This is Democracy – Episode 152: European Union

[0:00:05 Speaker 0] Yeah, this is democracy, a podcast about the people of the United States. A podcast about citizenship about engaging with politics and the world around you. A podcast about educating yourself on today’s

[0:00:19 Speaker 1] important issues and

[0:00:20 Speaker 0] how to have a voice

[0:00:21 Speaker 1] in what happens next.

[0:00:24 Speaker 0] Welcome to our new episode of This is Democracy. This week we’re going to discuss the european union, one of the most important, groundbreaking but also problematic institutional transformations in our world in the last 50 years. I remember very vividly in the late 20th century as I was finishing my scholarly studies and becoming a scholar, how much interest and excitement there was around the european union and it’s a topic that’s remained with us. But the excitement waxes and wanes, but its importance certainly does not change. And so we’re fortunate today to have with us, one of the foremost people writing and interacting with the european union and someone who can really share with us how the european union has changed over the last few years and it’s changing relevance for the world today. This is my friend and colleague, Dr Lawrence raid. I welcome Lawrence,

[0:01:15 Speaker 1] it’s a pleasure to be here.

[0:01:17 Speaker 0] Lawrence is a professor at the LBJ school and at the LBJ school. He also serves as the graduate advisor for the Global Policy studies program and he really does a fantastic job in preparing our students for international affairs and international policy issues, including helping them with their writing. Among many other things. Lawrence previously served as a press officer in the european parliament, which is actually a fascinating institution. It’s the directly elected legislature of the european Union. Many americans don’t know that such an institution exists. It’s it’s their Congress in a sense and it has all the pathologies of our Congress, to radio, research and writing, focus on european politics, the european union and the role of the european parliament. He’s written quite a lot about how the institutions of the european union affect foreign policy, making particularly the european Union’s relations with the United States and other parts of the world. So we’re very fortunate to have Lawrence with us today. Before we turn to our discussion with Lawrence we have, of course, mr Zachary’s scene setting poem. Zachary. What is your poem titled today? What becomes of a continent? Let’s hear what becomes of a continent. What becomes of a continent? They wondered, packing up their guns and heading home? What becomes of a continent? They asked forsaking their wartime prayers for peace time skirmishes. What becomes of a continent when the bombs have all exploded? And no one else can see the ghosts of apartment block and Coventry and frau in kenosha, when no one wants to speak the unspeakable or reverse the irreversible and no one else cares to see the forest for the bergen Belsen, they silently in tone when no one else can see what has been erased, they worry. But no matter we will eat our cheese and they will eat their sausages and we’ll forget what cannot be forgotten. Now. I was negative 12 at Maastricht, a negative 47 in Rome. And I marched negative 19 through the streets of Schengen dreaming of a treaty zone. And slowly we ate their sausages and they imported cheese till suddenly our honey came from eastern european bees. I love all the historical references. Just to clarify Zachary, the negatives. Those were your age is right. You were you were, you know, the unborn for those historical moments such as the Maastricht treaty. What is your problem about Zachary poem is really about uh

[0:03:47 Speaker 1] the, the

[0:03:48 Speaker 0] the absurdity of the european union as an institution and the fact that it is in some ways a miraculous occurrence that from the ravages of war torn europe in the mid 20th century

[0:03:59 Speaker 1] an institution

[0:04:00 Speaker 0] that professed unity was born but at the same time the absurdity of its existence. And the fact that in many ways it seems to be riding the waves of current events in ways that other nations and institutions don’t have to write. So it seems like it’s a miracle that it exists. But it also seems strange and it’s exactly right. Lawrence what’s a quick way to start our understanding of of why the EU exists?

[0:04:26 Speaker 1] I actually really like Zachary’s formulation of the point of the EU, which is to forget the unforgettable, right? So in my classes when I teach about the european union, I often make reference to the U. S. Official model which is unity and diversity. It’s a model nobody knows by the way. And what I always tell my students that actually the real model of the european union is screw history. And I don’t always put it so delicately. But but the reason I say that and I love that I can tell this to you as a historian right, is that it is a very deliberate attempt at the end of the Second World War to draw a line under centuries worth of nationalist and religious wars. And to say we are going to build something that is going to make all of those wars impossible in the future. And that I think is a very bold idea, right? And it starts with something very technical in terms of pooling coal and steel production, right? But the goal of it was from the very beginning, right after the Second World War was to make World War is impossible. And so so the european Union fundamentally as a peace project, Right? And as such, it’s been actually remarkably successful. And that’s something that I think a lot of times we forget is that there hasn’t been massive violence and certainly not between or among the member states of the european Union since, since the founding of the european coal and steel community. And that’s the longest that europe has gone for centuries without real bloodshed. And so, in that sense, it’s I like that formulation that’s actually had right, at the point of it, is to forget the unforgettable

