This is Democracy – Episode 195: War in Ukraine

This is democracy, a podcast about the people of the United States, a podcast about citizenship, about engaging with politics and the world around you. A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues and how to have a voice in what happens next. Welcome to our new episode of this is democracy.

Today. We’re going to talk about the current state of the war in Ukraine, where now more than five weeks into this war. And, um, there was a lot that’s happened and it’s often difficult to follow where we are in this conflict. The conflict began with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and has involved a weeks of heroic resistance by Ukrainian forces with help from.

Uh, European and the United States and other forces. Um, and it’s, it’s often hard to know where we are and we’re drawn joined today, uh, by our colleague and friend, Dr. Michael Kimmage, who has been with us on a number of episodes to help to explain what’s happening historically, but also to give us a sense of what’s going on on the ground and how we can understand the events in front of us.

Michael, thanks for joining us. Thank you so much for having me, Jeremy and Zachary, Dr. Michael Kimmage, as many of you know, is a professor of history at the Catholic university of America in Washington, DC. He’s also a fellow at the German Marshall fund and chair of the advisory council for the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson center in Washington, DC.

He served in the us state department on the policy planning staff for the secretary of state from 2014 to 2017, where he held the Russia Ukraine portfolio. So we’re talking about familiar territory for Michael he’s written extensively on us foreign policy, American politics and culture, including, uh, his book, the conservative turn Lionel trilling, Whitaker chambers, and the lessons of anti-communism in history, his grip, Phillip Roth’s Newark.

And Michael’s most recent book, the abandonment of the west, the history of an idea in American foreign policy, a book that’s become more precious than I think Michael realized when he wrote it most recently, Michael is a coauthor with Leanna fix of a collection of incredibly helpful articles that I recommend to everyone they’re available on the website for foreign affairs magazine.

And it’s a series of articles that explore what, uh, Michael and Liana called the possible outcomes of Russia’s invasion. These include, uh, Ukraine wins, Russia wins a whole variety of different outcomes. And we’ll talk about some of those in our discussion today. I encourage everyone to read them. We will have the link to those articles, um, in the liner notes, in the description for this episode.

So, uh, with that, uh, I think we’re going to turn first to, uh, our scene setting poem, of course, for Mr. Zachary Surrey. Um, what is this a scene setting poem titled Zachary thinking of the more on a Monday after returning from the Capitol. Okay. Let’s hear it. Yesterday. I heard the thunder rolling in from the Northeast, holding onto the tops of trees and thrashing them viciously into the building yesterday, the rain flooded the streets and made the grass mud, and even the highways seemed green and lush because everything else was so blue yesterday.

I heard the thunder rolling in and I thought from the classroom window, how I could almost hear the bombs falling in Marie. Yesterday, you will forgive me. If I repeat myself, I am nowadays unable to remember the difference between now and then I could hear the people sizzling in their own bedrooms, vaporizing into the sky only to fall on us a few minutes later, cutting channels in the mud, along the edge of the courtyard, where you tiptoed with me and you left with me on the way to the cafeteria.

On Sunday. I found myself at night looking up the great escalators at Rosslyn station in Washington, climbing the seven stories into the sky. But when I was looking down a minute later, I wasn’t even startled by the ground. It had sunken down into the earth below because I knew already what was behind me because I knew what ghosts were chasing me up the stairs and out into the ball me street.

I love the imagery. Zachary, what is your poem about? My poem is really about the ways in which a war, um, and, and human rights violations happening. Thousands of miles away from us can, can impact us emotionally, but also physically and literally in our daily lives here in the United States and the ways in which we are connected as human beings to, to those suffering on the other side of the world.

Do you feel that personally. I think so. And I think many Americans do, uh, at this moment. Hmm. Michael, your thoughts on that point? Actually, I, I think that, uh, is accurate as ever is onto so much with his, uh, with his poetry. And, um, I think at the same time that he and I, and you, and many of us feel acutely, the suffering that’s happening overseas.

I think one thing that I like about the poem is that it is of course. Happening overseas. So there’s this somewhat surreal quality of Washington and early may with the blooms and the flowers. And it’s very much, you know, very manifestly, not a city at war at the moment in the sense of how, what lives here and how.

Uh, operates here. Uh, and yet it’s a city that is in meshed in so many ways in the conflict that’s occurring thousands of miles away. So simultaneously there’s this feeling of connection and disconnection with exactly your poet. Your poem just captures that beautifully. I find with a lot of my students and friends and colleagues and scholars, there’s the same kind of feeling that, that we’re touched and connected to this.

But, but because we’re so distant, it’s hard to know what’s happening. How would you describe the state of the war right now? More than five weeks into it? Well, it’s a paradoxical war. I’ll, I’ll be a little bit clinical. It’s not that I want to pass over the war crimes and atrocities. Uh, I’ll just try to be as analytical as, uh, as possible.

Of course we spoke at the very beginning of the war. I remember it well, uh, Jeremy and Zachary, I think the day or the day after the war, uh, started. And then, uh, you know, that was an extremely emotional, uh, moment. And this is too, of course, but, uh, you know, there’s a lot to think through and to, uh, and to analyze, I think it’s paradoxical, uh, in a number of ways.

Let me start with Ukraine and then turn, uh, to Russia in terms of where these two kinds of. Uh, are, you know, I think that Ukraine now in roughly the ninth week of the, uh, of the war is obviously in a much better place than it expected to be in the first week. Uh, it’s possible. I think to argue that Ukraine in some fundamental way, won the war in the first week in the sense that.

