This is Democracy – Episode 211: Realism and Foreign Policy

[00:00:00] Intro: This is Democracy, a podcast about the people of the United States, a podcast about citizenship, about engaging with politics and the world around you. A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues and how to have a voice and what happens next.

[00:00:30] Jeremi Suri: Welcome to our new episode of This Is Democracy. Today we are going to discuss realism, a term that, uh, appears in almost every day’s newspaper, especially in the foreign policy section, a term used quite often to justify a wide variety. Are in policy options and activities. We’re going to talk today about what realism really is as an intellectual tradition, as an approach to policy and approach to politics, and what it means for democracy.

If the United States is to be a practitioner of realism in the world, but also a supporter of democracy at the same time. Uh, we’re fortunate to be joined by a scholar who has written some of the most important work on the topic. This is a topic that’s received a lot of attention, but he has written, I think, a dynamite new book on the topic as well as many things.

Before this, uh, this is Jonathan Kersner. He’s a professor of Political Science in International Studies at Boston College. Prior to joining uh, Boston College, he was the Steven and Barbara Friedman, professor of International Political Economy in the Department of Government at Cornell University. He’s the author of numerous articles and books, uh, most recently.

In 2014, Jonathan wrote American Power After the Financial Crisis, and most recently the book we’re going to talk about today, an unwritten Future realism, uncertainty, and World Politics. Jonathan, thank you for joining us

[00:02:02] Jonathan Kirshner: today. Thanks for having me. It’s real pleasure to come here and have this

[00:02:06] Jeremi Suri: chat. Uh, before we turn to our chat with Jonathan, we have of course, uh, Mr.

Zachary’s, uh, poem. What’s the title of your poem today for

[00:02:16] Zachary Suri: Want of an Over

[00:02:17] Jeremi Suri: code? Okay. It’s pretty hot here, but let’s, let’s hear about for Want of an Overco.

[00:02:24] Zachary Suri: Tell me, did you want to burn the bread when you pressed the button that launched the missile? Which shattered my windows. Did you want to burn my bread?

Did you want to tear down my curtains? Did you want to make me stoop down with a dust pan to pick up 14,227 pieces of. This is reality. This is politics. I reach down and hold the melted shards of sand. The breeze comes biting from the east, a whistling cold and ominous. They say you can hear the river’s sigh when winter comes, that you can feel the water curl back into the ground.

But if, what? If winter has a sound? It is this noise in the basement bomb shelter as the windows shatter again, one at a time, counting up the dozen floors to the sky. When you press the button that launched the missile, which shattered my windows, you probably never realized that you were a glider on history’s winds that, But for a few moments when they put on their decision making all the deaths, threads of glass on an overcoat, more and more hiding their faces.

But for a few threads for a single stitch for want of an overcoat, you too may have been pressing the buttons on the elevator of our apartment block, upwards to your shattered windows and your shattered live.

[00:03:59] Jeremi Suri: I love the imagery there. Zachary, what is your poem

[00:04:02] Zachary Suri: about? My poem is, uh, on the one hand, about the, uh, randomness of, of war and of state violence, uh, and the ways in which it affects individuals in, in, in completely, and not completely, but almost, uh, entirely random. Ways, and it can seem so absurd at times, but also the ways in which, uh, the decisions of states and the way those decisions affect people’s lives is dependent on historical contingency, uh, and on broader historical trends.

[00:04:31] Jeremi Suri: And I think that’s a key theme in, in Jonathan’s, uh, writing, uh, Jonathan’s connecting the poem to your book. Why do you talk of an unwritten future? Why is realism about an unwritten.

[00:04:45] Jonathan Kirshner: Well, the phrase, an unwritten future is really written somewhat in dissent of, uh, an approach that we commonly see with some are realists and with some students of international politics in which they think that the future is somehow is possible to anticipate the future with certainty in ways that I don’t think is.

Um, this is a little technical, but, uh, a lot of scholars imagine the future as unfolding along lines we might associate with actuarial risk. Like you roll a set of dice. I can’t tell you what number’s gonna come up on those dice, but I can tell you the exact possibilities of any possible number coming up, and I’d be right about that in the long run.

But in a world of uncertainty as opposed to risk, we simply don’t know what’s going to happen next. And so the future is unwritten. And I think starting that as a point of departure is very important. Um, and it also informs the way in which choices matter. So there are some forms of international relations theory that suggest that choices don’t really matter.

