This is Democracy – Episode 226: Ukraine

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[00:00:30] Jeremi: Welcome to our new episode of This is Democracy. This week we are going to return to a topic we have discussed, uh, many times and a topic I’m sure we will discuss many more times, which is the war in Ukraine, and we are now approaching about a year. Since, uh, the, um, Russian government attacked Ukraine and, uh, the war has reached, uh, what appears to be somewhat of a stalemate, though that might not be accurate.

[00:00:54] Jeremi: Uh, certainly the Russian government has failed and most of its, uh, Aims to conquer [00:01:00] Ukraine, uh, but the Russian government remains in, uh, control of a large part of Ukrainian territory and the Ukrainian army, which is fought Valiant Lee is now seeking to dislodge Russia, Russia from Ukrainian territory.

[00:01:13] Jeremi: We are joined today by our good friend, colleague, and leading writer on, uh, the Ukraine Wars, as well as many other issues. Michael Kimmage. And Michael is going to help us understand where we are with the war today, how we understand where we are. Uh, Michael, thank you for

[00:01:31] Michael: joining us. Thank you so much for having me.

[00:01:33] Michael: It’s, it’s, it’s wonderful as ever to be back with the two of you.

[00:01:36] Jeremi: And just to remind our listeners, many of whom I know are fans of Michael Kimmage, we’ve actually received multiple messages asking us to bring him back on. Uh, Michael Kimmage is a professor of history at Catholic University of America in Washington, DC.

[00:01:49] Jeremi: He’s also a fellow at the German Marshall Fund and chair of the Advisory Council for the Kennedy Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington dc. He served on the state department’s policy [00:02:00] planning staff from 2014 to 2017, and he held the Russia, Ukraine portfolio then. So as I’ve said many times, he knows these issues intimately.

[00:02:09] Jeremi: He publishes widely on these issues, uh, on foreign policy, on diplomatic history, on cultural history. He’s written a wonderful book, uh, the Conservative term, Lionel Trilling, Whitaker Chambers, and the Lessons of Anti-Communism. Very relevant for today in history’s grip. Philip Roth’s, Newark Trilogy and his most recent book a few years ago, the Abandonment of the West, the history of an Idea in American Foreign Policy.

[00:02:34] Jeremi: Michael has written a number of seminal articles in foreign affairs and other major publications on the war in Ukraine. I encourage our listeners to read his articles if you haven’t already, and as I understand it, Michael, you’re writing a book on the Ukraine War, is

[00:02:48] Michael: that correct? That’s correct. I’m trying to address.

[00:02:52] Michael: Origins of the war. Uh, it’s of course too soon to really write a serious book about the war itself for a comprehensive one. But I’m trying to [00:03:00] address the origins 2008 to to 2022.

[00:03:03] Jeremi: Wow. I think that’s going to be, uh, a very insightful analysis and I haven’t seen anyone actually do that yet. So, um, I, we really look forward to reading that.

[00:03:14] Michael: Well, I look forward to finishing it. Yes, that’s what we always say as

[00:03:17] Jeremi: author . Don’t hold your breath. . Uh, well this is gonna be a very important book and I guess we’ll be getting somewhat of a, of a preview of it today. Um, Zachary, you have a poem to start us out, as always. What’s the title of your poem A year after the war began?

[00:03:34] Jeremi: Well, there we go back to the same topic. Okay, let’s hear it.

[00:03:38] Zachary: I imagine if I were a Ukrainian peasant as my great-great grandfather was, and I could see the sunrise into the pleasant foggy mornings as he did and see a thousand armies at breakfast present and begging for food with their jokes lewd and see all my dreams become real fears.

[00:03:57] Zachary: I would begin to lose track of the [00:04:00] years, but I have not, and I can count them on my hand, like birds in the sky that also do not seem to understand that time has passed. They all were gased or they are ash. Way up high circling humdrum above the drunken land unanswered. When I ask what is my generation’s task, I see their faces now on TV reels eating their rubble with their daily peels.

[00:04:26] Zachary: So much of blood has flowed in these same fields that time two seems to march in martial ways and step right over the ones that have died. I have not thought of their new war for days. I wonder if the ghosts are still alive.

[00:04:43] Jeremi: I love it, Zachary, uh, what is your poem about? My

[00:04:46] Zachary: poem is about trying to come to grips, uh, with the length of this war, the human suffering that has been involved in a year of fierce fighting the civilian toll, um, all the lives lost, but also, uh, the, the [00:05:00] hunger and the the, um, the very basic, uh, suffering that has occurred and that so many Ukrainians have experienced this past year or so.

[00:05:09] Zachary: But also try to come to grips with the fact that this. , this isn’t a new story. This is an old story. And on this very land that is currently being fought over, uh, dozens of wars have been fought. And, and, and this has happened so many times before, but also trying to connect myself, uh, to that story with, with my Ukrainian ancestry.

[00:05:28] Zachary: Mm-hmm. .

[00:05:28] Jeremi: Mm-hmm. . Mm-hmm. Michael. Uh, do, do you see a continuity here? Zachary seems to be evoking. Suffering from the past as part of the suffering

[00:05:38] Michael: of today. Yes. Uh, and in fact, I think Zachary’s poem, you asked about my book a moment ago, Zachary’s poem really anticipates, uh, a core argument of the book, which is that there are really two modes, uh, over the last couple of hundred years, two modes of central and eastern European history.

[00:05:59] Michael: There’s the mode [00:06:00] of war, which has just been, you know, continuous, you think War of 18. Uh, first World War, second World War, uh, and of course the more recent wars, uh, all of which have foregrounded the territory, uh, of, uh, of Ukraine. Uh, and that’s, uh, an all too familiar story, but there’s also the mode of.

[00:06:21] Michael: uh, imperial control and imperial conquest. So there have been, you know, sort of pauses in the war, uh, but they’ve often been filled by, uh, imperial, uh, dominion. Uh, and I think it’s a miracle in some ways that after 1991, so many countries in Eastern and central Europe escaped from that pattern. But I also think that we were a little bit too sanguine.

[00:06:42] Michael: uh, that very pattern. And so I think we’ve rediscovered it. Uh, and one of the ways in which I think we can turn to history at the present moment, uh, is to look into that dynamic. And I’m convinced, although I haven’t found the answer yet, but I’m convinced that the answer to the core policy problems that the US and its allies face with [00:07:00] the war in Ukraine do lie in.

[00:07:02] Michael: uh, serious reckoning with, with the past, uh, and with, uh, and with history, uh, and we can perhaps learn the perseverance. Zachary very correctly mentions coming to grips with the longevity of this war. We can learn perseverance, I think, in part from a, from a study of history. So I think Zachary’s ation of.

