This is Democracy – Episode 137: Energy Catastrophe in Texas

[0:00:04 Speaker 1] mhm. Yeah, this is Democracy. A podcast about the people of the United States, a podcast about citizenship, about engaging with politics and the world around you. A podcast about educating yourself on today’s important issues and how to have a voice in what happens next. Welcome to our new episode of This is Democracy. This week we’re going to discuss an issue that has been very much in the news and in our personal experiences here in Texas. Uh, and a topic that has been with us for quite a long time as well. How should the United States how should communities? How should Texas in particular manage energy? Uh, what kind of energy policy should we have? And how should our society distribute power and manage the use of energy in different forms in different places throughout our country and our democracy? Uh, we have with us a good friend, one of the leading scholars on the topic, and also one of the leading academic thinkers and program leaders on this topic. Professor Varun Rye. Good morning, Varun.

[0:01:16 Speaker 0] Good morning, Jeremy. Thank you so much.

[0:01:18 Speaker 1] It’s delightful to have you here. Always fun to work with you, Dr Varun Rye is the Walt and Elspeth Ross Tell professor in the LBJ School of Public Affairs, where I have the great pleasure of working with him at the University of Texas at Austin. He’s a wonderful colleague. He’s the director of the university’s Energy Institute, which is a university wide, uh, and really an international center for major research on this topic. He’s also the associate dean for research at the LBJ School. Verone does remarkably interdisciplinary and rigorous work spanning multiple disciplines, delving into issues of energy systems, complex systems, decision science and public policy. Uh, he has briefed the U. S Senate and many other government agencies. His work has been showcased in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, Bloomberg News and many other locations. He’s also a major policy influencer through organizations like the commission that oversees Austin Energy and here in Austin, Texas. Um, and one other thing I should mention is that his work has been honored by the David and Kershaw awarded prize, which is really a big deal from the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. Uh, he received an honor is one of the leading scholars under the age of 40 in this field. So it’s really a treat to have a room with us to help explain these issues and and help us think about how we go forward as a democracy in the world of energy that we’re living with today before we turn to that topic with Vero. And, of course, we have Zachary’s scene setting poem. What’s the title of your poem today? Zachary. Do not be alone when the lights

[0:03:06 Speaker 0] come back on.

[0:03:08 Speaker 1] Okay, it sounds interesting. Exactly. Let’s hear it. The heat is transferred from the glass to the water. In the chemistry diagram I read by candlelight, the wind gyrates the tree branches. Broken beneath are the streetlights, as if windmills out there in the dimness, let loose your imaginings of a modern sensibility. Put away the image of your neighborhood by light and watch it sink like the end of a flashbulb into the hills shrouded deep in the darkness. And don’t forget that when you awake, the world will be white, bright and gleaming as if you had never slept. The cold sucks the water into icicles. Outside, one hangs in the corner of the roof dangling above the gate, reminding me tauntingly how wonderful it will be to see it fall. Forget that you can even picture living in the glow of phosphorescent bulbs that the streetlamps once worked or at least flickered into something you could understand. And remember, now that when the lights are inevitably on again, the digital clock face will make you jump Scare you senseless. Do not be alone when the lights come back on. Do not be alone when the lights come back on. It is perhaps more of a wish than a warning. Do not be alone when the lights come back on. Maybe if you repeat this too many times, you will feel the lights again with my head already in your hands. Do not be alone. When the lights come back on, it will be jarring. Maybe dangerous may be haunting, maybe even electrifying. Zachary that that poem makes me, in many ways relive what we experienced. Uh, just a few weeks ago, with the loss of power here in Texas. Uh, Zachary, what is your poem about? My poem is really about the very strange moment we found ourselves here in Texas in just a few weeks ago when it was we were we were constantly being reminded of how how modern our world was. And yet we we felt so dependent on such primitive, um, factors as weather or disease. And I think that’s that’s it’s a very strange reminder in our modern world, that’s very well, said Zachary. And it’s the perfect spot to turn to a maroon Varun did as an expert, is someone who thinks about this more than anyone else I know. Did you ever expect that here in the United States and in such an advanced progressive city like Austin, Texas, that that we would confront the loss of of power on the scale that we did for as long as we did? Uh, in February?

