This is Democracy: Episode 167 – Climate Change and the Pandemic

This is democracy, a podcast about the people of the United States, a podcast about citizenship, about engaging with politics and the world around you. A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues and how to have a voice in what happens next. Welcome to our new episode of this is democracy.

Today. We’re going to talk about climate change, the environment and how the pandemic that we’re still living through has affected those issues. The ways those issues play out in our world. And also the way we view them and talk about policy around those issues. And we’re very fortunate to have a leading scholar and colleague and good friend, uh, Sheila Olmsted.

On the podcast again, I think she was with us a little more than a year ago to talk about some of these issues. And it must’ve been more than a year ago, Sheila. Right? Cause it was before the pandemic. Right. There’s the compression of time makes it very hard to, hard to tell, but I’m glad that, well, we’re delighted to have you on Sheila Olmstead, as I’m sure.

Many of our listeners know is a professor at the LBJ school of public affairs here at the university of Texas. She’s also a university fellow at resources for the future and a senior fellow at the property and environment research. Uh, professor Olmsted is a charter member of the science advisory board at the U S environmental protection agency.

And from 2016 to 2017, she served in the white house in the really important role of senior economist for energy and environment on the president’s council of economic advisers. Uh, professor Olmsted has published as far as I can tell in every major, uh, science, uh, and related economics journals. Covers environmental issues, uh, publishing in journals that reach wide academic as well as public and policy audiences.

And so we really have the best person on to talk about these issues. Thank you again for joining us, Sheila. Well, thanks for that kind introduction. And before we get into our discussion, of course, we have our scene setting poem from Mr. Zachary Suri, what is your poem title today Zachary? Fuelless.

All right, let’s hear it. Children are supposed to be curious. To be trusting, not this stare from the bus. Stop at you in the SUV, idling through the streets of early morning, sunrise, it rises only while it can still be seen, not the stair from the bus stop. I too am disappointed. Now that we are adjusted to the mundane apocalypse, the everyday end of the world, I feel they have a right to know what it cost us, because it will cost them even more.

I tell you Carpe Diem before it all goes dark treasure. This winter of our discontent before the summer of no end, remember the world will burn, et cetera, until it is fuelless. Wow. What is your poem about Zachary? My poem is really about, uh, uh, the ways in which we’ve become desensitized to, uh, to the scale.

Uh, of, of, of, of, of tragedy around us, not just in terms of the human tragedy of the pandemic, but also, uh, the, the tragic impact of our own actions on the client surely or? Sure. Sure. Well, Sheila, that seems like a good place too, to ask. I guess the, the biggest question, how has this pandemic contributed to the environmental challenges and opportunities that we face?

Um, it’s a great question. It sort of opens a set of what I think are really interesting topics. I think I, I appreciate in Zachary’s poem, you know, that effort of art to try and help us do better at understanding problems at such a large scale. Like if you think this week about the, you know, those tiny white flags on the national mall in Washington, DC.

That effort to try and try and put in human terms, right. Something that’s just so, so just horrific, you know, approaching 700,000 deaths now with the pandemic. Right. Um, and then, uh, as Zachary said, you know, it’s just as hard, if not harder for people to, you know, kind of put in human terms, this idea that we are, um, you know, rapidly warming the planet much more rapidly than we have in the past.

And that has some really, really significant implications. Um, I guess I would start by saying. You know, we’ve learned again for that, you know, the households that are the most vulnerable, the communities that are the most vulnerable to the impacts of the pandemic are also in some cases, those that are most vulnerable to the downsides of climate change, you know, that poverty, constrains, resilience, and adaptation and vulnerability in all its forms, um, constraints, resilience, and adaptation.

Um, you know, so if you just think of. You know what happened when hurricane Ida come, you know, came through coastal Louisiana, again, another, you know, large, uh, coastal storm that rapidly intensified as it approached the land. Um, and again, we see right communities that are, um, you know, that are flooded our communities that struggle in so many different ways.