[00:07:20] Michael: history in his poem is, is, is just spot on. And, and Michael,

[00:07:24] Jeremi: how would you put our current moment then in historical context? I know that’s a big question, but is this yet another moment of, um, war of attrition between, uh, various warring parties in this area? Or is it something different? How do we underst.

[00:07:41] Michael: I think that, uh, it’s, uh, become a kind of war of attrition, uh, in almost the classic sense where, uh, the significance of political economy is on par with this significance of, uh, of military affairs. Uh, and to [00:08:00] a degree that’s true of course of, of every war, but it becomes, uh, increasingly true of, of longer wars we could dip back into US history.

[00:08:07] Michael: And Jeremy, you. mulling over this topic and think about, uh, the Civil War where I think it’s, uh, a consensus among military historians that the industrial capacities of the North, uh, over time were just, uh, decisive. Uh, and, you know, the war of attrition in that way, you know, sort of pointed toward the importance of political economy.

[00:08:27] Michael: And I think a lot of historians argue that in the second World War, the industrial capacity of the United States was a key factor over time that the US was sort of ill prepared for the war in 1940. , but proved to be very, very good at fighting a war of attrition. And we could also look at the, the Cold War, uh, and the role of, uh, of political economy there.

[00:08:46] Michael: So, uh, on one level, this will be determined perhaps decisively, this war by political economy. And in that sense, I think the signs don’t look especially good, uh, for Russia because what Russia [00:09:00] has. sort of kicked into being, uh, is a vast coalition behind Ukraine. True. It’s not, uh, comprehensively global, but it does encompass many of the world’s most advanced economies who would also wanna factor in Japan and South Korea in addition to, you know, EU and NATO member states, United States, Canada, Australia, uh, et cetera.

[00:09:22] Michael: Uh, and the technological and and economic capacities of this coalition are really. So if you can take a very long bird’s eye view, uh, I think that that does auger well for Ukraine. But at the same time that this is a kind of classic war of attrition. It’s also an ongoing hot war. So you’ve had incremental gains.

[00:09:41] Michael: Uh, from Russia over the course of the last week around, uh, BMU, uh, you have huge gains that the Ukrainians made starting in the second week of September and extending into October, uh November. So that’s really the recent past, and I think everybody expects there to be major kinetic offensives, [00:10:00] uh, from Ukraine and from Russia.

[00:10:02] Michael: Uh, in the, in the spring. And so I think there, you get all of the contingencies of warfare. So I don’t think we yet have the privilege of saying this will be determined by these big structures. Uh, we’re gonna be stuck in the contingent phase of this war, really for the next, uh, six to eight months, uh, at least.

[00:10:17] Michael: And in that sense, war of attrition is probably not the. Only necessary framing. So

[00:10:22] Jeremi: Michael, there’s been a lot of discussion and debate about sending particular kinds of equipment to Ukraine, particularly debates over tanks and, and readers of newspapers have probably learned more about German and American tanks than they ever wanted to know.

[00:10:38] Jeremi: Uh, and now there’s a discussion, of course about fighter aircraft. What’s really at stake when we’re debating these weapons.

[00:10:46] Michael: Well, I’m on the edge of my competence here when it comes to the, to the weapon systems, uh, themselves. But I can think of a few relevant points to put forward and answer to your question.

[00:10:58] Michael: And they don’t all line up [00:11:00] perfectly. But the first is that certainly the US but I think it’s allies as well, have gone past many thresholds that they would not have imagined crossing at the beginning of the war. Uh, and you know, Biden has always been clear about not sending uniformed American soldiers to the.

[00:11:15] Michael: but I think he was reluctant in the first two months to think in terms of a lot. Forms of military hardware, uh, and in a sense rapidly he’s sort of gone, uh, beyond that. And he has enabled some of the more reluctant European countries, most importantly Germany, uh, to follow in his path. Uh, and he’s also getting tugged in that direction by Poland and the Baltic Republics and other countries that really have felt that this has to, this should have happened.

[00:11:43] Michael: Sooner. But the big picture when it comes to military assistance for Ukraine is really about the scale of it, uh, and uh, and the significance of it. And it has been, in many respects, decisive on the battlefield at the same time. This would be my second point, which a little bit contradicts the. [00:12:00] the first one that by delaying, if you look back in the first three months of the war, by not providing certain weapon systems, then whether it would be tanks or whether it would be, uh, missiles or, or air defenses, uh, or aircraft, which is, that’s, that’s, you know, sort of still in play or still in question, but by sort of staggering it, maybe what the Biden administration and its allies achieved is, uh, not getting the Russians to over.

[00:12:25] Michael: Uh, to a massive, uh, burst of military, uh, assistance. But by staggering it, we’ve also put ourselves in the position where a lot of this stuff has been promised, but it still has to be delivered. You know, it’s not enough to just deliver the weapons. There also has to be training and kind of integration into the Ukrainian military and into its strategy.

[00:12:43] Michael: Uh, and I think that there’s a little bit of very mild panic at the moment about this coming too late. And, you know, Russia may press forward with an offensive. There was some discussion of that in recent days by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and by the, uh, by the New York Times. Uh, and I think that there’s sort of real.[00:13:00]

[00:13:00] Michael: Uh, uh, there’s real concern That is something that we, historians will know five or 10 years from now. But, uh, it’s, it’s, it’s a little bit scary, uh, in terms of where we are at the, uh, at the present moment, uh, for sure. Final point I would make, uh, and you know, all eyes have been on Germany and, and Schultz’s leadership has left a lot to be, uh, desired.

[00:13:21] Michael: But I also have to say that I admire the Biden administration for keeping the Germans. Uh, on board and that if the Transatlantic Alliance unravels, which I don’t see it doing, but if it unravels or even partially unravels, Ukraine is gonna be in the most precarious position imaginable. So it’s not just a military task when it comes to the weapons.

[00:13:41] Michael: It’s a domestic political task and it’s a diplomatic task. And all things considered, I think the Biden administration has juggled those. pretty well, but I think this is still a bit of an undertow of regret that it couldn’t, that it didn’t move faster, uh, sooner when it came to assisting Ukraine with the.

[00:13:57] Michael: I wanna

[00:13:57] Zachary: ask about the other, perhaps even more [00:14:00] powerful weapon of war, which is propaganda. It seems to me that, that both sides of the conflict have been embodied in, in two opposing personalities, zelensky on the one hand, and Putin on the other. H how do, how effective do you think, uh, that propaganda on, on either side has been at, at, at, at mobilizing and, and, and motivating, uh, supporters around the world?