Proved its own ability to survive. Uh, and it’s gone from proving its ability to survive, demonstrating its political cohesion. Its Parral uh, to showing that it has real skill, uh, and force, uh, on the battlefield. That’s been true. Uh, defensively, I think to a really remarkable degree. Uh, there’s one city, uh, maybe two now.

I mean, that the Russians seem to live, have conquered, but they haven’t taken heart give yet. Uh, they’re you know, very far from, uh, from taking care of. And I think that the Ukrainians have really learned in the last eight, nine weeks, how to defend their country. It’s probably the most important story to be told about the war.

And even beyond that, you see the Ukrainian army going on the contract. A couple of villages, some territory that’s been retaken, uh, obviously in the north, but also, uh, in the south. And I think that Russia really has to worry about in a way that I’ll try to develop in a moment, the scenario in which, uh, it’s going, you know, sort of being pushed back on the ropes, uh, by the Ukrainian military, that may seem theoretically impossible to Russia, but, uh, it was theoretically impossible.

It can also be. Uh, a reality. So, you know, it’s, uh, not a paradox that Ukraine has done so well, but, uh, it’s a paradox perhaps that you has done well and yet is not in the position to win the war or to expel Russian troops, uh, and, uh, is clearly facing what looks like it will be alone. Conflict. I think the paradox is on the Russian side or more, if anything, uh, more acute, uh, you know, Russia possesses, obviously, uh, immense military force from nuclear on down to conventional capacities, air power, uh, sea power, uh, et cetera.

And it’s not as if that that force has been decimated, uh, in the last nine weeks, the Russian military is still, uh, up and running and there are ways in which Putin. Uh, renew it, but Russia has placed itself in a catch 22, where the way in which it is prosecuting the war is invalidating the political aims that Russia set for the war, which are either control over the country.

I think that that’s just out of Russia’s grasp at this point, uh, or even influence over the country. So each day that the war goes on Russia’s political influence over. Uh, diminishes it’s a case study in a counter productive effort, but at the same time, Russia routines, enormous powers of destruction as, as accurate poem, uh, suggest and , uh, and, and elsewhere.

So they don’t have the capacity to win the Russians. I think that the political aims that they have set for themselves are unrealizable and yet they may have incentive and they certainly have the ability to keep up. Fighting. So there too, you see a kind of paradox. I think the wrong word to use would be stalemate.

I don’t think it’s that, but it’s a, at this stage of it as somewhat paradoxical Warren buffet. And Michael, thank you for correcting me. I keep saying five weeks. It shows how quickly time is passing is you say it’s nine, almost 10 weeks. Now this war has been correct at 24th of February. So it’s extraordinary.

How much has happened in such a short time? Um, you, you make the point in, uh, one of the excellent pieces rule for foreign affairs that Russia can’t when you don’t think, but also you don’t think Ukraine can. Push Russian forces out of, uh, of their country. Uh, w w w how would you explain that? That’s I think one of your paradoxes, isn’t it?

Yes, no, I, I believe so now. I mean, there may be scenarios and there are very serious military analysts who think in these terms. I mean, Elliot Cohen is the one who comes to mind. Dean of the school of advanced international studies at Johns Hopkins, who really believes that Ukraine can win. I think in the, in the dictionary definition of the word, uh, to win, which is to say and achieve, um, it’s independence along probably the pre February 24 lines.

I don’t know too many people who think that Ukraine could expel Russia from Crimea or all the way from Eastern Europe. Uh, maybe there are some who are looking into that possibility, but I think there are those who believe that you can consider taking us back to where they work, uh, on, on February 24th.

Uh, I think that’s going to be difficult. I mean, I think, uh, this is a prestige war for Putin, so he’s going to pour a lot into it to prevent that, uh, outcome and there’s of course, a military. Uh, dynamic whereby uh, it’s a lot easier to defend than it is to go on the attack. So Russians had been on the receiving end of that logic for the first, uh, eight, nine weeks because they have been the one on the attack.

And I think the more Ukraine goes on the attack, the more they make it possible that they could outright win. But of course the vulnerability has become quite. Uh, quite a bit greater. And, you know, I’m repeating the analysis of others in this regard, but there are two different kinds of shortages on the, on the opposite sides of this conflict.

Uh, on the Russian side, there’s a shortage of manpower because they’ve lost so many soldiers and they’ve exhausted so many soldiers as well. Uh, and on the Ukrainian side, uh, there is a shortage of, uh, of ammunition, uh, and if some of the tools that they need to fight the war now, Correct it day by day by the United States and other allies and friends, uh, of, uh, of Ukraine.

But, uh, you know, I think that they’re just not there in terms of, they would have to be to expel an army, like. Like Russia’s from their territory. Then if you, crane does win either in the traditional dictionary definition sense or in an, in a more sort of nuanced way. Uh, to what extent do you think Ukraine’s Ukraine will play a bigger role in, uh, in discussions of democracy and freedom in Europe?

Uh, but also in terms of American strategic goals, uh, in the region, sorry, that’s a, that’s a very broad question. No, it’s, it’s a wonderful question. Um, you know, again, um, we do want to vex the word winning in disregard, but let’s take the most optimistic possible scenario that through some combination of battlefield defeat, bad morale, uh, and just the politics of this whole situation, uh, police makes the decision to just.

Pull out, uh, and call it victory. And we can imagine, as people do that, Putin can use the propaganda apparatus in Russia to justify in effect whatever he does. So let’s imagine he does that. I don’t think this is the likeliest outcome, but let’s imagine that he, uh, he does that Ukraine is really able to ensure its independence, uh, and its sovereignty.