And again, the same thing as it has been true of the pandemic, that if you think about the impacts on households, you know, that, um, have frontline workers that can’t work from home or lost their jobs or. You know, cannot take off, you know, time to get their vaccine. Um, you know, these are the households that have been, um, or those that suffer from significant health, um, impacts of long run poverty and, uh, you know, differential treatment, according to race and the healthcare system and so on.

So it’s sort of both, both of these crises highlight for us that sense that. You know, we’re not doing as much as we could, you know, in a wealthy society, uh, you know, to, to help those households that are most vulnerable. Um, so that’s one, one thought that comes to mind. I think a second one is that, you know, it reminds us both of these crises.

Remind us just how hard, um, what we would call collective action problems are right. We have sort of another, a second set of depressing lessons in. You know, second set, meaning with the pandemic, right? The climate crisis we’ve been struggling with for many decades. Um, and we need to reduce emissions or sequester emissions, right?

And when, uh, households and firms and cities and states and countries do that, they get some benefits from that activity, but they bear all the costs. And similarly, you know, in the pandemic, we need to reduce transmission. Um, and so we can take steps to. Sheltering in place essentially, or masking, you know, as a family or, um, in schools or in the workplace getting vaccines.

And we can take those measures and we get some of the benefits from those measures, but we bear all of the costs. And in both cases, you know, we see people and community. States and countries that are reluctant, um, you know, to bear those costs, um, in a, in a world in which it’s possible to just, you know, do nothing right.

Sort of free ride on the actions of others. And so, you know, seeing these differing propensities for altruism and public mindedness, it just reminds us that, you know, It’s, these are both really difficult situations that incentives matter, um, that we have to make it as easy as possible to, to do the right thing and still, you know, we don’t get necessarily as far as we had hoped.

So I think those are two kind of important, important parallels. And I guess the last thing I would say to answer your first question is. You know, we’ve seen of course, with the reduction, a big reduction in economic activity around the world related to the world, shutting down, you know, starting in around March of 20, 20, starting in Asia.

Well before that, but, uh, the rest of the world following pretty, pretty closely in early 20, 20. Really big drops in greenhouse gas emissions, and those were detectable. And there’s a lot of reporting about that. You know, you think about the scale of that aircraft are grounded. No, one’s commuting to work by car.

Um, you know, all kinds of energy consumption was falling at the time. And so that drop that we saw in greenhouse gas emissions, those emissions. Changing the global climate. Um, in 2020, it was a drop of about 10% year on year. And that’s the largest annual drop we’ve seen since world war II. So I mean, it, it was bigger than the great recession, which dropped emissions by about 6% and lower for the first time, since 1990, then 1990 emissions.

So that was a big drop. Um, so we’ve learned how much. Impact, you know, our economic activity, you just are in regular economic activity has on emissions, but all these changes were temporary. Um, and so some, I think, uh, you know, are using this as a political opportunity to say, Hey, look, you know, Sort of pushing an anti-climate change policy agendas, see how poorly the economy fares, when we reduce emissions dramatically.

And it’s not a very fair comparisons, a bit of a red herring, right? It’s very costly obviously to reduce emissions in that way, right. By shutting everything down. But the policy prescriptions for doing this cost-effective. Are not emphatically shut everything down. And so that’s, I think an important point to realize too, is that there are many less costly ways of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

And so we might take as a lesson, the drop in emissions as an important point. Um, but not, you know, obviously the economic disruption that it caused as, um, necessarily, you know, what we would see with a serious climate change. Is there Sheila, a direct relationship between, um, the spread of the pandemic and climate issues.

Can, can we see something that, it’s a great, it’s a great question. There are a few direct connections. Um, so the first one I would note would be, there are some common links at the root of the two phenomena. So one of the, you know, big sources of emissions, especially in the past couple of years, You know, is deforestation, especially deforestation by burning, um, you know, of, of forests in the tropics and, um, and elsewhere as well.

We see that with wildfires in north America and so on as well. And deforestation causes the movement of animals like bats, right? In the case of coronavirus to places where they’re more likely to come into contact with people. And so one cannot draw a direct line between right, the emergence of COVID-19 as a human.