[0:06:02 Speaker 0] and Lawrence, how has it done this, and how has the structure of the european Union evolved over time, as it seeks to maintain peace in light of challenges such as the war in Yugoslavia a few decades ago, but also, obviously, international economic challenges and and various other challenges.

[0:06:19 Speaker 1] So I think that the idea behind the european union again is this relatively ambitious right peace project. But the novelty of the european Union and back at the end of the Second World War, it wasn’t called that yet. It’s just the european coal and steel community was to focus on very, very specific economic integration to create this kind of zone of peace. Right, So the idea is that you create bonds that are essentially technocratic, economic, they are common standards. They are common rules that bind countries together so that these states become so intertwined both in their politics, but also in their in their interests, that it doesn’t really make logical sense for them to go to war with each other. Right, And so that’s essentially what the european Union did for 5 to 7 decades after the Second World War, as it did this. And then it also expanded geographically to take in the eastern european countries after the fall of the iron curtain. So it’s been sort of expanding geographically the zone of peace and also deepening it in the sense that by now you can’t really come up with any kind of reason why, let’s say, you know, Germany would want to invade Belgium because it just doesn’t make any economic or political or geographical geopolitical sense anymore. Because of these common structures of the european union has created.

[0:07:38 Speaker 0] And over the last five years there’s been particular pressure on the european Union really more than the last five years, but particularly the last five years, obviously due to issues regarding economic inequality within the system challenges to its role internationally, and of course challenges in its relationship with the United States. How how has the the international face of the european union changed in the last five years or so?

[0:08:01 Speaker 1] That’s a good question. I think. Generally speaking, the EU has I think, become more fearful and more hesitant and less influential over the past five years or over the last decade. And there are several reasons for this. The first is, you know, the financial crisis of 2000 and eight and the ensuing euro crisis, which really sapped europe’s confidence in its own economy. There is the so called migration crisis in 2015 that made it feel very vulnerable to global population shifts Brexit. The decision by the United Kingdom to leave the european Union is also a symbolic blow. It was the first major decrease in the U. S. Territory or membership ever since the european Union itself in the 1992 came into existence. Russia’s use of physical force to take Crimea and destabilise Ukraine also rattled the EU. And within the EU as well, there was lots of backsliding in certain member states on liberal values and and rule of law, which also sapped the U. S. Credibility. So I think there are a lot of things that happened in the past 5 to 10 years that have made the You just more inward looking and a little bit less influential on the international scene. And the other thing that I will say is the sort of flip side of this is that one of the reasons we can say that it is not living up to its promise right, is because the expectations on the You have also grown. So we don’t really expect any international organization besides the EU to be a powerful international actor in its own right. That’s just not something that we expect of it, but the EU has created these expectations for itself because it talked a big game in terms of how it wanted to become a at least a regional power, but it’s not one of the superpowers in the world and then it hasn’t met those expectations that is set for itself. So, I think part of it is also just a a question of how the reality meets the expectations that we that we that we have of the EU itself.

[0:09:58 Speaker 0] How is the EU handled authoritarians outside of its borders, namely Russia, and also want to be authoritarians within its borders.

[0:10:07 Speaker 1] So, I think it’s important actually to ask the question this way that you did, which is that it’s time to focus on both right, authoritarian rising authoritarianism within the Union and on its borders. And I think that the main reason that the EU itself has been a bit lackluster in responding to authoritarianism on its borders is precisely because it has been unable to deal with authoritarianism within its borders. And to me, this is actually the gravest danger to the EU that loses credibility as a voice for liberal democracy and the rule of law because of the actions of a number of its member states. So, internally, the EU hasn’t really been able to really influence or stop the liberal back siding in, for instance, in Hungary or in Poland. And that’s a variety of reasons which you can get into in a minute if you like. But I think that has also made it very hard for the EU to credibly talk about liberal values and their importance in its relationships with other countries such as Russia, Russia and China, because all of a sudden it looks it looks to be very hypocritical if it does. So. So I think the general response to rising authoritarianism across the world has been really hampered by these internal um the internal rise of authoritarianism within within several EU member states.

