This is Democracy – Episode 215: Ukraine War

Jeremi Suri: Welcome to our new episode of This is Democracy.

This week we are moving away from our, uh, multi-week discussion of Civil War by other means, and coming back to a series of issues that bring the history of our international society together with contemporary affairs. And no issue does this more directly and more tragically then the current war in Ukraine.

We’re fortunate to be joined again by our good friend and really someone who. Already was a leading scholar of Russia and US affairs and European affairs before the war, but is now catapulted, I think, to [00:01:00] one of the leading public intellectuals on the topic. Uh, our good friend, uh, Dr. Michael Kimmage.

Michael, thank you for joining us again.

Michael Kimmage: It’s, it’s so wonderful to be back with the two of you.   

Jeremi Suri: Michael Kimmage is a professor of history at the Catholic University of America in Washington, dc. He’s also a fellow at the German Marshall Fund and chair of the Advisory Council for the Ken Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, dc.

He served on the, uh, policy planning staff of the Department of State from 2014 to 2017, and he held the Russia Ukraine portfolio for the policy planning staff. In that role, he publishes widely on international affairs, US Russian relations, intellect. Jewel and diplomatic history, uh, written a number of books that we’ve mentioned before.

The one I’ll just highlight now, which seems particularly relevant, The abandonment of the west, the history of an idea in American foreign policy, and Michael has been remarkably prolific. In the last few months, writing, uh, at more than a dozen major pieces, uh, in foreign affairs [00:02:00] and other places, other major publications in the United States and overseas, putting the war in Ukraine in historical perspective.

Uh, so we’re really fortunate to have, have Michael with us today. Before we turn to our discussion, uh, with Michael Kim, we have of course, uh, Mr. Zachary’s poem. What is the title of your poem today? A Fragmentary Illusion. I can’t wait to hear this one. Let. 

Zachary Suri: When the bomb fell, they were walking in the park and when the fire started, they were opening their frosted over windows to greet the morning as if it were a bluebird on a branch.

A few feet away. A few feet away. They were the children dancing in little circles down the avenue, reading off words like they were fragments in some grand mosaic and BR delivery recruit. Where needed necessary, if only to see some bigger, less fragmentary illusion illusions. The light was dancing on the blue green windows [00:03:00] illusions.

The roads seemed to bend, and the voices suddenly illusions dissipate into a general. Groaning. Eventually we will all be groaning. Eventually we are all alone and we find ourselves like them. Grave at the river’s edge in Unremembered unrecognizable individual. 

Jeremi Suri: Zachary that really, uh, evokes so many emotions.

What is your, your poem about? 

Zachary Suri: My poem is really about the, uh, conflict between the individual experience of war and the dehumanization, uh, that comes with such widespread violence, uh, and the terror, uh, such that, uh, Putin has been imposing on the people of Keve in other parts of Ukraine in recent days.

Uh, and, and, and the, the real horror, not just in its physical toll. On the population, but also in its 

Jeremi Suri: dehumanization. Right, right. Well, Michael, uh, that’s a sad place to start, but [00:04:00] probably the appropriate place to start in talking about the war, 

Michael Kimmage: right? That’s correct. Yeah. I believe it’s the eighth month of the war, probably approaching the ninth month in exactly as Zachary illustrates in his beautiful poem.

I mean, the, the humanitarian toll remains astonishingly high, uh, and uh, the recent development. Targeted attacks on Ukraine’s electrical grid and civilian infrastructure, which have been ongoing since the beginning of the war, but have intensified in the last couple of weeks. Really, again, underscore the immense humanitarian price that the Ukrainians are paying for this needless and criminal war.

Michael, with the perspective of eight 

Jeremi Suri: to nine months now, um, following things as closely as you are with the historical. Knowledge you have. What do you think this war is about? What, what, what is driving the, uh, not just Vladimir Putin, but primarily Vladimir Putin and the other actors in this 

Michael Kimmage: war? Well, I think Putin is difficult to characterize at the present moment.

I think that he has, [00:05:00] because the war has not gone well for Russia, has changed to a degree, uh, in his ambitions, not his ultimate ambitions, which remain, I think, in a sense, simple. He wishes to control. The destiny of Ukraine and through control of the destiny of Ukraine, he wishes to rewrite the rules, uh, of European secur security and European, uh, order.

And those are in his view, grand ambitions. And I don’t think he’s given up on those grand, uh, ambitions, but they seemed perhaps tantalizingly within reach in the first couple of days of the war for Putin. And they’ve really receded further and further from, uh, from view for him. So, you know, I think.

Tangible ambition at the present moment is just to kind of hold on through the winter, uh, and see if he can draw this war out and extend it. And if the other side will start to, uh, to crack. But, uh, you know, sort of a, a broader view of victory for Putin, I think is very, very hard to, uh, to identify at the moment I sort of feel from putz inside or from Russia’s aside, that the war is [00:06:00] entering into a nihilistic phase that.

It’s not really determined by victory anymore. It’s difficult to say what victory might mean under the circumstances, but the will to inflict suffering is still, uh, very great and in a sense to deprive Ukraine of any kind of victory or to deprive Ukraine’s Western supporters of any kind of victory. But it’s, it’s, it’s gone from a positive set of ambitions in the sense that.

In order put in which to create to a negative set of ambitions. You know, so the worst case scenarios that he’s trying to, uh, to force all that’s, you know, one half of the crisis for Ukraine. I don’t think that the war is complicated to characterize, uh, either. Uh, and in a sense it’s a very different trajectory for Ukraine, it was utterly existential for the first couple of.

uh, and months. I do think that we can say with confidence that, uh, Ukraine will hold, and Kiev will be its capital. And Lansky’s government, uh, will stay, uh, in place, uh, absolutely for the foreseeable future, or [00:07:00] simply for the future was a, which is a kind of astonishing victory for Ukraine. But the struggle for sur survival is still absolutely ongoing and absolutely unfinished.

