This is Democracy: Episode 166 – NATO Alliance

This is Democracy – Episode 166
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[00:00:00] This is democracy, a podcast about the people of the United States. a podcast about citizenship. about engaging with politics and the world around you. A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues and how to have a voice in what happens next.

[00:00:28] Jeremi: Welcome to our new episode of this is democracy. This week, we’re going to discuss the transatlantic Alliance and in particular NATO, the north Atlantic treaty organization, an organization that I think historians agree is one of the most, if not the most successful Alliance in the history of the world. And today we’re going to discuss why this Alliance exists.

[00:00:49] Jeremi: And, uh, what role it’s played and how we should think about the future of this Alliance, if it has a future and its relationship to democratic relations across societies and alliances, uh, on both sides of the Atlantic ocean, a very important issue for politics and international diplomacy. We’re joined by two friends and scholars and teachers who have, uh, written some of the most important work on NATO.

[00:01:12] Jeremi: Uh, two people who have taught me much of what I know about this Alliance. Uh, Joshua Schiffer. And, uh, James goldgeier. Hello gentlemen. Hello. Uh, Josh is an associate professor of international relations in the Frederick S Pardee school of global studies at Boston university. Uh, his first book, which is a wonderful book with a bright yellow cover.

[00:01:35] Jeremi: I can see it on my bookshelf now, and he’s always stands out on your bookshelf because of the bright yellow color and the brilliance of what’s inside of it. Rising tightens, falling giants, how great power is exciting. Power shifts. So really thoughtful explanation of how countries big countries deal with shifts in international power.

[00:01:53] Jeremi: It related to this. Josh has written numerous articles, particularly on NATO, on the durability of NATO on its expansion, uh, at the end of the cold war and various related issues. James goldgeier is a professor of international relations and the former Dean of the school of international service at American university.

[00:02:12] Jeremi: And he survived as Dean ship and remained an active scholar. No one has ever done that before Jim you’re the only one who’s managed that he’s also the Robert Bosch senior visiting fellow at the center for the United States in Europe, at the Brookings Institute. And he serves as chair of a committee that I have great reverence for the state department historical advisory committee, which helps us to get documents that we as historians can use for our research.

[00:02:37] Jeremi: Jim has written numerous. Uh, I think still the best book on the period, um, from the end of the cold war to nine 11 America, between the wars that he co-wrote, uh, with Derek, Sholay also power and purpose U S policy toward Russia after the cold war that he co-wrote with a now former Russian ambassador, Michael McFaul.

[00:02:56] Jeremi: And particularly for our subject today, Jim wrote the first and I still think the best book on NATO expansion, not whether, but when the U S decision to enlarge NATO. So we have, uh, two scholars and public intellectuals who clearly know more about this topic than anyone else. And a lot to share with us before we turn to our conversation with Josh and Jim, we have of course, Mr.

[00:03:18] Jeremi: Zachary series’ poem. Uh, what’s the title of your poem Zachary? transatlantic elegy. Transatlantic Elegy. Okay. Let’s hear it.

[00:03:28] Zachary: Out of the dust. Can you see it now over there, the giant sits alone. A figure in a rod iron chair, arisen from the hole he himself has piled up. The giant looks around once your wine inside his cup.

[00:03:43] Zachary: It is a lonely habit. Overlooking all your friends. It is indeed a lonely hour when they retreat into their day. But you giant over there, you behemoth in your gold plated layer. You have not been forgotten. Only tastefully ignored. They remember all your blessings and they remember how you snored. It is a solitary sport.

[00:04:05] Zachary: This gallivanting hopefulness, the smile, the embrace or recognition of your soul. You sit as if in the impression of a painting on the wall and they stand beside you, your picture frame relating recall, we believed you were arisen in Kabul before the fall.

[00:04:22] Jeremi: Hmm. Interesting. Wow.

[00:04:30] Jeremi: This, this, this is why we have the podcast. We have Zachary’s poetry to

[00:04:34] Joshua: open up

[00:04:34] James: our eyes, never written a NATO. Zack.

[00:04:38] Joshua: I heard it was called transatlantic elegy. Does this mean you’ll be running for the nomination in Ohio? No, no, no. JD Vance’s here from

[00:04:51] Jeremi: Zachary. Clearly. Your poem had impact already. What, what is your poem about?

[00:04:55] Zachary: My poem is really about, uh, the ironic position the United States finds itself in as the former center of the transatlantic Alliance. That was in many ways the strongest Alliance of the late 20th century. But now. Uh, as, as someone, as someone who’s seeking to reclaim that, but at the same time, trying to, trying to make decisions like pulling out from Afghanistan without really consulting our allies in the ways that we have in the past.

[00:05:20] James: Right.

[00:05:21] Jeremi: Or at least inspired. Right. And we’ll come back to that. Uh, of course, but, but I think, uh, I think your poem also implies that there was a golden. There was something there, right. It’s an Elegy to some. So, so maybe Jim, how should we start our history of NATO? What is NATO about, why was it founded and what did it do well in its time?

[00:05:40] James: Well, I think we start with Zachary’s poem and bringing the giant, giant out of the layer. I, you know, this was the, I think it’s really important to remember that. This Alliance formed in 1949 among the United States, Canada and 10 European countries. Uh, that then added four more, uh, European countries, uh, during the cold war and then expanded with 14 more.