I mean, I think that the next steps in that scenario actually fairly. Clear, uh, I don’t think NATO is even relevant anymore, in a sense. I wonder if it’s relevant as we speak, because I think that Ukraine already has such a substantial military relationship with the U S and with the major military powers of Europe, I heard just a detail, but to me, it was an impressive one last week that Norway has given his entire artillery cube.

Uh, and, uh, you know, that’s only one country in Europe, so Ukraine, if it can rid itself of this war, uh, is going to be a mini superpower in Europe. And it’s going to have the organic and direct support, uh, of many of the world’s leading military powers. So that’s, uh, a kind of remarkable turn of affairs, uh, for Ukraine and all of the ambiguity under which they’ve suffered between 2014 and 2026.

Would, uh, effectively, uh, vanish now democracy and freedom. I just want to be as candid about this as possible because in every respect, my heart goes out to the Ukrainians, but I also want to, as an analyst sort of characterize the situation as clearly as I can. I think that most Ukrainians soldiers at the moment are fighting for their Homeland, certainly for their freedom and independence.

Uh, and it is of course the case it’s one of the most important details. Then Symansky was democratically elected in 29. And it has the legitimacy that comes with that. So all of that is to the good, and I think there’s a foundation on which they could build, but Ukraine has had a lot of troubles since 1991 with rule of law, with corruption, uh, with governance.

I don’t think the war makes those, uh, any easier to deal with. So it’s going to have certain things to work on. Certainly even in the optimistic military scenarios to. Uh, solidify and ensure it’s democracy, but you have to imagine winning a war of this kind, you know, the experience of being David against a very ruthless Goliath has gotta be, uh, inspiring in a way that a politician likes Lansky or somebody like him could use to force that democracy.

But I see that as something that’s. Uh, shimmering a little bit, uh, in the future. It’s not something that the present moment guarantee. Right. Right. And I think it’s important as, as you’ve said, in many places, Michael, so eloquently, it’s important not to get ahead of ourselves here. There’s still a lot of uncertainty as there isn’t any war in, particularly in this case, um, what is happening now?

It does seem from. Uh, at least Western news reports that the Russians are concentrating their forces more in the east, but also increasing the lethality of their attacks on Ukrainian civilians, on Ukrainian oil supplies. Um, it is that accurate. And what effect is that having? I think it’s quite. Accurate.

I mean, I think it sounds hard for us to believe having received the news of butcher and, uh, many other places where atrocities were committed. Having seen the leveling of Medusa in so many other urban areas, uh, in Ukraine, it’s hard for us to believe that the Russians have imposed any limits upon themselves in this war.

But I think in the first phase they did propose some, there’s an article in the New York times today that that sort of explores Putin’s restraint, uh, up to the present moment, such as it’s been. Uh, and I think you’re right, Jeremy, that, that restraint is, uh, you know, that restraints in quotation marks perhaps, uh, is starting to diminish.

So, you know, I think from a Russian perspective, you know, again, the word winning, uh, is a complicated one. Uh, but they probably can’t win as they had hoped to win. Certainly can’t win as they had hoped to win before the war. Uh, but they have many ways of inflicting. Long-term and serious damage, uh, on Ukraine.

And so the elimination, uh, of, uh, the energy infrastructure within Ukraine or the damaging of the eminent energy infrastructure is one point the bombing of rail lines. I think it’s almost a matter of curiosity on the part of the U S and other countries that all of these arms are flowing into Ukraine, many of them over roads and rail.

And why hasn’t there been more of a Russian effort to disrupt that? I think that that’s what you’re starting to see. This week and probably, uh, in the weeks to come and the way in which this war is potentially very, very difficult for Ukraine beyond the ways in which it’s already been very difficult is on the economic front.

So Ukraine is a trading country. It exports green, other commodities. It really depends on access to the black sea. It’s now under Naval blockade. Uh, and you can just see that, uh, the way in which the war is, uh, is, is, is going, uh, is a very serious degradation of the Ukrainian, uh, economy. I mean, economic foundations are important for the prosecution of war.

And so I think right. Military planners are now contemplating a kind of war of attrition, a destruction of that economic foundation in hopes that that will give Russia certain battlefield and military, uh, advantages. And that’s not science fiction. I mean, that’s an equation that’s going to be difficult to, uh, to balance on the Ukrainian side.

Is that equation necessarily to the advantage of Russia though, because they faced their own isolation. Yes. Absolutely. So you have, it’s like, um, when you see pictures of the situation room in, uh, in the white house, all of these different clocks, you know, different cities, different clocks. And so this is a war that’s running on all kinds of different timetables.

And so the Ukrainian economy is a years long timetable that really matters for the prosecution of this war. Of course the war is being fought in terms of days and weeks. And you know, that’s a more immediate. But the timetables for Russia are also exactly, as you’re suggesting, Germany are potentially very, very punishing for Russia.

And in two respects, you know, so we’ve seen a sanctions regime with a pine that has never been put on Russia. It’s certainly far more, uh, aggressive and robust than the 2014 sanctions regime. And as we know, with every sanctions regime, it’s not the first couple of months, uh, in which it kicks in, it’s going to be the first six months, the first year.

Uh, and you know, Actually when we hit the winter. Where, um, you know, uh, things could get quite difficult for Russia and, you know, the politics of that is certainly something that puts has to be wearing about. So that’s a timetable and, you know, you see that Europe is now debating, removing itself from Russian gas and, and oil.

It looks like a very serious conversation that’s going on in the EU and Germany and elsewhere there too. You could have a very big loss of revenue, a very, very big hit to the Russian economy. So that’s one sort of clock that’s. Quickly for Russia, but there’s another clock that’s maybe more important, uh, uh, in, in, in, in terms of the war.