Uh, and uh, in that sense, Ukraine has achieved a great. Uh, but the road ahead of it is going to be. Long, I think it’s for the third side of the conflict, which is the Western and international global supporters of Ukraine, where in some respects the, the war is most difficult to, to characterize. It’s about support for Ukraine.

Uh, it’s about keeping Ukraine in sovereignty and independence as the Biden administration continues coherently to affirm. But, you know, beyond that, the kind of goals of the war, uh, are a little bit, uh, nebulous. So Russia is struggling not to lose. Ukraine is gonna struggle to hold on to all that. It’s, uh, achieved over the last eight, nine months.

Uh, and the Western supporters are gonna be there behind Ukraine. But, uh, I think with a little bit less of a strong story to tell. [00:08:00] And with 

Zachary Suri: the benefit of, uh, whatever eight months of hindsight can provide, um, uh, why do you think it was that the Ukrainians were able to resist? What, what many including, uh, US three, uh, on February 24th, uh, predicted would be a very.

Swift, uh, Ukrainian defeat. 

Michael Kimmage: Yes. I mean, it’s, it’s, uh, it’s an excellent question and it’s very nice to be reminded of that conversation that we had at the beginning of this whole, uh, nightmare. Uh, and to be reminded that for the three of us who. From the very beginning, we’re completely sympathetic with the Ukrainian cause, uh, that we underestimated, uh, several of the capacities that have shown themselves, uh, in, in spades over the last, uh, couple of months, uh, in Ukraine.

So I think that you could answer the question really from two. Vantage points and most important is to start with, uh, with Ukraine, that it’s a country of considerable size, you know, [00:09:00] roughly the size of Texas and the population a bit under 40 million. Uh, that has always had a sort of proverbial about Ukraine, that there are regional.

Ethnic, linguistic and religious, uh, differences within Ukraine. Uh, and there had been one source of skepticism about whether it could pull through with a war. Uh, but Ukrainians have resolved that problem. I don’t think that that’s, uh, an issue at this stage. It’s not that the differences have gone away, but they’re in no sense, uh, in obstacles, the kind of national unity that’s necess.

Uh, at war time. Uh, secondly, for the Ukrainians, uh, the military that they have, uh, is one that’s quite a lot better than it was in 2014. Uh, that’s, uh, you know, sort of better integrated, uh, better run, uh, better equipped, equipped when it, than it was when, you know, Russia took Crimea and handed Ukraine a couple of defeats in the summer and, and, and winter of 20 14, 20 15.

Uh, and, you know, in addition to a high quality [00:10:00] military, uh, Ukrainian decision making has, I think, been extremely, uh, sound, uh, the ways in which, uh, the Russians were repelled around Kiev and in the north in the first couple of months. Uh, how Ukraine with stood the war of attrition that Russia was imposing on it in the summer with seemingly some success on the Russian side, but that was.

Uh, and then of course, as we’ve all been watching since the 10th of September, the, uh, extraordinary counteroffensive, uh, which has, uh, been a strategic success and, and, and also indicates how well the Ukrainian military has absorbed us and other kinds of advanced military assistance that’s been coming to Ukraine and, and has been very, very successfully integrated.

So national unity, successful political and military leadership, uh, and, you know, high morale and. Uh, on the battlefield. That’s been the recipe, uh, on the Ukrainian side. And I think you see a lot of the virtues that U [00:11:00] Ukraine has demonstrated, sort of mirrored, uh, in Russian vices, uh, over the last couple of months.

So a lunatic concept of operations for Russia, far too ambitious for, uh, for Russian capacities. Uh, political goals that Putin can describe in the Kremlin, but that don’t speak very urgently to, uh, a lot of Russian soldiers who don’t know what they’re. Uh, in Ukraine, uh, and uh, a sort of consistent for Russian, for Russia catastrophic underestimation, uh, of Ukraine that they failed to see how Russia could even lose around Kiev vignette Russia did.

And then they learned very few lessons from that, uh, and were completely ill prepared for the counteroffensive around Har gif and have been struggl. Further to the south in, uh, in hair songs. So sort of hubris, uh, lack of organization, really a lack of purpose, I would say in the war. Not that Putin hasn’t given it a rhetorical purpose, but a lack of a purpose that that rings true.

Uh, and then finally a kind of, [00:12:00] um, discombobulation on the battlefield that I think has been a surprise to. Almost all observers. Uh, in a sense, uh, you know, everybody had two robust, an image of, uh, of Russia’s battlefield, uh, capacities. And they’ve shown themselves to be a midling army when it comes to conventional war.

You mentioned, 

Zachary Suri: uh, earlier, um, Perhaps the, the three major, uh, players whose perspectives we need to take into account here are the Western and, and, and other powers supporting Ukraine, uh, Ukraine and the, uh, Kremlin. But, but what of the Russian people? Um, we’ve seen in, uh, recent weeks a number of, uh, stories, uh, in the American press on, uh, Russian, uh, resistance to, uh, military cons.

Conscription, uh, could, could that. Uh, this sort of resistance to the Kremlin’s narrative in Russia at home, uh, play a role in the war. Perhaps 

Michael Kimmage: moving forward it will, uh, and it can, [00:13:00] uh, but here, uh, I would just urge sobriety, uh, it will sound like pessimist. My hope it’s more. Sobriety that, uh, Russia has nothing resembling an anti-war movement, uh, and has not had one since the very first days of the war where there were sporadic protests in a handful of Russian, uh, cities.

And by an anti-war movement, I mean something that has organization that has a kind of plan, either some method of influencing people in the gremlin or. Uh, of perhaps putting in jeopardy, uh, the Kremlin’s rule or the Kremlin’s power. There are such instances in Russian history going back, say, to the first World War where the czar’s power started to weaken and then was eventually eviscerated by wartime protest.