It’s all a function of structural pressures, uh, but it’s the future is unwritten. Then choices, policies, politics, diplomacy, all these things matter in shaping that future along a number of plausible pathway.

[00:06:05] Jeremi Suri: Why isn’t the future written? I mean, the, the structural realist argument that you contrast your classical realist argument as you call it, from, um, it has a powerful, uh, pull because it, you know, it does say that.

Countries with more power and more capability are likely to get their way more often than not. What, what, what is wrong with that set of presumptions?

[00:06:28] Jonathan Kirshner: Uh, that, so nothing, I’ll give you that. Uh, I think power is a very important arbiter of outcomes in world politics. Um, but I do think that structural realism, uh, that looks solely at the distribution of power, and that’s really the issue.

Looking solely at the distribution of power to try and explain outcomes will come up. Because even the very analogies that it draws upon, uh, which it draws upon from microeconomic theory. Suggest that there are a broad range of possible outcomes so that it’s not to take an economistic analogy, which is what the structural real is views.

It’s not a world of perfect competition where every actor is confronted with structural constraints like the price level and must act accordingly. Rather, it’s imperfect competition. It’s oligopolistic competition where great powers make choices about what to do next and those choices. Affect what the world looks like.

And economists have shown us that under oligo ballistic competition, any number of possible outcomes is possible. So if I can wave the cla, the flag of classical realism here was mdo Roland. Who said that in the international system, great powers determine as much as they are shaped by the nature of the international system.

[00:07:45] Jeremi Suri: Mm-hmm. . Mm-hmm. , and, and you, you cite, uh, our own, uh, number of times, including in the introduction, focusing on the limits of what you call hyper rationality and instead social cohesion and other dynamics that influence states. How should we think about.

[00:08:02] Jonathan Kirshner: I think the question of rationality is a very important one.

And here again, I’m, I’m a self-identified realist and there’s some branding here. If you call yourself a realist, you’re kind of saying to other people, What are your theories? Unrealistic, right? So in, in a certain sense, there’s just some public relations going on there. Similarly with rationality, there’s a very narrow definition of rationality that’s rattling around out there, and it’s very influential in international relations theory.

And as you don’t embrace it, the notion is somehow, well, are you saying actors are irrational? And I think the difference between classical realism and other forms of realism and certain. Uh, the, another approach to World Park is called the bargaining model has a different assumption of what rationality looks like.

Um, and so it’s still rational, but it’s different than the kind of back of the envelope definition of rationality commonly used and is actually erroneous. Um, I can elaborate, uh, tremendously I this if you would

[00:09:03] Jeremi Suri: like. Absolutely. I mean, what is the, the, I like this back of the envelope rationality. How should we understand that?

Because that’s the rationality you are embracing, right?

[00:09:12] Jonathan Kirshner: Yes. So classical realism and classical real do view their actors as more or less rational. They can order their preferences, um, they can take actions designed to advance those preferences in a way that makes sense to them. Following a logic that outside observers can understand.

Um, but they’re more rational modelers than kind of chess playing machines. There’s a lot they don’t know, and most importantly, the difference between. A classical realist, conception of rationality and and say, and a common realistic definition of rationality is that theistic definition of rationality insists that if two actors look at the same information, they must draw the same conclusion from that information.

And that’s an extremely narrow definition of rationality. And it’s also. And appropriate definition of rationality from the study of world pops because that requires that all actors in the system share the same underlying causal model of how the world works. If actors can share, can have different.

Causal models in their minds about how the world works. This will cause this. That will cause that then true people looking at exactly the same information can drop markedly different conclusions about the implications of that information. And so you really have to decide, um, do you believe there was one universal known shared model?

Or do actors walk around with different models in their heads, often implicit models, and therefore come to situations rationally. That is their processing that information through their thoughtful models. But those models can often be competing with one another and therefore lead to very different sets of expectations about what’s going to happen next.

Which brings us back, of course, to my unwritten future. , what

[00:11:16] Zachary Suri: does this kind of, uh, approach to international relations look like in the real world, if you will? How would, uh, a, a classical realist view a situation like say the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

[00:11:32] Jonathan Kirshner: I think that’s a very good example because both the invasion and how the invasion has gone, um, has been, I.