[00:06:08] James: After the end of the cold war, it was a big deal to form this Alliance in 1949, because it really went against the. The ideas of the founding of this country, George Washington’s admonition against permanent alliances. Thomas Jefferson’s, uh, Uh, argument against entangling alliances that, you know, we got involved in the Alliance, the grand Alliance in world war II because, uh, the world was at stake.

[00:06:38] James: But the idea was that when that was over, that would, that would be that, um, you know, who thought we would be forming some kind of permanent Alliance, uh, with Canada and our European allies. And there we were in 1949. Forming NATO. Uh, and of course, other alliances as well during the cold war. So, uh, but the Soviet threat was deemed to be so sufficiently.

[00:07:04] James: Uh, dangerous, uh, to the United States and its partners that the United States did go about forming, uh, these alliances only a few years after it had been allied with the Soviet union and the United Kingdom in the grand Alliance of world war II. So, so it really is hugely important that it was established and that here we are in 2021, uh, and, uh, Zachary’s, uh, poem, uh, Has, uh, pointed out that, you know, there are some cracks in the, in the thing, but, uh, it’s, you know, it’s still standing all these years later.

[00:07:39] Jeremi: It’s amazing. And you’re certainly right, Jim, uh, as a historian, I always remind my students that, uh, the United States, after the revolution, when we had an Alliance with the French, we never formed another lions again, until world war. I mean, so our tradition, as you said, was not to have alliances, uh, like this, uh, Josh it’s often said, and the quote is apocryphal from Lord Ismay, as far as we can tell, but it’s often, uh, taken as a, as an apocryphal statement that NATO was created to keep the U S in the Soviets out.

[00:08:10] Jeremi: And the Germans down is that accurate.

[00:08:13] Joshua: I think that is highly accurate and it gets a duality in NATO’s founding purpose. And I think Jim alluded to this. But it’s worth putting a point on it. You know, we, we think of NATO retrospectively as this exercise in using American power to deter the Soviet threat, to keep kind of the red army and the Soviet union’s political influence, uh, in check.

[00:08:36] Joshua: But of course founded in 1949, the states of Western Europe and Canada, aren’t only even primarily even worried about the Soviet union. There’s this country called. That sits in the heart of Europe. Now, of course, Germany in 1949, wasn’t a sovereign actor and it was divided between the victims of the second world war in Europe.

[00:08:56] Joshua: But there is a real fear about the resurgence of German power, akin to what we saw after the first world war. And this worry that the Germans would run a muck again, if not. So Lauren is May’s apocryphal statement, keeping the Americans and the Germans down the Soviets out really gets at the idea. The Americans were going to project power into the heart of Europe and try to manage European security affairs to on the one hand, check the Soviets, but also check the Germans.

[00:09:24] Joshua: And so American power was to focus in. Very dual hatted

[00:09:27] Jeremi: fashion. And, and how did this actually work in practice? Jim? You’ve written a lot about this. Uh, NATO was actually a relatively consultative structure and still is right. It wasn’t just the United States getting its way all the time. Correct.

[00:09:42] James: Well, yeah, a little bit of both.

[00:09:44] James: I mean, the United States clearly has been the dominant actor within NATO. Um, and, uh, but it is an organization that does op operate by consensus. Uh, you know, nobody has a, has a veto within NATO and, uh, it, it’s interesting. I have a former PhD student from American university. Bilash Martin fie who wrote a great dissertation on NATO.

[00:10:10] James: Decision-makers. Uh, in, uh, uh, in the middle of the cold war period. And he used, uh, archival materials from NATO and showed that actually there were lots of times, lots of conversations within NATO when, uh, smaller countries were able to push back successfully against the U S position. So, um, especially at the end of the cold war, and soon after we tend to think of the United States, uh, is this truly.

[00:10:38] James: Power within NATO and it provided so much of the wherewithal for NATO to be able to deter the Soviet union that, um, it definitely has. Uh, pretty overwhelming voice, but, but it, it does have to consult and, uh, you know, it does have to work with its allies within the institution.

[00:10:56] Jeremi: And Jim, just following on that really interesting point and thanks for mentioning that dissertation.

[00:11:01] Jeremi: I haven’t read it. I need to read it myself. Um, would you say that NATO spread or encouraged democracy?

[00:11:12] James: Uh, I think that’s really more of a post cold war phenomenon. Um, when we look at the establishment of NATO, I mean, we think about it as this, uh, Alliance of democracies. Uh, but you know, there were countries during the cold war.

[00:11:29] James: Uh, Portugal, initially Greece, Turkey, Greece, and Turkey come into the Alliance in 1952. Um, and both in the 1960s, uh, go through challenging periods. Um, it is the case that Spain doesn’t come in until 1982 post post Franco. But the, I mean, the emphasis during the cold war really was strategic. Uh, and. But it’s in the, it’s in the aftermath of the end of the cold war and the effort to think about NATO as a more political institution and trying to figure out what to do about central and Eastern Europe and how one could help encourage democracy and, and respect for human rights and rule of law.