[0:11:33 Speaker 0] And I think as you said, Lawrence, this is something we should dig a little deeper into you. So eloquently articulated the mission of the what became the EU right as a zone of peace. So there would never again be uh war like World War Two or the many, many wars that had preceded it in europe, uh embedded in that notion of peace after World War Two was a set of assumptions about liberal democracy. Um and we see those uh still as the image of the european union in many ways. Even during President Biden’s recent visit to europe, all the photographs right, are designed to be photographs that show us democratically elected leaders coming together to meet of one kind or another, whether it’s through the G seven or in EU framework. So, so so why has it been so hard that in recent years to deal with the rise of authoritarianism in a zone that is so so self consciously set up to emphasize liberal democracy.

[0:12:30 Speaker 1] So, I think the real reason and this is my interpretation. I’m not sure that everybody who studies this in detail would necessarily agree, is that the assumption among the leaders of the european union, right in the in the nineties, when when the european Union really started its project of expanding into central and eastern europe, is that liberal democracy is to a certain extent sticky, right? So once you have a kind of a one way street, like once you become more and more liberal and more and more democratic, essentially get yourself into that mode and that, and and and it’s very hard to go back um and to to de democratize or d liberalized right. People thought that this was the euphoria after the end of the Cold War, thinking that that liberal democracy is going to be sort of the end result of the Cold War, you know, liberal democracy had won. And so there was this understanding that that this was a one way street. And I think it was very hard to understand that that’s not necessarily the case and the institutions of the european Union weren’t set up to deal with this. And so while there have been a lot of hand wringing among several, especially the european parliament, but also some governments of solidly established liberal democracies in europe, there have been very few ways to actually be able to to sanction governments that have been undermining the rule of law. And so that has changed recently. So there’s been there’s been some legislation passed that is tying, for instance, you funds to the respect for the rule of law. But a lot of that is going to be going too long legal processes, etcetera. So it’s going to take a long time. It’s not a nimble approach to to fighting authoritarianism within, and that’s because the EU was never set up to do that. Um, the idea was always, you know, this is a club of liberal democracies and, you know, once the central Eastern european countries join, and once, for instance, Portugal after fascism had ended their joined, they would sort of get accustomed and socialist into these liberal democratic norms and it wouldn’t occur to anybody to backslide. And so that I think is one of the things that really surprised many in the european union of how quickly this backsliding can happen and then how hard it is to do anything about it. And then the second thing, and this is just very short right is that the those who those governments that there are, you know, on the on the forefront of this kind of liberal backsliding, they can protect each other in votes where unanimity is needed. So a lot of times, it’s also just an institutional setup question that, you know, they can sort of have each other’s backs

[0:15:11 Speaker 0] right, right. The system is set up for unanimity and obviously that allows even one outlier to to have a lot of influence, I guess Lawrence for me as a historian and an observer, one of the surprises is not simply that the EU has trouble taking action against internal authoritarians, but that these authoritarians are attractive to citizens because the EU, especially for countries like Hungary, has so much to offer to these relatively new entrance to the european Union. It has a lot to offer them in terms of access to markets, in terms of uh the promise of more open politics. And so why within this shall we say, circle of privileged states? Why are some of the privileged rebelling against their very sources of privilege?