Unanticipated. Um, I don’t think most observers got the invasion they thought they were going to get, and I’m very confident that most observers didn’t get the war that they thought they were going to get. So part of it is we simply don’t know what is going to happen because we don’t have an under that underlying correct shared model of how actors will behave and what will happen afterwards.

There’s a A that’s very powerful or not very powerful, this very influential model of inter natural politics. The bargaining model would be very confused by the Russia Ukraine confrontation because since Russia and Ukraine should know exactly in advance what would happen if the two sides came to blows, then they should simply be able to understand that and reach a rational bargain that.

Have the outcome. We would know that would happen, but without all the horrible costs and blood and treasure. But because in the real world, actors don’t know what’s going to happen next, often they don’t even know how they’re going to behave. That kind of hyper rationality simply isn’t productive in understanding what’s going on.

So it’s in, so the Russian Ukraine confrontation, aside from looking very real in many ways, and we can talk about that. Um, fits well with the vision of classical realism in that it has so many surprises, so many things that are unanticipated, and there’s a mantra of classical realism. It’s not to predict, but to sort of.

Anticipate the range of possible outcomes so that you won’t be essentially caught with your pants down. So we’re not gonna say this, If this happens, then this will happen. But you can say, Well, here are some. Here are the range of likely consequences of these types of behaviors, and we ought to be alert to those s.

Yeah,

[00:13:32] Jeremi Suri: that, that to me, what you just described so well, Jonathan, that that’s very compelling and it is, it’s classical, it’s through Acidities, right? I mean, this is the essence of what he’s describing. The Peloponnesian, where your, your book is filled with a wonderful analysis and elaboration on through Acidities and Morgan th Hunts, Morgan Thou and others.

Uh, Um, what are the stakes here, though? Why, why does this matter? You wrote a, a, a full, long book about this that’s filled with lots of details and graphs and various other items. What are the stakes

[00:14:02] Jonathan Kirshner: here? Well, at an academic level, which may not be super interesting, um, , it’s an effort to offer an approach to describe, explain, understand, and anticipate events in world politics at a practical level.

If we’re doing that better, uh, then perhaps we’re avoiding, uh, terrible blunders and making somewhat ser a foreign policy decisions, but, I would not want to sell this as a magic bullet. It’s the articulation of one approach to understanding, explaining and describing how the international world works. Um, I think it’s a productive one.

I don’t think it should be the only one, but I think we should be aware of its strengths and weaknesses and what it can tell. A about the real world. And if we look at lots and lots of practical situations around the world, um, we can see that classical realism and other approaches have distinct things to say and perhaps offer.

Uh, various insights into situations that that might be productive for policy makers and the general public.

[00:15:11] Jeremi Suri: So, so looking over the last decade and then looking forward, uh, as well as we can, recognizing that the future is unwritten, as you say, and I, I think any historian would agree. What are some of the key insights you think that classical realism has for our listeners who care about foreign policy but might not be IR scholars?

[00:15:33] Jonathan Kirshner: I would say there are several. Um, one isn’t a, kind of an easy one, which is I don’t think it was just classical realist. I think that most realists, uh, of every stripe, uh, thought that the us uh, war in Iraq was misguided. Again, not because the US probably wouldn’t happily have been able to defeat the Iraqi army, but rather because of the unpredictable, cascading political effects that would follow in the wake, uh, of that, um, invasion.

So I think one rule of thumb that classical realism brings to the table that perhaps regular folks don think about a lot is. And this is Claus Mitzy and in its conception, right, which is that force only has meaning in its political consequences. So we wanna look at international politics. We wanna look at the use of force and we wanna look at the prospect for war and conflict.

And we wanna understand that being able to blow things up or being very powerful or being mighty or having a strong military is, is a means to an end, but that end is political. So what are the political consequences of the application of force, and what are the political outcomes that you’re introducing force for in the first place and will.

The introduction of force in that way, in that context, bring you closer or further to the goals that you were seeking. So that’s one, I think, very important example. Um, but then there are of course, lots of other areas of the world where we can look around and see the applicability of classic realism.

But I, I think I would go back to another, perhaps general lesson of classical realism that I think, again, the average person might not think about as. Which is that politics never ends so that there is no finish line, so that when we see political contestation or even war and there’s a winner and a loser in that conflict and that war not far behind that.

