This is Democracy – Episode 192: Syria and Ukraine

This is democracy, a podcast about the people of the United States, a podcast about citizenship, about engaging with politics and the world around you. A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues and how to have a voice in what happens next. Welcome to our new episode of this is democracy.

This week, we’re going to discuss the recent history of the civil war in Syria. And this is a topic that deserves attention in its own, right, because of the importance of this country, the atrocities committed and the lingering effects. But we’re not only going to talk about what happened in Syria and what continues to happen in Syria.

But the effects of that civil war and the violence in particular, the Russian intervention in that civil war and its influence upon the war in, in Ukraine right now, the ways in which events in Syria are in some ways a preview to what we were all watching in Ukraine and the ways in which the experiences in Syria have influenced.

The Russian military and other actors, uh, in the terrible war that we’re all witnessing and Ukraine, uh, that began about five weeks ago with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We’re joined by. I think the person who knows more about what is happening in Syria than almost any other scholar in the United States.

She’s also one of the most interesting and exciting, uh, writers on foreign policy and international affairs today. Uh, and if you haven’t, uh, learned about her work before you should look it up, uh, her name is Emily Waylon and, uh, Emily, thank you for joining us. Yeah. Thank you for that. Very generous introduction and.

Well, I’ve only just begun to introduce you. Uh, Emily, uh, Emily is a historian of us foreign policy and of the middle east. Uh, she earned her PhD in history at the university of Texas at Austin. Uh, I had the great fortune of being her PhD advisor, but I often felt she was my PhD. Uh, she’s now a postdoctoral fellow at our fantastic Clements center for national security.

She’s also been an earnest Mae fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy school and the Belfer center for science and international affairs. She has been a Smith Richardson foundation. Pre-doctoral fellow at Yale’s international security studies program, and she’s been affiliated, and this is probably most relevant for our discussion today with American universities, a bay roots center for Arab and middle Eastern studies.

Emily has worked as a historical consultant for the east west Institute, which is an international non-governmental think tank specializing in track two Depro the diplomacy and her writing appears in many publications, her book manuscript, which will be out soon, we hope is the Lebanese wars. Uh, really the, the first major international history of these wars, at least written in English.

Uh, and. That’s something we’re all looking forward to. Um, before we turn to our discussion with Emily, we have of course, uh, Mr. Zachary series, uh, poem for us today. What is the title of your poem? Zachary shadows at the door. Let’s learn about this. Where is it that the killers learn to kill while we’re sleeping in the quiet of a window sill.

And while we wait in dreams of snow, they are in the icy streets. And when we’re late and knocking on the door, they trace faces in the sleet that were once, but are no more. I’d like to think that they are haunted when their rifling is done and they wait on a cold porch and watch the rivers run. Inside behind them in this stifling light, someone cooks them dinner and reads to them.

But they are seeing faces in the shadows at the door and we are there in suits and laces prancing on the floor. So hold it tight. Don’t let it go for, even in the desert. Sometimes there is snow and sometimes even in the cavern with a lantern and just a plumb, sometimes there is justice. Often. There is a.

Where is it, then the killers learn to kill so cold in the streets of your city. They have overturned the stones. They have opened all the sewers, just outside your door. And here in our town, we’re already buried because we’ve seen it all before Zach, where you might’ve outdone yourself this week. What is your poem about whom is really about trying to understand the psychology of war more specifically?

The, the soldiers, the mercenaries who go from one conflict zone from one war zone to another, and, and really how they live with themselves, but also the devastating, uh, the devastating trauma, uh, and death that they leave by. Well, I think that’s a perfect spot to turn to Emily. Um, there’s clearly been a lot of death and destruction and trauma in, uh, Syria and in surrounding areas, um, for at least the last decade, but maybe if we could start around 2015, how should, how should we understand?