But, uh, that’s just not, uh, the story so far. Uh, in Russia. What you’ve seen is, uh, certainly. You know, lots of resistance to, to mobilization, uh, in the sense that most young, uh, Russian men seem not to wanna go to war, and [00:14:00] so they’ve done things to evade the draft or they’ve left, uh, the country. What you’ve seen, according to polling data in the last couple of, uh, weeks and months, is a lot of anxiety in Russia, uh, about the war.

That’s a new factor, but you have not seen this coalesce, uh, into an anti-war movement. Then if you trust the polling data, which I kind of have, , uh, it was a popular war up until say, July, August, but it’s still not an unpopular war, uh, in, uh, in Russia. And my personal conviction is that Russians look at the war.

Wish it wasn’t there, wish it wasn’t happening, but don’t wanna lose it. Uh, and to that degree, Ru uh, Putin has the support. Uh, of the Russian population, but it’s early days for a war that I suspect is gonna be quite long. Uh, and if Putin would be prudent, you know, he’s apparently in his own description, a great student of history.

If he would be prudent, he would study the history of long, poorly articulated, uh, wars of attrition. Uh, and he might see some very, very worrying signs, uh, already within Russia, [00:15:00] but wearing signs in terms of what could happen a year from now, two years from now. Three years from now. So yes, disorganization, chaos, I think a lot of discontent under the surface and behind closed doors, uh, but in public, uh, alas, uh, an absence or nonexistent anti-war movement.

So, Michael, as I was 

Jeremi Suri: listening to your really, uh, evocative description of the situation in Russia today, It does seem to me it echoes as I think you implied, uh, the circumstances in Russia, perhaps in 1915 or 1916 when there wasn’t an anti-war movement, as we think of it in the United States. But there clearly was a restiveness and a, um, discombobulation of society that contributed through discontent to the undermining of a.

Shouldn’t Putin be conscious of that, and should that have some effect on him? 

Michael Kimmage: He should. I mean, it’s, it’s a very good, uh, analogy, very telling analogy. In fact, in 1913, a [00:16:00] year before the first World War begins, you have the, I think it’s 1913, uh, but, you know, uh, roughly then you have the 300th anniversary of the Romanoff Dynasty, which is celebrated with great, great enthusiasm across Russia.

All different orders of, and classes of, uh, of society. So if you would, you know, draw your conclusions from that moment, you would say that the Roman of Dynasty had another 300 years. Uh, in its circa 1913, of course, 1915. Summer of 1915 is the apex of the war on the eastern front for Russia, where Zar Nicholas II speaks in the Polish city of Shema cell, which is now a staging ground for the, for the war in Ukraine.

So 1915, you know, there’s a almost a kind of euphoria about the. Uh, in Russia and then those two years that follow, uh, there’s a very, very precipitous decline. I think that the one salient difference, in addition to just how huge the first World War was and how devastating for the population of Russia overall, which the Ukraine war so far.

Uh, it hasn’t been. I think the one salient difference is that you have 20 years [00:17:00] before the revolution, 30 years before the revolution, the long legacy of political violence. It’s really Russia that innovates the modern practice of sort of political terror with assassinations. And I think it was thousands of Czars officials who were assassinated in those years.

And, you know, of course, uh, Bolick and other revolutionary movements that are. You know, sort of operating within Russia and, uh, have the czar as a target. And that’s, you know, not been the case for Putin. He’s sort of presided over, in a sense, more stable, uh, or, or, or, or peaceful time so that there’s not a revolutionary movement waiting in the wings right at the moment as there was.

Uh, as there was then. But you know, one has to be careful with those kinds of judgments because especially in the dictatorship that Russia overtly is now, and you know, probably has been for several years, but very emphatically is uh, now, um, there’s a lot that’s invisible. So, um, there really may be revolutionary sentiment, but it’s, it’s, it’s possible that we can’t see it.

But I think that the basic fact is that a war is a pressure point. An [00:18:00] unjust and criminal war is an additional pressure point. And then a war that Russia may well be losing is, uh, an even greater pressure point. Uh, and whether Putin has the capacities to navigate himself toward a ceasefire or to navigate himself out of this war, or to navigate himself.

This catastrophic war, it really remains to be seen. And, and it’s, it’s possib that he does not have those capacities. Right. And it’s also possible he might 

Jeremi Suri: overcompensate and, and come to the conclusion that the czar was too weak. And you, you are referring to the, the, uh, assassinations undertaken by SR.

And others. Of course, you could argue now Putin’s been the one doing the assassinating, the people. Right. . Right, 

Michael Kimmage: right. Exactly. There is political violence, but it comes from the state. Right, not against 

Jeremi Suri: the state. How do you think about the on again, off again, nuclear 

Michael Kimmage: threats that come from put, I’ll offer you an argument that I think is clear, uh, and I think also reassuring, and I hope that it’s, it’s, it’s true.

Uh, you know, [00:19:00] I think that, um, the value of the nuclear threat for Putin is the value. that it has in terms of instilling fear. Uh, and he’s done a good job in the last couple of weeks getting headlines about this. And, uh, you know, just today at the Valdai Conference, a sort of international affairs conference in Russia was making jokes about nuclear war, uh, and sort of bringing it back onto the, Uh, onto the agenda.

Uh, and of course when he does that, uh, he forces everybody to take note, uh, of this circumstance that Russia is a nuclear power and, you know, kind of madman theory type, uh, behavior from, uh, from Putin, uh, at the moment. And I think that his goal, uh, his most, uh, uh, you know, sort of, uh, Effective goal or sort of efficient goal with this is to sew division within the body politic of perhaps the United States, but especially of Germany, where you know, you have a sort of pacifist sensibility and lots of concern anxiety about, [00:20:00] about nuclear questions.