[0:05:52 Speaker 0] Great. Thank you, Jeremy, for that question, Thank you for having me and Zach. As always, he’ll continue to blow my mind. That was such a beautiful poem. It captures many, many deep aspects that we hope to tang a little bit in this. This discussion, Jeremy, it was quite unprecedented, you know, as a a scholar who studies energy, electricity systems all the time, I am very much aware that it’s not a perfect system. It’s a very, very complex system and you know, there are disruptions. But the scale and scope of the disruption that we experienced in this crisis was pretty unprecedented. I grew up in India. I was there until the age of 22. And we were, you know, not unused to almost daily power and water disruptions. But in all those years, I was there. Have we never saw something like this so that this one really beats them out

[0:06:49 Speaker 1] and what caused it? How do we understand this? Because in India, in my experience, these are often planned disruptions. You’re told that every afternoon you’ll lose two or three hours of power. This was nothing on that scale. Nothing like that. This was on a much larger scale. And, of course not well planned, Right?

[0:07:08 Speaker 0] That is right. Our system operators certainly did not expect this. What really sparked this journey, You know, it was a very severe weather event, multiday deep, cold snap that sparked a series of interrelated factors that lead to electricity shortages across the state, affecting over four million customers. So essentially a few things happened. About 60% of Texas homes are heated by electricity. And so certainly because of the severe cold, the demand for electricity and electricity based heating went up. And which meant really, uh, that the peak predicted demand was really an all time high for for our electrical system here in taxes. Remember, this is a summer Peking system and, you know, we had very high demands. Projected demands We never in a researcher because because of the Lord shelling. So so demand was a huge factor and will come back to demand and what could have or should have been done, and certainly something very important to keep an eye in the future. So that was one piece. The second piece was disruption to our gas supply, gas production as well as supply. So well, heads froze their, you know, a midstream there compressor power losses which led to, you know, lower pressure and the gas system, and that all meant that in our production was certainly hurt. But that’s important because a large part of our power generation here in taxes is based on gas generation. And so if you’re not able to supply the gas to those generators, certainly you won’t be able to generate the power. And so that is the third piece, which is, you know, generation was hurt and this was not just in gas. It was across the board. There was a little bit of cool that was heard. There’s a little bit of nuclear that was hurt. Renewable power was hurt, but really the biggest one was on gas based power generation account for really accounting for about 75% of the last capacity. And you know, as you know, one of the CEOs mentioned that last week’s hearings at the ledge that good biggest gains would have been if we could have kept gas flowing to the plants. And, you know, in the end, math Jeremy, this was about 100 times in scaled and rolling blackouts in California last summer. I’ll just give you very quickly and we’ll come back to maybe unpacking some of this cost to the system and to individuals. Households is just literally astronomical, something that will become more complex as we see this impacts over $50 billion in power bill, widespread water system damage at you know at city municipality, but also at the household level, mental and physical toll. Their covid related issues that you know are, you know, just starting to get highlighted insurance class related to, you know, houses. And you know, other things. Bankruptcies of companies and local governments, loss of life, which is, you know, really the astounding. And here and then much more that we’ll see. So multiple interrelated factors led to this starting with their deep weather event, Uh, and in a huge cost of the system in an absolutely unprecedented scale here German.

[0:10:18 Speaker 1] Is it safe to say Varane that one of the causes was the insufficient maintenance and updating of the basic infrastructure, from equipment to the various other elements of this large, complex system

[0:10:36 Speaker 0] That certainly contributed Germany. But, you know, I won’t say that that was singularly the main reason here. And and part of that is because of that, Because of, you know, winterization and equipment maintenance, there was some disruption in power generation itself. But as I mentioned, uh, a lot of that played out because what happened in the gas supply, right. And they’re they’re also there are these multiple factors associated. So, for example, one of the things you know that played out is some of a lot of the gas operation, both in the fields as well. As you know, as you start moving the gas in the pipelines and process them before you send them to the plans. It’s dependent on electricity. And as load was being shed, a lot of that powers are also getting lost, so you don’t have the power to run your gas system and you need the gas to run your power system. So we saw a lot of the circularity play out. So equipment maintenance Ventura ization certainly played a role, and if we were much better on that front, this that would certainly have helped. But it was not the only factor.