[00:12:12] James: It’s really in the aftermath of the end of the cold war, that NATO becomes more geared toward. Trying to help develop democracy in these, these potential new members. Whereas I think during the cold war, it was really much more focused on its strategic purpose

[00:12:32] Jeremi: and Josh on this point of the strategic purpose, which I think Jim is obviously correct about was at the core of NATO.

[00:12:39] Jeremi: Would you say before we talk about the, the end of the cold war during the cold war, did NATO. Succeed in containing a Soviet aggression. And did it succeed in, as you discussed before bringing Germany into the Western Alliance in a way that was comfortable and effective for the countries of Europe and for the United States?

[00:13:00] Jeremi: Oh,

[00:13:01] Joshua: I, I think beyond the shadow of a doubt, uh, by which I mean there wasn’t a world war three in the Soviet empire did not expand in Europe, beyond it’s late, it’s late 1940s borders. That, that that’s a pretty big success in at least overtly stopping the Soviet threat. Now with the turn to you obviously never know if the other side actually intended to act, but it just, in the surface of it, there was no further Soviet expansion.

[00:13:26] Joshua: So that’s a way. Germany side of the equation. You know, one thing we only loosely talked about, but I think speaks to this, to this issue that you’ve raised Jeremy, is that the initial American plan was to integrate Germany. So thoroughly into the. European order of the Western European order. If you want to use that term that the Americans could eventually withdraw, right?

[00:13:49] Joshua: The plan was for eventually Western Europe to stand on its own two legs against the Soviets and the Americans could move more off shore ju judged against that very high standard. NATO during the cold war, didn’t quite meet its goal. As mark track number has written quite elegantly on how this problem came about how these tensions lingered, but in terms of making Germany acceptable to other countries and making France and Britain, Belgium, Holland, so on and so forth, comfortable with Germany, NATO managed to succeed in that mission.

[00:14:22] Joshua: And American influence was critical to that.

[00:14:26] James: So, so I often hear NATO spoken of sort of, as almost analogous to, to the Warsaw pact, but not obviously, uh, there was much more of a back and forth between between the countries. How much did internal relations between NATO members shape needle policy during the cold war?

[00:14:46] Jeremi: Jim?

[00:14:47] James: Yeah, I mean, I, it’s not comparable to the worst Outback. I mean the Warsaw pact, I mean the Soviet union dominated Eastern Europe. I mean, those, those countries are really. You know, properly known as client states, um, and, uh, you know, the Soviet union, um, in most cases installed the leadership, uh, uh, of those countries and, and controlled those leaders.

[00:15:10] James: Although there were some exceptions and especially as, as time went on, I mean, the United States did have to work. With its allies and it had some, it had some difficult allies. Uh, Tim sale’s written a great history of NATO called enduring Alliance. And, you know, I was fascinated when I read it. The sections on, uh, you know, French president, Charles de Gaulle, uh, I mean his, I mean, it was just exasperating, uh, for American presidents.

[00:15:40] James: Um, I mean, a lot of the, sort of the ways in which the goal was threatening. Uh, to walk out, uh, you know, sort of echo the way Donald Trump would, uh, are threatening to walk out. But of course, it’s, it’s a big deal for the United States to walk away from NATO, France walked away from the integrated military command and it’s France, not the United States.

[00:16:01] James: So it wasn’t the end of the Alliance. And, uh, you know, of course it’s, it’s since come back, uh, in recent years, but, uh, You know, there, there there’s certainly, you know, there were some, some interesting personalities and there were some, um, some issues that had to be managed, uh, during the course of the. Uh, of NATO’s existence and, you know, there’s, the old joke is sort of that natives always in crisis.

[00:16:29] James: Every time we talk about NATO and crisis, it’s like, yeah, you know, we’ve seen this movie before, uh, uh, because there’s always some issue that’s dividing the.

[00:16:38] Jeremi: Right, right. And yet they managed to stay together that that’s, uh, that’s a perfect segue to, uh, to, to Josh and your work on NATO expansion. And of course Jim’s written about this as well.

[00:16:49] Jeremi: So we’ll get both of you in on this. What happened at the end of the cold war? If extensibly the most. Obvious reason for NATO to exist was the Soviet threat. When the Soviet union no longer existed after December 25th, 1991. Why did NATO not only continue to exist, but actually expand into places like Poland?

[00:17:12] Jeremi: And the Czech Republic, places that have been part of the Warsaw pack that Jim has just discussed. Josh, give us, give us your understanding of expansion.

[00:17:21] Joshua: Sure. I’m happy to well, so, so first of all, we have to remember that at the end of the cold war, there were any number of plans, the number of calls to.

[00:17:30] Joshua: Both of the cold war airlines is the worst whole pack obviously fell apart. And there were calls in some quarters for NATO to close up shop and to be replaced with either a new European security organization to anchor European security on the European union than the Europe, than the European community, but slowly coming together, the conference on security, cooperation, and Europe.

[00:17:50] Joshua: So the war, all of these calls to abandon ship or change course. Um, but when the cold war ended and if the cold war ended above all with Germany’s unification with east Germany, melding into west Germany, the Lord is may statement of keeping the Germans and the Soviets out. You know, the Soviets were gone.

[00:18:10] Joshua: But keeping the Germans in check remained a real concern. Number one and German leader, a helmet cold at the time was very much aware of European concerns with your new found German power. As there was a lingering desire to keep the American, the American team engaged in your handle a lot. And at the same time, The states that were formerly in the Warsaw pact, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, so on and so forth.

