This is Democracy – Episode 231: Iraq War: Lessons and Legacies

[00:00:00] Intro: This is Democracy, a podcast about the people of the United states, a podcast about citizenship, about engaging with politics and the world around you. A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues and how to have a voice in what happens next.

[00:00:24] Jeremi: Welcome to our new episode of This Is Democracy.

[00:00:28] Jeremi: This week, uh, we are fortunate to be joined by a good friend, a truly great historian and scholar, and, uh, really someone who has put more effort into understanding one of the most important topics of our day, uh, the legacies of the Iraq War, um, and more specifically why we went to war about 20 years ago.

[00:00:48] Jeremi: In Iraq and in the larger Middle East. This is of course, uh, professor Melvin Loeffler. Mel is, uh, professor Emeritus at the University of Virginia. He’s written numerous books that have shaped fundamentally our understanding of US foreign policy. Many books, uh, I have assigned to many of my students who are listening.

[00:01:08] Jeremi: I know and probably remember, uh, at least carrying these books and hopefully reading them closely. Uh, among my favorites, a preponderance of power. Which I think, uh, is the best single volume on the origins of the Cold War. Uh, Mel earlier in his career, wrote about inter-war foreign policy, uh, between the United States and its European allies, and, uh, his most recent book, the book we’re gonna talk about today, uh, confronting Sodom Hussein, George W.

[00:01:35] Jeremi: Bush, and the Invasion, uh, of Iraq just recently published to coincide with the 20th anniversary of this war. Mel, congratulations on your book and thanks for joining.

[00:01:46] Melvyn: Thanks Jeremy. I’m delighted to talk to you. It’s great to engage another fellow historian who’s written so thoughtfully about so many different aspects of American history.

[00:01:57] Melvyn: So, and this is an important time to discuss the invasion of Iraq. So I’m, I’m glad to be, to join

[00:02:02] Jeremi: you. Thank you, Mel. Uh, before we get started, of course, we have our, uh, weekly scene setting poem for Mr. Zachary Siri. Uh, Zachary. What’s the title of your poem Today? An 18 year

[00:02:13] Zachary: old recalls a 20

[00:02:15] Jeremi: year war. Let’s hear it.

[00:02:18] Zachary: When the war is over, I say, we must count our chickens, count our marbles, count our dead, and ask ourselves, how many have jumped over the moon when we jumped over the moon strolled into their dining rooms and like cats ran away with the spoon, did we somehow assume the world would turn with us too, that our armies would bring no flying?

[00:02:44] Zachary: Fortune favors the bold, the stubborn fortune favors the men of steel. The morals of rubber fortune favors the Adonis, the cupid, but fortune, she often mistreats the

[00:02:57] Jeremi: stupid. What, what is your poem about Zachary? Well,

[00:03:03] Zachary: my poem, uh, is about, uh, trying to reconcile, uh, the way that the Iraq war has shaped my life and my understanding, uh, of, of American power and American policy.

[00:03:14] Zachary: Um, as someone who was born after the Iraq war began, uh, but is still incredibly. Influence and affected by it. Uh, but also about the, the sort of level of ignorance with which we came into the war, uh, particularly the ignorance of, of the society we were entering. Uh, and, and, and also I think the lack of reflection, or at least serious reflection, uh, after the war, which, uh, which hopefully, uh, we can, we can, uh, aim for today on our episode 20 year, almost exactly 20 years to the.

[00:03:45] Zachary: Right since we invaded

[00:03:46] Melvyn: Iraq. Right. Zachary? Zachary, that’s, that’s really salient because, uh, two of the key themes of my book are about power and hubris. And we can talk about what hubris means along with one factor you didn’t mention, uh, which I think is of compelling importance as well. And that is fear.

[00:04:09] Melvyn: So fear, power. Hubris. Saw the big themes of my book, and I know, I know Jeremy’s gonna want to talk about some of those things.

[00:04:18] Jeremi: What we’re gonna try to get a at all of them because, uh, you, you an analyze them so carefully and so eloquently in, in your book. Mel, let, let’s start at the beginning, uh, uh, with fear, uh, your book opens, uh, in many ways with, uh, as it should, the attack of nine 11th of September 11th, 2001.

[00:04:37] Jeremi: The, uh, failure. It’s only obvious in retrospect of the Bush administration and, and others to anticipate this attack. How did the September 11th attack change, in particular, president Bush,

[00:04:50] Melvyn: Jeremy? I think the attack on nine 11 was incredibly determinative. Actually. As you know, my book does not start really with nine 11.