And this is the binds that Russia has put itself in, by pursuing such a foolish concept of operations at the beginning, and by fighting so badly losing. Yeah. Perhaps tens of thousands of it’s true, but certainly wounding that number, uh, and exhausting many, many more, uh, and you know, putting its best troops forward at the initial part of this conflict.

And, uh, and if this rating them, uh, and so it faces a diabolical choice from its point. Uh, does it come to terms having achieved? Nothing really. That’s a tough thing to imagine what the latter we were polluting, or it doesn’t mobilize and draw up millions upon millions of young men and women. That’s certainly an option in a country of 140 million, but then, you know, you put the urban elite into the war in a new way.

You affect the lives of tens of millions of parents in a very different way. And if Putin mobilizes, he cannot settle for anything small. He’s going to have to get a big victory. And that’s very, very, very far from being a guaranteed. So that’s the timeline. That’s also, I think, very difficult for Putin and then very finally on this issue of timeline, if they do decide to mobilize, and it’s a prediction of some that this will happen on May 9th, victory day for the second world war in Russia.

Mobilization is slow. So it takes maybe six to eight months to get the troops trained. By that point, given the flow of harms into Ukraine, uh, they’re going to face probably double the firepower, uh, on the opinion side. So Russia has put itself in a terrible, uh, military bind and time is definitely. A friend in some respects in terms of a war of attrition, but time is the enemy in many more respects.

We’ve asked this, I think on every episode we’ve done with you over the past few, few weeks. Um, but, but do you think as, as Putin and as the Russian regime gets more and more desperate that there is a threat of escalation beyond the borders of Ukraine? I’m confident in my answer and hopefully I’m right, but I’m very, at the very least confident in my answer that this is not going to play itself out unless some accident really pulls Russia in this direction.

And let’s dwell on the detail that the city of Kharkiv in the Eastern part of Ukraine still has not been taken, uh, by Russia. This is a city that’s really on the Russian. Uh, it’s a Russian-speaking city, whatever that means, you know, I don’t think it means that the residents are pro-Russian, but, but still, if there was any city that would have been presumably easy for Russia to take in this war, it would be hard given that it hasn’t been, uh, it hasn’t been taken and you have so many other setbacks elsewhere.

You have this manpower problem, and then you have the internal politics in Russia. If the war has to escalate that now they’re sort of pretending that it’s not a war. Uh, and you can’t do that if it becomes something much, much larger. So they run the risk of that happening of the war. Getting out of control, getting too big to handle within the territory of Ukraine.

That’s a very real danger and fear that the Russians have to have, or Putin has to have, uh, with this war. So to me, it seems on that basis, a kind of insanity to draw Poland, uh, or. Lithuania or Hungary or Slovakia or Bulgaria. It starts to sound really like science fiction, but to draw any of these countries into the war, not to mention giving any pretext for NATO as such to enter the war, because that would mean that the U S problem.

Go in much further than it’s already gone. I don’t see how that works in Russia’s favor in any respect. So it seems to me like they would maybe choose rhetorical devices that could intimidate populations of NATO member states. And that’s what the nuclear threat. Comes in handy, but, uh, I see no reason for Russia to go bigger than they’ve already gone.

Uh, and I see no incentive and I see Mo no motive. So to that degree, I think terrible as this war is and has been and will be, we can draw a certain size. Uh, Michael, what about the possibilities of the Russian army disintegrating? I mean, there’s actually a long history of this happening to Russian armies.

Um, and, uh, there’s some evidence of, uh, Russian soldiers abandoning their, um, their orders, um, selling their fuel they have for their vehicles. Um, oh, are we likely to see more of that? How would it be a bit surprised? I think that. You know, Russia is now a dictatorship and that means public opinion is a very, very difficult thing to gain access to.

But, you know, looking at it from afar, with the best evidence that we have outside of Russia, it looks like the war at the moment is maybe thinly popular, but relatively popular in the Russian, uh, population. Uh, one thing I think that we can’t underestimate, but doesn’t get reported on in ways that. Feel on this side of the conflict as you can’t underestimate the effect of, of the deaths and the, and the suffering of Russian soldiers on the Russian population.

And of course, on the psychology of the Russian military. So like many wars that are difficult to figure out to understand. It’s hard to know. I think if you’re a regular Russian soldier, what exactly it is that you’re fighting? That may be true in the abstract, but when your Conrad dies or your Conrad is wounded, then you ended up fighting for your, uh, for your comrades.

So I think that, you know, for a couple of months, maybe even for a couple of years, I don’t think that the disintegration of the Russian military, uh, is, uh, is likely, uh, and, uh, you know, I think that there is perhaps a gathering fear in Russia that. So in the wind and reap the whirlwind that, uh, the army of Ukraine is really becoming a problem for Russia.

Uh, and there may be certain elements of, you know, sort of fear and worry about that point. And that could also be turned to. Sort of incentive to keep the war going or not to be humiliated or to be, uh, outright, uh, defeated. I think that those things happen certainly they’ve happened in Russian history.

Uh, a number of times, of course, world war one is the most important, uh, example, but it’s not been rapid. It’s not been in the course of one summer that in army is disintegrated. I think it usually. Kind of piling on, of suffering and, uh, and incompetence and inefficiency and, and criminality, and then it, and then it disintegrates.

And what about on the other side? I mean, the Ukrainian forces, as you said, so, so eloquently before Michael have, have fought in ways that that are extraordinary in their effectiveness, in their courage and their unity. Um, are we likely to see that to continue or, or, or are we likely to see, um, more internal difficulties that so far we haven’t seen many of from the Ukrainian forces, the difficulties I would anticipate for Ukraine are logistical.

