uh, and even conflictual aspects are really at the fore. And I think that’s going to continue, um, because of the spillover effects of China’s highly autocratic and repressive political system because of some of its choices about foreign policy where it’s choosing to, to, you know, Use water cannons and, and other tactics in very aggressive ways against democratic allies like the Philippines in, um, in the Indo Pacific.

And so I think for a lot of listeners, um, our counterparts in Asia, whether they’re allies or, um, potential competitors or adversaries like, like the, the folks in, um, in Beijing. often know our history and the history of the bilateral relationship much better than we do, and are able to draw on that history and learn from it, um, because it’s more familiar.

Um, so I think the first thing is it’s, it’s really helpful to, to know a little bit more about the history that, that Zachary’s poem alluded to, um, and the, the way That these two countries, you know have interacted over over time and the way that the United States has interacted with Um with its allies and partners and other countries in the indo pacific over time, but I think really Um asking a lot of tough questions of policy makers Uh in particular whether that’s you know The the new team that comes into the white house, whoever whoever it is, um, there’ll be you know Some personnel transition and some new members of the team Um or a wholesale turnover You Um, you know, or your local officials and members of Congress, um, and really ask them, okay, what are the priorities and how do we, how do we get to good outcomes that are in the United States interest?

Because some, um, some measures of cooperation are going to be in the United States interest. And in others, there’s a much more subtle risk reward, um, ratio that policymakers have to think through. And we delegate responsibility to them to go learn about these things and make those decisions. And so I think making sure that people are informed enough to be able to ask tough questions and really push policymakers on what their theory of success is and what the top priorities are for that, um, are really important questions.

And then, you know, as an educator at a great public institution, um, you know, I, I think there’s a, there’s a pretty serious responsibility that we have, um, to go try to bring the best information and teach people how to assess the trade offs and the thinking that they’re hearing from policymakers, um, so that we can have an informed public conversation.

And so just encouraging people in their busy lives to, to take enough time to try to learn enough about the issues to participate and ask those questions, um, you know, that in and of itself is, is a, is a fairly simple ask, but it’s a really important one for citizens right now with these issues more than ever.

[00:30:18] Jeremi: I think that’s so well said, Sheena, and it echoes, um, One of our themes that, that runs through the podcast week after week, which is the importance of an informed citizenry. It’s, it’s one of the most obvious points, but it’s a point that needs to be reinforced. And especially when we’re dealing with a society as complex and as important as China, knowing some of the right questions to ask, even if we don’t have the answers is a really important start.

And that’s, of course, where history matters. And it, it, uh, it warms my heart to hear you say how important history is. So thank you for that. Uh, Zachary, what do you think? Does, does this discussion help you and others of your generation make sense of, of this issue? I know you all see China as an important part of, of history.

of our world, of our, of our democracy, um, and our democratic future. We hope to have a more vibrant democracy. We hope to see more democracies around the world. Does this discussion help you to think forward and in what ways?

[00:31:15] Zachary: I think so. I think the call to learn history is probably the most important.

Call to action that, uh, that when, when, when can have on China, I think, um, we need to be clear eyed and, and about, uh, the threat that China poses to democracy around the world. But we also need to recognize, um, that. That is not inevitable and it’s not necessarily, uh, how the relationship with China has to be in the future.

Um, and I think, I think learning this history and, and being aware of the way the United States is perceived around the world, particularly in places where we’re competing with China for influence, um, or to protect democracies, uh, in the face of Chinese threats. I think having a clear understanding of that history, not just of our relationship with China, but our relationship with other countries in the developing world.

Um, can only make those relationships, uh, stronger in the future and make us, uh, better policy makers, better citizens, and better voters.

[00:32:13] Jeremi: Well said. That more information and knowledge, uh, doesn’t give us answers, but it gives us a better framework and a better way of staying involved, informed, and, and hopefully, you know, more influencing even on the margins, the way we think about these issues.

Um, and China is only going to grow in importance in future years. So, uh, beginning that process now, all of us as citizens is probably a good thing. And there’s no one better to begin that process with than our guest for today, uh, Professor Sheena Chestnut Greitens. Sheena, thank you for all of the insights you shared with us today.

And, and most of all, thank you for posing a framework and a set of questions that, that allow us to think about. Uh, the evolution of this very complex relationship going forward

[00:32:57] Sheena: was a pleasure to talk with you both today. Thanks for having me.

[00:32:59] Jeremi: I just want to remind our listeners that, uh, Professor Sheena Chestnut Greitens, uh, is, is I’m very fortunate a colleague of mine here at the University of Texas.

Her books include Dictators and Their Secret Police. and the politics of the North Korean diaspora. And you can find her many articles, uh, all, all over the major journals and newspapers of the world. Thank you, Sheena. Thank you, Zachary, for your insightful poem. And thank you most of all to our loyal listeners for joining us for this episode of This Is Democracy.

[00:33:39] Outro: This podcast is produced by the Liberal Arts ITS Development Studio and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Harris Codini. Stay tuned for a new episode every week. You can find This is Democracy on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher. See you next time.