Yeah. What happened in Syria beginning around that time? Yeah. Um, well, I will focus mostly of course, a post 2015, but I think it’s worth reiterating that, you know, we’re, uh, broke out in Syria in 2011 in conjunction with. Popular protest movements. Um, in the middle east, at the time, the war was begun by the Syrian president Bashar.

I said, because, you know, the protesters were really calling more for government reforms and he was the one who really saw this as a, as an existential threat to his regime. So, um, the, the war broke out. Sort of in his resistance to any kind of political reform. And, uh, I, it continued on, it was pretty touch and go for the Assad regime.

I think all the way up until probably about 20 14, 20 15 and 2015 is when the, uh, that when Putin and the Russian military began. Russian mission in Syria. And the mission in Syria, uh, was sort of a nominally, a mission to conduct airstrikes against, um, ICL. So this is the Islamic state in the Lavant and that, um, which you and your listeners may remember was sort of a version or a sect of, um, ISIS, which was, um, the.

Extremists terrorist organization that spring up in Iraq, um, in the, around the same time. So, uh, so we have, you know, the Russian military, again, this is sort of a nominally, an air strike mission it’s, um, still remains normally an airstrike mission, but by about 2016, it’s, you know, it’s pretty clear.

Reports on the ground, that there are Russian troops in Syria. And in particular, in addition to Russian troops, there’s also a pretty significant presence from Russian mercenaries, like the Wagner group and that they are conducting pretty robust operations on behalf of the ESAD government. So what I would say, the two kind of key features of the Russian military mission in Syria were its brutality and the distortion of truth that went alongside.

Uh, and I can talk a little bit about that some more, or I don’t know if you want to, if you have any questions about anything. No, I, I have so many questions and I’m so glad you’re with us to help us understand this, but well, for many of us, even those of us who follow these issues closely, Emily, it’s, it’s very hard to know what’s going on because obviously there’s a lot happening.

Um, and um, most of us don’t have the language skills and the historical background in that region that you have. So, so in terms of the brutality, I mean, many, uh, outside observers are accustomed, unfortunately, to watching images of brutal military, um, conflicts of one kind or another in the middle east, what made, what made the Russian intervention particularly brutal for you to single it out that way?

Sure thing. And I would actually add to what you just said, where it’s hard to know what’s going on. That is actually a tactic of war, so it’s not. Um, you don’t, it’s hard to know what’s going on. Not simply because it’s, you know, people are a little bit accustomed to seeing violent images coming out of the middle east and because of the language barrier, but because that’s a, that is a deliberate tactic specifically by the Russian regime, uh, to make it hard to know what’s going on and, and the Syrian regime as well.

Um, so what I would say for the Bruce in terms of brutality, you know, the, at the very. There is a Russian general Alexander foreigner. I’ve probably butchering that name. Um, so he was, he led the beginnings of the Russian mission and what I would say distinguished the, um, the brutality were. You know, tactics in some and some of the material that were used so that you have thermobaric weapons, which people often confuse with white phosphorus bonds.

Thermobaric weapons are much more brutal, uh, and much sort of hotter. Uh, and, um, you have the use of cluster munitions and things like that. So things that go against the, um, against the Geneva conventions of war, and then also what they were targeting. So again, this is nominally, you know, The Russian regime and the Assad regime are claiming that these are strikes against extremists, terrorist factions.

Like I saw like the illness reference, um, which were there were, and there were in the opposition, some extremist terrorist factions, but, um, they’re blending those missions against these terrorist organizations with strikes against civilian targets. So hitting things like schools, hitting things like hospitals, they are pioneering, or I don’t know if pioneering is the right word, but.

Um, using what’s called a double-tap strike, which is when, um, you hit a target and then wait for, you know, um, really sort of, you wait for the emergency personnel and volunteers to come in to try to take people out of rebel or, um, or to, to tend to people’s wounds. And then you hit it again. So you’re hitting people, um, who are trying to help others.