So if Russia continues to bomb, fuel depots and, uh, to, to Mendez transportation and to do those kinds of things, and it could be more difficult to run the war for both sides of the war, it matters of course, that you create as a variable. Uh, country, I used to have a complicated way of configuring this.

It’s from Maine to West Virginia, or from Illinois to, uh, to Virginia. I have an easier one, especially for your audience, Zachary and Jeremy. It’s roughly the size of Texas, which is very big and it gives you a sense of how hard it is to invade. But it also, you know, it’s not easy to run a war, a defensive war on Ukraine because of the size of the, uh, of the country.

I see no indication that Ukrainian. Uh, is bad. I think to the contrary, uh, morale has been excellent from the very beginning of the war when things looked pretty dire for Kia and Slansky, and for the country at large, um, you know, you have the sinking of the Musca, uh, which I think was a huge morale boost, the expulsion of the Russian armies from around Kia and other huge morale boost.

And I think also the support, it’s not the whole world, but as much of. Has been meaningful. Uh, you see Ukrainian flags all over the city of, uh, of Washington was in Asheville, North Carolina a week ago and saw lots of Ukrainian. Uh, there, uh, it just indicates the depth of, uh, of, of the support the country has internationally.

Uh, and that too, I think, is a boost to, to the morale of the countryside, really anticipate no problems with, uh, with Ukrainian morale. Even if the war were to extend a few years, uh, into the future, we could turn our gaze and I’ll let you ask the question. If you’re interested, we could turn our gaze to the United States and to, and to Europe and countries that are not true.

Involved in the warrant ask about their depth of commitment and their patients and what might happen there over time. And I might have a few more concerns in that regard than I do with, with Ukraine itself. So, so let’s turn there. I think that is where we wanted to go next. Uh, part of the Ukrainian success so far in resisting Russia.

Has been built upon a unprecedented support from the United States from many European countries, particularly Germany, uh, from various other countries around the world. Is that likely to hold up? What are the challenges there? I think the challenges are, uh, are significant. I do think it’s likely to, uh, to hold up for, for, for two reasons.

I mean, I think that the war. Is creating, uh, in the countries that are observing it, those that have supported the sanctions regime. So it’s Europe, the us Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, and a handful of other countries. I think the war is creating its own rationale. In some respects, we’ve gotten so used to Russia as this master manipulator and this great producer of disinformation.

We’re not accustomed to Russia. The country that completely undermines, uh, its political arguments by the, by the way, it conducts itself abroad. It’s done that in part in pass, but not as spectacularly as it’s doing it now in Ukraine. So I think the war kind of argues for itself in some ways. And I also think that the west, we can use that term or whatever we can use to describe this coalition.

I think it likes the feeling of unity and. Uh, and leadership that it’s demonstrating. I mean, who wouldn’t really, I mean, you want to compare this to the pullout from Afghanistan. You want to compare it to the orcas submarine, DL, to sort of the less happy moments in the transatlantic relations. Uh, what you’re seeing now is something just much more formidable and who as, at least for us, the residents of these countries who wouldn’t rather see strengths, uh, than weakness.

And so I think that that may become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Uh, if the leadership succeeds that to becomes a kind of rationale or justification for, for doing what’s being done in this war. But I wouldn’t want to be too sanguine about all of this because. I see, you know, sort of two difficulties on, on, on the coalition side one is that it’s a coalition.

Uh, and so there are a lot of moving pieces, uh, and for, especially the EU and NATO. I mean, if you get one Cypress, one malt at one hungry, uh, that starts to become a real problem, they can kind of to up the, uh, the Alliance structures by, um, uh, you know, by sort of, um, Making, uh, making problems, making difficulties from, uh, from within.

So a coalition is only as strong as all of its constituent elements. And there are a lot of constituent elements, uh, and that’s a real worry of mind that you just get one dissident or one sort of in country. And then we could have a much harder time with the sanctions or with other things that are necessary to help Ukraine.

But I think the. Concern is, is to me more frightening, more sort of profound. And this is what the war is clearly going to have very severe economic implications for all. Also in Washington, DC, uh, for people coming up to subway steps, uh, in Rosslyn, Virginia, for people in Austin, Texas, uh, and elsewhere. Uh, and it’s so easy for populous politicians to take advantage of that or other kinds of politicians to take advantage of that and say, well, Great.

Good. We all support Ukraine, but how much do we support our own country? The kind of rhetoric that you saw in France leading up to the election on April 24th there, of course the pen didn’t win the election, but you know, it’s early days in the war. And I just, I think that there’s going to be a lot more of that politician, scrupulous unscrupulous, who are going to try to use the, use the war as a catchall, uh, and suggest that less commitment might.

Uh, more in the interest of, of, uh, of, of, of these countries. And I think that could become quite tricky over time, right? And this has to do with the rising energy prices, rising food prices and various other, um, basic commodities that come out of this part of the world. That will be more expensive for all of us, particularly in Europe, but for Americans and others too.

Michael, are you surprised that there have not been more, um, successful cyber attacks coming out of. I am. I thought that, uh, there would be a much more, um, uh, aggressive posture toward Ukraine. And apparently, I mean, I think everything is just being pieced together. Now, there were lots of attempts on the Russian side.

So Ukraine, I think may have defended that may be more of the story, uh, here than, um, uh, Russian neglect is, is, is the quality of Ukrainian, uh, defenses, but I’m very surprised that there haven’t been bigger Cyprus. On Poland on the Baltic republics, also on the United States, maybe on the UK, for some reason, the UK is the country that’s demonized the most on Russian media.