[00:05:01] Melvyn: It starts with, uh, a biographical chapter about Saddam Hussain. and then another chapter about the first eight or nine or 10 months of the George W. Bush administration. And what I tried to do in those two chapters is illuminate the character behavior, opportunism brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

[00:05:30] Melvyn: And then I try to outline. The ambiguities ambiguities with regard to the administration of George W. Bush in terms of dealing with Saddam Hussein. Basically, I demonstrate, uh, in contrast to so many other books, I demonstrate that despite the rhetorical commitment to regime change and the, despite the hatred and contempt for Saddam Hussein, Policy makers inside the Bush administration and the president himself could not decide on any policy toward Iraq prior to nine 11.

[00:06:14] Melvyn: In fact, I show that Iraq, despite all the rhetoric about it by so many writers, were simply not a top priority of the administration. prior to nine 11. Yes, they focused some attention on it, but it was not a top priority and they could not resolve what to do. Nine 11 then was a transformative moment. It was transformative, not because it riveted American policymaker’s attention on Iraq.

[00:06:50] Melvyn: It was transformative because. Reshaped the whole perception of threat. Nobody grappling with the Bush administration’s foreign policies after nine 11 or with its specific policies toward Al-Qaeda, Iraq or uh, Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan or Iraq can be, can even begin to come to terms with those policies unless one grasp.

[00:07:22] Melvyn: The magnitude of threat perception after nine 11, policy makers were absolutely certain there would be follow on attacks. They had every reason to believe there would be fo follow on attacks. Intelligence reports every single day communicated the fact that Al-Qaeda wanted to inflict more pain on the United States, and in fact, in even greater magnitude than what had happened on nine 11.

[00:07:56] Melvyn: So threat perception was transformed by nine 11. And gradually, especially after the Taliban were dislodged from power in Kabul and after Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda terrorists were forced to flee from their training camps in Afghanistan. After that happened, attention began to gravitate on a rock. For a number of very, very good reasons, and if you want me to explicate those reasons, I’ll be glad to do so.

[00:08:30] Melvyn: A

[00:08:30] Jeremi: absolutely, because one point you make so clear, in fact you make it a number of times, Mel, is that, uh, the Bush administration to the very top recognized that Sadam Musin was not responsible for nine 11. So one of the, at least surface paradoxes. Is, although he was not responsible, then you show they become more concerned about Sadd Hussein.

[00:08:54] Jeremi: Why is that?

[00:08:55] Melvyn: Yes, they become extraordinarily concerned about Saddam Hussein. And there uh, are convergence of factors that lead policy makers to or lead the president to really focus. On Iraq. Now, some officials, as is well known, and as I point out in my book, some officials like Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, immediately upon the shock of nine 11, wanted to focus attention on Iraq.

[00:09:26] Melvyn: I show in my book that the president simply did not agree with that priority, but his own views evolved over the next six or six or 10 weeks. Why did, why did they evolve? Why did he begin to focus more and more attention on Iraq? First of all, there were reports, um, and, and absolutely, um, truthful reports that the Saddam Hussein regime was gloating.

[00:09:55] Melvyn: over the impact of nine 11. Saddam Hussein was, are probably the only leader in the entire world who expressed gratification, satisfaction and praise for the terrorist attack on nine 11. The president was informed about this two after, um, nine 11, within a couple of weeks after nine 11. Anthrax spore.

[00:10:25] Melvyn: Began circulating in American Mail. Several postal workers died as a result of the Anthrax scores. These envelopes with anthrax turned up in the Senate office building government buildings, then closed down. You may recall that even the Supreme. Was forced to move its deliberations to another location, and then in the middle of October, specifically on October 18th, sensors went off inside the White House itself suggesting that there was a toxic substance inside the White House.

[00:11:06] Melvyn: That turned out not to be true, but it illuminated the growing perception of threat from a biological and from biological or chemical weapons. At the same time, during these very, very weeks, in October and November of 2001, as American Special Forces moved into Afghanistan, and as they occupied the training camps of Al-Qaeda fighters, they found incontrovertible evidence, truly incontrovertible evidence that.

[00:11:45] Melvyn: The Al-Qaeda terrorists were seeking to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction, especially chemical and biological weapons. At the same time that this was going on, information was flowing into Washington, into the intelligence agencies that Saddam Hussein was restarting or accelerating. His biological and chemical weapons programs.

[00:12:13] Melvyn: Now, once again, subsequently it was found that those reports were mistaken, but if you want to understand why the. Focus of attention gravitated to Iraq. It was because during the, during these months, there was a heightened perception of threat. There was a growing apprehension of chemical and biological attacks, and there was burgeoning information that Saddam Hussein.

[00:12:43] Melvyn: Had restarted his chemical and biological programs or, or was, or was accelerating them. Hence, the president’s attention gravitated to Iraq. And a key factor in this also was that after the Taliban government was dislodged and Al-Qaeda fled from its training camps, there was a tremendous. Of empowerment inside the Bush administration, a tremendous sense of success.