Does he he’s right as a, as a deadly human disease and climate change per se. But, you know, you can say, look, there’s this tendency for this, you know, kind of zoonotic spillover to happen where we, you know, we have deforestation and deforestation is also a really important climate change drivers. So, you know, there are other common links too, but I think it’s important to think about those.

And then I think the second thing I would say is that we definitely also know that. Poor air quality increases the risk that individuals that are exposed to COVID will die from COVID-19. And so it’s similar to the effects of smoking, you know, an additional stressor on people’s lungs and the evidence that’s racking up for this is from China and from, uh, various parts in the United States.

And it’s pretty convincing. And so, again, right. You know, you can think about. The fact that we have to live with climate change and we have to live with global pandemics. And if we expect that to be true in both cases going forward, um, then many of the things that we would, we would redo to, you know, reduce emissions, um, you know, that are correlated with those greenhouse gas emissions, like, um, particulate matter emissions and others.

Um, would also, um, improve people’s health outcomes, right. Uh, with, or without the pandemic. So there are several important links, um, and it’s a really good idea for us to be mindful of those. So looking at something like the vaccine, uh, during a pandemic, uh it’s I think in many ways shows, uh, the role that technology.

Can play in responding to these big collective action issues. Uh, what do you think, uh, that experience during the pandemic tells us about the role of technology in our solutions to climate change or attempts to solve climate change? Yeah, that’s a great question. So what I would say is, um, You know, when you think about what the world did and, you know, just as an example, um, you know, th the sort of us government support for rapid development of vaccines, but even, even without that, right there certainly were, um, I think the Pfizer and Madrona, you guys can correct me if I’m wrong, but I don’t believe that those were, um, supported by the.

You know, by the operation, I’m forgetting the name. Warp speed. Yes. Thank you. Operation speed. It was a mix, right? Some of, some of the vaccines that were developed in the U S were supported by the us government and others were not. And that’s what we see, you know, with respect to climate technologies as well, technologies that will help, um, this kind of transition that we’re experiencing to cleaner energy, which is necessary to stop the, you know, the rapid warming of the planet, or at least to slow the rapid warming of the planet.

You know, people have asked, well, you know, if we can do that so quickly and, and turn on a dime, right. And, um, you know, create these amazing inventions, the vaccines that have saved so many lives, you know, couldn’t, we do that. Um, also for the climate crisis. I mean, obviously there are lots and lots of us research dollars and research dollars.

Governments around the world that have gone into, you know, technologies like solar and wind energy and, um, you know, lots of other technologies that are helping with the energy transition, but nothing near the kind of scale, you know, in the short run. Right. Sort of treating the. Situation as a crisis as what we saw with the, with the vaccines.

And I think it’s a great reminder that the, you know, the power of governments to make those huge investments, right. That no single private firm could, could hope to make, especially in the short run. Um, they can be very powerful and they can work out quite well. Um, do you also see a connection between the anti-science rhetoric surrounding vaccine and a lot of the, uh, sort of very ignorant reactions we’ve seen in the past few decades to, to climate change?

I do. I think you see some of the same individuals, especially in the political sphere, right? Espousing, both right. Skepticism of, you know, hard science that’s coming either from academic institutions or from scientists within the government. That’s especially distressing to see, um, you know, the, you know, politicians and, um, and even the, the executive.

Directly attacking, you know, science from its own employees, um, on a regular basis. I think that’s been hard to watch and it’s been hard to see, um, you know, some of the brain drain that we’ve seen in some of the agencies on, uh, you know, that have, have worried about climate, but, you know, honestly we see some of that same debate and discussion, you know, between the FDA and the CDC.

Right. And the. Um, over, you know, issues having to do with the pandemic. There’s a real strain, you know, I think maybe Jeremy is the better expert on this. Probably, always historically has been some of this in the United States, but it’s really grown, um, you know, and been, um, pretty destructive in the past several years, this tendency of people to be skeptical of science and skeptical of, um, You know, scientific expertise and it, and it slows us down, right.

It slows us down and getting vaccines into arms. It slows us down and doing something about, you know, uh, the, the greenhouse gas emissions that are changing the climate. Um, you know, eventually. Often the U S does the right thing, but, you know, it’s just that, that, you know, whether, you know, what the cost will be of, um, of slower being slower to action, um, due in part to this skepticism of the science, it’s, it’s hard to.