So, uh, maybe that would be a likely, uh, candidates possible that Russia is holding certain options in reserve. I wouldn’t be surprised in that regard. Um, It’s possible that they’re not quite as brilliant at this as we assume that they were in 2016. You know, I think that if you take a step back with cyber attacks or maybe this is more active measures, uh, sort of a version of cyber attacks, uh, if you take a step back, I think that they really succeed and I have 2016 very much in mind, they succeed to the, to the degree that we ourselves are going.

So they succeed on the basis of prior vulnerabilities. I don’t think Russia can create these vulnerabilities, but it can exploit them. And it may be that this moment of unity, uh, and, uh, quite robust support, uh, for the war is difficult to capitalize on. Now you could always attack the infrastructure of the United States or the financial system, or, uh, you know, really material parts of the country.

But I think Russia has a certain reluctance when it comes to the, with. Because I think that the worry there is, if they do it, the us will just be like, okay, it’s an act of war. We’re going to go in. Well, we’ll just go into Ukraine, you know, forget the sort of three-quarters support for your painless, give them a hundred percent support.

Uh, and let’s see how the Russian military responds to that. So I think that they are in a, in a sort of tricky, uh, tricky position for them. Uh, and that there’s a lot that they probably would want to do. I’m sure that there’s a lot that they’re capable. But they really don’t want to push the U S or other powers directly into the war.

So they may be stuck there. So a lot of what you’re saying does sound like stalemate, Michael, but you said earlier on that you’re not comfortable with that term, correct? Yeah. No, I think it’s not stalemate because. Uh, I think, you know, it’s not impossible. It looks less and less likely by the day, but it’s not impossible that there could be a certain encirclement of Ukrainian troops, uh, on the Eastern front.

That’s certainly what the Russians are striving for it by moving. To the north from into the south, from, from, from heart gifs. So that’s not something that is completely off the table or not in the cards, uh, this summer. And that of course would be a big development in the bore. Uh, and it’s also not impossible at all, uh, that Ukrainians could, uh, punch through in a bunch of different places.

Now, this famous land bridge that is spoken of from Russia to Crimea, uh, as a Russian war objective. And I’m sure that the Russians would love to have. But let’s again, remember, I mean, sort of roughly estimate here, it’s, you know, half the border of Texas in one direction or another, can you imagine how difficult that is to defend, uh, and you know, the very folly of the Russian war plan to go in with 200,000 troops, uh, and to take on a country of this size means that a lot of the territory that Russia has taken.

Is much less securely held and some of the maps suggest, you know, it’s blocked out all in one color as the kind of Russian side, but it’s not, uh, honeycombed with Russian troops at all. So I think the Ukrainians have huge options and the caliber of the weaponry that they’re now getting. Tanks, uh, artillery, especially from Germany, from across Europe, from the United States may mean that they really have the capacity, uh, to go forward.

Uh, and if we see how the Russians have been fighting so far, uh, you know, they might turn in terror, uh, in retreat, uh, in many places in which case you also wouldn’t have stalemated. So it’s really not, you know, it’s not that there isn’t an element of stagnate at the moment, but there are ways in which that could be shredded very quickly in the next few.

And I guess looking forward, Michael, then, uh, after that, I think very helpful description. I, I guess the natural question is what, what are you looking at in the coming weeks as we go from week 10 to 11, 12, 13, it’s certainly clear from what you’re saying that we shouldn’t expect this to end anytime soon.

So what are you watching? So of the three variables, then three core variables in this conflict. The first is Ukraine. I’ll say the second is its allies and support. And the third is Russia. The first two variables policy-wise I think are set. I don’t think Ukraine. I mean, obviously there are military decisions that has to make, do they go on the offensive?

Do they counter attack? If so, do they try to liberate Harrison? Do they go after some other target? Maybe. Do they continue making strikes within Russia itself? Obviously there are tactical decisions that have to be made of that nature. Those are up for grabs, but Ukrainian’s goal is, uh, it’s elegant in its simplicity is to win people.

Book to go back to the word that, uh, use accurate. Jeremy and I have been struggling a little bit to define here, but that’s clearly their goal is an outright victory to compel the Russian forces back to where they were on February 24th, or even further back, uh, perhaps. That’s not going to change as an objective, and they’ll just try to get as much support and Marshall as much force and energy to get there as they can.

I don’t think that us or transatlantic policy is complicated. Sanctions, maybe more to come, you know, maybe really hitting energy soon in a way that people have been reluctant to do up to now. But, uh, after the atrocities and after the successes of the Ukraine opinion, military, that may become more of an option and then just as much aid as possible.

And you don’t see a lot of disagreement on Capitol hill about what the white house is asking in terms of military aid to Ukraine finishing. And the GOP seems to want. Uh, a touch faster than the democratic party and European countries are lining up to do the same. So that policy I think, is set as well.

And the objective is, you know, it may not be to win quite in the way that I think Ukrainians articulated, but, uh, it’s to support Ukraine to the maximal degree. That’s, that’s the goal on this side of the, uh, on this side of the conflict. So. What I’m watching is Russia. That’s the third piece of the puzzle.

That’s the third variable. And I think there things are just a lot less certain policy-wise. Uh, I don’t think that the choices are very easy that Putin faces, but the key thing is that Putin faces choices. He really has to make a decision. Does he mobilize or not mobilize? If he doesn’t mobilize, then the task is going to be faced with is holding tariffs.

In Ukraine, much less territory than then it’s going to give him sufficient diplomatic leverage. So that’s a kind of tacit defeat in a certain way, not outright to feed, but a tacit to feed. And that’s what it means for Putin, not to mobilize. Now he can mobilize and maybe think of going back to Kiev and it kind of massive world war two type invasion, uh, of the country.