[00:13:15] Melvyn: Uh, they had been accused for several weeks that their efforts in Afghanistan were falling short, that the administration would be caught in another quagmire like Vietnam. And then within two or three weeks in late November, early December, The whole trajectory of war inside Afga, Afghanistan changed dramatically.

[00:13:39] Melvyn: And suddenly Al-Qaeda, uh, fled from their camps. The Taliban government was dislodged and there was a great sense of power of increased power that the United States now had the power. To deal with the threats that it perceived and that threat now was not exclusively in Iraq, but certainly in Iraq. With the benefit

[00:14:08] Zachary: of hindsight, um, and your expertise, how real do you think those perceived threats were?

[00:14:15] Zachary: I’m speaking specifically about the perception that there would be another nine 11 or that there would be further terrorist attacks, that American inter fur, further American intervention in the region was necessary to prevent sort of this imminent

[00:14:29] Melvyn: danger. Personally, I’m convinced that the perception of.

[00:14:35] Melvyn: Was extremely real and extremely high. Every single memo memoir. Attests to that, even, even memoirs by people who turned out to be very critical of the administration’s focus on Iraq. Like, uh, like Richard Clark, the counterterrorist expert. He, he was very much opposed to, to the focus on Iraq, but was he obsessed?

[00:15:03] Melvyn: With the prospect of another attack. Yes, he was, was obsessed. Um, the, the memoirs, the interviews, the memoranda of the time, all, all are conclusive in my opinion. It’s not, it’s not even questionable that there was a huge perception of. , there was a great deal of fear. Now, now Zachary, I wouldn’t say that that was the only emotion that existed.

[00:15:38] Melvyn: Um, there was also a great sense of anger, uh, great sense of embarrassment and humiliation over the fact that nine 11 had occurred on so-called on their watch. The administration officials. I write in my book, felt a great deal. I use the word guilt. Some of people in the administration don’t like that word, but I think it’s an appropriate word.

[00:16:05] Melvyn: I think they felt a great deal of guilt that they had been warned about a perspective attack by Al-Qaeda that would be gigantic and astonishing, and they. Minimized the likelihood of that happening. They knew the top policy makers, including President Bush himself, knew and acknowledged that they had not paid enough attention to the warnings.

[00:16:39] Melvyn: that had existed prior to nine 11. That is not to suggest that they could have prevented nine 11, but what was in their heads, and that’s what’s important, what was in their heads was the knowledge that they themselves had minimized the likelihood of such an attack and had not done everything that they might have done to try to preclude it.

[00:17:02] Melvyn: So in a. They are now compensating. They have a tremendous sense of responsibility. That’s, that’s a term I use and I take seriously. These people did have a sense of responsibility that their overriding obligation was to prevent another attack on American soil and to thwart any attacks on Americans living abroad.

[00:17:27] Melvyn: So the, the perception of. Was very, very real. It was not at all contrived. You can argue, and some people have, many people have that focusing on Iraq was the wrong way to go about dealing with the threat. But if you’re just asking me about the perception of threat, it was palpable. .

[00:17:50] Jeremi: So I think the heart of your book, at least to my reading, and I think one of your many contributions, Mel, is to lay out what you think the Bush administration strategy was from just where you left off from this sense of fear and guilt and responsibility.

[00:18:07] Jeremi: In the wake of nine 11, uh, your chapter five is called Coercive diplomacy. I think, uh, Condi Rice Bush’s NSC advisor uses that. Phrase, uh, herself. Um, and, and you argue that the Bush administration and the president in particular, in late 2001, early 2002 becomes determined for reasons you’ve already articulated here, becomes determined to either disarm.

[00:18:32] Jeremi: Or dislodge Saddam Hussein. He’s never certain, whether it’s both, but certainly he wants to prevent the development of weapons, of mass destruction. The phrase that’s used repeatedly and at times he makes, he makes it clear. He act also wants regime change. These are the two elements they’re pursuing. Tell us about this strategy, because this is also where I think your critique of the Bush administration.

[00:18:55] Melvyn: Yes. Um, that’s a wonderful summary of some of the points I make, Jeremy. Thank you. Uh, I wish I could s say those things as succinctly and accurately, uh, as, as you just did. So, I think an important starting place is to realize that war planning, which the president. Initiates in very late November and begins to take place in December of 2001.

[00:19:26] Melvyn: War planning does not mean war. War planning does not mean a commitment to go to war. That is an indispensable part of my argument, what the, and, and, and to illuminate that. I point out as just one of many examples of, of compelling evidence, an interview that General Tommy Franks, the head of Central Command, gave, uh, in 2000, I think 14.