[0:15:58 Speaker 1] And that’s a really good question. And I have a few answers to that, right? So the first is, as you said, these governments are actually relatively popular among their citizens, right? And this is why I never use the term democratic backsliding because a lot of them are democratically elected. It’s not the same as m belarus, where, you know, it’s completely forged election results, right? They are democratically legitimate to a certain degree. What it really is, is backsliding in terms of liberal values. And so so the couple of explanations that I have is, first of all, um the way that the EU is set up, and this is one of the common critiques of it, is that even in places like Hungary that are, you know, where the government is actually um in its rhetoric, very antagonistic to the EU. A very large portion of Hungary’s GDP comes from actual EU funds, right? These are direct payments, essentially from german Swedish and dutch taxpayers right, that come into the into the pockets of the of the Hungarian government that can then distribute it, right? So they can actually blame the european union for all the failings of their policies, while at the same time taking advantage of EU funds. And that combination, I think is quite toxic in the sense that it allows for these governments to keep their constituents happy with all sorts of social programs and spending, etcetera, while at the same time also railing against the very institution that makes the stuff possible. And the second thing, and this is something that I think is I don’t hear too many people talking about is that in a lot of places where you have this kind of liberal backsliding right? I’m thinking of Turkey Ukraine. These kinds of places. You see very big protests after a while, because there is a kind of urban liberal middle class right that for whom these values are really important and they come out into the streets, right? And you have made in in Ukraine or you have these big protests in Istanbul in Turkey a few years ago. And the reason that I think you don’t see that as much in these, um as you said in these kind of privileged states, right, So the Member states of the EU is that being a member of the of the european union has some very big advantages for these kinds of liberal democratic middle class, I would say, elites, but more in terms of like intellectual elites, which is that they can travel freely. And so I’m a perfect example of this, right? So I’m the type of person who actually protests, again, I’m sitting in Budapest right now actually for the summer and, you know, last weekend there was a protest against the government for trying to set up a huge chinese university here in a place where that was essentially planned for Hungarian University students to have a have a new dormitory complex. And so I went out and protested right, But for most of the year, as you know, um I sit in texas, right? I’m abroad right now for a lot of my sort of friends and and and co patriots who are also not terribly fond of this government. They live in brussels, they live in Berlin, they live in Vienna, you can just grab a train jump on it in two hours, you’re in Vienna, nobody checks your passport, you’re allowed to work there without any kind of paperwork for getting a work visa etcetera. So there’s kind of a safety valve in these, in these Eastern european countries, right of very easy immigration to Western europe that I think is not present in, for instance, Turkey or Ukraine. And so a lot of these ways to undermine liberal democracy are easier to implement because those people who are most bothered by it, at least a big chunk of them, instead of being out in the streets and really making a ruckus forming new political parties, really being active in the opposition, they just leave. And that I think is something that’s that’s also weirdly something that the european union makes possible and it’s of course great for these citizens. But I think in terms of the political systems in these, in these countries, it’s it’s actually in the long run, potentially a problem,

[0:19:57 Speaker 0] right? So freedom makes unfree DMB possible as well.

[0:20:01 Speaker 1] Yeah, it’s it’s kind of a, you know, instead of a brain drain, right? It’s kind of like a liberal values, right?

[0:20:07 Speaker 0] Zachary had a question. So, returning

[0:20:10 Speaker 1] to to

[0:20:11 Speaker 0] the topic of chinese intervention in countries like Hungary, what has been the relationship between the Eu and china, particularly when they’re so economically tied and it might this change, especially with the german federal election in september where this has sort of been a major issue.