[0:11:45 Speaker 1] And one more topic that’s been in the news because the governor mentioned this himself, I believe, during the crisis on television, what role did renewables, wind and solar play in this, uh, you you made the point maroon. That gas is the largest source of power in the system. So So what role did Renewal’s play?

[0:12:08 Speaker 0] All types of power generation? Jeremy were impacted during this event. This was a massive event, including renewables, where hurt in the month of February wind and solar and largely wind. Solar is not at the same scale as win wind is really pretty big in taxes. About a quarter of installed capacity in Texas is wind. In the month of February, wind was expected to

[0:12:36 Speaker 1] supply

[0:12:38 Speaker 0] in about 10 15% of the demand, so the expectations were not high just because, you know, that’s how wind blew, so that was kind of expected. But because of the weather event, wind underperformed even that right so And that led to about three gigawatts of 3 to 5 gigawatts of, you know, lower capacity because of wind underperforming. And there are lots of things that happened, including including frozen wind turbines and other other factors. That said the peak lost capacity in the system that led to the Lord shedding was about 35 to 40 gig awards, and about 30 gigawatts of that was because of gas. So you’re talking about authority, giggle or disruption in the gas based system and a 3 to 5 gigawatt disruption in the renewable system. And you know, that’s you know, anybody can look at that and said Yes, you know both both were contributors, but really the larger much larger contribution here was because of, you know, the gas based generation and the gas supply that feeds that generation.

[0:13:40 Speaker 1] Right? Right. So So in other words, if the gas generation had not gone down in the way it did, we would not have had anywhere near the disruption that we had.

[0:13:50 Speaker 0] Definitely. So

[0:13:51 Speaker 1] that leads, I think, to the the next set of questions Maroon and I think, probably some of the most important ones for us thinking about how we move forward, understanding first of all, how the state reacted. So So how did the state react to this? And and to what extent did the state fall victim to circumstances that couldn’t control? And to what extent were there opportunities that that were missed as this crisis unfolded?

[0:14:17 Speaker 0] Great, really, very important question for all of us to reflect. Jeremy. Let’s let’s begin with what happened during the event itself. So, you know, I think you know, taking a step back operationally right. Our utilities, the grid operator, which is our cat and especially frontline workers in power plants and utilities in, you know, water systems. They did a phenomenal job. I mean, you know, we as individuals and households were struggling to stay warm and, you know, keep our families fed and clean and healthy and and just imagine what these workers were going through and putting themselves, you know, everything that they have out there, um, in such extreme weather to keep the lights on and keep us keep us form. So I think you know that that’s, you know, if you ask for one single story that was amazing, you know that is that is it? Without those efforts, the crisis could have been much deeper, and impacts would have been, you know, much worse. I mean, it’s it’s already as worse as, you know we have seen here, but it could certainly have been worse. They’re also in lots of other positive and saved actions. You know that the state government level. So, for example, reaching out to the federal government, you know, lining up and clearing up things to have female support flow, remove temporary bottlenecks and equipment repairs at homes and businesses. And in all the other things, you know, there are certainly we saw during the event quick recognition and movement to, you know, make sure that you know things. Things can move forward and get taken care of during the event and and following it now. But they’re also, you know, I would say three pretty big failures, even during the event. And, you know, we still have to talk about what could have been done leading today when we’ll come to that. But during the event, so state coordinated disaster response, right? This was a disaster by any measure. And actually one of the big ones, Hurricane Harvey, that they experience a couple years ago, that was a major disaster. And this is in an order of magnitude. Bigger than that Could, you know, certainly much deeper in statewide. Alright. Just gives you a sense of scale of what we’re talking about here. Oh, there was very little of state coordinated disaster response that we actually saw even during the event. Right? You know, the 34 days of the high intensity from February 15 to 18th, households and communities had to organize quickly and take care of themselves. Really? Here. Kudos to the local leaders and our nonprofits in the state that really came together quickly and and helped each other and help communities and and people. The second is communications. All the communications from you know, different layers of our government, where you know, all over and inconsistent in many parts, I mean to really left are people who completely clueless, right, And you know them quickly. I think individuals made the decisions. Hey, you know, we will have to deal with this on our own and lean on our on our neighbors and friends and community to take care of this and and, you know, uh so that was not very helpful. And the tor piece, which is playing out now And you know, that is where a lot of, uh, system changes, including policies and regulations and market changes will come from, Is is really the finger pointing and passing the book on responsibility. That happened even during the crisis, right? You know, it really laid bare or some deep gaps that exist in the system in terms of coordination, interaction, responsibility, accountability and created an ugly situation and very bad name for a state that greatly proud itself with its energy system.