[00:20:05] Melvyn: It was not an interview that I conducted. It was an interview that oth other people conducted, and that is available now at, uh, at the Miller Center, at the University of Virginia. , Tommy Franks was, was asked about, you know, whether he thought the president was determined to go to war after meeting the president during Christmastime at his ranch to discuss the first iterations of the war plan, and Tommy Frank said explicitly, no, I never had the sense.

[00:20:42] Melvyn: That President Bush was determined to go to war. I had the sense that he was determined to put us in the best position to wage war. Should he decide that it was necessary to to do so? And it’s getting to your essential question. What’s so interesting here is that when Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks began working on these war plans in December of 2001, their first assumption that they enum.

[00:21:22] Melvyn: Goals of the war should it take place? Goals of the war. And they list two things and they’re really interesting to focus on and think about in the long run because they talk about two things, regime change, W m D, tho, those, those are the two things. They don’t assign priorities to. and Jeremy also notice what I think is extremely important and has huge ramifications as the year proceeds.

[00:21:58] Melvyn: They don’t list democracy, promotion, or freedom or nation building. None of those things are not mentioned as a goal. Those were not the things on the mind. Of Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld, and General Tommy Franks, w m d and regime change, and the president comes to believe, and this was the heart of coercive diplomacy, that by mobilizing American power, threatening the prospect of war deploying American forces, he could intimidate.

[00:22:43] Melvyn: Saddam Hussein either to flee or to disclose and relinquish his alleged weapons of mass destruction. In my analysis pre I show that President Bush and Kdi Rice’s National Security Advisor never really resolved which of those two prior two priorities. W M D or resume change was their overriding goal, but they believed that through military force and intimidation, they could achieve one or another or both of these objectives.

[00:23:29] Melvyn: And by the way, most observers around the world also believed that the only way to get Saddam to comply with his previous promises. Was through the threat of force. Even people who did not want to use force believed that Saddam would not change. unless threatened with force. So one of the keys to keep in mind here, especially during these months, from September, 2001 to September, 2002, is to realize that through this entire period of time, Saddam Hussein is extraordinarily recalcitrant.

[00:24:08] Melvyn: During this entire period of time, Saddam Hussein is not complying with UN resolutions. Hans Blis, the head of the UN in. Says, wants to get Saddam Hussein to invite back the inspectors. But again and again, the talks between the regime and the UN monitors fail. And so increasingly during, during this period of time, in the spring of 2002, there is a growing perception that only through coercive diplomacy, only through the threat of force.

[00:24:46] Melvyn: Might you get Saddam Hussein either to comply or to flee?

[00:24:52] Jeremi: So you make the point, Mel, that as late as the summer of 2002, really a year after, uh, the September 11th attacks, and even later than that, uh, president Bush is still not decided on going to war. You. You stress that repeatedly. You remind us through the narrative.

[00:25:09] Jeremi: He still hasn’t decided. What was he preparing to do if coercive diplomacy did not work? What was his alternative?

[00:25:19] Melvyn: Oh, if, if coercive diplomacy did not work, he was prepared to go to war. So the, that, that is clearly the case. But he hoped he hoped that coercive diplomacy would work.

[00:25:39] Jeremi: Right. But, but, but, so, and then in a sense, he had, he had closed off his options pretty early on, if that’s the case.

[00:25:48] Melvyn: he in, he had, he had MA made the determination as as his national and deputy national SEC security advisor said either, either that either Saddam complies or Saddam leave. either Saddam complies or Saddam leaves. So was

[00:26:12] Jeremi: that wise? Was that a, was that a, was that a wise position

[00:26:15] Melvyn: to take in? No, I think I, I do not think it was a, a wise position and I’m, I’m critical of the conduct of the diplomacy.

[00:26:25] Melvyn: I’m critical of the fact that if, if President Bush’s overriding priority, if it was. Gaining control of the we of the alleged weapons of mass destruction. He did not conduct coercive diplomacy in a way that provided inducements or enticements to Saddam Hussein to comply. So in effect, he was ent trapping himself himself.

[00:26:55] Melvyn: He wa he was. He was vesting his credibility and America’s credibility. in one or another outcomes, and one outcome was that Saddam would comply. The other outcome would be that he would be forced to flee, or a third outcome might be that the threat of force would induce some of his lieutenants to murder him, and that that was also on, on the minds of, of, of some policy makers.

[00:27:26] Melvyn: But yes, if you’re, if you’re saying that. By embarking on coercive diplomacy, he cuts off an option of absolutely, um, not going to war. That, that, that, that is true. Now, one has to decide whether that was, I, I, I don’t think that was. , but in grappling with the possible options one do does need to think. Okay.

[00:28:00] Melvyn: If Saddam was not threatened with force, if Saddam was not threatened with force, would he have ever even allowed back the inspectors? And if the inspectors were not allowed back, would that have been a tolerable situ? If there was not another un resolution that was in part, catalyzed by this program of coercive diplomacy, if there was not another UN resolution, and if the allies divided amongst themselves, France and Germany, and the United States and Britain, if they, if they divided, uh, amongst themselves and sanctions collapse, and sanctions were not collapsing, the, and sanctions were collapsing.