So there, I think it really has a kind of utility for Putin. You just sort of keep the pressure on a low boil, keep people speculating. And I think journalists have a very hard time resisting, uh, any kind of statement that puts in issues. Uh, about nuclear war. I’m not saying that, you know, it should be swept under the carpet, but it’s, it’s, it’s sort of good copy, uh, this, this, this kind of stuff.

Uh, and, uh, it’s, uh, you know, it’s a way of, uh, of, of changing the conversation from Russia’s battlefield defeats of the last two months, uh, and putting it on a different footing in one that’s more politically useful for. For Putin? I do not, You know, in so far as I understand these things, I don’t see great military utility in, in, in, in Putin using nuclear weapons in the sense that I don’t think it would win him The war.

There is I think, a very important difference between Hiroshima and Nagasaki and, and, and nuclear weapons that Putin might use, which is that in the summer of 1945, Japan was losing the. Uh, and in a sense, nuclear weapons finished the [00:21:00] deal, uh, and at the moment, Ukraine is winning the war. Uh, and so I think it’s the likelihood that Ukraine would surrender or sort of give up because of nuclear weapons use is, is, is very low.

And then there’s the demonstration, the effect that nuclear weapons have. But it seems there that. Putin probably would lose, uh, more than he would gain if he were to put these weapons into practice. And the point has been made, you know, sort of often that countries like India or Brazil that are fence sitters at the moment might get off the fence.

And even China, which has, you know, thrown in its lot behind Russia to a degree with this war, uh, that even China might change course where Putin to use nuclear weapons. So I think the threat has a lot of value for him. I think the use of the weapons themselves, uh, is pretty unlike. The only way in which I think it might become likely is if Russia were rapidly to lose, uh, perhaps in the vicinity of, uh, of Crimea or if a kind.

escalation would occur by accident, which is mm-hmm. , uh, hopefully not gonna happen, but, uh, maybe a remote possibility. [00:22:00] And, and I, I, I think that 

Jeremi Suri: makes a lot of sense and it is a little reassuring, uh, a little reassuring that we should say, not a source of complacency in, in any way. How do you think about the role of, uh, are European allies?

As, as this war emerges and as we get into winter, it does seem one of the things Putin is counting on is that the pressure on the Europeans will be greater, both from the greater energy needs. They’ll have this, this winter and from rising prices. Uh, and, and the Saudis have certainly contributed to that by reducing production of oil 

Michael Kimmage: in this period.

So one thing that I think the Europeans are not gonna do, And I think this speaks to mistakes that Putin has has made regarding Europe is that they’re not gonna go back. So it’s very true that Europe will suffer, is already suffering from. inflation and all of the costs that come with high energy prices.

And I guess you could say, if you want it to be very simplistic, that the magic bullet would be the super piece in Ukraine and sort of get Russia to [00:23:00] resupply, you know, the gas and the oil, especially the gas. But you know, I think that Russia has shown itself to be so untrustworthy, uh, that that would be a pretty, uh, crazy argument for Europeans to embrace.

And I think that they’re not gonna embrace. You know, it’s as if they’ve crossed that bridge. They’ve sort of crossed that Rubicon and there really isn’t a way of going back to the status quo anti, So I just don’t think that European countries are gonna link sanctions policy or start exerting pressure on Ukraine in such a way as to, you know, sort of bring the war to a quicker, uh, termination because of all the things that you’re describing.

But, um, you know, having been reassuring on the, on the nuclear question, Try not to be too Pollyanna-ish on this, uh, particular question. I think it’s, it’s the way I see it, it’s more a set of variables, uh, that are going to. Bring increasing instability to Europe. Uh, in terms of Europe’s domestic politics.

I mean, we saw this in 2015 with, uh, the Syrian civil war and the migrant crisis that it generated, that it [00:24:00] did, for example, in Germany create a new kind of popularity for the afd For that far right political movement, AFD has been creeping up a little bit and some of the more recent German, uh, elections, and so it’s not as if.

Europe per se, is gonna change course. I don’t think in the next 12 months that’s gonna, uh, that’s gonna happen. But will enough of these variables coalesce, uh, to sort of diminish the consensus, uh, to foster polarization, uh, maybe to make Europe as a whole less functional and, and, and, and therefore less able to prosecute, uh, the war to, to, to contribute to Ukraine’s success.

Uh, through financial and, uh, and military means. Uh, and in that sense, could the kind of Western coalition be degraded? But let me just throw in one further point here that the US plays a pretty important role, uh, in all of this, and I don’t think that Europe is gonna break from sanctions or from support for Ukraine.

If the United States is robustly in favor of these things, it’s not as if Europe, uh, it’s not as if the US calls [00:25:00] the shots in Europe, but I just think that if you have strong support from the US it would be quite hard for Europe to go, uh, in a very, very different direction. So I think for the next 12 months, we’ll see a kind of policy continuity.

Uh, if Europe has to go through a second winter, uh, of energy crisis, then maybe you could say all bets are off, but 12 months is, is a long enough time in politic. 

Zachary Suri: Well, and it, it seems to be shaping up for a pretty warm winter so far in lots of Europe. 

Michael Kimmage: It’s been a warm fall. Yeah. Yeah. Well, 

Jeremi Suri: let’s hope so.

Let’s hope though. Uh, it’s hard to know what to hope for with climate change. Right, Right. . So I don’t know what I’m supposed to hope for. Colder or warmer weather. I don’t know. , I just want non extreme weather, let’s put it that way. . So, So Michael, uh, the, the question that puzzles me the most is, Ukraine should strategize going forward, and, and maybe we can talk about that.

You, you’ve spent a lot of time, I know thinking about the Ukrainian position and all of this, and it’s clear as you said, that they, they’ve done so much [00:26:00] better than so many of us expected and, uh, they are winning the war. I think those are just undeniable facts. But that doesn’t mean they will win the war.