So that’s the kind of brutality that we’re talking about in Syria. And this was pioneered by, um, general cornucopia. In Syria in 20 15, 20 16 and has continued since he’s, since he has left the command of the Syrian mission. I hate to, um, make such a apocalyptic analogy almost, but how should we understand the logic of the Russian presence in the middle east?

Is it, is it similar in some ways then to the Nazi involvement in the Spanish civil war? Practice round for Russian expansion, maybe. Yeah. I, you know, I don’t know that that’s a terrible, I think that’s not a terrible comparison. Uh, I think, you know, historically Russia has been an ally for the ESAD regime and I want to be careful here to, to emphasize the acid regime is not the same thing as Syria.

There are many Syrians who do not support us quite for quite a few. And, um, it’s really been, you know, the essence came to power in around 1970 and that were historically releasable. The Soviet union. So there is a long history here, and it’s a history that has its roots in that Soviet moment that we also know is so evocative for Putin and so important to his psychology.

So I think, you know, I think that there’s, um, a sense of. Russian supportive Syria as kind of almost an Imperial legacy, if that makes sense that this is sort of a moment when the Soviet union had a great deal of power and they were sort of seen as equals to the United States on the world stage. And so by reinforcing his support for the sides, Putin is really enacting his vision of what Russian power is going to look like in the world.

Does that mean. I think so. Thank you. And, and Emily it’s, it’s striking what you just explained. So brilliantly, um, Putin claims in both this middle Eastern space, and then of course, uh, in, uh, Eastern Europe and elsewhere, he claims he’s preserving Russian civilization. But what you’ve described is, is really extreme destruction, which includes not only mass death.

But, uh, the destruction of economies, the, the, the rendering of, of resources and wealth unusable in many cases. So, so what is the logic of that? The logic of, of the material destruction? I mean, I think that, you know, you, you can look at. I think I want to add another sort of element of destruction in there, which is the destruction of trust.

So, you know, the double traps, this double-tap streets that I, uh, I talked about. And then also when you are creating an environment that is quite literally almost unlivable people become focused on survival and you cannot focus on things like. You know, your political rights on altruism on, on, um, you know, the things that make us human you’re simply focused on covering sort of what’s, um, Walter Benyamin and other philosophers called mere life.

Your bear life, your sort of animal basic needs for surviving and, um, in destroying. An environment in which people can flourish and be sort of full human beings, will Putin sort of reinforces and asset as well. This is something that the Assad regime supports reinforces people’s dependency on the regime for basics like security and, um, and you know, keeping, keeping themselves safe, nevermind that the regime is the greatest threat to their safety.

But when you. Make people afraid and you destroy social trust then, um, then they’re easier to. Right. And they’re forced to cling to the very source of their suffering. Absolutely. Yeah, absolutely. And, and that extends by the way, beyond the borders, this is not a specifically Russian philosophy. This is not specifically Syrian philosophy, right.

As Zach mentioned, there was historical antecedents to this. This is something that extends beyond borders. I mentioned that one of the signature features of the Russian campaign in Syria has been, you know, an almost industrial strength, disinformation campaign. So. Something that the Russians, you know, test it out in serious, starting around 2013 and really culminating in 20 15, 20 16 in advance of their, um, you know, disinformation camp campaigns and their involvement in the U S um, elections in 2016, you started to see when the Russians got involved in Syria, uh, Sort of a lot of allegations about particular groups, like the white helmets, which is a group of Syrian volunteers who would go in, they would, they, they were very important and exposing the war crimes of the ESAD regime, they were also emergency services.

A lot of them died in these double checks. I’m describing. Um, but there was a coordinated campaign online campaign implying that they were linked with Al-Qaeda and that really, that story came out of Russia. Um, and it was one of the first times we’ve seen this really, like I said, industrial strength, disinformation campaign, so that, so spreading that mistrust beyond the borders of Syria and Russia has also been a part of this.