[00:14:23] Zachary: Uh, and in the case of Putin in particular at home?

[00:14:26] Michael: I think the virtue of Zelensky, he has many, I think, as a politician, but the virtue is that it’s not just. Propaganda that he set an example at the beginning of the war of personal courage. Uh, and he’s been a, a good communicator just using the facts of the war.

[00:14:44] Michael: So, you know, it’s not as if, when you think of the way in which he’s publicized, atrocities committed at Vja European and elsewhere, it’s not just a propaganda campaign, uh, on the part of Ukraine. I mean, there’s a PR element to it, but it’s sort of getting the word out and he’s done that I. [00:15:00] Uh, very effectively.

[00:15:01] Michael: Uh, and, uh, in some respects, I mean, this is a kind of curious way of putting it. I think Putin has done a great job of furnishing propaganda that favors Ukraine. From the kind of war that he’s fought. And I feel like there are moments when maybe Western attention has lagged, or Western Europe has gotten cold feet.

[00:15:19] Michael: And then you have, you know, Russia blowing up a train station, uh, in, um, uh, in, I can’t quite now remember where it was, but in central Ukraine. And that again, reminded people of the stakes of the war, uh, and the, and the horrors of the war. So I think, uh, on the Ukrainian. This part of things probably couldn’t have been done.

[00:15:41] Michael: Uh, a great deal. Uh, better. I think they’ve captured the attention of a global public. Uh, they’ve made clear that the war is unjust. Uh, and you know, I think that they have evoked. Large structures of sympathy, uh, which in turn, uh, are very important for the domestic politics of the United [00:16:00] States and of, of, of Germany and other countries.

[00:16:03] Michael: Uh, and that provide really the political foundation for the military support to, to, to Ukraine. So there’s a virtuous circle in that case that has been running and, and, and Zelensky has been, uh, at the center. Now in a sense, Putin, if you compare him to Zelensky, has so visibly failed. And there are always the contrast that you have zelensky in his Olive green T-shirt, uh, and still going to, you know, to places in the war zone and, uh, interacting with real people.

[00:16:31] Michael: Uh, and then you have Putin at his long table and sort of isolated in the Kremlin. And, and, and, uh, you know, the kind of creepiness of Putin, uh, over the past year is, is, uh, is undeniable. Uh, and he really has not, I think, offered to people who are not Russian. Any kind of compelling or persuasive explanation.

[00:16:50] Michael: Uh, of the war. So his propaganda, such as it is, is the typical Russian propaganda of poking holes in the arguments of the Ukrainians or, uh, of the US and [00:17:00] trying to just sow doubt and, and, and, and, and make that less, uh, persuasive. But there is one area in which Putin has not been ineffective. Uh, and this is that for much of the, you can use the term global south, but it’s.

[00:17:14] Michael: Uh, so precise, but for global populations that are not supportive of, uh, of Ukraine, uh, there’s either a kind of indifference or a sense that the conflict is far away. Uh, or maybe a sense that, uh, not that Russia is innocent, but that both sides are guilty. You know, the west has squeezed Russia, and Russia has, has responded by invading, uh, Ukraine, and that doesn’t stem really from a propaganda.

[00:17:39] Michael: In the Kremlin, but the Kremlin has used its media apparatus globally, uh, to encourage that. Uh, and it’s not been an abject failure on, on, on, on Putin’s part. So he’s skilled from his career in Russia at using people’s indifference. cynicism. Uh, and, you know, he knows how to exploit those things and he’s been trying, uh, on, [00:18:00] uh, on the global stage.

[00:18:01] Michael: If, for example, you would look at, uh, foreign Minister Lav Roth’s visit to South Africa last week where he was quite warmly recce, well quite warmly received, and it did seem like the South African government was endorsing some aspects of the Russian. Uh, argument about, uh, about Ukraine is sort of effective to that degree that he can get countries and, you know, China would be relevant here as well.

[00:18:21] Michael: Countries to mirror or to parrot, uh, the Russian thesis about, uh, about the war. I think that we, in the US sometimes underplay Putin’s ability in this with the narrative that we all wanna believe, and I, to a great extent, do believe, uh, that the war has been, uh, uh, uh, uh, a very significant failure for Russia.

[00:18:40] Michael: What

[00:18:41] Zachary: about the argument, to put it bluntly, that that Putin is crazy. Uh, we’ve seen, uh, Ukrainian intelligence chief, I believe in recent days promote, uh, this idea. Do you, do you buy that? Do you think that that Putin is a rational actor at this

[00:18:54] Jeremi: point or that he’s unhealthy that’s related to the Right, right.

[00:18:57] Jeremi: Question. Yeah.

[00:18:58] Michael: You know, I think it’s possible that he has [00:19:00] cancer. It’s possible perhaps that he has Parkinson’s. I find that a little bit harder to believe just because he looks in the last couple of months, you know, sort of, you know, relatively healthy. Although that could be, uh, stage managed. Uh, you know, I thought at the beginning of the war he looked pale and bloated.

[00:19:16] Michael: Uh, and, uh, under a lot of psychological duress, uh, to me he looks like he may have bounced back from that, uh, emotion. Um, you know, uh, Jeremy for us students of the, uh, of the Cold War or rather of, of, of World War ii, there’s the story about Stalin being sort of incapacitated for the first two weeks of. , uh, the, the German invasion, and then he kind of got back into, uh, got back into action and, you know, in, in terms of Putin’s physical health, that’s, that’s, that’s the impression that I have.

[00:19:44] Michael: I, I, I, I’m not sure that rationality and irrationality irrationality get us so far because they’re pretty subjective, uh, terms. A lot of that is in the eye of the beholder. The best answer I can give to your, your excellent question, uh, [00:20:00] is, uh, my own misinterpretation of Putin before the. Uh, and you know, the way that the war has changed my understanding of him, uh, as a human being.

[00:20:10] Michael: And it’s not that he’s gone from being sane, uh, to being crazy, but it’s that he’s undergone a process over time, uh, of radicalization. You know, we speak about this sometimes in terms of the way people go. , uh, and become terrorists or commit acts of, of, of, of political violence, uh, or get involved in extreme causes.

[00:20:28] Michael: And I think that that to me sort of speaks to how Putin has been in the last couple of years. It felt to me before the war that he was an aggressive man. Uh, he had grievances and resentments toward the west. He was fully capable, uh, of brutal violence. I think the Russian campaign in Syria with the Asad government is proof of that.