Michael Kimmage: Where should they go from here? It’s not an easy question to answer. The tragedy of Ukraine’s position is that Russia is after all a nuclear power. Uh, it is the case that Russia has a population of 140 million people and however badly Russia has done militarily over the last eight months, uh, it’s not a military light.

And it does have, if it’s able to sustain this war effort over a two, three year time period, it does have the chance to reconstitute itself. And if Putin stays in power, which, which he may, uh, those ambitions are going to stay in place. Uh, the ambitions of taking key of toppling the Ukrainian government of, uh, of trying to exert considerable Russian control, at least over, you know, sort of half of Ukraine or a portion of Ukraine.

So, In a sense is part of the landscape for Ukraine, [00:27:00] uh, in the way that the Alps are part of the landscape for Switzerland. You can’t get rid of that set of circumstances, and I don’t think that Ukraine can bet on Putin falling. And a benign Russian president, pro Ukrainian, you know, pro Russian president coming to power.

That’s, you know, that’s betting on a thousand to one odds, uh, of, of something happening. And you just can’t base your security on that, uh, on that foundation. I think that Ukraine has to be very careful about keeping its alliances with the us. Partnerships, alliances with the us with Western Europe. I think Eastern Europe is gonna be just very firmly in Ukraine’s camp, you know, forever.

So it, that’s not something that Ukraine really has to work on so much. But certainly with the US and Western Europe, that support is crucial. So there, it needs to just be clever diplomatically and continue using the kinds of narrative devices, social media devices. Zelensky has so effectively used. Uh, and then I think there will be a need, uh, in the future, maybe a year from now, maybe two years from now, not.

Peace with Russia, uh, but perhaps [00:28:00] for a version of a ceasefire, uh, that Ukraine can then back up with real deterrent tools. Uh, with of course the help of the US and with other outside, uh, outside power. So it’s not that you’re depending on Putin’s good faith, uh, to keep the peace, but that you can hopefully put an end to the worst of the fighting along which territorial lines, I don’t know.

We can say going back to pre February 24th, I suspect that’s probably on the optimistic side, but you know, if it’s that, if it’s less than that, if it’s more than that, that you know is, is, is up for determination. A kind of line of contact, uh, uh, a 75% ceasefire perhaps. Uh, and then really, really robust efforts, uh, at deterrents that would make it hard for Russia to act on the will, uh, that it will have, that it will retain to rein invade.

And, you know, we could go on to the economic questions from here, but let me leave it at that. But I think it will be a semi piece enforced by deterrents, uh, that. Not resolve [00:29:00] the problem, but put an end to the worst of the fighting. 

Zachary Suri: And, and what about the sort of, uh, maybe the factor that’s most up in the air at the moment, which is, uh, the American, uh, political climate around Ukraine?

There’s been a lot of talk lately of what a Republican controlled house of representatives or Congress, uh, entirely, uh, would change about American policy towards Ukraine. Do you think there’s a. Uh, that Ukraine loses, uh, in, in, in some significant sense, um, support from the United 

Michael Kimmage: States. I don’t think it risks losing support, uh, from the United States.

I mean, it does feel to me like the Biden administration has been hurrying to get a lot of assistance over to Ukraine before the midterms, so they are perhaps worried about something and, and, and I would take that. , Uh, quite seriously. Uh, you know, Congress is a co-equal branch of government and, um, you know, in theory could try to wind down the war, but that to me seems, uh, a lot more than what [00:30:00] republicans, uh, would attempt to do if they would take the house or if they would take the house.

Uh, and the Senate, they, they may get in the way. They may slow things down. They may make the money harder to come by. Maybe worst case scenarios that they would start impeachment proceedings or congressional investigations related to the war that could muddy the waters and just make it more difficult to.

To argue for in the public sphere. All of that is possible, but I just don’t think that Congress is gonna impose a change, of course, on American foreign policy with this, uh, with this issue. And I don’t think that the White House is gonna be persuaded by, by congress to change course, uh, itself. So, you know, there could be tweaks, there could be diminishments to the policy, but I think the policy is gonna stay long past, uh, the midterm elections.

And in, in that sense, I think 2024 will be the. Uh, the sort of test case if, if, if I were, you know, sort of in the Biden administration at the moment, instead of looking at the midterms with fear or looking at the Republican party with fear in this [00:31:00] regard, I think that they should look at it as an opportunity, uh, to just continuously connect, reconnect with voters, with constituents, with, um, with the American people.

And continue to win the argument. Uh, you know, the arguments that the administration has are very good. Uh, and it has a considerable track record at the moment, uh, over the last eight months. So just keep driving that home, keep sort of, uh, engaging in the debate in some ways. Uh, uh, a bit of skepticism or questioning from Congress could be a good thing.

I frankly was, was happy to see, uh, Congressional Democrats put out a letter a couple of days ago, challenging Biden administration. Policy. They retracted it. It was a foolish letter. It was very badly timed. It didn’t present a, you know, I think a persuasive counter argument, but that’s why I was happy about it.

you know, , there should be a debate, you know, that’s what congress should be doing. You don’t wanna rubber stamp of the kind that we had after, uh, after nine 11, uh, let the chips fall where they may, you know, sort of put the questions out there and then give the Biden administration the opportunity [00:32:00] to answer.

Uh, uh, effectively. So, you know, it’s not what the administration, uh, fails to see. I think that they see that, but you know, they should really be directing their attention internally on these, on these matters. There is probably a bit of Ukraine fatigue in the American population. You know, I think that there will be questions coming up about why the US is doing so much, and in a sense, comparatively Europe is doing so.

Uh, and, you know, those issues are gonna have to be dealt with, uh, and, and managed. So that’s, I think how ideally the, the sort of Republican skepticism could be converted into just a more, uh, firmly grounded policy for, for the, for the White House. 