[0:17:59 Speaker 1] And what role did structural issues in the grid play? I mean, we’ve heard a lot about how the Texas grid is separated from the two other American grids. Would the crisis have been better out that that energy structure in the state?

[0:18:15 Speaker 0] That’s a great question, Zach. It could certainly happen better, right? You know, the advantage of being connected to other systems is when you have difficulties in your system, other systems can basically prop you up. All right. And this is you know, how we also have faced this as individuals. We have our social networks and, you know, safety nets that, you know, when we go through crisis individually, uh, we reach out to, you know, folks in our network, our folks in our network reach out to us and and help us really go through that. And it’s it’s no different from that perspective. There are other parts of the, you know, other grids that were also hurt, actually, not at the same level, right, because in the market, constructs are different. And there is ability to take care of some of these in extreme events in different ways than our system. So I mean, all things equal, could it have helped for us to have been connected? Uh, definitely. It would have helped the question, though, Does it mean that we should? We should go ahead and connect. I mean, that raises all sorts of very, very deep questions as to win and how and if that needs to happen.

[0:19:25 Speaker 1] And this connects maroon to to me what is the most difficult puzzle to understand, Which is we’re a state that’s filled with so much talent and expertise and knowledge and experience in this area. The UTI Energy Institute is one example of this, but but there’s no state that has as much energy expertise as Texas. We seem so unprepared for this in all kinds of ways. Why is that?