Will be a new set of political contestations so that international politics may be benign. It may be malign, but it will invariably involve serially. The endless conflict of interests, the clash of interest between motivated actors and settling one conflict will not settle matters indefinitely. It will rather just pave the way for the next set of contestations, which doesn’t mean that it’ll be war.

It just means that classical realists perspective looks at world politics as a. A contestations between clashing interests. Right. And,

[00:18:15] Jeremi Suri: and, uh, in, in contrast to more structural, social sciencey realism, it’s making the case that each iteration from conflict to conflict is that much more unpredictable.

[00:18:30] Jonathan Kirshner: Yes.

But I, I would say, um, if we wanna focus on this in classical realism and structural realism, it really has to do with the role of. Purpose in addition to. Structural realism limits us only to power. It sees the world in what it says as like units that comes to the world, distinguished only by their relative capabilities, how powerful they appear to be.

Class of realism says, of course, power matters and you must be attentive to the balances of power. And power will often be the arbiter of disputes. But to understand how states are going to behave, to understand what states will. You have to understand their purpose as well, which will be varied from country to country and from setting to.

So class realism insists upon variables. The structural realism forbids like the role of history and society in shaping what states actually will want. Power does not determine purpose. Rather both power and purpose jointly determined behavior. How do

[00:19:36] Zachary Suri: we understand then the role of individuals, in particular individuals who see themselves or, or at least think they are outside of politics?

For example, how do we understand, uh, say in the war in Ukraine, the overwhelming reaction to the Russian invasion, uh, by ordinary Ukrainians? And how, how can we account for that when it seems we’re dealing mostly with state.

[00:20:03] Jonathan Kirshner: So that’s a, a very deep question for which I don’t have a short answer, but I do think that one of the lessons of that invasion, and it’s a law, excuse me, it’s a, it’s a guideline, not a rule, as I think Bill Murray first said in Ghostbusters is that most policies prefer not to be dominated by other policies.

And so when you’re going about the business of invading another country, that’s something that really should be kept in mind. Um, again, I don’t think there are laws about this, but I do think that this is an important general tendency and again, informed by the perceived historical lessons of the people involved.

And so we do see, I think this natural tendency. Uh, for resistance, which in some torical cases has been, has been overcome by, by conquerors, but we’re just an important factor and certainly one that’s blended a very important factor in this particular confrontation. You,

[00:21:03] Jeremi Suri: you close the book, Jonathan, uh, in very classical realist fashion, if I might say so with a, an elaborate discussion about the problems of hubris.

And, and you have this under heading, uh, about social cohesion in the end of the American order. Um, so even though the future is unwritten, you, you, you see a certain direction of things, I’d love for you to elaborate.

[00:21:30] Jonathan Kirshner: Sure. Um, you’ve touched upon three separate things, so I’m gonna try and do them in turn.

Um, the question of hubris, I think that’s a very important one for, um, classical realism and one that distinguishes it from structural realism and from varieties of hyperrational. Classical realist, and this goes all the way back to the facilities, but it, it weaves its way through all of classical realist thought expects that great powers will be arrogant and grasping and in fact over arrogant and over grasping.

Whereas a structural realist or a hyper rationalist will think they sort of dispassionately will. Their relative power and parse out their opportunities in, in a very dispassionate way. Um, and so I think that the role of hubris in great power politics is central to classical realism when dealing with the great powers, of course, and, and, and disregarded by other approaches to politics.

So I think that’s very important. Now, if I can build a little chain here, Hubris was one of the things that undermined, um, the American order, even though the American order that was forged in 1945, and which I would say is, is in the process of unraveling now, part of it had to do with the fact that the US.

Failed to appreciate the limits of its own capabilities, uh, and made foolish decisions in that context. At the same time, and this is a little off topic, but I I do a lot of international political economy work, as they call it. There was some economic hubris involved in the financialization of the American economy, which contributed to, uh, dramatic these, these dramatic polarizations of.

Equality of income and wealth that we see in the American economy. And so the period of the first two decades of the 21st century has been one characterized by both these acts of great hubris and also. The consequences of these economic transformations within American society. Two variables again that are, we can associate with classical realism, um, but we are forbidden by other approaches to the study of world politics.