Well, and it’s hard to avoid it. I think Sheila, the, the, the obvious conclusion that people have died because of our slow reaction or a mixed reaction, both on the climate and particularly on the pandemic issue, right? Yes. I think that’s fair to say. I think with climate, you know, The best links in terms of kind of most well-established empirical links in the literature are between, um, you know, increasing heat and this, you know, increasing frequency and intensity of heat waves and human mortality and morbidity, as well as, you know, things like coastal storms.

It’s a little harder to say in those cases, because in the case of storms, there are pretty infrequent events. And so the best we can do is, um, what scientists would call attribution science that tells us, you know, how much more likely it is that we would have. Uh, hurricane Harvey or hurricane Ida than it might’ve been, um, without anthropogenically induced climate change.

And those numbers look awfully convincing to me. But again, you know, we can’t make that direct link and say, right, this storm is, you know, happened because the climate is changing. Right. Um, but in, but for sure, right. Kind of given what we know. To the extent that we can attribute some of that increased intensity and frequency and the kind of rapidity with which, which the storms increase in strength before they meet, um, houses and buildings, um, to climate change that has been responsible, you know, for, um, you know, some pretty significant, um, human.

I mean the Texas winter storm is another classic example of that. Right. That’s just what I was thinking of a, all of those who died around the state of Texas because they lost. Right. And that there, again, sort of similar to the pandemic in the sense that it’s not just right. It’s not just that people froze to death in their homes.

Right. But, or died from carbon monoxide exposure. But that they couldn’t get to the hospital. Right. Similarly with the pandemic, right. We have, you know, long waits to get an ICU bed. So it’s, you know, it’s not just COVID that kills people. It’s the, um, you know, the lack of access to rapid and high quality medical care.

So I think that’s a good point to transition Sheila. You’re, you’re so closely in touch with the policy community, both those in government and, and many of those outside of government, how has the pandemic changed the way policy experts and policy makers think. Some of these issues. You know, if I were to say one thing, I got to say, it’s a little bit of a downer and you know, me, I’m an optimist.

So I don’t like to focus on the negative, but I think. The pandemic has further polarized the political setting in the us kind of federal, right. Um, you know, in the Congress for sure. Um, and possibly, you know, in other settings as well. And so at a moment when, you know, at the beginning of the Biden administration, there were some pretty ambitious targets on the table for reducing us greenhouse gas emissions and doing something serious about the climate.

We were also at a moment where it’s extraordinarily difficult, um, to get any of that done. And I think we’re seeing that, um, with respect to the infrastructure bill that the Congress is currently considering and recognizing that may be the climate pieces of that bill are among the most vulnerable pieces.

Um, right. If we’re to get to some agreement in which that passes through, um, it may be, you know, without some of its major climate provisions and that would really be difficult to accept because it is the main. The sort of centerpiece of right. Of the current Biden administration approach. I know they’ve got some other things up their sleeve and right.

Things can change and, um, and so on, but with an election coming up in 2022, um, you know, if the prospects for this spill don’t start looking better, um, you know, you have to wonder how much con. Territory. They’re going to cover on climate change in this first term. And why do you think this has become more politicized?

Is it simply because there is a, a set of political actors, particularly from one party who have tried to politicize these issues or are there other factors as well as their uncertainty about some of the things we thought we knew that, that, that is affected this debate. That if anything, on the second point, right.

What we know and what even, you know, quite conservative politicians are willing to accept in terms of the basic science. I actually sense a subtle shift in that. And, and I, from what I am reading, um, I think people are actually more willing to talk about climate change and the fact that some of the, many of the phenomenon that we’re experiencing, um, you know, are linked to it.

Even, you know, folks from, um, you know, heavy fossil fuel producing states. I’m not sure about the Texas delegation, but I do know for example, that Senator Joe mansion, right, when you’re kind of reading what he’s saying, it no longer seems to be about, um, just outright denial, but they’re right. There is a sense that people.