[00:28:50] Melvyn: Then you would’ve had the prospect of no inspections and no sanctions and was, should policy makers have regarded that as a satisfactory situation given the perception of threat. So that’s, that is the policymaking dilemma that I think the, the officials are facing. And yes, uh, coercive diplomacy, vests, American credibility.

[00:29:19] Melvyn: in a, in one of two outcomes, but would not doing it have been more satisfactory? That’s, that’s the key question. Right.

[00:29:30] Jeremi: What about

[00:29:31] Zachary: the domestic politics of this kind of coercive, uh, diplomacy? I think, uh, the. You, you, you mentioned the, the sense of fear of, of terror, uh, not just among policymakers, I think, but also among the public at the time.

[00:29:47] Zachary: In, in what, what role did, did the American public and and domestic politics play in the calculus that led eventually

[00:29:55] Melvyn: to war? Well, what what, what I think is in interesting here is that there was a perva pervasive sense of, and I show amongst the public, and I shown my book that many Democrats shared that perception, especially the leading Democrats like Al Gore and Hillary Clinton.

[00:30:20] Melvyn: The major difference between the Republicans and the uh, between the Democrats and the Bush administration with regard to this perception of threat, I would say was. Was that Democrats believe there should be much more of a multilateral effort, that the administration should work much harder at trying to cooperate with America’s.

[00:30:50] Melvyn: Allies and not act unilaterally, but the perception of threat by most Democrats was similar to the perception of, um, of, uh, of, of the, of the Republican leaders. Now what, what is interesting, Zachary, but you, your question isn’t extremely good on what role does public opinion play? One of the important factors I suggest here, although I don’t have conclusive evidence, but I have some evidence, is that Republicans in the administration, like President Bush and his top political advisors were extraordinarily worried about what would be the public reaction if there actually were another attack, and the there was.

[00:31:44] Melvyn: Widespread belief and the top policy makers, including President Bush himself several times, said, if there is another attack, there is no doubt I am going to be held responsible. And so the, the sense that ano that another attack could have huge, domestic, political, political ramifications weighed heavily on Republican policy makers, I would not say.

[00:32:13] Melvyn: and I don’t believe that it was determinative, but it was a contributing factor to the way they pursued their policies.

[00:32:23] Jeremi: I, I guess, Mel, that’s one area I wanted to push back a little bit. You, you say to this is in your conclusion, uh, on page 2 49, that Bush succeeded. These are your words, succeeded at preventing another major attack on American soil.

[00:32:39] Jeremi: How do we know?

[00:32:42] Melvyn: Well, we, we know that there was no subsequent major attack one, and we all, we also know pretty conclusively from information that was derived at the time that, that Al-Qaeda certainly inspired. To in, in, to inflict more damage and to undertake additional attacks. So that’s, that’s the evidence, uh, that there was none, and that the adversary and terror, various terror terrorist groups, clearly would have liked to do so.

[00:33:22] Melvyn: So I think the measures, I, by the way, I don’t say that the war in Iraq. Prevented another terrorist attack. I do say actually that the war in Iraq complicated the global war on terror and made it more difficult and contributed to the to jihadism. around the globe. So I’m not saying that the, that the war in Iraq prevented, prevented another attack, but I do believe that overall the policies of the administration, some of which I think were repugnant and illegal and, and immoral, um, did contribute to thwarting another.

[00:34:10] Jeremi: uh, Mel, when Bush finally decides to go to war, and you, you chronicled this very closely in the book, and I hope all of our listeners will read it because it’s really the best account I’ve seen, certainly in March of 2003. Um, why does it go so badly that that’s something you, you have a chapter on, really a chapter and a half in the book?

[00:34:30] Jeremi: Of course, it’s another whole book unto itself. Uh, but why you call it mission awry? Why does it go so wrong? ,

[00:34:38] Melvyn: that’s a wonderful question, and it’s critical to the tragedy that unfolded. It goes awry in my assessment because of very poor planning inside the administration with regard to the post-war phase of, uh, uh, uh, of, of the, um, invasion.

[00:35:05] Melvyn: Very little attention was focused by President Bush and his top advisors on so-called phase four, the postwar stabilization phase. There was a lack of consensus amongst the top policy makers about what they wanted to actually accomplish inside Iraq. So ide, I argue in my. that although President Bush did not want, did not go to war to promote freedom, he did want freedom to emerge some aspect of freedom or d democracy to emerge if the United States did go to war.