[00:18:36] Joshua: You know, they’ve just lived on the communist. Jackboot for 45 years. They’re deeply concerned with the Soviet union coming back. And it’s not irrational at the time, right? Russia is going through any number of internal turmoils in 1993, of course, or is Yeltsin then Russian president fires on the parliament.

[00:18:55] Joshua: This is not a stable situation if you’re living in Eastern Europe. So even as NATO was staying alive in Western Europe, there’s a real desire. And the parts of these former Soviet power Warsaw pack states to get the security benefits that. With an Alliance with the United States that generates have a perfect storm of external conditions that mobilize the United States to begin looking east.

[00:19:20] Joshua: And at the same time, as Jim’s written, uh, quite elegantly, president Clinton starting off as in 1993 is really invested in keeping the Americans, keeping the United States involved and in some ways in charge of European security affairs. So pulling it, he is taking you to ease. Uh, also satisfies American strategic concerns,

[00:19:41] Jeremi: but Jim, you, you have written what I still think is the best book on this, not whether, but when, w w why was bill Clinton so committed, or why did he become so committed to NATO?

[00:19:53] James: Well, I think there were both policy and political reasons for him. And I, I think it was just really important to remember that both George H w Bush and bill Clinton were very concerned about isolation, the sentiment in the United States, uh, very concerned that the American public would not support international engagement.

[00:20:12] James: With respect to Europe in particular, you know, the lesson of the, of the 20th century was that they had internalized was when the United States leaves as it did after 19, 19 bad things result, you know, staying after 1945 was, was good for Western Europe. Uh, the fact that war had broken out in Yugoslavia in 1991, led people to believe that that kind of ethnic conflict could break out all over Eastern Europe.

[00:20:39] James: Uh, you know, people talked about ancient hatreds. I mean, you know, people didn’t know that much about Eastern Europe and there was fear that there would just be conflict breaking out all over. So there was a, there was a policy reason for trying to figure out how to, how to ensure security and stability.

[00:20:55] James: There was the notion that the United States had done something good for Western Europe, with NATO after world war two, that as Clinton would later put it, it was time to do for Europe’s east, what we had done for Europe’s west. But then there was also a political calculation, um, was very important in the 1992 campaign for, uh, Tony lake who was advising bill Clinton on foreign policy.

[00:21:20] James: Um, Democrats try to woo back the neo-conservative elites who had left for the Republican party and in 1980 and supported Ronald Reagan and also voters of central and Eastern European descent, sort of Reagan Democrats, particularly Polish Americans, you know, sort of the idea that the Democrats had lost these voters in the 1980s, in the two Reagan election victories, and then the Bush 88 victory.

[00:21:48] James: And George HW Bush was seen as, uh, slow to recognize the change that was taking place across the communist world and, and Tony lake thought that using sort of democracy promotion was a way to woo. These. Neoconservatives and, and also voters of central and Eastern European descent back to the democratic party and, and Clinton, the Clinton team felt they did.

[00:22:15] James: They did that successfully in 92, and they were going to keep those supporters in 1996. And it’s no accident. Then when bill Clinton makes his big announcement about NATO enlargement in October, 1996, it’s no accident that it goes to Hamtramck, Michigan. To speak before a largely Polish American audience.

[00:22:35] James: Um, you know, this, this, this, this, this constituency in the Midwest and Northeast was very important to the Clinton Democrats and, and

[00:22:45] Jeremi: your compelling account. Jim belies, the notion that, uh, domestic politics are, are separate from foreign policy. Clearly they’re integrated even in something that is sometimes a more archaic issue, like foreign alliances.

[00:23:00] James: Yeah. And I just think in this case, you just had, you know, again, especially for somebody like Tony leg, the sort of the political needs and the policy. Uh, desires just meshed together. So well, uh, you know, in political science, we’ve talked about over to over determination of the outcome. I mean, I think, you know, there were just a lot of factors that went into this and, and it also was a reason why.

[00:23:25] James: You could get both democratic and Republican support. And you had people who wanted NATO enlargement because, um, it would help promote democracy in central Eastern Europe. And you had others, uh, particularly, uh, Republicans who looked at NATO enlargement as a way to. To ensure that central and Eastern Europe was protected against Russia in the future.

[00:23:44] James: And so you had lots of people supporting this for, for a number of different reasons.

[00:23:50] Jeremi: Josh, you’ve written quite a bit about, um, how the, the story that Jim is telling ran against, uh, Uh, show a commitment to the United States had made, or at least commitments, the Soviet union and the Russian leadership believed the United States had made not to expand NATO.

[00:24:09] Jeremi: Uh, tell us about that.

[00:24:11] Joshua: So a little bit before the period, Jim just described this. Really 1990, the heyday of the politics behind German unification reunification. There is a question over what it would take to get the Soviets to consent to allowing east Germany, then a Soviet client state to reunify with Western.

[00:24:34] Joshua: Right. And the Americans were really eager to do this rapidly and to do this without causing a crisis in European security affairs. So in February, 1990, uh, then secretary of state Jim baker, along with some other officials, including then deputy national security advisor, Robert Gates flew to Moscow for meetings with the Soviet leadership.