But that’s very costly. Uh, in, in different ways. If I had to bet, I hope it doesn’t happen, but if I had to bet, I would bet on mobilization because I just think Putin can’t tolerate a defeat, but that would be a huge shift in the Warren’s decision. He’s probably going to have to make in the next two to three weeks.

So I think that the key variable in a sense is the mind of Putin or if that’s not, if that’s too reductive and the key variable is just how. Goes forward at this moment. They’re the ones in the hot seat, but it’s interesting your description. And I think this was intentional was, was Putin centered. It’s not centered on any other decision makers or actors in Russia.

I continue to feel, um, not in the basis of good evidence, but I continue to feel the war in the highest circles of the Russian government is quite unpopular. Uh, I think we all saw the growth. Stalinist demonstration that was put on shortly before the war, where people had to show their support. Uh, they looked utterly miserable.

Um, and, uh, you know, I think a lot of certainly the foreign policy elite didn’t expect the war to happen until, uh, until it did. Um, it may be that the massive Russians, as I said earlier, is thinly. Uh, the kind of majority of the war, uh, that comes from Russian media and I think just the sentiments of war, uh, and supporting the troops and such.

So, you know, I think that’s there, but on the more elite levels of the Russian government, I do not think that it was a popular war. I don’t think anybody has the courage or the ability to out argue Putin or to show that they’re disloyal and they’re all living in fear. Uh, and that’s, you know, why the regression that Putin has instigated is a very calculated kind of repressive.

Uh, to squelch disloyalty, but, uh, I, I don’t think that, uh, the military likes this war. How could it, uh, the military command? Uh, I don’t think the economical leads of Russia like this war, how could they, they stand only to lose, uh, from it, uh, and in some ways this is an odd argument to me, perhaps, but I think true Russian Patriots.

Uh, I don’t like this war. It’s selling the reputation of the country. It’s attaching the country to a monstrously stupid, uh, and of course, a criminal enterprise and who could as a Patriot watch something like that happen, uh, and feel good about the endeavor. So it’s not that it’s just one man’s Wim.

Exactly. Uh, but, uh, it’s very different from Crimea in 2014, where there was a consensus. Uh, very different from the war in Syria, where I think a consensus emerged over time. Uh, and, uh, in that sense, Putin is playing with political fire, but in the short run, which is to say in the coming weeks and months, you don’t think that descent, which I agree with you.

And I, I also agree that the evidence is mixed at best, but assuming what you say is correct, and I think it is, you don’t think it actually. Matters with Putin in the short run? No, because I think, uh, you know, it’s like a political machine, uh, Russia at this point that only Putin knows how to run. And, uh, that’s, I think in the very nature of personalist rule and one implication of that, or one consequence of that is that.

It’s not in the self-interest of many people to, to disrupt it and to sort of overturn it. And then the question of Russian politics. I always think it’s one Shakespeare play or another, but I don’t know. I don’t know which one it is a is a Julius Caesar as a king Lear is a Coriolanus. I mean, it’s, it is one of those places I’m up, I’m thoroughly convinced or Macbeth over time.

We’ll learn. Uh, and I I’m sure that there are lots of enterprising princes, uh, around Putin who thinks that they could do the job better or would like to get rid of. But I have to say that the fear must be, uh, must be tremendous. And the moment one enterprising prince shares applied with another enterprising prince, I think both are in mortal danger.

And you’ve seen Putin in prison, somebody from his own intelligence services recently. Uh, and I I’m sure he would execute people if he thought it was, uh, it was necessary. So, no, I don’t think, uh, in the kind of peculiar climate that exists there, that a real rupture in the system is likely, or perhaps even possible.

Um, you know, here I resist some of the parallels sort of puts in Hitler, you know, sort of contemporary Russia, Nazi Germany, because they seem often. And historical to me, but you might want to think about resistance to Hitler and in a way how hard it was, even though a lot of Germans on the high government levels knew that Hitler was, was running the country into the ground.

Great. So Zachary you’ve listened to, to this discussion and Michael’s a really vivid descriptions of what’s happening on the ground. What’s happening in Russia. What’s happening among the allies, supporting a Ukraine and back to your poem, does this help to center your connection to this? Does it help to.

To provide this context and, and, and the, how do you, as a, as a city. Processes. I think, I think it’s very helpful because it helps us understand where we are. I think the difficulty with such a protracted conflict following such a conflict from, from thousands of miles away is as I talked about, uh, when discussing my poem is that.

Yeah, it’s hard to keep up with what’s going on and not just the strategy, the, the, the statecraft, but, but how it’s impacting people’s lives on the ground. So I think it’s important that we as Americans stay in touch, not with, not just with the ideals that the Ukrainians are fighting for, but, but with what’s actually going on, um, so that we can, we can best respond.

But also, so we can be aware of, of what’s going on in the world. I think that Putin is thriving on. Disinformation and, and onlies, and if we can constantly inform ourselves, it takes a huge amount of power away from, from, from Putin’s regime and from the whole war, where effort on the Russian side. I think that’s very well said, Michael, I want to give you the last word on that point.

You you’ve been putting so much energy, so many sleepless nights. I know into writing, uh, really remarkable things, including these four articles in foreign affairs. Uh, put up on different scenarios that, that I’ve encouraged all our listeners to, to read and, and many other things you’ve been writing and speaking in many contexts, including our own podcast, which we’re very grateful for.