[00:20:47] Michael: But the, you know, the second Chechen war that, that Putin prosecuted is also. Proof of his capacity, perhaps even his appetite, uh, for violence. But it did feel to me before that Putin had his limits right When he goes into [00:21:00] Ukraine in 2014. He doesn’t try to take Odessa. Uh, he annexes Crimea and he kind of improvises in the dunas, uh, Eastern Ukraine.

[00:21:08] Michael: And, you know, at a certain point he comes to the table, uh, you know, not in good faith, but uh, he comes to the table and he winds down the fighting. So he imposed on himself, uh, uh, a limit. And you sort of look at Syria and, you know, Syria was only, uh, an air campaign for Russia and there weren’t. Russian casualties.

[00:21:24] Michael: And it wasn’t that, uh, expensive. And with the meddling in the American elections in 2016, there was the WikiLeaks element that was plausible deniability. It was not as extreme, uh, as it could have been. And I don’t know what caused the radicalization, you know, maybe it’s a little bit of it as the pandemic, that that is an argument that people make.

[00:21:41] Michael: I find that very persuasive. Uh, a little bit of it is being in power for as long as he’s. , it often goes to the heads of, of rulers. We can think of lots of American examples of this, you know, sort of late stage Nixon or, um, you know, cer certain rulers that have just become hubristic, uh, over time. Uh, and of course [00:22:00] the emergence of Russia as a dictatorship.

[00:22:02] Michael: Uh, that’s what Russia has become. There’s no other word for it. And Putin is a dictator. Uh, and I think he’s taken on the mentality, uh, of a dictator where he doesn’t like to be disagreed with. He encourages flattery. Uh, he’s surrounded himself with, uh, with psycho fans. And here we have lots of examples from ancient history, from, you know, sort of medieval history, early modern history that would help us to understand this, uh, this dynamic.

[00:22:26] Michael: And it’s made him a highly, um, , impulsive and highly dangerous, uh, actor and I would sort of leave it at that. It often feels crazy to me, the war itself. Uh, crazy to me, but I doubt that Putin is sort of clinically, uh, insane in any form or fashion. He’s become, uh, a dictator and so we might turn, uh, you know, Zachary, in this case to the plays of Shakespeare.

[00:22:50] Michael: Uh, and to think of the ways in which Shakespeare helped us to understand the malign effects of power, uh, on the human psyche. I think that’s probably the. The best context for it, [00:23:00] uh, and sort of puts us to where we need, puts us where we need to be in terms of assessing Putin’s actions from this point forward.

[00:23:05] Jeremi: It, that’s such an insightful way of thinking about it, and I think it leads naturally to the next question, Michael, which is now with a, a year of war, uh, under our belts, for better or for worse. Uh, one thing we, we know as historians, uh, studying any war that we’ve studied is that war changes the actors.

[00:23:25] Jeremi: Uh, and the insight from clouds of Itz and others is that it changes those in the war. Even those commanding the war in ways they don’t expect. Uh, Lincoln is a different person after the first year of the Civil War. Franklin Roosevelt is a different person, uh, in 1942 at the end of 1942 than he was at the end of 1941.

[00:23:45] Jeremi: Uh, war is transformative for all involved. Uh, how have you seen the war change, uh, Ukrainian and Russian actors? We, we had you on. The day after the war [00:24:00] started for one of our most moving episodes and also one of our most popular episodes, I think, and you, you described the, the, uh, the difficulties the Ukrainians were up against and the challenges they faced and, and it was a very tragic narrative.

[00:24:15] Jeremi: We were contemplating at that time. We’re not free of tragedy now, but it’s, if it’s a tragedy, it’s a different tragedy. Now, it seems a war of attrition is not what we were talking about in year one or in in week one. So, so how has the war changed the actors and, and how has it changed you as an analyst ,

[00:24:33] Michael: that’s maybe the hardest question to, uh, to answer.

[00:24:37] Michael: Let me pick three, uh, uh, from, from what you described. Let me take, pick three points and then I, I can try to reflect on, uh, on, on that in personal terms and, and, and do my best with that. Uh, you know, I think in, in, in, in Ukraine’s case, uh, it, uh, has elicited from, uh, Ukraine, uh, a set of quite remarkable [00:25:00] qualities.

[00:25:00] Michael: Uh, and I think they’ve been much remarked upon. By observers of Ukrainian, by, by Ukrainians themselves, and to a degree, they, they, they, they speak for themselves. That, uh, the resilience of, uh, of Ukrainian society to absorb, uh, this set of challenges, uh, and not, uh, have political fragmentation or not to have a kind of mutiny in the society or, or running away from the, the problems that, uh, in and of itself is, uh, remarkable.

[00:25:28] Michael: The civic agency of Ukrainians, the. , uh, is supported often. , you know, different forms of, uh, of civic action. People who bring food to the soldiers and, and, and sort of make everything, uh, run in a sense. And that’s a bottom up effort on the part of, uh, of, uh, of Ukrainian society. I think also, and maybe this gets, uh, downplayed in part because we focus either on Ukrainian society or on the, the figure of zelensky, but, uh, the excellence of Ukrainian military leadership that you can’t take for granted.

[00:25:59] Michael: I [00:26:00] mean, you can have a will to fight, you can have a reason. , but, uh, the strategic choices, uh, that Ukraine has made, uh, destroying Russian ammunition over the course of July and August in a very methodical way, but doing it kind of quietly while everybody is biting their nails in the west about, uh, a possible Ukrainian offensive, and then choosing the right place to.

[00:26:20] Michael: uh, attack in September, uh, taking Harky very quickly, uh, and then successfully pushing the Russians out of, uh, out of Caron. I think, you know, I’m not an expert on military affairs, but I think that the Ukrainian ability to integrate Western technology has been just remarkable because once again, if the US could dump all of this military assistance, uh, in Ukraine, Uh, and it could be very hard to use.

[00:26:42] Michael: Uh, and it, you know, that’s, I think a very important part of the, uh, of the story. And so when histories of of Ukraine self-defense are written, I suspect that they will focus as much on, uh, zelensky advisors, uh, and the sort of caliber of strategic thinking in Ukraine. Uh, as they will [00:27:00] on Lansky’s talents of communication and his personal, uh, in integrity.

[00:27:04] Michael: So it’s a holistic picture really of, uh, a achievement you could say in the midst, of course, of, uh, of immense and terrible, uh, terrible suffering. And now Russia, uh, has been transformed. Certainly, uh, by the war in ways that to me, were hard to anticipate, uh, and to predict. I over believed, uh, that there would be a anti-war movement of consequence in Russia and there has not been, although 20,000 people are, I believe, currently in jail in Russia, and lots of people have fled the country out of anti-war sentiment.