[0:20:29 Speaker 1] Mhm. So let me take those 22 separately, I think. Um the relationship between the Eu and china, as you said is very much based on on these economic ties, right? So the EU has generally been much more cautious with china uh in the U. S. For instance and less willing to challenge it geopolitically. And you saw this at the G. Seven meeting just uh yesterday or day before where the common position on china was actually pretty watered down. And the U. S. Came out with a separate statement on china. That was a that was a bit bit more strident. Right? And so the EU in general doesn’t tend to openly challenge china as um as overtly as the U. S. Does. I think where the EU does actually play a bit of hardball. But it’s I think somewhat harder to see because it flies under the radar uh of what we usually pay attention to is over specific global norms and rules because generally speaking the european union and china are are in this kind of norm setting or standard setting war right now. Right. And I’m thinking about things like you know global rules on data privacy or cybersecurity or um rules for providing access to five G networks or legal standards for new technologies like artificial intelligence or something like that. Right. And so here, I think there’s a competition between kind of the standards that china wants to push in and the standards that europe wants to push and the EU especially is very concerned with pushing um standards that are based in in its in its values of openness and liberal democracy and data privacy and those kinds of things. So there I think there’s actually, you know, a lot more friction than what we see, but it’s usually contained to um a very specific subset of of of standard setting issues, Right? So those aren’t necessarily always on the front page. But in terms of open confrontation with china, I think it’s much more careful now in terms of the german elections, right, which is the second part of your questions act. I mean, german elections are going to be crucial not only for Eu china relations, but for the U. S. Future as a whole, right. Nothing that the EU does happens without at least the tacit consent, but most likely the support of the german government. Right? I mean, they are they are one of the the top two most important member states along with France. And then I think, you know, we’ll see sort of where the campaign goes. There’s already been some back and forth in terms of who’s who’s leading the polls, right? But Armand lasted who is the the candidate of the christian Democratic Union, the main center right party, it’s hard to say that this is even possible, but he’s kind of an even less charismatic version of current Chancellor Angela Merkel, right. I mean, it’s sort of the, you know, add some beige to the gray right? And so I don’t see him being very likely to make bold suggestions or to lead the Eu in a new direction, right? It seems like he’s taking the same approach to Angela Merkel, that which is sort of very very careful, very piecemeal, right? And and mostly focused on german interest, not on, you know, the interests of europe as a whole. So the second favorite candidate, right? The currently the one in second place is an Arena Burbach who’s the Canada the Green Party now that, you know, if she became Chancellor that would bring a lot more change to Germany in general, right? She’s she’s young, she’s from a party that has never, you know, governed or had had a chancellor before, but to me at least, and you know, I haven’t ready to too much, but it’s a little unclear what her ideas and priorities would be for europe. I mean, she has clear ideas and priorities that she’s talked about for Germany, especially on the environmental front, but but I haven’t heard her really talk or write about her vision for for for Germany’s role in europe or for that matter, which is what your question is, europe’s role in the world, Right? And so I’m unsure what chancellorship under bear book would look like, but for sure, everybody is kind of holding their breath to see what happens with these elections. right? This is one of the major inflection points also for eu foreign policy

[0:24:51 Speaker 0] and the french also have a major presidential election coming up in the next few years as well.

[0:24:55 Speaker 1] Mhm. Yeah,

[0:24:57 Speaker 0] okay, well, and they’re and they’re, of course, President Macron seems to have a much more federalist, federalist and an ambitious vision for the european union, correct?

[0:25:08 Speaker 1] Yeah. And, you know, he’s been relatively open about this since he became president, right? Um and, you know, I actually was was very I had high hopes for for my home because he and Matteo Renzi and Italy actually had, you know, had at least the the willingness to spend some political capital on saying, no, we are actual european federalists, and this is what we want to do. And, by the way, for those listeners who don’t kind of know the code work for that, a european federalist is somebody who basically wants a, uh, even more powerful european union. So for member state governments to see it even more power to sort of, this federal level, which would be the EU level. And, you know, it’s it’s something that, you know, I I’m one of those, hopefully not a dying breed, right? But at least, um, at least an endangered species of european federalists. I actually think that would be a great idea. I would love to to to see that happen, but but I’m also a pessimist, so I don’t see it happening anytime soon. So, in a way, what I foresee is that the EU will do in the next couple of years, what it’s best at, which is, you know, muddling through in a very slow, inefficient, frustrating way, right? But in a way that’s also still immensely useful in our in our current world of rising nationalism, right? And this is what brings us back to the beginning, right? Whatever way we are frustrated with the european union and what its role is in the world and how it’s handling its own internal challenges, right? I think what’s important to realize that if we look at it as a peace project, it’s still working. I mean, no matter what we’re talking about, in terms of our frustrations with the eu nobody is trying to figure out, oh, well, where are the Italians going to attack the Slovenians next, Right? Like where are they going to cross the border? Like, that’s not, you know, that’s just not something that we talk about. And I think that’s still it seems weird, right? And we laugh at that, but but that’s still we I think we sometimes need to remind ourselves that that hasn’t been the normal in european history, as jeremy knows, um for a very long time. And the fact that we can we can laugh at that sentence and be like, oh yeah, the Maginot line, That was a funny thing, right? When the french like defended against the Germans in a way that didn’t work for more than two hours, right? But the fact is they don’t have to anymore and that’s still kind of an accomplishment. So I think if we, if you sort of trying to squeeze blood from a stone, right, like squeeze a little bit of optimism out of my eastern european pessimism, right, then I think that’s what I would focus on.