What w what are you hoping that our listeners will pay attention to going forward? So thank you for the kind words, uh, Jeremy, about the, about the articles I have to overriding. Concerns at the present moment. Uh, and it’s wonderful to have the chance to air them on your podcast and, and, and to share them with you because I suspect you have the same concerns as I do.

The first one is how we can maintain what I would describe as moral patients. And, you know, it’s hard to fathom, although I think we learn now, what this means is that the second world war lasted for six years. And the Holocaust, which does in some ways begin before 1941, but technically kind of begins in 1941.

The Holocaust lasts for four years. It’s awful to contemplate. Uh, it’s, it’s horrific. Um, it tells us of course, that these things do have an end as this war will have an end, but they’re very, very long. Uh, and they wear us out. And I agree with Zachary about the disinformation that comes from Russia. But I think on par with this information is going to be Putin’s effort to exhaust.

Know our attention span, uh, and uh, our ability to continue to keep our focus and even our ability to keep our focus. Uh, when there isn’t a happy ending insight, uh, when there isn’t an obvious arc, when the moral universe is not bending visibly toward anything that we can recognize, then I think we have to maintain moral patients and make sure that our concern for the humanitary.

Fate of Ukrainians in the country and outside of it, as refugees is as strong a year from now or two years from now or three years from now, as it was at the very beginning of this war, we have to fight, I myself, have to fight against the rapidity of social media, which builds in my mind narrative arcs that are, you know, 18 hours long.

Uh, and I have to resist that myself and start to think and arts of times that are much less. Uh, so that I can retain a kind of moral patience, uh, and argue for that, uh, in the, in the public domain. So that’s, that’s, that’s one point and, you know, it’s up to the organizers of podcast and the writers of books and the teachers of courses, uh, to stimulate that in the people around us.

Secondly, when I’m really concerned about, and I mean, concerned in the sense of interested in or invested in not worried about, uh, his excellence in us foreign policy. I think the Biden administration has demonstrated quite a bit of that. Uh, so far I think the nature of the U S monetary support has been of the essence, uh, for Ukraine.

Uh, I think, uh, the diplomacy has been high quality. That’s what this team was. Built to do. Uh, and I think in many ways they’re doing it. I think foreign policy in, in ways that you, Jeremy and I have been discussing now for years, does depend though on a virtuous cycle between domestic politics and foreign affairs.

And here, I think the Biden administration just has to be as vigilant as possible. It has to create bipartisan coalitions where it can. Um, issues related to Ukraine and it has to keep on making the case to the U S that we need to support these policies and that there has to be strong domestic support for these policies over the long-term, uh, for the policies to, to succeed.

So I, you know, I think that the outlines of the policy are fine. I think they’re making good policy. They really have to build in the domestic component, I think a bit more, uh, than they have. Uh, and continue, uh, with international audiences to remind them of what the priorities should be, why this is an urgent conflict, why it’s a necessary conflict and just sort of keep on going with that.

So those are the two things that are on my mind when I write, you know, moral patients and foreign policy, uh, excellence, uh, and that will hopefully, you know, sort of be there in the debates and in the thinking, uh, and the discussions that we’re all. You know, Michael, your, your emphasis on those two elements, moral patients and excellence and foreign policy and diplomacy.

Uh, those are simple statements, but they’re very difficult things to follow through on. And, um, in a certain way, they come back to the core of our weekly podcast here. You know, democracy is built on the. The moral patients in a, what is always a, a messy system of trying to get it right after getting it wrong.

So many times and foreign policy in a democracy is fundamentally also about finding ways to work with, uh, allies and, and build coalitions at home among unlikely partners. And in some ways the. The patron Saint of our podcast, Franklin Roosevelt. And these are the two things that were essential to his victory in world war II.

And I think you’ve put your finger on the, the eternal wisdom of these two areas, but yet the eternal challenge of pursuing them. It’s so funny that you say that Jeremy, because as you were speaking, I was thinking of FDR in the following way that Joe Biden, who I think has modeled themselves in many ways on.

Lionized FDR, when he came to the white house in January, 2021 as a domestic parlor, a domestic precedent, right. It was the pandemic, it was the economic dislocations, the difficulties of that. And I think Biden looked at FDR and said, yes, this is kind of 1932, and we need to get the country moving again and sort of, uh, you know, bring that spirit back and use government to, to, to solve problems as FDR.

And it’s not ironic. It’s just interesting. That this crisis, and Ukraine’s not equivalent to Pearl Harbor for the United States, but it’s up there, uh, is really bringing back the war time, precedents and models of FDR. Uh, and I don’t think Biden quite expected that when he came into the white house, but that’s what he’s got.

Uh, and so it’s FDR the patron Saint of these two. Domestic politics and foreign policy. And that’s a perfect note to close on because it brings us full circle to why historical perspective matters so much, Michael you’re following the day to day in Ukraine and recounting it to us. Narrating and analyzing it for us.

This is so helpful and it shows the power of not only your expertise, but also your historical imagination too, to be able to contextualize and make sense of what is such a complicated situation. And Zachary has said providing us a foundation, a framework, at least for understanding what’s going on. Uh, thank you for joining us.

Well, I’ll be content. If I can find a foundation or a framework for one as accurate as poems. So thank you so much to the two of you for your, uh, your engagement in the topic. And thank you so much for your wonderful questions. And it’s always such a joy to speak with you about now. The feeling is mutual Zachary.

Thank you for your moving poem as always. And for framing our discussion with your poem. And thank you. Most of all, to our loyal listeners for joining us for this episode of this is democracy.

This podcast is produced by the liberal arts, its development studio and the college of liberal arts at the university of Texas. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Harris codine stay tuned for a new episode every week. You can find this is democracy on apple podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher.

See you next time. Uh,