[00:24:56] Joshua: And in the course of these conversations, uh, baker set pledges that if the Soviets consent. Two German reunification that there would be no expansion of NATO’s prisons. One further inch to the east, and this sort of idea that needle expansion would be kept in check these repeated throughout the spring and summer of 1990 in various ways.

[00:25:20] Joshua: Culminating. In the formal reunification of Germany in October of 1990. Now we also know from our KIBO releases that even as this deal was coming together, as these promises were being made, and I should add, this was never codified, right? These are diplomatic assurances of the kind that leaders give to one another very often.

[00:25:40] Joshua: But even as these assurances are being offered behind the scenes, the American other policymakers are realizing. Hey, look, this is an opportunity to kind of consolidate or begin expand the American influence in Europe. And maybe we don’t want to expand NATO right now, but we don’t want to foreclose the option.

[00:25:58] Joshua: Maybe we even want to think through the conditions under which we’ll expand NATO going forward. Despite what we told the Soviets and that conversation really takes off in 19 90, 19 91, 19 92. Even before Clinton comes to office. So to go to the period that Jim was mentioning by the time of Clinton gets into office, there’s already been a lot of discussion and a lot of thinking behind the terms and conditions as to when the U S would consent or allow or push prenatal expansion, I’ve always been struck by, uh, then state department, counselor, Robert Zeluck statement that had Bush been reelected for a second term.

[00:26:38] Joshua: He was convinced. That baker and Bush would have pursued NATO expansion just as clean.

[00:26:44] Jeremi: So is Vladimir Putin though, correct. When he says this was a double cross by the United States, judge,

[00:26:50] Joshua: uh, you, you know, Putin has his own narrative on this one. I would just say that when it comes to world politics and Jim and I have discussed this at length in our own studies of this topic, you know, in international politics, state policy is often determined.

[00:27:04] Joshua: By external factors, right? By balance of power, rail politics, strategic concerns. And in 1990, when the us was seeking to unify Germany, it made lots of sense for the us, the promise, the Soviet union, not to expand NATO, but then once the Soviet union declined further and the Soviet union fell apart, there’s really nothing to keep the United States in check Russia.

[00:27:25] Joshua: Certainly wasn’t the Soviet union. So whereas Putin calls at a double cross as if it’s. Various long-term plan. I would simply say this is world politics deals change all the time. It doesn’t mean we should accept the outcome. It doesn’t mean we should support, uh, the American policy in this position.

[00:27:42] Joshua: Doesn’t mean we shouldn’t have anticipated some blow back, but I think it’s a little harsh to call it a double.

[00:27:48] Jeremi: And Jim, there were efforts that, that, again, you’ve written about by the United States to, to bring this Russia in somehow, right. Not necessarily as a member of NATO, but to make this palatable to them.

[00:27:59] Jeremi: And of course that carry forward. Well beyond the period of expansion, uh, what, what was accomplished, if anything, by those efforts to partnership for peace and things of that.

[00:28:09] James: Yeah. I mean, you know, it’s, it’s, it’s a really fascinating thing. I I’ve been fascinated in and did a piece in the journal of cold war studies in 2020, because I was just interested in this idea that, I mean, bill Clinton was so eager to develop a partnership with Russia was so eager to develop a partnership with Boris Yeltsin saw Russia as a partner, as being really important for his own.

[00:28:36] James: For his own agenda that, you know, he’s, he believed that if, if Russia was no longer an enemy, that that would free up defense dollars to be, you know, used for his domestic, uh, his domestic agenda. And so, you know, you, the obvious question is, well, how is it that the person who’s so responsible for pushing NATO, enlargement is also a person who wanted a great relationship with bars, the Elton, and one of the U S to have a new relationship with Russia.

[00:29:05] James: You know, my conclusion was he convinced himself he could do both. Um, and that, I think that he convinced himself, it was largely a political issue that if he could just keep the process going, but not in a concrete way until after Yeltsin was reelected and in July of 1996, but then make it more concrete before his own reelection in November of 1996.

[00:29:29] James: That, that, that would really. Solve a lot of the problems. I also think from a us standpoint, you know, I mean, Josh mentions the specifics about what was said in 1990, and he’s done more than anybody else to aluminate, uh, sort of those conversations and what they mean. There’s a broader assurance that the United States is giving to the Soviet union.

[00:29:52] James: And then the Russians, which is basically we won’t. Take advantage of your retreat from Europe to undermine your security and the U S officials I, throughout this period, they believe they stuck to that. Their argument would be NATO became more of a political institution. Uh, they reduced weapons in Europe through the CFE treaty, the U S pulled troops out of Germany, um, and that they were doing all these things and then invited Russia.

[00:30:19] James: Uh, to sign the NATO Russia founding act, uh, to try to create a NATO Russia relationship. So, you know, from a us standpoint, the view is, look, you know, we said we wouldn’t undermine your security and, and nothing we did as undermine your security. And meanwhile, the Russians are looking at NATO moving closer and closer, taking up all of these wars ELPAC states in 2004, they take the three Baltic countries in 2008, say that Ukraine and Georgia are going to become members of NATO.