So it’s not only destroying, um, people’s cities, uh, resources, uh, it’s destroying any semblance of truth. Yes, exactly. Yeah. And what about the use of chemical weapons, which, which was in the news for a short while, and then again was almost. Yeah. So this was sort of the first, um, I would say kind of moment when we started to see Russia take a more robust stance in Syria.

The, it was in 2013 that the exposure of Assad’s use of chemical weapons in certain suburbs of Damascus was, um, was sort of broadcast to the world. The reaction was. Pretty immediate. And there was a sort of universal condemnation, but there wasn’t much done beyond that. And one of the, kind of there’s a.

There was a lot of conversation from the Obama administration about potentially becoming more involved in Syria. There was a lot of domestic resistance to that. Um, and the solution that was kind of struck upon was by Sergei lever of, um, the then Russian foreign minister to believe. Was that th that Russia would help coordinate, but sort of act as serious guarantor, um, and, and help coordinate the removal of the chemical weapons by the S the us at Virginia’s chemical weapons, um, in coordination with the United nations and the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons.

And, uh, and they did this, they conducted this, these operations in September, 2013, starting in September of 2013 into October, 2013. And, um, for what we know, most of the chemical weapons were removed and destroyed significantly though. I would say, um, that. There were certain certain sort of ingredients of other chemical weapons that were not covered in this, um, in this agreement.

So there has been evidence of the, uh, us address teams continued use of chemical weapons since this moment. But I think I could, I see that moment in 2013 is kind of when you start to see a more, a bolder Russian presence in Syria, if that means. And for many of our listeners who probably aren’t very, well-informed on the current state of politics and, uh, the regime in Syria, uh, what is this sort of, I don’t know if you could call it stalemate or the sort of status quo that is now being reinforced.

Yeah. It’s um, you know, it’s really, it’s concerning. I would say Siri is pretty much a defacto. Um, Partitioned to states with certain areas of the, of the nation under the control of the ESAD regime, certain areas that are under the control, mostly around ad-lib that are under the control of this sort of, of the rebel groups still.

Um, and there’s some concern about that actually in light of the new developments in the Ukraine war. And then I would say other parts of Syria are under, um, under control of. Pretty lawless groups and mafias and things like that. So it is a defective, I would say partitioned states that it is a locus of the international sort of international illegal trades.

So you have an enormous trade in illegal drugs, weaponry, and other sorts of unsavory things going through Syria. And. And I would say actually that this is a pretty tolerable solution for the Russians and for the Assad regime in the sense that, you know, there is no real significant challenge to their control and to their power it’s intolerable.

Of course, for the vast majority of Syrians you have roughly, I think I want to say 22 million displaced Syrians for about more than half of the pre-war population. You’ve got hundreds of thousands of people missing. Killed forcibly disappeared. There’s a 90% poverty rate in the country. Um, about, I want to say.

I think it’s several million. I think I want to say about 15 million dependent on eight. I can’t remember if that’s exactly right. So it’s just, I, it is, it is, it is, uh, it is not really a country any more it’s I would say it’s more sort of the, um, the Essette regime and, um, the people that are of course, unable to escape the Assad regime.

It’s really a pretty grim situation. So how on earth? Movado Mr. Putin and Assad see this as success. Well, it’s success in that again, there’s no threat to them in this, in this particular area. So although the United States has, you know, resisted some of the, um, the tentative normalization of acid that has gone on.

We have, we don’t have the same level of commitment to our allies in Syria. That Putin has to acid. If that makes sense. There’s a differential in terms of, um, of how much skin we have in the game. So, so they there’s just, no, it’s very hard to envision a situation in which the United States or other Western allies disrupts the current status quo.

And the current status quo is that. Putin and asset are in control and that is their that’s their vision of success. And what does Putin gain from this? Um, I’m sure that there’s a great deal of, of income generated for him and the oligarchs off of some of these illegal trades. I mentioned I’m sure also there is, and there is, as you know, Zachary’s question brought up.