[0:27:47 Speaker 0] It’s such an important point Lawrence. I mean, it’s, it’s very hard historically to come up with any other example of a region that has been so embedded in conflict and conflict, not just in the places that are famous for conflict, Germany and France, but at every level, as you say, you know, conflict around the italian peninsula and elsewhere. And then over the course of really a half century for that to become unthinkable and unthinkable, not because one country conquered the area, but because of a set of not equally consensual but generally consensual decisions made. Uh it’s extraordinary and and it’s it’s ironic that the United States, some americans often uh look down on this. Let’s see the Europeans as weak when this is actually an incredible historical accomplishment. And you’ve articulated that. That’s so well. Lawrence, I wanted to ask quickly about Covid about responses to Covid. We haven’t talked about that in our 1st 2025 minutes or so. And I think that’s indicative of uh these other issues being so important. But but but how has the EU dealt with Covid? And since you do have the advantage of being an expert on both the EU and the United States, what are some of the differences? You see?

[0:29:00 Speaker 1] It’s a good question. I think, you know, I think the pandemic has shown both how much the EU is necessary and also how um ill equipped it is to um to to deal with the these kinds of big issues for which it is necessary and what I want. I mean, what I mean by that is that, you know, clearly there there are ways in which the EU was was the best place to deal with with with covid 19 right? Um in terms of the institutions that that europe has, it was the the actor with the biggest clout in size that you need to negotiate bulk prices and access to vaccines right from vaccine makers. There’s a european medicines agency which would have been the perfect place to vet vaccines for emergency use and make sure that, you know, any vaccine that’s that’s that’s allowed in in one country would be would be acceptable in another. He would have needed a lot of you coordination on travel rules and and vaccination cards and border controls and all this. Right. And what’s strange is that even though it was clear that, you know, I mean, think about a state like Luxembourg right? Which is, you know, especially compared to texas, right? Like it’s it’s smaller than a county in texas, right? It doesn’t make sense to have a national Luxembourg ish policy on covid, Right? I mean, you know, you sneeze on one side of Luxembourg and the virus travels across the border. So, but at the same time a lot of the actual interventions, right? Whether those were lockdowns or travel restrictions or vaccination drives or border controls, all of these were still in national competence, right? So each member state was reacting differently. So you had lockdowns in one place and then they would be open in another and then you’d flip as the virus spread. And so you had these constantly recurring Williams of infections. And if this sounds very similar, right or familiar to your listeners because it’s exactly what’s happening in the US where individual states for making you know, creating their own mask mandates are not mask mandates or rules about lockdowns versus not. And these kinds of things. Right? So what’s interesting is that you have the same to me that it was actually quite similar to the U. S. Response in the sense that there was a clear need for centralist and and efficient rollout of policies and the relative independence of these units in the U. S. It’s the States and the Eu it’s the Member States made it much much more difficult. Right? So just to give you an example, So as I mentioned, I’m sitting in Budapest but I have to drive to the Czech Republic a few weeks ago, which meant if you look on a map that I had to drive through Slovakia. Right, so that means two border crossings to get to the Czech Republic and then to boarding crossings to come back. And just the amount of time it took me to research what documents I would need to be allowed to enter Slovakia. So I could drive through Slovakia which takes like 45 minutes by the way to then enter the Czech Republic. And then what the rules are for coming back. And do I need to quarantine in each place? And what kinds of, you know, sort of tests do I need to be allowed to enter? What kind of vaccination cards do you accept as proof? All this kind of stuff. Right. And that’s just me going as a private citizen. But you can imagine the cost of that to business, right? That needs to have all sorts of cross border movements all the time. So these kinds of inefficiencies really do matter. It’s not just, you know, annoying for the average citizen, right? But it’s gonna have a lot of costs as well, right? And so on this front, you know, generally the way that the EU moves forward in its integration processes, there is a crisis that hits and people realize, oh wow, we really messed this up. And this would have been a lot cleaner to do if the european union were able to coordinate this. So I actually expect that in the next a couple of years that there’s probably gonna be a larger role for the EU and kind of pandemic response because all the Member States are going to agree that that benefits everybody,

[0:32:45 Speaker 0] right? This is the very traditional, functional ist argument, right? That the needs of the members will in the end dr the the evolution of the system.

[0:32:54 Speaker 1] Yeah. And that and that basically just the clear need of a certain policy to be made at a higher level is going to become apparent to everybody, right, Whether that’s businesses, citizens governments, etcetera, right? And then they will be less protective of their competences, right? And be more willing to let the you do that job for them.