[00:30:48] James: You know, from a Russian standpoint, it looks very different than it does from Washington. And, and I just think those perspectives, uh, really can’t be.

[00:30:59] Joshua: And Jeremy, could I jump in for just half a second? Because I, I think Jim gets at a really important point and I’m glad he made it because there’s a parallel which he’s alluding to between how Clinton viewed the world and how the broader us, uh, foreign policy establishment, the foreign policy makers of the time viewed the world.

[00:31:18] Joshua: You know, Jim described Clinton, not wanting. To choose between expanding NATO and antagonizing the Russians and convince themselves that you could do both in a similar way. What Jim is getting at is that American decision-makers in the 1990s and early aughts convinced themselves that they couldn’t negotiate what Russia saw as its own interests.

[00:31:36] Joshua: They didn’t have to choose between what the us saw as in, as in America’s interest and what we could convince the Russians as to their. And, you know, that’s a fraught situation for generating the types of perspective differences.

[00:31:50] Jeremi: Right? Right. And, and it’s a, it’s a common issue in international politics, uh, as, as the dog is indicating as well.

[00:31:56] Jeremi: Right then different perspectives. Uh, Jim is this, um, difference of viewpoints and interpretation, what we need when we try to understand what happened in Europe. That ended up, of course, with, uh, Russia invading and taking control of Crimea after Ukraine sought to become part of NATO. Is that part of the story?

[00:32:19] James: Well, I think it’s part of the story, but I, you know, there’s no excuse for the fact that, you know, Vladimir Putin, um, invaded Ukraine, the next part of its territories, fostering civil war in the Donbass, um, and, uh, you know, has, has refused to really. Uh, pursue a negotiated solution to that conflict. And.

[00:32:43] James: Yeah, you can understand Russian fears about Western intrusions. Um, but I don’t think that, you know, excuses invading another country. So, uh, but there’s no question. I mean, I think this is one of the interesting features of this, uh, bill burns. Oh, who’s now the CIA director, uh, was ambassador in Moscow in 2007, 2008.

[00:33:08] James: Uh, his book, the back channel is an amazing book. He has posted on the Carnegie endowment website, the back-channel book website, declassified documents, a document. He got declassified including. Cables that he sent home, uh, you know, in the run-up to the 2008 Bucharest summit. And he, he NATO summit and he writes that, you know, Ukraine and Georgia membership in NATO, this was a red line for people in Moscow.

[00:33:40] James: And he says, this isn’t just hardliners or Putin. This is people across the political spectrum. Uh, just feel that this is, this would be very damaging. To uh, to Russian interests and, you know, the Russians see themselves as having a privileged sphere of influence in the former Soviet union. They, they think they should be able to control the affairs there.

[00:34:05] James: They don’t want to see these countries in these other countries, in Western institutions. They don’t really want to even see them as successful democracies, you know, and the United States views these countries as independent countries that, you know, if they want to pursue democracy, if they want to pursue.

[00:34:20] James: Uh, Western orientation. If they want to draw closer to Western institutions, that’s their prerogative and they should be able to do it. So again, you know, you have, you have fundamentally different perspectives and of course, Russia is closer and Russia’s interests are. Uh, you know, much deeper, uh, and you know, they’ve been able to carve out this part of Ukraine, uh, to control, but at the same time, they’ve also antagonized the population of Ukraine, which is now some more supportive of NATO and large, uh, of being part of NATO than they’ve ever been.

[00:34:58] James: So Josh, how does this lead into, uh, the Trump administration’s policy, uh, towards NATO? Where did NATO find itself in 2017 under, under Trump administration?

[00:35:10] Joshua: Right. Well, w w well, it’s a re it’s a really good question. I think we need to remember that throughout the 1990s and two thousands NATO really expanded quite dramatically.

[00:35:18] Joshua: By the time Trump came into office, actually shortly after Trump came into office, Nino took in its 30th. Right. So this is now a very large multilateral organization. And at the same time, the Alliance has kind of taken on any number of tasks, right? This long-term fear of a Russia, at least in the 2000 tens was bad.

[00:35:41] Joshua: Because of Russian machinations in the Ukraine, Germany was largely contained. No one was really deeply worried about Germany at this point in time, but the Alliance has been operating and out of areas, missions, conducting operations over Libya intervening in Bosnia in the 1990s, of course, has the Afghanistan mission.

[00:36:00] Joshua: And there’s a concern which will precedes Mr. Trump, that despite taking on all these new tasks and despite being the focal point of European security affairs, that the European members of the Alliance and Canada have really not been pulling their weight in terms of building military forces that can do the hard security tasks that remain at the core of the Alliance’s different operations.

[00:36:25] Joshua: Uh, but this was a theme in president Obama’s administration, within secretary of defense, Bob gates using his last speech as secretary of defense to really criticize the NATO allies. But of course, Mr. Trump comes into office and makes us a real focal point of his foreign policy of daring. You know, saying that if the allies don’t step up, the U S may go home.

[00:36:47] Joshua: Now this is actually fairly ham-handed because even as he’s saying this, the U S. Is increasing funding for different native initiatives, at least early on. And so it becomes a very incoherent message, but Mr. Trump ends up both exacerbating tensions in the Alliance because he’s cuing the things the Europeans don’t want to hear.