Broader vision of, of Russia as an Imperial power and, uh, sort of, um, fulfilling its duties in terms of being a world power. So I said is a, is a very loyal ally to, um, to Putin. There’s also, by the way, uh, a recently Putin has suggested that he would permit up to. I want to say 40,000 Syrians to come fight in Ukraine.

So I mentioned that 90% poverty rate and that is forcing a lot of Syrians to, and to come and fight in Russia, excuse me, in Ukraine. Um, and, uh, And so we’ve, there’s only a few thousand now, but, um, it’s likely that there will be more working with the Russian army and with the Wagner group and other mercenary groups.

Um, so you will see more Syrians coming to fight in Ukraine, I believe. So that is also a source of course, um, of success for, for Putin fortunate. This is a grim story or you’re describing for us, but you’re painting a picture of, of what is happening on the ground and has been happening for upwards of seven years, uh, now, and it’s important.

We recognize this and, and it’s, it’s, it’s something we need to grapple with in and of itself, but. Even greater urgency, I think for, uh, citizens of the United States and other parts of the world who care about what’s happening in Ukraine. Because as both, you and Zachary have said, in some ways, this is a precursor to what we’re seeing in Ukraine now and what we’re likely to see in coming days and weeks, as, as you pointed out, Emily general, Alexandre , who is.

I’ve been appointed recently by Putin as the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. He is responsible for what you’ve just described. Uh, and so as an expert on Syria and the middle east, who has watched what you’ve described so closely, you were even there months ago. Um, how do you view what you’re seeing in you?

Yeah. I mean, I think it is, as you point out when it comes, um, appointment is very concerning. It coincided with an attack on, um, a train station that targeted Ukrainian refugees. So it’s a hint of, I think that it’s a suggestion that, that Putin and his generals are really going to play out the Syria playbook in Ukraine.

Um, So it’s yeah, it’s, it’s concerning and it’s upsetting. And I think that you could see, again, that sort of tolerable solution for Russia in this in Ukraine would be something similar to. To, uh, Syria where you have a defacto partition state with a weekend kind of rub state, perhaps under control, um, in the west.

But that, um, Putin can sort of act with impunity in the east. I hope that I’m wrong. And I would say one thing that’s different about Ukraine is that Syria did come before it and that there is enormous. You know, people can recognize that. And although Syria often gets forgotten, but people who still pay attention to Syria and quite a number of Syrians themselves are actually reaching out to help there, um, to help citizens in Ukraine resist the Russian invasion and, um, and to, and to fight against, uh, to put in sources.

So there is some. You know, although this looks very similar to Syria, there is, you know, I have a little bit of hope that it will not play out in exactly the same way. There’s also a much more robust international response this time around, um, which. You know, actually hopeful also for Syrians, a lot of Syrians are very, um, are hopeful that if Russia is held to accountability for what it’s done in Ukraine, someday, that that will set a precedent for, um, Russia and for, uh, for Putin assets to be held accountable for what has happened in Syria.

But so far, have you seen what looked to you as a, as a historian, as some of the same behaviors in Ukraine? Yes. Yeah. And, and I think you have to also remember that a lot of these are the same people, so there’s an entire generation of Russian military officers who cut their teeth, um, in Syria now, you know, that’s been going on.

Quite some time. And so that, so they’re enacting the same kind of practices and they’re approaching these battles in this, in a similar way. The material difference of course, is that you have, um, a much more, a much stronger, uh, you have, you have things like artillery in, um, in Ukraine that you did not have, you do not have in Syria.

So there’s a little bit more of the weight of the Russian army being unleashed in Ukraine that we didn’t see quite so overtly in Syria. Um, yeah, I don’t know if that answers your question. It certainly does. And of course there’s the, the Ukrainians are being far better armed, uh, by external actors and by themselves than, than the Syrian resistance was.