You know, they, they’re extraordinarily cognizant of the costs of serious climate policy and not really clear on the benefits. Um, and they’re also highly aware of the distribution of those, you know, somewhat lopsided costs and benefits in which states are going to lose and, and which states stand to gain from serious climate policy.

And so, um, that’s, I think where we are, and I think the other piece of it is, you know, an unwillingness to. Kind of hand the democratic administration of victory of any kind. Right? So there’s some, even though there may be a better understanding, better agreement on, you know, on the basic science and what the concerns are.

I think for those two reasons, we’re just not seeing the progress that we need to see. And, and what’s your sense about public opinion in general? It seems to me, uh, but I’m not an expert. It seems to me that public opinion is every year more and more concerned about climate change and more committed in one way or another to address any issue.

Obviously the devil’s in the details, but is that a, is that a fair reading of where you think the public that’s a fair reading again? I think we’re probably reading some of the same things. I mean, I see that too, and it certainly has been noted in the literature kind of, you know, academic research has suggested polling, right?

Th that I think it’s one of several important examples of, you know, the failure of the U S political system to deliver on, you know, issues that are, seem to be increasingly important to the people that the system governs. And it’s hard to say why that is again, I’m sure you’ve had lots of conversations on this show about.

Gerrymandering and right. The, you know, all kinds of reasons why the, um, you know, elected officials aren’t necessarily catering to their median voter anymore. Right. Um, but I just, I think we gotta put this right now, right on, um, in the ledger of, of issues that, um, You know, whether the action has not, um, necessarily it doesn’t agree very well with, I think where people see right, it would fall under that category.

I think that, that we’ve talked about quite a bit on, on the podcast, which is the failure of democracy in a particular area where it can be fixed. This is not a, an inevitable failure of democracy, but it does seem in the institutional matrix that we’re in now that this is where we. I think that’s right.

And I don’t think you can lay it at the feet. I don’t want people to come away from the conversation with this impression that I think we can lay this entirely at the feet of Republican politicians. I think democratic politicians have also been kind of loathed to give in on some favorite, um, sort of favorite items that aren’t necessarily gonna work for finding areas of compromise.

So I’ll give you an example. Comprehensive carbon pricing is not really something that’s been seriously considered, even though right at the beginning of the administration, there might’ve been some appetite for that among, um, you know, among some of the conservative, especially those sort of the, the Republicans who have signed on to, you know, the climate groups within the Congress and so on.

Um, I think we’re, unfortunately, as we approach 20, 22 now, you know, when that gets closer, it gets harder to do things that might have been accomplished. Um, you know, in the first, you know, year or two, um, But I, I do worry right. That, um, that Democrats, you know, kind of hanging onto their favorite policies and not necessarily kind of moving towards something that might be more of a compromise have contributed to the problem as well.

Sure. That’s the paradox of polarization that both sides end up. Playing the game they’re criticizing. That doesn’t mean they’re playing it equally, by the way. There’s, there’s an asymmetry, certainly, but nonetheless, I think your point is so well taken. So, so Sheila, where do we go from here? What, what do, um, experts like yourself who also have a very strong, uh, dark in the game, right?

Who really, really want to see certain solutions pursued? Where do we go from here? How, how can we see this history that we’ve discussed contributing to some progress in the. I think there are a couple of areas that, that one could focus on. I mean, one is, you know, spending serious money to address this first issue that we talked about, which is, Hey, there are a lot of households and firms and, you know, buildings and so on in the United States that are really vulnerable.

To, you know, not just coastal storms, but inevitably inundation, right? Permanent flooding and, you know, heat waves and these other things that, you know, fires things that we’re seeing like that. And I think, you know, states and the federal government are probably going to make a lot more progress talking about how we can help with adaptation and resilience.

Um, you know, because for better or for worse, that means, you know, spending a lot of money and benefiting communities that are struggling then. The, you know, in reducing emissions, I think that’s just a harder conversation. And I think the country kind of politically, especially on the conservative side, might be more ready to talk about, Hey, you know, what do we do, uh, you know, for relief and what do we do to, um, you know, help bolster these communities that are so vulnerable then.