[00:35:52] Melvyn: But I also. That some of his top policy makers, like Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks, were not interested in freedom and democracy and nation building. So there was a lack of clarity about goals, a lack of. Preparation for some of the most critical issues they would face in the post in as soon as Saddam Hussein was toppled.

[00:36:21] Melvyn: Only in the weeks before war did the top policy makers really begin to grapple with what are we gonna do with the Iraqi army? Once it, once it capitulates, uh, what are we going to do with the top echelons of supporters in, in the civilian agencies? What type of government, interim government are we going to support?

[00:36:49] Melvyn: These critical questions were not really resolved in any effective way prior to the invasion. And then there was tremendous confusion. In the first weeks of the Liberation slash Occupation, tremendous confusion about what ought to be done. And in addition, and perhaps most important of all, there were inadequate troops to preserve order and security.

[00:37:21] Melvyn: That decision. Very, very heavily on Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who believed in using a very lean force and quickly rotating troops out of or out of Iraq. So it, it weighs it, it Rumsfeld bears huge responsibility for the inadequate number of troops, but ultimately, Bush acquiesces to that, and there is huge disorder.

[00:37:53] Melvyn: What I demonstrate is that the failure of the occupation becomes clear during the very first months in April, may, June and July of 2003, because of inadequate planning, insufficient troops, incredible feuding within the administration. And, um, a total lack of preparation for the challenges that, that, that emerged

[00:38:19] Jeremi: to, to me, Mel, this is a mystery.

[00:38:21] Jeremi: After reading your account, uh, your searing account, I think, and in a sense, Rumsfeld is your villain on the American side, but how is it possible that a president could go to war? Conscious of the, the burden you, you show that Bush is not, um, I, I is, is not lightly going to war. He’s careful. As you point out.

[00:38:44] Jeremi: He takes many measures. He listens to Tony Blair repeatedly. He, he tries to, to get the outcome he wants without war. How does he then go to war without thinking about what the end state will be?

[00:38:56] Melvyn: I think that’s Jeremy, where the hubris comes. and, um, some, some people say that I don’t assign enough attention to ideology, but when I talk about hubris, it in part incorporates notions of ideology.

[00:39:21] Melvyn: But basically the answer to your question is that President Bush really believed that Iraqis. embrace American soldiers and American troops. Uh, Iraqi exile leaders in Washington told the president and he asked them how, how will our soldiers be met? And the Iraqi exiles told him with flowers and chocolates.

[00:39:48] Melvyn: That’s, that, that, that’s, that’s what they told them. And, uh, president Bush believed that now it was not. What resonated in Bush’s mind and in the mind of Kdi Rice and Dick Cheney and many other leaders was. what had happened during their own lifetime. What’s on their mind is the triumph in the Cold War.

[00:40:16] Melvyn: What they are remembering literally, and they explicitly say this, we remember when the Berlin Wall came down. We remember Germans dancing on the streets, uh, east Germans dancing on the streets of Berlin. Um, jubilant over the fall of the bur over the fall of the Berlin Wall. We remember East Europeans celebrating their freedom.

[00:40:41] Melvyn: The United States in the view of President Bush and Condi Rice had waged a cold war for 40 years, had produced freedom, and that freedom was met. Was met with excitement and enthusiasm. By the peoples of Eastern Europe, and they extrapolated that the Iraqis would react the same way that Iraqis would embrace Americans.

[00:41:10] Melvyn: And I say it was hubris and I explicit explicitly say, because it did not demonstrate and understanding of Iraqi society, Iraqi culture, Iraqi. Why, why would Iraqis not meet Americans with smiles and chocolates and uh, et cetera? Because the Kurds in the north felt that the United States had betrayed them again and again.

[00:41:39] Melvyn: Not, not, not not just Bush, but Bush’s father. Um, but also, but also during the Nixon administration, KDS felt that the United States had repeatedly sold them out. Shia in the south of Iraq felt. President Bush’s own father had encouraged them to rise up after the Persian Gulf War, and then had done nothing when Saddam Hussein had crushed them brutally.

[00:42:07] Melvyn: So lots of Iraqis had huge misgivings about the United States to begin with. That is not to say that they. Unhappy with the removal of Saddam Hussein there. They Iraqis, by this point in time, loathed Saddam Hussein, but at the same time, they were not jubilant about an American occupation and they were incredibly skeptical and their skepticism turned to contempt, even hatred.

[00:42:45] Melvyn: When the United States immediately showed an inability to preserve order and stability, and Iraqis, you know, said to American journalists at the time, this is in May, June, July of 2003, we cannot understand how the United States with all its power can defeat Saddam Hue. Constitute a hegemonic presence in the international arena and fail to preserve order and stability inside Iraq.