But I, I can’t think of a better example. Emily of why understanding in this case, recent history is so important. What I hear you saying is that if we want to understand and anticipate Russian behavior, what we need to do is not think of Russia operating as a. Image of our own militaries, which have their own problems by the way.

But instead as following a pattern of behavior and learned experience, that reflects what you’ve described in Syria. Yes. Yeah. And I would say that the international response is an important part of that. There was not an, there was not, there was a significant international outcry, um, as, as war crimes became revealed in Syria, but not much happened.

Um, and so it’s, you can see how someone watching that would assume that, okay, well, we’re going to sort of unfold the same playbook and Ukraine and other. There won’t be, and maybe there’ll be an outcry, but there won’t be much. Much behind that. And so I think this is why it’s of critical importance that the international system come together and really actually commit, commit in a, in a significant way to resisting the Russian, the Russian push.

And so that, that leads naturally into my next question. What, based on your in-depth knowledge of the events in Syria, what do you think that those who are interested in helping do Ukrainians may be too late for the Syrians, but at least helping the Ukrainians? What, what lessons should we take for resistance to Russian?

Yeah. Um, and I actually, I would say, I hope that it’s not too late for Syrians. You know, there are still many Syrians who. Um, you know, they’re living there, perhaps not living in Syria at the moment, but that have really taken, uh, taken on the lead actually in, in helping Ukrainians with this there’s something called the Syria Ukraine network, which is led by a group of Syrians who are giving advice and practice, practice, practice sharing, and things like that to Ukrainians in Russia, things like teaching them how to build underground hospitals, to treat people who have been, um, you know, People who have been injured and things like that.

Um, I think what we can do, um, our biggest lessons that we can sort of take away is that, um, th that words are very cheap. It sounds kind of trite, but, um, that there is real, you know, that there’s political posturing and then there’s actually doing something. So this is a moment where real political courage is needed.

I think the other lesson would that I would take away from it would be. You know, maybe more of a question. And the question I would ask is what kind of international system do we want to have? And to me, the, the, that really comes down to, we can. I think that a lot of times American foreign policy is very reactive.

We’re interested in preserving the status quo and the way in which the United States is powerful. And we view any change to that status quo as a potential threat to American power. And I think that this is a moment where the status quo is changing already. The status quo is, you know, has changed. Uh, we will not be able to turn back the clock to PR to get back to what Syria was in 2010, we will not be able to turn back the clock to get to what Ukraine was last year, even.

Um, So then the question becomes what kind of international system do we want to live in now and how do we best, um, how do we make that system and, and what do we, what do we do actively to make that system work? Yeah. That’s what I would say. What about, what about, uh, I think you, you hinted at this a little bit, but what about the parallels between the sort of diet diasphoric communities that, that, that we’re seeing now of Ukrainians, particularly in Poland and in other parts of Eastern Europe?

I mean, uh, it’s hard, not, uh, it’s hard not to, to notice the irony that the Ukrainian refugees who were being welcomed in Poland today are in many ways. Coming the same route and coming same violence of Syrian refugees who were turned back 10 years before. Absolutely. Yeah. And I would actually, you know, there were actually stories, um, of Syrian refugees who have lived in, you know, Romania and Poland and who, who came to the borders actually to help welcome Ukrainian refugees.

Um, so even these people who have, you know, for the most part been kind of abandoned by Europe still really they see solidarity with Ukrainians. Um, and yeah, it is, you know, it’s a reminder that the problem of refugees, a lot of people were saying this during, during the Syrian war and, um, that, you know, refugees are that it’s sort of.

It’s not a feature of a particular region of the world. Although we have seen more middle Eastern refugees, um, in recent years that it doesn’t take much for refugees to exist or to originate from outside of the middle east. And you’re seeing that now in Ukraine, um, obviously Ukrainian refugees are getting a much warmer welcome, and it’s frustrating.

Um, but you have to also keep in mind the broader context that, um, I think the way. You know, things get covered in the media. We were still learning in the, in 2015 and 2016, really about what, you know, disinformation and fake news and things like that were, um, capable of how, how they were capable of shaping the, the, um, the media coverage.