Jeremi Suri: Well, and it does seem an area, Michael, where there is an opportunity to build bridges between some Democrats and Republicans on this issue.

Not all Republicans and not all Democrats, but it does seem that this is an area where. One could see 

Michael Kimmage: effective partnerships across the aisle. Yeah. Certainly with Mitch McConnell. So, whose statements, you know, over the last couple of days, um, have been, you know, [00:33:00] very robustly in support, uh, of, uh, of Ukraine and I’m, you know, sort of less versed in, uh, in, in other figures.

But you see how a candidate like JD Vance has been sort of struggling on this issue that he wants to take a. I dunno what the explana that the best description would be for it, but a kind of populist Ukraine skeptical line. He wants to, and he sort of tr sent up a couple of trial balloons and it seems not to have worked that well.

Right. Uh, in Ohio, that’s not material for coalitions in the White House. But it is interesting that the kind of, maybe it’s a stereotype at the sort of neo Trumpian pro rushan or, uh, you know, sort of skeptical, uh, politician about Ukraine that they seem. , uh, have very good recipes for connecting with voters and getting their message across.

And that may be helpful in terms of finding other Republicans who are much more in line with the, uh, with the Biden arguments about Ukraine. Right, 

Jeremi Suri: right. So, so Michael, to, to sort of bring. All of this detail together, you’ve given us really such a, a powerful and well-informed perspective on [00:34:00] so many dimensions of this very multidimensional conflict.

Is it safe to say really what this is, is a war of attrition that we’re in that is not going to end anytime soon and where there’s unlikely to be major shifts militarily or politically 

Michael Kimmage: in the near future? I’m not entirely sure getting a bit outside of my own actual. Uh, expertise, but I think that what the 10th of September, the Ukrainian counter offensive around her have showed is that what threatened to become a classic war of attrition over the summer could pretty quickly shift into something else.

And again, the integration of high Mars and other precision, you know, sort of missiles and other kinds of weapons, uh, by Ukraine, uh, has given them a kind of momentum. Uh, I think that was surprising even to them, and certainly very surpris. To the Russians. Now, granted a hair, sun has not been a cake walk by any means.

It’s very, been very costly. , uh, for the Ukrainian military. But there too, you could imagine that hair could, could, could fall to Ukraine. [00:35:00] Uh, and uh, you know, in that sense, uh, the war might take on new dimensions. I mean, I think that there was maybe a bit of over optimism in September. People thought that Ukraine could kind of punch through the land bridge or maybe retake, uh, ple on that, uh, looks pretty remote, uh, at the moment.

But I think, you know, there. Pretty considerable ships shifts that could happen even over the winter. It’s not, I think, guaranteed that the fighting will cease. I think the next couple of weeks are gonna be pretty muddy and wet in Ukraine, so you might see, uh, a very slow pace then, but it could come back.

Of course, we need to remember that the war itself began in the third week of February. So it, it was a winter war, uh, at the outset, and it may a winter war, uh, in the next couple of months. And, you know, I, I say with less, um, you know, with, I say with no enthusiasm at all, but. We have a social media conversation about Russia’s mobilization.

That’s a little bit like the social media war. Very much filtered through certain lenses, and we’ve seen the incompetence and you know, Russians running away and people who don’t have enough [00:36:00] equipment and all of that. , but you know, mobilization over time will get rationalized. Uh, and if it is 300,000 additional soldiers that Russia has brought on board, uh, that too could make it something other than a war of a, uh, of attrition.

But that would be a spring summer dynamic next year. So yes, it has many of those aspects of a war of attrition. Certainly if we look at the global dimensions, we have the kind of Russia block, uh, and the Ukraine West block, and they’re sort of trying to outdo each other through economics, not through military.

But on the battlefields it could be, uh, you know, sort of fluid and dynamic. Uh, certainly for the next couple of months. And, and that 

Jeremi Suri: anticipated my, my final question for you, um, and you already spoke a bit about this, but I wanted to really, uh, put a fine point on it. I I, If you were advising the Biden administration now, would you advise the administration to try to support a breakthrough for Ukraine or to, to bet on time?

Uh, is time in? Is [00:37:00] time in our favor? 

Michael Kimmage: I, I, I think, uh, betting on time to me makes more sense. Uh, you know, if they can achieve a breakthrough, you know, God’s speed. But I don’t think that there’s any achievable breakthrough that Ukraine can can get to in the next couple of weeks or months that would fundamentally alter, uh, the war.

Uh, and, uh, in that sense, the war is not gonna be. Probably by a, by a breakthrough. It’s gonna be, uh, real resolve in patience, uh, on the Ukrainian side, certainly on the side of Ukrainian supporters. That’s gonna matter. And in that sense, the costs of the war as they begin to mountain Russia. Could well be a factor and could start to alter the dynamic.

I think that the hardest task now for the Biden administration, and maybe they’re there in private, you know, I don’t see evidence of this in public, but the hardest task for the Biden administration is to figure out the place where this can, you know, sort of [00:38:00] finish up, uh, acceptably and you know, obviously.

The administration has repeated many times. That is the Ukrainians who are gonna decide this. That makes, uh, that makes a lot of sense. But it can’t be up in the air forever. It’s too soon to decide Now, it’s too soon to give it that sort of shape. But I think there’s a way in which the. Story of the war and the end phase of the war are gonna have to be brought together.

My gravest concern about the war on our side is not the Republican party, and it’s not even the, you know, sort of the economic fallout of the war. It’s that we’ll lose the storyline, we’ll sort of lose the narrative. Um, we maybe pumped up a little bit too much of this Hollywood narrative about Zelensky, that he’s the Churchill and he’s sort of destined to win the day.