[0:33:15 Speaker 0] So, I like that optimistic note. Lawrence, you’re you’re getting more and more optimistic the longer I know you, which I like, strangely enough, I’m surprised, but I like it. Uh I guess, you know, as you know, we always like to close on an optimistic note and and I’d like to hear and and for you to share your insights with our audience about what you see is some of the possibilities for the EU going forward in the next 3 to 5 years, particularly possibilities that affect international affairs. What are the ways in which the EU can be a helpful partner to some of the international changes that we want to see and what are the ways in which our listeners can better follow and even contribute to those developments

[0:33:57 Speaker 1] to the questions? I think maybe two things. So one I think is relatively likely, which is that you is still very much in the forefront of setting standards in a lot of in a lot of areas that are there are kind of below the threshold of what we pay attention to, right? So I think the perfect example for this was the um uh data protection um realm, right? Where the reason that certain american websites now can’t actually sell your information to advertisers and then um basically just data mine uh every click that you make is because the european union passed pretty stringent regulation on on what kinds of data companies can collect on you and how what they can do with that data, right? And big websites that have to operate both in europe and the United States and across the world, um didn’t want to actually you know, bother with having different standards of data protection on different websites depending on the I. P. Address that you’re using, Right? So essentially these EU regulations become became global norms, right? And so generally speaking, I think the EU does have a very citizen centric right centric and liberal approach to many issues. So in the coming years I think as these you know very tough. I think new technologies are going to come become more mainstream whether this artificial intelligence or biotechnology or these kinds of things. I think the EU is still going to be there to make sure that there are some regulations that sort of keep this keep these technologies humane right. And and make sure that they don’t sort of um run amok right so that I’m relatively confident in but I and less confident in but I think would be even more important right is that the european union is still the only that I can think of the only example in the world of a relatively successful form of political organization that does not rely on nationalism, and that in fact is not necessarily rejecting nationalism, but that has no space for nationalism within its structures. And I think with not just with rising authoritarianism, but with the but to me is actually even more problematic the rising nationalism across the world. I think it’s really important that there be an example that there’s a different way to do politics, that you don’t need to be stuck in these kind of nationalist frames, right to organize politics. What I mean by that is just you don’t have to have a country in order to um regulate train travel, right? Like you can actually you can maintain clear water supplies without having to sort of create a nationalist idea of citizenship, right? And to me, you know, this kind of thing is actually really important because if we are going to look at any of our big challenges in front of us in terms of global policies, right, whether it’s global climate change or space trash, or any of these kinds of big global issues that clearly cannot be solved by individual countries alone. I think we will need examples of um of non nationalist or post nationalist policy making that give us hope that we can actually tackle those globally.

[0:37:17 Speaker 0] It’s so well said Lawrence. And of course, one of the underlying approaches to building peace, as you described earlier after World War Two in europe, was to de emphasis nationalism, because nationalism was seen as one of the sources of militarism. And and so these are deeply intertwined Zachary. Is this vision particularly this latter point from from Lawrence? Is this something that you think can be attractive to young people, a vision, a model of international cooperation that’s not built upon nationalism, but built on something else on regionalism or a common post national identity? What do you think? Yes, I definitely think that that the european Union serves as a model for young people who who want to escape the sort of nationalist binary that we’ve been in for so long. But I also think that it’s it’s a good model of how to handle issues of cultural diversity. I mean, the fact that the european Union can cover so many languages and so many cultures and yet still make the trains run is pretty amazing. And I think that moving beyond the the the aura of nationalism is a way to achieve that. I think there’s something to that last question. Lawrence, do you think this is a way in which history can be rewritten also that there’s a useful history of cooperation? Most of the historical examples we think of that we’re in Zachary’s poem or of course examples of conflict, but perhaps as a different kind of history here. What do you think of that?