So. You know, I don’t want to give people a pass, but I think I’m hesitant to say, um, I think that we should be welcoming refugees, whether they’re Syrian or Ukrainian. And I think, um, at least there’s a little bit of a conversation started about that. You know, other people are noticing, okay, there’s a big difference in the way that these Ukrainian refugees are treated and the Syrian refugees are treated.

Um, so while the response is not perfect, there’s at least a conversation going on. So my hope is that in the future, we’ll be a little more. That’s a very sensible perspective and it it’s, it’s terrible to see. And it’s a topic we talk about quite often on this podcast. It’s terrible to see how racial prejudice continues to, um, influence the way people make judgements about life and death, quite frankly, but it is also heartening to see.

Ukrainian refugees being welcomed, and it is heartening to see that at least there’s a conversation beginning, as you say about the disjunction between the way we treated Syrian refugees and now Ukrainian refugees. Um, Emily, uh, coming back to where we were a second ago, as you know, we like to always close on an optimistic note, and this is a very grim story we’re discussing tonight.

Um, there is the opportunity for our democracy and I mean, broadly American democracy, European democracy, democracy’s in various parts of the world. There’s an opportunity for democracy to learn. Learn from the tragedy of recent years, learned from the mistakes of the past. Uh, that’s one of the strengths and possibilities of democracy.

Uh, what is it that we should have learned from Syria? When we think about Russia today, I know you, you are a critic appropriate. Compellingly of, uh, the excessive use of American force and the American frequent refrain that we will save the world by imposing ourselves upon it. Uh, so the last thing I know.

Argue for, it would be an American led a military intervention to correct the wrongs of Russia. Uh, nonetheless, you clearly think we need to do certain things and we are a society and our allies have capabilities as our society does. So, so what should we do? And in particular, what should our listeners be encouraging our society and fellow democracies to do in this grim moment as you, as you to.

Yeah, well, you know, uh, you, I think accurately assess the uncomfortable position I put myself in where I don’t think that, um, you know, I think that there’s, there’s military intervention, there’s military intervention, you know, I think there’s a way to intervene or contribute to the war effort in Ukraine without coming in with the full weight of the American military and sort of imposing an American envisioned solution.

So I think the first thing that we need to do is listen to Ukrainians, listen to what they need from us from a material standpoint, from a strategic standpoint, and then try to give that to them. It sounds very simple, but you know, this is something that was, you know, I was in Jordan in 2013 when, um, when there was a real possibility of American response.

The American involvement in the Syrian war and people were very agonized in Jordan about, you know, whether or not the United States should intervene militarily because their memory of course, of the Afghanistan and the Iraq wars was so fresh at the same time. There’s a long scale of involvement and of real commitment that goes, you know, there’s a wide spectrum.

That’s kind of what the word I’m looking for a wide spectrum from, you know, saying a bunch of things and not doing anything to full bore invasion. Like we saw in Iraq in 2003. And. For be it for me to say what the right thing to do is, but I think the first step has always gotta be listened to the people who are suffering right now and take them at their word for what they actually need from us.

And I think, um, you know, what I would say for people to encourage their representatives, to do and to, to think about in terms of response, um, that’s a tough question. I think. You know, again, that kind of very astute question at the beginning where I think that the parallels I’ve been thinking often of the parallels to the, to the Spanish civil war.

And that, that was a real moment for the international system to understand what was coming. Um, and I think we need to understand that. Ukraine is not an exception. Syria is not an exception. These are Indic indicators of, uh, of, of a one man’s very, um, dangerous worldview. And I think we need to think very long and hard about what we do with that.

Zachary. I know you’ve been struggling over this. You’ve you’ve actually been, uh, emotionally touched as many of us have. And I think as many of your contemporaries have Zachary and your poem, uh, reflected that, uh, what do you think we should be doing and has Emily’s, um, discussion of listening to the Ukrainians?