And so if we look at the world in 2020 and we look at the American domestic political setting, Um, there’s good reason to question whether it is in a position to sort of engage the world in the way that it did for the 75 years previously, and once again, We can only see that if we reach for variables that are understandable to classical realism, but incomprehensible to other approaches.

So I can’t begin to explain American behavior personally without looking at its two 21st Century Wars, and without looking at the political consequences, at the management of the global financial crisis of 2007, 2000, But again, these variables have forbidden to other perspectives. But if I wanna understand how the US is gonna behave, I would reach quickly, uh, for those variables.

And again, as you, as you chastise me appropriately, I’m not on the business of prediction, but I do think that those factors have contributed to and unraveling of what we could call the American order that was first constructed after the second world.

[00:24:56] Jeremi Suri: And so how would classical realism, assuming that’s correct and it’s a, it’s a plausible argument, how would classical realism prepare us then to deal with what comes.

[00:25:05] Jonathan Kirshner: Well, I’d say there are several things that I would want to focus on. One as always, uh, and I guess all realist would kind of share this view, is that it’s a dangerous and uncertain world. And so, you know, the realist watch word is prudent sometimes. That word. That, that, that is lead upon too heavily. Uh, but certainly a, an instinct for a caution and a sensitivity to the potential for dangerous developments to occur in the world is very important.

Um, and we haven’t yet talked about, you know, the rise of China and things like that, but I do want to distinguish a class careerist perspective by saying that it would, again, e. The politics of that. What is the political, um, threat that emanates from China at? How might the US engage politically in a reaction to it and focus a little less on the changing military balance of power, Although certainly the changing military balance of power matters tremendously.

However, again, going back to the early Cold War and something, you’ll certainly be very familiar. Near George F. Cannon emphasize the Cold War more as a political confrontation than as a military confrontation and had to be managed in that context. So the emphasis on the politics of international politics is one thing.

I think classic realism would emphasize moving forward. But the other does bring us back to American politics. How powerful is the United States? Well, it’s. An incredibly impressive military machine. You know, ships and tanks and planes and weapons and all of these things. It surely is the most affordable military in the world.

But is there an unraveling of its own domestic social cohesion that might create a great distance between its actualized power and its ability to. Use that power purposefully. In world politics, I don’t necessarily mean in a war pi, in a warlike situation, I simply mean marshing. Its resources to advance its own interest internationally.

So if I wanted to understand American power right now in this era, from a classical realness perspective, I would be focusing a lot more on what striked me as the. Political dysfunctions in American society much more than I’d be counting how many tanks we had compared to some other country. Right.

[00:27:28] Jeremi Suri: So for a, for for you as a classical realist, elections matter enormously.

Whereas for structural realists and many other I theorist, elections don’t matter as much. Right? Yes, that is exactly. Correct. So, so Jonathan, this has been super helpful in ex implicating a, a very thoughtful, sophisticated, uh, analysis of international relations. And I encourage our listeners to read your book, which is beautifully written and really takes a lot of these media complex subjects, goes into more depth, but also makes them very accessible, which is, which is really hard to do.

It’s something I really admire in your. We always like to close Jonathan with a, a question about, um, using the scholarship, the history, the social science that we discuss each week using it to improve the world, and many of our listeners care about democracy. That’s what our podcast is about each week.

How does your book, how does your analysis of, of classical realism help us to think perhaps in some productive ways about a future? For more vibrant democracy at home and abroad. What, what, what can, what can you add to that, that mission statement?

[00:28:37] Jonathan Kirshner: Um, I think classical realism has something to say about that.

Um, it is often commonly said that it is realist to view the world as a dangerous and amoral place, and therefore you may behave in the world, in the international arena in an AOR fact. Uh, because you have to protect your own society and the national interest is sacra sac. Um, but. I think a Claus of realist perspective embraces the first part.

It says, Yes, the world is a dangerous and often a moral place in which horrifying acts of bism take place. But that is a description of how the world works, uh, and you need to be alert to the fact that the world is fraught. With danger and latent or present potentials for horrifying barber. And that, yes, we must be cautious about the limits of our own power and the dangers that are lurking out there.

But too many realists and many people who observe realism have seen that as sort of a get out of jail free car , meaning I can do whatever I want without concern. Uh uh, for, for values or. O o other goals. And the first does not necessarily imply the second so that you can think the world is a dangerous and amoral place, uh, and reckon with the consequences of that.