[00:43:22] Melvyn: There is something amiss here. That’s the way Iraqis felt and it generated incredible distrust. . And of course for many other reason, the confluence of circumstances, insurrectionary activity, uh, um, uh, emerged almost immediately. But, but

[00:43:40] Jeremi: Mel w why did these policymakers emphasize that memory, that historical memory of the end of the Cold War more than Vietnam?

[00:43:49] Jeremi: They had all been sea. As, as you were growing up by the Vietnam War, right. I mean, Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld, one cannot, George, h h w George W. Bush one can’t talk about their biographies without the early experience of Vietnam is formidable for them.

[00:44:06] Melvyn: I, I, I think Jeremy, I mean, that’s a, that’s a very, uh, good question, but I think that that triumph in the Cold War is.

[00:44:17] Melvyn: the compelling thing on their minds, and especially keep in mind, these were the policy makers. Condi Rice was in the administration in 1989 and 90 and 91, and worked on the National Security Council staff. Vice President Cheney was, uh, the Secretary of Defense. These people believed, firmly believed that they had brought.

[00:44:45] Melvyn: The triumph of the United States in the Cold War and that it had been a monumental success and that what they had learned, what they had learned, and I think this speaks to your very good question. What they had learned was toughness, boldness, re armament had actually. Contributed to victory in the Cold War.

[00:45:10] Melvyn: They associated themselves with the pos po. Po policies of of Ronald Reagan building power, championing freedom, boldly declaring your values. Those were the things that led to success. That was their perception. That was their percept.

[00:45:28] Jeremi: So we always like to close. Mel, you, you’ve been so, uh, generous with your time, and, uh, I do hope all of our, uh, listeners will read your book because you’ve shared some of the highlights, but there’s so much more.

[00:45:41] Jeremi: And, and as always, with your work in particular, Mel, the details are often as exciting and interesting as the larger argument. Um, but I, in the end, I know because I’ve been talking to you about this for 20 years, , I, I know you’ve, you’ve studied this. So closely, not simply as a historian, but also as a citizen who cares about democracy, which is of course our weekly theme, and someone who cares about international, uh, peace, harmony, and survivability.

[00:46:09] Jeremi: Um, what are the lessons you draw? I mean, I, it seems to me you are warning us about those very. Uh, topics that Zachary brought up in his poem that you highlighted at the very start about hubris, about power, about fear. Wh what, what are the lessons we should, we should take today as we look at a war in Ukraine and as we deal with our democracy at home?

[00:46:30] Melvyn: I, I, I think there, there are clear, clear le lessons one Americans need to modulate their perception of threat and calculate threats much more careful. The loose talk about Iraq constituting an existential threat or even Al-Qaeda constituting an existential threat was exaggerated rhetoric. Um, the United States needs to modulate its perception of threat and calculate its vital interests.

[00:47:09] Melvyn: very carefully. What precisely are our vital interests? So I think though, that’s one lesson. Other lessons grasp the limits of American power. Gra, you know, that is an unmistakable lesson of what happened here, exaggerating what the United States can do, believing and assuming and postulating that the United States can.

[00:47:37] Melvyn: Transform other societies and cultures is a huge overestimation of American power. Yes, it’s desirable to promote freedom and individual rights I, I, and, and democratic institutions, but one needs to grasp the limits of America’s power and to find appropriate tactics that will bring. Incrementally positive ends without overcom commitments.

[00:48:10] Melvyn: Third, curb your hubris. Americans need to curb their hubris. They need by, and by that I mean to say they need to ha to really develop a better understanding of the societies that they’re dealing with and not simply extrapolate that all peoples, every. Want to emulate the United States or that American values are of utmost importance.

[00:48:37] Melvyn: Clearly, in Iraq, after the, the liberation, after the toppling of Saddam Hussein, it is unmistakable that Iraqis felt that security. Order stability were far more important than the rhetoric of freedom and democracy that seemed to be pie in the sky while there was total disorder on the streets, while increasingly people were being killed.

[00:49:11] Melvyn: And their proper, their property infringed upon, uh, not by Americans necessarily, but by one another, and there was no security. So cur, curbing, hubris. I think it’s also important for the United States to. Define its goals clearly and to think very wisely about them in, in this respect, the as. As I tried to point out early in the discussion, the assumptions at the beginning of the whole Iraqi venture was regime change or, or control of Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction.

[00:49:50] Melvyn: The initial focus was not on democracy, promotion and bush. Bush wants that, but he didn’t clarify that as a goal and therefore there was not appropriate preparation, uh, for that. So there are many other lessons, but in terms of basic promotion of democracy, both at home and abroad, curbing U ris, grasping the limits of your power, calculating threats effect effectively.

[00:50:25] Melvyn: Defining vi vital interests, carefully, all of that would contribute mightily to the health of America’s democracy.

[00:50:34] Jeremi: And those are all, uh, easier said than done as you Absolutely. As you’ve pointed out, Zachary, um, as you said in your poem so eloquently, right? You’re an 18 year old, your generation, and, uh, The generation that’s taking over our democracy.