[00:27:36] Michael: But I thought it would be harder for Putin to, uh, make this war stick. Uh, and I got. Uh, wrong to be sure. Um, uh, I think that, uh, the war has transformed Russia in the following way. Uh, and it’s not that that many Russians are true believers in this war, uh, or feel that it’s the right choice, uh, on the part of Russia or even that it will bring good things.[00:28:00]

[00:28:00] Michael: Uh, to Russia. I think that there’s not a great endorsement of the official arguments. I think that there is a basic sense among Russians that it’s a war that they don’t wanna lose, and Putin will ride that sentiment, uh, as far as he can. Uh, and so it is, uh, a sort of shocking transformation in a way. It’s not a war that was wielded or wanted by the Russian population, yet it’s a war that Russians seem willing to perpetuate and to fight as they live in a society that is.

[00:28:27] Michael: Uh, evermore, uh, repressive. So, you know, it’s a different kind of tragedy to be sure from the tragedy that Ukrainians are, uh, experiencing. But in a sense, uh, Putin is depriving Russia of much. Of the country’s potential, uh, and, uh, of, of, of its bright future, really, such as it was before, uh, before the war.

[00:28:48] Michael: And that’s a transformation all of us will be living with for, uh, for quite a long time. I’m afraid. I think that the US is not transformed as a society. Uh, I wish in some ways that Americans at this stage we’re paying more [00:29:00] attention to the war, uh, and we’re more involved. what’s happening? It’s no longer the early very dramatic stages.

[00:29:05] Michael: It’s something else. But the Biden administration has, uh, I would argue, uh, and I would be glad to be critical if I felt there was a need to be, but I think that they’ve risen to the occasion. Uh, it’s not Afghanistan, uh, in the summer of 2021, where. They were misreading the signals and not communicating well with allies.

[00:29:23] Michael: That is not the story of the Ukraine war. Uh, and, uh, it’s, it’s sort of, in some ways I find a bit tru esque, uh, of Biden, uh, to come into office, uh, and to have to deal with the challenge of this size and caliber. , uh, and to keep his messaging clear, uh, to support Ukraine probably as much or close to as much as the American polity, uh, will allow, uh, and to do an absolute superb job of keeping, uh, the allies, uh, on board.

[00:29:53] Michael: You know, I think a really, uh, an really kind of remarkable, remarkable job. So that’s not an utter transformation of Biden. [00:30:00] It’s sort of things that Biden has been preparing for all of all his life, but, uh, uh, it’s a modest transformation. And at the same time, a. Uh, consequential, uh, one, uh, you know, I myself, uh, have, you know, probably changed in a, in a, in an intellectual way.

[00:30:15] Michael: Uh, before the war, I had always been looking for, Avenues of cooperation with Russia, acknowledging that there was confrontation and there was a lot that was ugly and, uh, and scary about Putin’s, uh, Russia. But I had thought that, you know, the two countries, the US and Russia kind of need to at least work out some kind of basic arrangement, uh, because of nuclear weapons, because of, uh, the stakes of the relationship.

[00:30:38] Michael: Uh, and, um, if that was reasonable beforehand, uh, it’s no longer reasonable to think in those terms. Uh, now, so, um, I don’t believe that the US should negoti. , uh, anything about the future of Ukraine, uh, with Russia? Uh, I think that the two government should have a degree of con uh, contact and there should be deconfliction.

[00:30:59] Michael: Uh, [00:31:00] but, uh, I think, uh, the US has to be sober, uh, about, uh, how Russia would misuse, uh, those negotiations. And I think that that chapter is over until there’s a new leader of Russia and you would have trust, uh, that something better could. Uh, achieved. And so I’ve arrived now in a sense that we really have to revisit containment and think about how containment could work as a, uh, as a US strategy in the absence, I think really of, uh, diplomatic, uh, options.

[00:31:26] Michael: And so that’s been sort of a big change for me, uh, and I’m still trying to, uh, to, to work that through. Michael, I’ve

[00:31:33] Jeremi: known you for a long time and, uh, you’ve always been a historian of east west relations of one kind or another, both diplomatic and cultural. Uh, but what I’ve noticed, uh, is that you have really, um, become not just an expert, but you’ve embedded yourself in the Ukrainian story in a way that I, I think, is different from where you would’ve predicted.

[00:31:59] Jeremi: [00:32:00] You would be spending your time two years ago? Is that, is that fair?

[00:32:04] Michael: It’s true. Uh, and I will offer a sort of caveat there. Uh, and I think it’s very important to, to bring up with you, uh, Jeremy as a professor of history and somebody who works at a as well at a, at a, at a policy school. Uh, I feel very uncertain writing about, uh, Ukraine as such.

[00:32:22] Michael: You know, I don’t speak Ukrainian in my graduate education and I did a ton of, you know, Soviet studies and Russian studies in, in undergrad and in graduate. Uh, I did nothing on Ukraine. Uh, and nor was that an expectation or a requirement, uh, or really a part of graduate education at, uh, at Harvard and Russian studies, SL studies, post-Soviet studies, uh, PhD.

[00:32:45] Michael: I got my PhD in 2000, uh, 2004. Uh, and so I have tried as best I can, you know, to brush up on Ukrainian history and to get the kind of knowledge I feel I should have to write on these topics. But I do feel that there’s a. Uh, and I [00:33:00] do feel that there’s something, uh, missing. And so, you know, you do the best you can with, with, with, with the kind of crises that come your way.

[00:33:07] Michael: But I do feel ill-equipped, uh, and I’m very gratified to see a debate that’s going on among academics. Uh, you know, decolonization to me is probably not the perfect term. I think you’re importing something. One field of discourse to another if you’re talking about decolonizing, uh, Russia. But, uh, you know, be that as it may, what I’m very gratified to see is that there’s a much greater interest in Ukraine, uh, and there’s a real effort to understand the sort of complexities of Eastern and central Europe.

[00:33:34] Michael: You know, not just with Ukraine, but uh, beyond the Russian purview. And I think that that’s just essential. So I think I’m. Properly educated, but I hope to be a part of a larger process that will rethink some of these questions and hopefully educate a new generation of people who will have the tools that they really need, uh, to think through these, to think through these questions.

[00:33:53] Michael: I,

[00:33:53] Jeremi: I, I asked you that question, Michael, and, and your answer is, is, uh, really thoughtful and, and, [00:34:00] uh, inspiring. Uh, but I asked you that question in part because I wonder if that actually captures most of all how. First year of war has changed all of us. Uh, many of us, uh, had thought about Ukraine in a, in a sort of peripheral way.