Uh, I hope it’s true, but it may not feel that way for a, for a long time to. Uh, and if not, we’re gonna need a story to tell about this war that’s gonna keep our populations behind it. And it’s gonna, that story is gonna have something to do with how the war ends. So, if I knew all the answers in this regard, I would write it [00:39:00] up for foreign affairs and, uh, uh, put it out in public and sort of say what the answer is.

I don’t know what the answer is. Uh, in this regard, but this is where the Biden administration has to move. They’ve done brilliantly with military support for Ukraine, really brilliantly. Uh, and I think one only begins to see now through newspaper articles. There’s a long New Yorker article about weapons provision to Ukraine and just sort of the scale of the effort and the intelligence behind it, and intelligence sharing and targeting.

And it’s, uh, it, it, it’s, it’s been sp. Uh, but it’s half the necessary effort for, uh, the successful prosecution, uh, of this war. And I think the really difficult decisions, and they will be difficult. There will be some degree of compromise that’s probably gonna be, uh, necessary on the ground. Ukraine is not gonna get everything at once in terms of, you know, war crimes, tribunals and reparations and, and territory and sort of figuring.

Where that compromise is gonna be acceptable is gonna be enormously difficult. But if we only defer there, uh, and we’re not willing to sort of contemplate some of those things, uh, [00:40:00] we’ll run into this problem of narrative and story that if it’s a war of attrition that lasts for 20 years, uh, I just don’t know on our side if we’ll be able to sustain it.

We need to sort of, Better story than that. We just have to, uh, we have to arrive at that. I, I’m, I’m, I’m confident that we will, uh, but, uh, it, it won’t be easy work. And then sort of the final 0.1 can make in terms of the Europeans is that it is disconcerting, of course, that we have continue still, you know, a sort of German pragmatism, , British preoccupation with internal problems.

Uh, you know, France thinking about a kind of European vision for the war. And then Eastern Europeans who are very, Im. Uh, to see Ukraine triumph on the battlefield and willing to make very, very great, uh, sacrifices. So Europe is not on one page with this war. Uh, and probably as time goes by, those differences could become more emphatic and more accentuated.

Yet another reason to kind of come to some kind of conclusion about the beginning of the end in Churchillian terms, where maybe at the end of the beginning, uh, but we’re not yet at the beginning of the [00:41:00] end. And, and, and in a way we have to get there. I don’t even mean practically. We sort of have to get there philosophically, figure out what the end means, what we can drive for, what we can push for.

Uh, and when we get there, I think a kind of complete strategy will have crystallized and come into focus. So, And maybe that’s in terms of the public sphere and people like us who write about these things and teach them and engage with students, we have to sponsor a very rich, open-ended and creative conversation.

Uh, on that point and, you know, sort of bring these ideas forward and, and, and give them as a gift to, to the, to the policy makers. 

Jeremi Suri: Absolutely. And, and the Churchill quote that I, I used myself in my recent book is that now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. And, and your, your point is we have to at least have some vision and begin a conversation, a story about what the beginning of the end is.

If it’s not the end. 

Michael Kimmage: Jeremy, you and I are both, you know, sort of students of long standing of George Cannon, and he comes to mind very often to me in this, in this crisis because what Ken recognized in a [00:42:00] nuclear age is that you don’t get unconditional surrender. In fact, I think Kenon felt in general, a lot of wars, you don’t get unconditional surrenders.

It’s sort of an unusual right ending to a war. And I think we can say with confidence, we’re not gonna end this war with Russia’s unconditional surrenders. So what then? Right, right. And maybe we have to go back to Kenon and sort of think about how he conceptualized these things and, and, and work with that.

And, and, and maybe it is some, in the end, some version of containment that’s, That’s gonna make you grain free. Uh, and that’s, that’s a tricky way to end a war. But, uh, but, uh, I, I, I suspect it’s a possible one. Well, and it’s 

Jeremi Suri: perfectly clouds visian, right? The, the 19th century German theorist or Prussian theorist, Carl von Klotz is his whole argument, right, is that war is politics by other means.

And that’s as true at the end of a war is, 

Michael Kimmage: it is at the beginning of a war. Yes, Zachary, 

Jeremi Suri: uh, Michael has given us really such a, a, a powerful tour al of, of this conflict. He’s allowed us to see the domestic and the international implications, uh, in Russia and Ukraine and elsewhere. He’s encapsulated [00:43:00] so many dynamics as, as a young person watching this closely, and I know you and your friends.

Many others. What do you hope for in the next few months, Zachary? 

Michael Kimmage: Well, 

Jeremi Suri: I 

Zachary Suri: hope, uh, that, uh, as Professor Kiwi, uh, echoed, uh, or I would like to echo what he said, uh, which is I think we need to make sure that we don’t lose the narrative. And I would like to see in the next few months, uh, uh, a clear understanding among the American public of why we are fighting this war.

I, I don’t think we have fully lost it yet, um, but I think we need to, um, take a hard look possibly. At our initial fervor over the war, but at the same time retain the kind of, if not optimism, at least, um, hope, uh, that I think the last few weeks have brought 

Jeremi Suri: And moral purpose as well. Indeed. Yes. I mean, do you think the moral message, the moral purpose, do you think the moral message is important here?

I do think 

Zachary Suri: the moral message is important, and I think the advantage. From a, uh, sort of narrative perspective in the United States is that [00:44:00] I think it is clear to most or the vast, vast majority of maritime servers, uh, who the good guy is and who bad guy is, and I think that that’s always a much easier story to tell.

Uh, And, and sell, if you will, 

Jeremi Suri: to the public. Michael, I want to give you the last word on that. When we first spoke, uh, in February, um, in, in the shadow of the beginnings of this terrible war, uh, it was one of our most, um, morally difficult conversations in more than 200 episodes on this podcast. Not because we didn’t know where we stood, but because of the, the moral crisis in front of us.