Um, than they are about reducing emissions. So that’s one area where I think we could see some progress. Um, and the other is something that you and I have talked about before. I think we did a, I did a short talk to some diplomats in training for group that you were working with here in Austin. And that is recognizing that there are certain things we can do.

That do reduce emissions that also improve health and welfare of local populations. You know, things like reducing, you know, other particulate matter emissions and other emissions that are directly causing, you know, asthma and premature mortality and so on in the communities, um, where these emissions occur and a lot of the things that firms and others would do to reduce those emissions are also things that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions, not all of them by any means, but.

Moving more rapidly from coal to gas or coal to renewables and electricity generation is a good example of that. So I think maybe focusing on those local benefits, which are just, I mean, writing from that collective action perspective, just easier to, um, you know, to, to talk about and easier to get people behind doing something about, um, that could be really helpful.

Um, so those are my two thoughts. And I remember that talk, which was a wonderful talk you gave, and the diplomats, I think, took a lot away from it. Uh, they were struck though that, that you didn’t emphasize things like the big international agreements. Yeah. I think I, you know, it’s, this is not to say, I think that that process run through the UN framework convention on climate change has been incredibly valuable for many, many reasons.

But when I think about. Whether that process moving forward and achieving its, you know, it’s many different goals has been helpful to the U S conversation on climate change policy. I’m not so sure about that. And again, in the current political climate was skepticism about global engagement generally.

Right? Um, I think it can be, you know, it’s, it’s not as powerful as it has been in, in many other countries. That makes sense. Um, final questions, Sheila. Um, do you, do you have optimism and what, what makes you most optimistic? I’m optimistic that we’ll do something to avoid some of the most serious implications of climate change.

I just think again with this movement of public opinion and so on that we can’t be stuck in this trap of right. Uh, you know, a frozen political apparatus forever, and that this will be one of the many issues that helps us bust through that. Um, you know, Constraint, you know, what makes me optimistic again?

I just, you know, teaching our students, right? Young people are impatient. They are tired of the mess that we’ve made of this world. Right. And I just don’t see that that is sustainable for any, you know, reasonable period of time. Their revolutionary is right. Our, um, young people are in my classes and so on.

So I feel optimistic that the pressure for change will just get greater and greater. Um, you know, and I feel sad that we’ve left it to. You know, future generations to solve the problem, but that is what we’ve done. Um, and so, and, but I think they’re up to it. I do. That’s the optimistic part is I think they’re up to it.

Uh, you’ve articulated so well, one of our key themes weekend and week out, which is how change comes with generational change as well as policy changes. Zachary, does that resonate with you? Do you share Sheila’s optimism about your generation? Are you, are you going to correct the mistakes those before you, you know, I, I just think that.

The, this climate science has been so embedded, um, at least into, into, into everyday classroom interactions. Um, and, and the learning of young people like myself, that, that I really do think that we’re, we’re going to be the generation that, that, that makes a difference. Uh, and, and, and, and I hope, I hope.

Because it needs to happen to, well, Zachary and I have been talking about this. I hope our listeners, especially after our discussion of the German elections, a couple of weeks ago, I’ve been paying attention. Not only following Sheila’s discussion, have young people, uh, made a difference in, in Germany already in a stronger green party.

They also are pushing for reducing the voting age to 16. Oh, this might be one of those issues where that would really help. Right. Sheila, I think that it would, I think that it would, I don’t think that’s going to happen in the United States, Jeremy, but I know. No, not at, not, not immediately, but, but, uh, who would have thought in 1959 that we’d lower the voting age to 18, right?

That’s true. That’s the next one? That’s true, Sheila, thank you so much for sharing your insights with us. Uh, and, and also giving us some optimism, uh, really wonderful talking to you. Thank you. It was fun. Thanks for having me on and Zachary, thank you for your poem and your insights as always. And thank you most of all, to our listeners for joining this episode of this is democracy.

This podcast is produced by the liberal arts its development and the college of liberal arts at the university of Texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Harris Codini. stay tuned for a new episode every week. You can find this is democracy on apple podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher.

See you next time.