[00:34:16] Jeremi: We recognized this was an area that had been a cockpit of conflict for a long time. As, as Zachary points out in his poem, many of us have a connection to it, a familial co connection, but we don’t think of ourselves as Ukrainian usually. Um, . And of course this was an area of focus at the end of the Cold War, the United States worked hard to get nuclear weapons out of Ukraine.

[00:34:36] Jeremi: Now the Ukrainians might regret that now. Um, but it’s never been central to American strategic thinking nor to European strategic thinking. It seems to me, a and it’s now at the top of the agenda, uh, and in some ways that that’s always. Smaller countries are struggling for Right. Attention, voice in the international system.

[00:34:58] Jeremi: Yes. Um, [00:35:00] and I, and I wonder if that might turn out to be one of the most significant geopolitical shifts of the last year. I wonder your thoughts on that.

[00:35:07] Michael: Yes. I, I, I fully agree. In fact, I would use, uh, The term central, uh, and, uh, and Eastern Europe. I mean, it’s always been of interest, uh, to Americans especially, um, uh, especially Poland.

[00:35:20] Michael: I mean, there’ve always been, uh, a lot of books written about Poland and the kind of engagement in some ways with, with Polish intellectual life and, and, and, and, and Polish history, which is, uh, which is wonderful, but we really need to broadly. Think through this, uh, think through this region. I think that that was the undoing of, of Woodrow Wilson really, uh, in, uh, in 1919.

[00:35:43] Michael: It’s poignant in a way when you think that the Ukrainians were not at the table, uh, in, uh, in Versai. They were sort of left off. Uh, and when Woodrow Wilson proposed this idea of ethnic self-determination, it’s a nice idea. Uh, and the train station in Prague is named after Woodrow Wilson for that, uh, for that reason as a, [00:36:00] as a matter of homage.

[00:36:00] Michael: But he really didn’t get. Troubled and problematic that would be, uh, in Eastern and central Europe where there weren’t clear lines and. who were ethnic, uh, you know, sort of politics and nationalism could so often lead, uh, to conflict. Uh, in a sense, after 1945, I don’t know if we had to think too much about Eastern and Central Europe because it was buried behind the Iron Curtain and the US regretted that.

[00:36:23] Michael: Uh, but it sort of took it out of the picture in a certain sense. And then you have the Helsinki final Act in 1975, and, and I don’t think a huge amount of thought was devoted to, at that time, to the future of Hungary or to the future of. Uh, of Ukraine, and I think we could have done a much better job of this after 1991.

[00:36:40] Michael: That’s I think a place where I would be quite critical, uh, of, uh, of US policy that was just published in Foreign Affairs in exchange between stroke Talbot and George Cannon about Ukraine. And Kenon raises some pretty interesting questions about, well, will the provision of military assistance to Ukraine cause problems in the region?

[00:36:57] Michael: And what is stroke? Talbot right back. He says, well, [00:37:00] you know, it’s all now about economics and the region is gonna integrate because they’ll be trade in commerce. Uh, and even for somebody who has learned it as stroke Talbot, that’s a pretty. answer. Uh, so we should have been thinking much harder about, uh, the history and the sort of politics of this whole, uh, region and bringing it forward in our strategic sensibility because it really does, in some ways determine, uh, whether Europe is gonna tip one way, uh, or another.

[00:37:25] Michael: And then finally, the point that I would make about the US in particular is that I think that the US is going to. As a kind of victor in this conflict. In other words, I think it’s gonna be on the winning side. It may be five years from now. And in that case, if that’s true, the US is gonna be probably the most significant, significant actor in the region in terms of security, in terms of its, uh, of its future.

[00:37:46] Michael: That’s a huge responsibility and you would want to have the requisite. Cultural skills and knowledge, uh, and nuance and sens and, and sensitivity. And probably the same is true if things don’t go well for the US because this will remain then, uh, a long [00:38:00] lasting, uh, conflict zone. And those same things would be, uh, would be valuable as well.

[00:38:04] Michael: So, um, you know, there are these. tectonic fault lines in the world. Uh, and I think it’s fair to say that Ukraine, uh, sits a top one of them. Uh, and we had not understood this adequately, adequately. We probably don’t understand it adequately today. Uh, and there’s therefore, uh, a huge intellectual job to do.

[00:38:23] Michael: And if, if, as you say, Jeremy, that I’ve been trying to do some of this in the last year, then I’m, you know, it’s, I think it’s only to the good. I’m just, this is, this is what I would want to try to.

[00:38:34] Zachary: Uh, I’ve been, uh, revisiting in recent days this essay, uh, by Milan Kundra, the tragedy of Central Europe. And, and your comment really reminded me of that, uh, the idea that he writes in the essay in, in, in the mid 1980s, uh, that, that the west has forgotten that behind the Iron curtain lies not just Russia, but a whole nother region, uh, central Europe.

[00:38:56] Zachary: And I think that your. , your point is, is very clear and it is that [00:39:00] hopefully one of the outcomes of this war will be a, a greater American awareness of the region, a greater American, uh, understanding of the region. But that’s not just gonna come from, from passivity. We have to be active in our efforts to understand the region, to learn the language, to read the literature.

[00:39:16] Zachary: Um, so hopefully our listeners will, will, will join us in doing that.

[00:39:20] Jeremi: Do you think that’ll happen? Michael,

[00:39:22] Michael: if I could add as a footnote to your comment, I hope it will happen. Uh, it’s, it’s, it’s hard work and, and it’s complicated stuff and, uh, you know, the national commitment, uh, learning languages and just area studies in general needs to be.

[00:39:36] Michael: Larger across the board. So, you know, I, I hope it will happen, but you know, we’ll have to move mountains to, to make it happen. If I could just add, as a footnote though, Zachary, to what you just said, in terms of regional knowledge and thinking back to, uh, to the Cold War, these great books by David Angerman about.

[00:39:52] Michael: American scholarship in the Cold War. I think what we were trained to do, those of us who were interested in this topic and we’re sort of either trying to [00:40:00] understand the Cold War or to be, uh, able to comment on, on US policy after 1991, we were trained to think about Moscow. , we were trying to think about the Kremlin, uh, and we were trying to think about its nuclear weapons and its strategic culture and its concerns and kremlinology and all of that, and I would never argue against that.