And, and I, I, I would just love for us to close with you some of your thoughts on, on. The moral issues today and what role they play in the war. 

Michael Kimmage: It’s, it’s, it’s hard to feel in any sense, like we’re out of the woods when it comes, uh, to the moral questions for the simple reason that as, as, as Zachary has documented in his poems, the atrocities have piled up, the war crimes have piled up.

You know, it was very, very [00:45:00] sad to read. Uh, last week, the, uh, advice of the Ukrainian government for those people who are now living as refugees outside of Ukraine’s borders. The advice was not to come home this winter because of all the sort of energy concerns and electricity concerns, and you sort of think of the family dynamics there and the children and all of that.

And it’s, it’s, it’s, it’s utterly heartbreaking. So, despite all of the great battlefield successes Ukraine has had in the last couple of months, that humanitarian tragedy is one that. It’s intensifying, uh, over time. I, I, I think that the extraordinary challenge is just to, to echo Zachary’s point, is that, uh, it’s not hard for us as outside observers to come up with a moral position, uh, on this war.

It’s, it’s, it’s, it’s, it’s a very morally unambiguous war. It’s hard to marry that moral position to the kinds of patients that this war is gonna demand of us. Uh, and so in the same way that we might think about Kenon with his [00:46:00] refusal to sign on to unconditional surrender and the sort of, when you think of containment, one of the contributions Kenon made is that containment was a strategy for decades, not for years.

I think we’re gonna have to have a kind of moral posture that’s capable of lasting for decades and not just. Not just for years, because there’s no doubt in my mind that Putin is gonna try to out weight us, uh, and outlast us and that, and tire us out and say, you know, count on our distraction and our return to entertainments or preoccupations of private life and, uh, of, of, of domestic national life.

Uh, and his assumption is that we just don’t care that much. And that was his assumption in 2014. We care more about Ukraine. I should have heard that phrase a lot when I was in government. Uh, on the Russian side, we care more. You guys care. To a degree. Putin was kind of right about that in 2014, but he has to be wrong about that.

Uh, now he must be, we must prove him wrong on that point, uh, at the, uh, at the present moment. So, How do we sustain support for our country? How do we sustain, [00:47:00] sustain more resolve when you don’t get the Hollywood finish when it’s not saving private Ryan? That’s, Yeah, that’s our question. And we need the moral framework and vocabulary.

So let’s, let’s never forget the second world war. It’s always worth remembering. Uh, but let’s not overthink the second World War at the present moment and, and overthink that moment. Of resolution because I think we’re gonna have to live without a, a quicker, easy resolution. But at the same time, uh, I think it was the word moral fervor that, uh, uh, that Zachary used, you know, sort of, uh, retain that moral fervor as we stand at the river’s edge of this war.

Right. And as George Ken 

Jeremi Suri: said, of the Cold War, and as, uh, many, uh, said it really throughout this, the Civil War and the long post Civil War period in our country, it’s the long struggle and the, the moral mission and narrative of a long struggle. That’s, that’s crucial. 

Michael Kimmage: The Civil War, the, it don’t need to extend that conversation too far, but the Civil War, and I haven’t read your book Jeremy, but I, I wonder if you would agree with this point.

I think the Civil War is an excellent analogy because [00:48:00] as Eric Foner and other great historians have taught us, it’s not that the Civil War ends in 1865, right? I mean, it’s still in a certain sense ongoing in our political lives and, and culture and certainly on the, on the issue of, uh, eradicating slavery and racial prejudice and, and those inequalities, uh, that.

One of the many reasons why the war was fought again, 18 65, 18 75, 18 85, 19 25, 19 65. I mean, you can just see the sort of, uh, the ways in which the cause was not realized, uh, and the ideals of the war were not, you know, sort of fully achieved if they’ve even been down to the present day. So I think the Civil War is a very, very, Uh, analogy, uh, and, uh, in a way a very, uh, a very sobering one.

Precisely, 

Jeremi Suri: precisely. And, and, uh, back to the, the point you’ve emphasized so many times, so, well, Michael, uh, the reason it’s a civil war by other means is because the, um, the politics continue to matter enormously. The narrative matters, uh, as much as who’s firing weapons upon whom on a [00:49:00] battlefield. 

Michael Kimmage: Michael, 

Jeremi Suri: you have given us really a, an informative, provocative, stimulating and very helpful way of understanding this enormously complex and terribly tragic moment that we’re all a part of, uh, in different ways right now.

And I think you’ve also given us a pathway forward for our listeners who care about democracy and care about their own participation in democracy, to see how this history can be. How all of us can be part of, at least the public discussion about the moral dimensions of this war and how crucial those moral dimensions are to the, the content of the war itself.

Michael, thank you for sharing your insights and your time with us, and we hope you’ll continue writing so we can continue learning from you, from your pen, as well as from your voice. 

Michael Kimmage: Well, these kinds of conversations are only possible in the company of a poet, uh, and, uh, of a scholar of, you know, sort of wars, civil, civil, cold, and, and civil, cold and hot.

So it’s, uh, [00:50:00] it’s the ways I like my steak,

right? Well, better civil than, than cold, but, uh, or rather better, better hot than cold. But, uh, But, uh, it’s only possible because of the, uh, of the, of the wonderful space that you guys create on this program. So I will very, very much look forward to, uh, the moment when it’s possible to return to your company.

Well, we look forward 

Jeremi Suri: to that as well. Thank you as well, uh, Zachary, for your, uh, stimulating and thoughtful poem. As always, thank you most of all to our loyal listeners for joining us for this week of this is Democracy.

Outro: This podcast is produced by the Liberal Arts Its Development Studio and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Heroes Kini. Stay tuned for a new episode every week. You can find this is [00:51:00] Democracy on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher.

See you next time.