[0:38:45 Speaker 1] This is interesting. It’s a question of, you know, this better than most. Right? But history always changes depending on the time that you’re living in, right? Um, and how it’s being interpreted and to give away my age, just the way that Zachary gave away his age with his negative numbers, right? I basically came of age in the 19 nineties. Right? And so the idea was we were on this kind of path of progress, right? And things have been getting better for a while and all of a sudden they got a lot better. The iron curtain fell, the Cold War was over without anybody nuking each other. Right? The internet was invented, right? So there’s this kind of euphoria, right? And to me, the the best example of that right is like the big show that kind of brought everybody together with star trek, the next generation, right? There was this idea that you its version of the future, right? Reflected what the president of the 19 nineties was, which is basically we are on track to become one unified planet, right? That is then going to increase its diversity even to aliens, right? And we will be this peaceful federation, right? That was the kind of trajectory. But that’s what people saw. And if you look at netflix now, right, it’s all dystopia, right? It’s all here are the different ways in which we are all going to help. And so, you know, I I missed that kind of optimism, right? And I think this is where the european union is useful is that it gives us this kind of sense that there can be different modes of doing politics, right? And so, you know, I’m not sure that it’s kind of a new history, right? But it’s it’s it’s more do we think of history is this kind of march of progress right? Towards whether it’s more democracy or more freedom, you know, depending on how you define it? And that’s why I really hope that, you know, this kind of rising authoritarianism and rising nationalism is more of a a blip or a um a reactionary movement that will go away, right? I have this uh this debate with my wife quite often, and she’s a historian as well, right? So she she’s a she looks at things from from from much longer view, and she she thinks, you know what they were in the blip, and it’s really bad to be living in the blip, but it’s still a blip from a historical standpoint. I’m a bit less sanguine than that. But maybe that’s why you’ve you’ve seen me getting more and more optimistic is because my wife is rubbing off on me, well,

[0:41:07 Speaker 0] you are learning to listen

[0:41:09 Speaker 1] to your wife. This exact

[0:41:10 Speaker 0] best advice you can take from anyone. So

[0:41:14 Speaker 1] I think that might be, you know, 11 way in, which is it’s a new history, right? Is to just come back to this idea that the history can actually be seen as progress, right? Rather than just one bad thing after another.

[0:41:27 Speaker 0] And one of the things both you and I experienced growing up in the nineties was how quickly things can change and what you see in front of you. And I think this is probably what you’ve been discussing with your wife and many of your friends also, you know, is, you know, what, what we see in front of us is not the only historical dynamic. And so we can have Viktor Orban’s and Vladimir Putin’s and Donald trump’s who seem to dominate the media cycle. It doesn’t mean they’re dominating the historical cycle. Those are two different things. We experience this with the unification of Germany, right? I mean, all of the naysaying, every major expert I knew as a undergraduate at the time, listening to them talk about, they said, oh, this, this is going to wreck europe, There could never be a unified Germany again. And, and look at everything you told us today. Lawrence a unified Germany is the anchor for the european union, isn’t it?

[0:42:18 Speaker 1] Yeah, exactly. Yeah. No, and I think that’s right. You know, we all, we always talk about what’s in the, what’s in the headlines. And then, um, you know, decades later you try to go back and be like, okay, why did the headlines not have not talk about the things that we’re actually going on? Exactly. And it might be, you know, Zachary and his friends, you know, mobilizing and it turns out that in 5, 10 years they’re going to vote in a way that is unpredictable or unpredicted today, right? And there’s a sea change and democratic change and we no longer see donald trump’s in office, who knows,

[0:42:47 Speaker 0] that’s right inshallah, which is appropriate for the european union these days.

[0:42:52 Speaker 1] As as as I’ve started saying in texas in Shell and the Creek Don’t rise

[0:42:56 Speaker 0] Creek Lawrence, thank you so much for sharing your, your insights, your wisdom, your your scholarship and your experiences and also your your budding optimism, which makes me all the more optimistic to see you back in the office in a few months to share your optimism with you, me

[0:43:15 Speaker 1] and my bubbly self will be their

[0:43:16 Speaker 0] race and Zachary. Thank you for your inspirational poem is always in your comments and thank you most of all to our loyal listeners. Thank you for joining us for this episode of This is Democracy Yeah. Mhm.

[0:43:35 Speaker 1] Yeah. This podcast is produced by the Liberal Arts I.

[0:43:39 Speaker 0] T. S. Development studio and

[0:43:41 Speaker 1] the College of Liberal Arts at the University

[0:43:43 Speaker 0] of texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Harris Komotini.

[0:43:49 Speaker 1] Stay tuned for a new episode. Every week you can find this is Democracy on Apple podcasts,

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