[00:40:17] Michael: That’s useful knowledge too, of course. Uh, but, uh, it’s also, uh, enormously limiting. . Uh, and that has replicated, I think, certain Russian efforts to construe the region as sort of subordinate to, uh, to Russia. This is an ongoing, you know, sort of academic discussion at the, at the present moment, at conferences and in, uh, and in journals.

[00:40:39] Michael: But, uh, it’s, uh, it’s something that we have to really carefully think through. I can add. Further footnote, being an academic, it’s never one footnote, uh, but, uh, in, in this case too, , and this is, it’s about, you know, the kind of practice of diplomacy. So I’ve heard from a lot of American diplomats that what really changed for them after 1991 when the US opened all [00:41:00] these embassies in the, you know, the 14 other countries apart from Russia that had emerged from the, the Soviet Union, is that it wasn’t, it was a transformative experience for the.

[00:41:09] Michael: That instead of going for their training to Moscow, they would go to Tbilisi or to Vilnius or to, to mince or tekia. Uh, and they would learn from the local people there how they thought about, uh, the region and politics and uh, you know, sort of what their, uh, preferences and ideals were. And that really, in a sense brought the region interview in, in three dimensions.

[00:41:29] Michael: So that’s happened for the diplomats. You know, there’s probably an academic task. And then when the academics can. Adequately. I think this is a big task of public education, uh, when it comes to the enormous complexity, uh, of this region. But it is moving , you know, uh, for better or worse, it’s sort of moving precipitously into the center of America’s own strategic objective.

[00:41:49] Michael: And so, uh, uh, the aforementioned mountains really do have to be moved, uh, in the direction of better under. So, so

[00:41:56] Jeremi: Michael, we don’t want to close by asking you to predict the future, [00:42:00] because that would not be fair. None of us can predict the future, uh, particularly in this conflict. And, uh, again, going back and listening to the really stunning episode that you, that we did with you when the war started.

[00:42:14] Jeremi: Uh, none of us anticipated where we would be right now. Uh, and I think it’s probably a better place we are now than we thought we would be in, uh, with regard to this war. Uh, what I think is appropriate to close on maybe is what. Historical knowledge in particular, do you hope that people are inspired to, uh, investigate, to better prepare for the future?

[00:42:38] Jeremi: Um, obviously one needs to follow the war, as I’m sure many of our listeners are followed in the newspaper. There’s excellent reporting every day. There are all sorts of sites online. You are writing frequently about it, so keeping up with the day-to-day is a task enough. But then there’s the question. The historical knowledge, the context that we need.

[00:42:58] Jeremi: It’s one of the really [00:43:00] extraordinary elements of your analysis. You bring that. Where should our listeners go to prepare themselves to understand what will happen in the next few

[00:43:09] Michael: years? This is a tough, uh, question to be sure. Uh, and, uh, let me touch on three points, uh, in, uh, in answering at a US point, um, uh, a Russia point.

[00:43:23] Michael: And I think it’s appropriate to conclude with the point about, uh, about Ukraine itself because, uh, it’s, uh, obviously at the center of the story and yet I myself often. You know, sort of move beyond that in my, uh, analysis. And I think that speaks in part to this education that I’ve had and, and, uh, it’s, it’s, it’s, it’s very, very important to root at times to reroute the story, uh, so that Ukraine is at the, uh, at the center of it.

[00:43:50] Michael: Uh, I think when it comes to, uh, the US uh, I think I’ve mentioned part of the answer already. I think it’s very important to go back to the Treaty of Versas. , uh, [00:44:00] and to go back, uh, to that moment, uh, and think about conceptions of the east, uh, in Europe, uh, there, I think that what captures our attention when we go back to that moment, especially people who are interested in policy and what to learn from it, is the Franco German relationship and it’s sort of German reparations.

[00:44:17] Michael: And did you know, did Versace screw up Germany and enabled the rise of Hitler or. Was it the kind of best that can be done, which I think is Margaret McMillan’s argument in her beautiful book, uh, on the topic. But I think we need to bring forward the Eastern component. In fact, in her book, not to be critical of it, but the Eastern stuff is sort of a, a a, a sort of marginal, it’s like the, the polls and the checks and the, and the Ukrainians that kind of show up on the periphery of that narrative.

[00:44:40] Michael: But it’s really a kind of British American French, German, uh, narrative. And I think we have to rethink that. We should probably. Rethink the second World War to think a bit more about, uh, the eastern front, uh, and, uh, the significance, uh, of that. And we need to go back in a very careful way, uh, and go through the history of the [00:45:00] 1990s, uh, and, uh, and beyond and get a little bit away from this.

[00:45:04] Michael: You know, sort of NATO expansion debate. Was it right, was it wrong? I don’t think that that matters much for the outbreak, uh, of the war in 2022. I don’t think it’s paramount on, uh, on Putin’s mind, but how the US worked with the regions, the, the sort of mistakes it made, or the misunderstandings and the achievements as well.

[00:45:19] Michael: I think we need to tally that all. Up and we can do that through historical inquiry and, and, and, and, and debate, uh, and discussion. Now on, on the Russian side, for me the key variable, I think the key variable in the war, uh, is Russian public opinion. And I say that, uh, not to displace the war from Ukraine, uh, to Russia, but I don’t think that you, the Ukrainians are gonna yield.

[00:45:41] Michael: I don’t think the US is gonna go back on its policy. And I don’t think that the Europeans are gonna break up on the issue of. , I think it’s set this policy and barring electoral flukes in one country or another, I think it will go on as it, as it as, as it is now, uh, for years. . And so in that sense, I don’t think Russia has what to [00:46:00] work with in terms of changing the situation on the other side of the, uh, of, uh, of the line of contact.

[00:46:05] Michael: And I think all of that is gonna hold. It’s interesting. We have to pay close attention to it, you know, I could be wrong about that, but I think it’s gonna, it’s gonna stay put, but I’m not sure about Russian public opinion. Uh, I think that that is where, uh, Putin could lose out with the. , it could be a year or two from now.

[00:46:21] Michael: It could be for economic reasons. It could be because the veterans come home and tell people a different story from what they’re seeing on tv. It could just be the setbacks and defeats of the war. Uh, turn the population against it. It’s, it’s not gonna happen fast, but it, it, it really could happen. And for that reason, we need to go back into history.

[00:46:38] Michael: We need to think about 1905 and how Russia loses the Russo Japanese war and goes into. You know, sort of period of both revolution, uh, and reform. We need to think about the Afghanistan war. We can even go back to the Crimean War, which Russia loses. Uh, and that induces a kind of moment of, of reform in Russian history.