But that doesn’t mean that you can’t still bring your own values and judgments to bear on how you would craft the foreign public.

[00:30:10] Jeremi Suri: Right. So, so this is saying that you can buy into Hobbes, uh, in seeing the, the world as nasty bru filled with violence and nasty brutus and brutish and short behavior, but at the same time, that’s not a license to simply do more of the same.

[00:30:24] Jonathan Kirshner: Exactly. It’s not a, it’s not a license to hip. Um, I mean, I think realists would urge people who want to do good in the world to be alert to the limits of our own power. To the limits of our own capacity and to the power of others. And so those are three important constraints on trying to quote unquote do good.

But there’s nothing that stops us from trying to do good in that context.

[00:30:55] Jeremi Suri: Zachary, is that helpful because I know, uh, something that many young thinkers and political activists struggle with is the ugliness of parts of our world, the desire to make. Better, but still also the recognition that you have to sometimes dive into the ugliness to find a way out.

Right? This is the veian dilemma also, right? That there’s certain things you have to do, you’d prefer not to do, to try to get to good ends. Does this help one think about that? I think it

[00:31:24] Zachary Suri: really does. I think it, it, it shows us a very important truth, which is that. In some ways you have to understand the system and be willing to work within the system if you want to change the system.

And I think that, uh, that as young people, we are naturally outside. To the system. And so we have a, a, a greater degree of clarity about the way the world works or, or at least we think we do. Mm-hmm. . Um, and, and, but we also have to have to have to learn to work within that world right. Before we can think about

[00:31:55] Jeremi Suri: changing it.

Right. And, and I like Jonathan’s point that he made so clearly here, Right. That. There are some things you have to do that might have questionable, questionable moral valances, but you have to still be conscious of the moral purpose behind what you’re doing, that it’s not an excuse. The system does not excuse immoral judgements.

[00:32:15] Zachary Suri: Right. And, and, and those, uh, I don’t know if we would call them moral or sorry, immoral or. AOR decisions, but, but the, the decisions you have to make, which, which, which go beyond what you’d normally be willing to do, have to be, uh, to serve good ends. And you, you have to keep the purpose in mind a as you, as

[00:32:32] Jeremi Suri: you make those decisions.

Right, Right. So not Go ahead, Jonathan. I

[00:32:35] Jonathan Kirshner: just wanna add here, I, I agree with everything that was said, but, uh, I think classical realism a little, is a little gloomy. And I, so I just wanna toss into this mix. S oftentimes there isn’t an obviously right choice and so much of of royal politics and foreign policy.

Even the best intended one is choosing the best among a menu of Unpotable options. And, and one must choose cuz even inaction is in a way a choice. And so it would be great if we could say, Well, this is the right good and correct thing to do, and that one will work. And this is the nasty mean one that won’t work when rather, again, because there’s a lot of uncertainty and because choices are.

Difficult and unpleasant. Um, we are often, you know, we’re not presented with the pristine options of here’s the good thing to do and here’s the bad thing to do,

[00:33:26] Jeremi Suri: right? I, I think it’s Morgan Thou who writes about, uh, lesser evils, right? But choosing lesser evils is not a justification for choosing evil.

Those are two different things, right, Jonathan? Thank you so much, Jonathan, for joining us today. You, you’ve done really a, a brilliant and compelling, uh, job of articulating some of the key themes. Certainly not all or even most of the themes in your wonderful book. I wanna recommend it to, uh, really all of our listeners who care about foreign policy and care about politics, uh, which I guess is everyone, uh, Is again titled, An Unwritten Future Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics.

Uh, Jonathan, thank you again. Thanks for

[00:34:12] Jonathan Kirshner: having me. It’s been a real pleasure having this conversation. A as I knew it wouldn’t be . And

[00:34:17] Jeremi Suri: Zachary, uh, thank you for your poem, uh, for want of an overcoat this week and for your insights and your struggles with lesser evils. And, um, international political change.

Uh, most of all, thank you to our loyal law audience for joining us for this episode of This is Democracy.

[00:34:45] Outro: This podcast is produced by the Liberal Arts Its Development Studio and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Hero Kini. Stay tuned for a new episode every week. You can find this is Democracy on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher. See you next time.