[00:37:07] Joshua: No one wants to be told, spend more or else. At the same time, he’s sending a very different message of, but you know what the U S is still sticking around because we like being in charge is essentially Mr. Trump’s message. So Trump has really a force for chaos inside of NATO at this point in time, even as he’s oscillating rapidly on the Russia issue, oscillating grappling rapidly on whether the U S is leaving Afghanistan.

[00:37:30] Joshua: And so the whole thing is just a mess and historians of the future will have a field day trying to make sense of whether there was any consistency in Mr. Trump’s needles.

[00:37:39] Jeremi: W w we will certainly have our work cut out for us, whether it’ll be a field day or not. I don’t know, but we’ll definitely have our work cut out for us.

[00:37:45] Jeremi: Understanding Trump, Jim, that brings us up to the, to the president right into Afghanistan. Um, what has Afghanistan done to the NATO alone?

[00:37:56] James: Well, I think first we should just know the, you know, remarkable nature of the mission in Afghanistan. Uh, you know, w after September 11th and the attacks from Al-Qaeda, uh, that were formulated from the territory of Afghanistan, uh, by Osama bin Laden, uh, and, and, uh, his colleagues, the.

[00:38:21] James: You know, the United States made the decision, uh, that if the Taliban, um, wouldn’t, uh, wouldn’t offer up Al-Qaeda to the United States that, uh, we would go to war and the decision was made not to include, not to do this as a NATO mission as had been done in 1999 and Kosovo. Uh, and impact in part, because there was a belief that the coast of a mission showed, you know, the United States had to go through all its partners for, you know, getting targets approved and so on.

[00:38:50] James: And the Bush administration didn’t want to be hamstrung by that. And then the Bush admin, you know, even though the, the allies had invoked article five and stood with the United States in the aftermath of September 11th, but then the Bush administration goes and invades Iraq in 2009. And gets bogged down in Iraq and then, oh my gosh, it needs Europe and it’s asks NATO in fact to come and set up an international security assistance force.

[00:39:14] James: And. Reconstruction and stabilization in Cabo. And so you then have this NATO mission and NATO countries and, and non NATO countries, lots of partners. And I, you know, it’s a pretty extraordinary effort, uh, by NATO and, and, and non NATO partners to, uh, try to, uh, you know, establish, um, Some, uh, good governance and security in Afghanistan.

[00:39:42] James: And so the NATO allies become quite invested in it. You know, a lot of times they were made fun of, for the caveats that they had on, on the kind of, uh, military operations they would engage in, but, but they were quite committed to it. And. You know, by this past spring, I mean, they had more troops in Afghanistan than the United States did.

[00:40:01] James: And so they were really, they knew that Joe Biden was committed. I mean, Donald Trump had signed a peace deal with the Taliban. They knew Biden was committed to getting out. Biden had wanted the United States to leave in 2009 when he was vice-president and he lost that argument. So it was pretty clear he was going to do this, but the way it was done.

[00:40:22] James: It was just so troubling and, you know, allies felt that they weren’t consulted and there’ve been a lot of pushback on that. People have said, oh no, they were. And secretary general was, you know, was consulted and brought allies together for this. But, you know, I, I think this, this was done in a way that, um, that the allies really did resent.

[00:40:45] James: Uh, there wasn’t much that they could do about it. Uh, I don’t know if it’ll have any long lasting effects. I mean, partly it depends on how the Biden administration looks at its European allies and how it thinks about them. And I think the big question there is, does it think about them as allies to work together, to solve.

[00:41:05] James: Problems of a general nature, including specific problems related to that region or does it flow? Does it view every ally in terms of what it can do for the United States and its strategic competition with China? And I think that’s the danger for the Alliance is that the United States is so focused on the Indo-Pacific in China, that people, you know, that are really dominant and the administration are those who are driving the policy toward the end of Pacific.

[00:41:33] James: And the allies have sort of become an after. Uh, and I think that could really come back to haunt the United States. Well,

[00:41:41] Jeremi: and, and that really, uh, very, very thoughtfully Jim takes us into where we always like to close, which is bringing all this history that you and Josh have shared with us, uh, to the present and thinking through not how we predict the future, but how we think about possible pathways for the future.

[00:41:59] Jeremi: Um, Josh, let me turn to you. You know, what do you think from this, this history that you know so well, and I’ve shared a bit of with us, what do you think are some lessons going forward? How should we think about the transatlantic Alliance going forward? What should it look like? And what are the possibilities is.

[00:42:16] Joshua: Sure. So, so I’ll echo Jim’s point. First of all, just to say, look, the U S attention issue us attention has, will continue to shift barring anything unforeseen towards the Indo-Pacific region. So, so NATO is getting so Europe in general is going to do what EJA was during the cold war. The secondary importance that.

[00:42:36] Joshua: Uh, but not the focal point of American concern. So NATO in that context is likely to lose important us time and attention is not going to be as devoted to it. And so I expect needed to hang together in some way, but more and more of the U S USAA’s own attention is going to shift elsewhere, which in turn is going to create an opening for.

[00:42:59] Joshua: Voices in Europe, arguing for a greater European pillar within NATO, or simply some kind of your EU based security apparatus to kind of take. Uh, the agenda and run with it. We’ve already seen hints of this, uh, with prison Macerana Francis, uh, calls for a gritty European effort. So we’re going to see those F exercises really step up where that goes.