[00:46:54] Michael: But let’s think about the Russian population now and the present tense sociologically. But [00:47:00] let’s go through history and look at moments in which. Public opinion has shifted, uh, attitudes, Russian history, authoritarian as it is top heavy as it is. It’s not just the czars, uh, and the general secretaries and, and, and the presidents.

[00:47:12] Michael: The people matter, uh, greatly and they will, I think, uh, matter a lot to the, to the end phase of this war, uh, whenever it comes, uh, in terms of history and, uh, and Ukraine. Uh, you know, I think that there’s just a. Uh, to gather. Uh, and you know, one thing is to understand the geopolitics as we’ve been talking about for the past hour.

[00:47:34] Michael: You know, the various wars and, uh, the configurations and the great powers that have, uh, you know, sort of often invaded Ukraine and, uh, and divided it up and. , that’s, uh, a very important topic. Uh, you know, what Ukrainian politics is, is another topic, and that’s not equal or the same as, uh, as the geopolitics.

[00:47:54] Michael: Uh, and there I think we all have a great deal, uh, to learn. This would take us back to 1918, the [00:48:00] creation of a first, uh, Ukrainian Republic to the late 19th century into the form. , uh, of a kind of Ukrainian bourgeoisie that was a, uh, a vehicle of, uh, of, of, of national sentiment. Not just nationalist sentiment, but of, of, of national sentiment.

[00:48:14] Michael: And even, you know, the sort of the medieval period that is, is, is so important to the, uh, to the region at large. And then finally, Ukrainian culture, uh, you know, what is. Uh, Ukrainian, uh, culture, uh, and, uh, you know, sort of what, what forms it, what, uh, what, what fuels it? What is the role of, of, of religion in Ukrainian society?

[00:48:34] Michael: It’s, it’s, that’s, that’s, that’s one important question. What’s the role of language and music? Uh, and, uh, how does the cultural imagination work out, uh, over the course of the last 10, 20, 30 years from the period of independence? But, Back into the 20th century, uh, and into the 19th century. I don’t know if that’s gonna provide us a key to the war.

[00:48:53] Michael: Uh, it may, uh, help to explain certain kinds of resilience or, or civic, uh, activism or pluralism, [00:49:00] uh, in Ukraine. Uh, but I think it may help us to understand just the people. Who are there, uh, at the, at the center of this war. Uh, and, uh, the way in which, uh, they live, uh, through it. Uh, and you know, that’s, uh, as important when it comes to the memory and the history of the war as the great decisions and the battlefield events, uh, and the political economy, uh, and the, and, and the economics, the, the people themselves in their, uh, in their, uh, in their cultural life.

[00:49:27] Michael: And there, I think most of us in the US and outside of Ukraine, we have, uh, truly an immense amount to. Michael, you have,

[00:49:34] Jeremi: you have given a masterclass in, uh, why history matters, particularly in moments of conflict, in moments of uncertainty and in moments where we recognize the world is changing, but we don’t know how and in what direction, um, history provides us, as you’ve pointed out in each of the cases for the United States for.

[00:49:55] Jeremi: Russia for Ukraine. Uh, it, it provides the only setting [00:50:00] in which we can contemplate what are the likely futures in this uncertain moments by looking back that we can think forward. Zachary, does this, um, resonate with your poem on the ghosts that you say are still alive? Is, is this the moment a year into this war?

[00:50:16] Jeremi: When we have to not just focus on the battlefield, but understand the ghosts better.

[00:50:20] Zachary: I think so. I, I think for many of us, and, and I know this was the conversation on February 25th, uh, 2022 on this podcast, uh, wi wi with both of you, many of us expected this war to last only a few weeks. And I think that it’s, it’s worthwhile.

[00:50:36] Zachary: Um, a year or so later to think about why it didn’t, as I think we’ve done today, but also to go back and, and look more deeply at the history of this region and, and recognize that, that, that this, this, this war, this terrible conflict, I is here to stay. And, and we have a responsibility not only to understand the present conflict, but all of the conflicts that came.

[00:50:58] Michael: Well, Zachary, if, if you don’t mind [00:51:00] my, by jumping in just for a second, Zachary, it’s, it’s a word that has come up in several of your poems with our discussions over the past year, at least in, in, in, in two. Today’s in, in a previous one, and it’s the word generation. Uh, and you’ve often spoken in our conversations about what this means, uh, to your generation, which is a wonderful question, uh, to ask.

[00:51:18] Michael: It’s my strong sense, uh, in terms of predictions. I’m comfortable making this. , that’s a conflict that began perhaps in 2014, but certainly in 2022, the conflict that began that we call Russia’s War Against Ukraine, it’s, it’s, it’s a generational conflict for us. Uh, it’s not a conflict of years and probably not even a conflict of, of decades.

[00:51:39] Michael: It’s a general con generational conflict, by which I don’t mean to predict that the war is gonna last for 30 years, that I have no idea about. And it could end, uh, in a year, but the conflict is not gonna end in the, uh, in a year. And in that sense, we need to. One of the hardest things to do in an age of social media.

[00:51:53] Michael: We need to think in generational, uh, arcs. So it’s, it’s, it’s, it’s wonderful in every respect, Zachary, to have you as a part of these conversations, but I [00:52:00] think you remind us, uh, of, uh, of the importance of, of, of generations and, and also I would say of of generational thinking.

[00:52:08] Jeremi: I think that’s a perfect note to close on.

[00:52:10] Jeremi: This is a generational conversation that we’re having here, and it is a conversation that will continue in many forms. And, and that’s the whole point of, uh, this podcast and what, uh, Franklin Roosevelt was articulating when he spoke of each generation writing a new chapter in the Book of Democracy. We, we don’t know what that chapter’s gonna look like.

[00:52:29] Jeremi: But we’re all in the midst of writing it. And, and as with writing anything, it’s, it’s a messy, difficult process. Uh, Michael, as a, as I think one of the best writers on this topic today, uh, thank you for joining us and thank you for sharing your wisdom with us.

[00:52:45] Michael: No, Zachary and Jeremy, it’s, it’s, it’s an honor of privilege and, and, and also a pleasure to be, uh, to be in your intellectual.

[00:52:53] Jeremi: And Zachary, thank you for your, uh, wonderful thought-provoking poem as always, and, uh, for your excellent [00:53:00] questions. And thank you, most of all, to our loyal listeners for joining us for this episode of This is Democracy.

[00:53:14] Outro: This podcast is produced by the Liberal Arts Its Development Studio and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Hero Kini. Stay tuned for a new episode every week. You can find this is Democracy on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher.

[00:53:34] Outro: See you next time.