[00:50:49] Jeremi: You didn’t live through this, uh, just as most of my undergraduates now didn’t live through this, uh, how does the Iraq war in this discussion and Mel’s book and scholarship, how, how does it offer some lessons and pathways for you and your generation?

[00:51:05] Zachary: Well, I think that, uh, one of the things that the Iraq, uh, debacle, debacle, if you will, shows us is that, uh, the importance, uh, and the perception, uh, of, of, of trust in, in policy makers and in the so-called experts is vital to, um, our society, our democracy.

[00:51:24] Zachary: I think one of the lasting, uh, lasting, uh, effects of the Iraq war was that Americans lost a lot of. In their government. And I think that one of the problems that we have failed to address in the past 20 years is the way in which, uh, that, uh, failure, uh, continues, continues to haunt the relationship between Americans and their government.

[00:51:51] Zachary: And I, and I think it, it shows how important it is even, uh, on, on specific decisions that seem to be solely matters of foreign policy or solely, uh, concerns of, uh, uh, for, for, for the military or, or military matters. Uh, it’s important to keep in mind, uh, that, that those dec, those decisions, Those policies, that planning has a huge impact on the health of our democratic

[00:52:15] Melvyn: institutions.

[00:52:16] Melvyn: Mm-hmm. . Mm-hmm. Zachary, I would ju just conclude, um, um, by saying that your, your observations are so pertinent. One of the clearly lasting consequences of the Iraq war was to sunder trust in, in the American government. A vast number of Americans, even well informed Americans, believe that the policy makers simply lied to the American people.

[00:52:50] Melvyn: I do not believe that is the case. I believe the policy makers did believe that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. And I talk a lot about that, uh, in, in my book. I, I think that. erred, egregiously, but they also at the same time exaggerated their confidence about the weapons of mass destruction.

[00:53:16] Melvyn: So yes, they believed that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, but they exaggerated their own degree of confidence about that to the American people, which contributed greatly to America. Disillusionment. So today I think the majority of Americans, I have not seen recent polls, but I think the majority of Americans even listening to the commentary the last few, few days, um, reporters and journalists often, you know, use the term that the administration.

[00:53:50] Melvyn: Lied to the American people or manipulated the evidence? Um, I, I don’t think that that is true. I believe that they misconstrued the evidence. I think that it was understandable why they did so, but they should bear responsibility for the exaggerated rhetoric, uh, that they used and they should have reexamined.

[00:54:19] Melvyn: Their basic assumption that Saddam Hussein possess weapons of mass destruction. I’ll just conclude by saying, Jeremy, you know, it’s so easy for, for me and for any observer to say that, , the policymakers should have reexamined their fundamental assumption. Their fundamental assumption was Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.

[00:54:44] Melvyn: There was good reason for that assumption. He had had them, he had used them. He had lied about them, he had concealed them. So there was good reason for them to believe that. But there was also lots of evidence that I suggest that I point out in my book for them to step back and say, well, today, does he really have?

[00:55:05] Melvyn: And they were unwilling based on the lacuna in the evidence, they were unwilling to step back and reexamine, and they bear responsibility for that even though they did continue to believe mistakenly that the regime had weapons. That has so centered trust in the American people and it’s the lack of trust that is critical to so much that is going on domestically and internationally.

[00:55:36] Melvyn: Zachary, you’ve hit it on the head.

[00:55:39] Jeremi: Uh, I have nothing to add except to, uh, remind our listeners that. The whole purpose of our podcast is each week is just this. For us to do what Mel and Zachary have done so well in this discussion, to force us all to re-examine our assumptions, democracy grows and prospers when we come out of our positions and actually examine our positions, re-examine our assumptions on the basis of evidence of.

[00:56:03] Jeremi: The world around us. And that’s a hard thing to do, but it’s absolutely essential. Mel, you’ve always done that in your scholarship and you’ve always reminded us how important that is. It’s what you call prudence. I think , and it’s what we all, we all need to focus on. Uh, I hope all of our listeners will re will read, uh, Mel Loefflers book confronting Sadam Hussein, and use this moment to rethink the legacies of the Iraq War.

[00:56:26] Jeremi: Thank you, Mel, for joining us today.

[00:56:29] Melvyn: Thank you so much. Great to talk to both of you. Real pleasure.

[00:56:32] Jeremi: Thank, thank you, Zachary, for your poem as always, and your wonderful comments as well. And thank you, most of all to our loyal law listeners for joining us for this week of this is Democracy.

[00:56:49] Outro: This podcast is produced by the Liberal Arts Its Development Studio and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Harris Kini. Stay tuned for a new episode every week. You can find this is Democracy on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher. See you next time.