Does that give you a way to think about this? I think so. I think it’s easy to either. Forget about Ukraine now, after the, the sort of outpouring of emotional support from Americans, the sort of Ukrainian flag, cause they, you still see all over the country. I think, I think it’s easy after a month of doing that to, to forget or, or to focus on other things.

But at the same time, it’s also easy to become sort of. To, to, to desensitize, to what’s going on and forget the actual human suffering involved. So I think we do have to listen. We have to make sure we’re in tune with the actual human suffering that is going on on the ground on a daily basis. And we also have to be aware that it’s not, it’s not going to be contained to Ukraine simply by virtue of us being thousands of miles away.

It affects. Every time, the, the, the laws and norms of international behavior are broken and in such an egregious way. Right? Right. Well, I think, uh, this discussion has opened so many avenues for understanding and empathy and at the very least, um, rethinking some of our assumptions, uh, Emily and Zachary, I think you’ve both shared with us ways in which we should recognize that there are no easy solutions that their patterns.

That are very difficult to break, very difficult to stop. And that, um, maybe the best we can do is to at least start by forcing ourselves to understand and open our eyes and see what’s happening. That there’s a humanity and recognizing, acknowledging. And trying to respond by listening to those on the ground who are suffering in this way.

And I think your, your perspective, Emily, I don’t think it offers an easy solution, but it at least humanizes, uh, the conflict. And I think that’s important. I think that’s part of your aim, isn’t it? Absolutely. And I actually would say, I think what you said, you know, um, you know, there are no easy solutions that do something that, that we can do as individuals every day is really resist.

The easy story resist. Resist the, the easy narrative, if that makes sense, the simple narrative, and when we see simple narratives, be a little skeptical towards it, um, and that will do, I think go a long way towards sort of opening our minds to what comes in. Right. Simple narratives of forgetting Zack reset or simple narratives of our own.

Self-righteousness both of which we need to work our way past. So I, I want to do something now to close that we don’t often do, but I think a Zachary’s poem was so powerful and so appropriate. Emily for so many of the really thoughtful, uh, uniquely informed insights that you shared with us. Zachary, I want to ask you to read the last four lines, the end of your poem.

One more time to close us out. Where is it that the killers learn to kill so cold in the streets of your city? They have overturned the stones. They have opened all the sewers, just outside your door and here in our town. We’re already buried because we’ve seen it all before. And Emily, I want to give you the last words to close it.

Yeah. Um, you know, Zach, I just thought of it as you’re reading the last bit of your poem of, uh, another poem written by a great Lebanese poet and, um, she wrote it and, and the, the title is it was Beirut all over again. And she wrote it thinking about, um, the conflict in El Salvador and 1980s and how it reminded her of, um, the war that was still ongoing in Beirut at the time.

So I think that that’s a good reminder. That these things do not stop at border. Right. And we study history. So at least we give ourselves the opportunity to learn and not just revisit the same tragedy again and again, as if it’s as if it’s something we’re not prepared for. Right. Absolutely. Emily, thank you so much.

Uh, I want to, again, encourage our listeners to look up, uh, the, the voluminous work of Emily Waylon. Uh, she is really writing some of the most interesting, uh, work on the middle east today, and it’s really. The larger international community and she will be writing a lot more. I know, so everyone can, can keep an eye out for her work.

And, uh, of course I want to thank, uh, our podcasts poet and co-producers Zachary Siri. And most of all, I want to thank our listeners for joining us each week and for continuing to remain faithful to the aspirations of democracy or what Franklin Roosevelt called the next chapter that we are all right.

Uh, right now. Thank you for joining us for this week of this is.

this podcast is produced by the liberal arts, its development studio and the college of liberal arts at the university of Texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Harris. Codine stay tuned for a new episode every week. You can find this is democracy on apple podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher.

See you next time.