[00:43:22] Joshua: I don’t really know. I could tell a story that the EU really steps up and the European allies really step up and bear more of the weight as the us withdraw. Turned elsewhere in the world. I could also tell a story that says Nita without the active managerial role of the United States begins to free at the scene.

[00:43:40] Joshua: I likely suspect it’s really going to be more of a slow kind of attrition flooring at the margins, but despite that somewhat negative or cynical answer, I think it’s also important to step back from. Right. This is what I was telling myself. Whenever I had you buy net judgment of how of with less seventy-five years in Europe have been, you know, if you had said to an American policymaker in 1949, Hey, 75 years from now, you’re going to have a Europe that is mostly democratic, where there are no real great power threats where nuclear weapons have not proliferated everywhere.

[00:44:13] Joshua: And most of the countries have settled their outstanding territorial and economic dispute. You know, they would have taken that and run with it. That’s a massive slam dunk. So even if needle falls apart tomorrow, which I don’t think it will, you know, the situation in Europe except for the border regions really is unprecedentedly good from the perspective of many European actors and certainly from the United

[00:44:38] Jeremi: States as well.

[00:44:40] Jeremi: That’s really helpful. Josh, Jim, to come to you. It seems to me that it’s a question of path dependence, right? NATO has been part of this very successful set of developments that Josh describes. Uh, but what do we know about the role it should play going forward.

[00:44:55] James: Well, it’s interesting. You know, when Josh mentioned sort of, if you had told us officials in 1949, here’s what 2021 would look like, uh, you know, how happy they would have been to hear it.

[00:45:08] James: And I think they also would have asked the follow-up, which was, so that means the United States didn’t have to stay in Europe anymore. Right. They would have expected that we would have left that’s right. So, uh, so, you know, but there we are. Uh, and I think. That it’s just it’s. What’s so fascinating. We started with the focal point of Europe and the Soviet union, how NATO was formed, what the thinking was at the end of the cold war in that period, as Josh said, Europe and Russia were the focal point of us foreign policy.

[00:45:43] James: That’s what we, we thought about the most. And that’s no longer true. We’re not. We’re thinking about U S Europe and Russia today. Just as part of our policy toward China, we want Russia Biden, one stable and predictable with Russia so that he could focus on China. He’s looking at Europe, what can you do for me on China?

[00:46:07] James: And I just, you know, NATO is now talking more about China, but it’s not really a great fit for the Alliance. And I think that, you know, the more that China becomes the focus, the more clear it’s going to be, that. That’s not really the. Uh, you know, a purpose for NATO, uh, and you know, we’ll certainly see interactions with allies.

[00:46:31] James: We saw the us and UK working with Australia, uh, on the submarine deal, uh, of course, uh, to the detriment of, of Francis’ own pursuit of a deal with Australia. So I think we may well see more of those types of things going forward, but, uh, you. Uh, there’s still, there’s still a big institution there. And there were a lot of people with a lot at stake in NATO.

[00:46:54] James: So, uh, like Josh, I think it will be around for awhile.

[00:46:59] Jeremi: Zachary. I want to come back to you at the end here because you got to start it with your, your wonderful poem. W how do you. And you’re a generation of younger people who think about international affairs, think about climate change and topics like that that are not been traditionally topics for NATO.

[00:47:17] Jeremi: How do you see an Alliance like that fitting into those issues of. Well,

[00:47:22] James: I think at the very least, uh, this history, uh, of NATO and, uh, and, and maybe the recent events that have, that have made the importance of native to American foreign policy, more clear, uh, show us at the very least that there is no option.

[00:47:36] James: Bury our heads in the sand that the American economy, the American society is so deeply embedded in the world that we have to interact with the world and we have to have allies. And I think that’s so important because because alliances and actually like sticking with deals. Very exciting, but it’s so deeply

[00:47:55] Jeremi: important.

[00:47:56] Jeremi: Very well said. And it’s been a theme for our podcast week after week, right. That democracy implies a certain amount of multi-lateralism. Exactly. Um, and, uh, and NATO has been fundamental to American international multi-lateralism as, as Josh and Jim have made so clear today. Um, and it certainly in some form will probably be part of that future, but it will be in a different form.

[00:48:17] Jeremi: But I hear Jim and Josh saying is that NATO will continue to exist, but it won’t look. Institutions have a history as well. They have an arc of change and a, I think your generation’s actually will play a major role in, in reforming NATO as we go forward and build another alliances as well. Uh, Jim and Josh, thank you so much for sharing your insights with us today.

[00:48:38] Jeremi: You’ve given us, uh, a bookshelf worth of history in about 40 minutes, which is really extraordinary. So thank you so much. Thanks for having me and Zachary. Thank you for your poem.

[00:48:49] Joshua: And thanks. That

[00:48:51] James: was amazing.

[00:48:53] Jeremi: And thank you, uh, most of all, or equally as much. Uh, thank you to our audience for joining us for this week of this is democracy.

[00:49:08] This podcast is produced by the liberal arts its development. And the college of liberal arts at the university of Texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Harris Codini. stay tuned for a new episode every week. You can find this as democracy on apple podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher. See you next time.