[0:19:53 Speaker 0] That’s the core of the question, Jeremy and and just as you said it is, you know, this is a reminder that often beneath the calm, there can be lots of nuances and fragility, right, And it will come back to this towards the end of discussion and talk about you know what it means. And, you know, in the spirit of your series, this is democracy. What it means to, you know, have have great modern systems. And as Zack pointed out in his point right, we are in. We live in these extremely complex modern systems, but how to make sense of it and how to stay connected with it. To your question, Jeremy, you know, there are multiple things that play out here and and gaps that have, you know, not at the scale. But, you know, the different analysts have been tracking those talking about those over the years. You know, Not not recently only. And now, you know, we see just how interconnected, interdependent and inadequate those pieces are in taking care of this, You know, the energy system at at this scale. So I just, you know, highlight a few. So, for example, the first one that comes to mind, you know, if you ask me, Jeremy, what is it that we could have done that would have led to a different outcome? Not in the long run, but in the very short run. Right? And that is the one that, you know, I I keep wondering a lot about and the first thing comes to mind is very short term planning and weather forecasts and so on. So typically, our system operator or cat and, you know, other actor. So generators and producers, they worked with a 10 year horizon. Right market? Certainly. Uh, you know, that’s kind of the time house. And it works on. And, you know, we have seen we had a similar experience in 2011, not as intense, but similar 89 was in. In some ways, there are some early studies coming out which are saying 89 was perhaps more intense. So I mean, it’s it was It is an extreme event, right? We don’t see this every year or, you know, for that matter, even every five or 10 years. But it’s not something that we have not seen. This is, you know, cannot completely out of the back. And this is not once in a century or once in 500 years event. And so that’s one thing, right? You know why? You know, why do we not take along the horizon? And that the answer there is Obviously we should. So let’s let’s keep that aside talking, leading to the days and weeks ahead, there was a lot of warning, you know, I I individually I knew it was going to be very bad, right? And many, many power producers and forecasters already we’re tracking this and you know, many of them were communicating to different pieces of the ecosystem, including the operator and regulators, as well as you know, policymakers. And the biggest failure, in my view, leading up to the event, was not doing more by our operators and and regulators during the event, just a few days or weeks ahead of the event. Even though it was not a computer surprise, It didn’t happen overnight. The new and and so you know just how so, For example, what could have been done? Well, you know, we knew we were going to face issues on the supply side, right? And a lot of that is factored already into projections. Yet, you know, if you sense that it it is going to get very ugly and uglier than what may have been planned a few months ago, right? The reports for the next season get done a few months ahead just so that you have some time to plan. But days and weeks ahead. You know, the indications were that this is going to perhaps get much worse. And if that is the case, you know, obviously you reach out to demand side right, which is you know something you typically don’t plan for. But, you know, you prepare people, you communicate, you say, Hey, you know, we really need to come together, and there are lots of other things that could actually be done. But if you do that proactively, it could have been a much more managed real ruling. Blackouts, not the kind of, you know, massive multi day deep blackouts. So so, you know, planning, forecasting how we communicate and manage demand even in the very, very short run is one factor. Oversight. We talked about militarization of equipment, but then also, you know how what the expectations are for for reliability. How is that defined? Right? Currently in the power system, much of our reliability is just left to the energy only construct that we have. It works pretty well in in a lot of the lot of the time. But just as we saw right now, uh, there there certainly gaps. So we are going to see a lot of discussion around. What do we mean? The reliability. What our expectations and is our current market construct for how our electricity system and its interconnection to other parts of the energy system operate. Is that adequate? And the answer will be there. There there are gaps and we need to plug those. I already mentioned coordination across agencies and across levels of government. You know, we really saw how that was very inadequate. And there’s a lot more that needs to be done. And then even the last one I mentioned, um, is basically the market features of our market. Right? We saw many market. Many discrepancies come in the market design, including very high prices, both in power and gas. Right, You know. So our system hit the maximum cap that is allowed, that is, you know, $9000 per megawatt hour. Uh, typically, that is for a long time. It is expected to last a few hours in a Europe at different times, Not all at the same time. But, you know, this lasted for, you know, many, many hours, right? In a couple of days, straight and more all at once. And And that’s not how this is supposed to work. Likewise, on the gas site, Normally, gas has been very cheap for the last several years. Just before the event, it was trading at you know $23 per unit, and it went up to $200 so over 100 times during the event, right? And you know that that’s, you know. And so what’s going on? Their customers are exposed to different types of these prices, both on the power and the gas site. And, you know, these are not the same problems. Uh, and and then finally, what role does market power of? Some of the forms were able to operate as well as potential price gouging. I just mentioned prices went very high up. But this is a complex question, right? Scarcity. Prices are allowed to go up because you know, if there’s scarcity, prices should go up. And you know that helps you allocate resources better, and at the same time, because if there is a lot of scarcity, that means, you know, some actors might have more market power and it could lead to price gouging. It is a very tough, complex question to separate, and it will be months and years before we know anything and then putting all of this together here. I mean, I think you know it points us to What are the What are the? What do we need to change in policies available? Come to that. But essentially, you know, really very two things, very clearly defining what the reliability expectations are and putting in place sets of policies which takes the interconnected nature of this system this electricity, gas and other, uh, sources interconnectedness, dependencies, putting a holistic look at that. It’s just I mean, that’s the one single thing that has come out of this

[0:27:08 Speaker 1] Varun just following up on these very insightful comments. Um, do you think that in the balancing that’s required in any energy system in really any system of any kind, the balancing between market and government regulation have we gone too far in the market direction? And is that part of the cause here?

[0:27:28 Speaker 0] That’s a very profound question, Jeremy Markets markets are are great, you know, they really allow, you know, if efficient allocation of resources, it it allows, uh, you know, because of the competition and it is able to generate, there are lots of great things that that come out of it. The one thing to keep in mind is that in markets as complex and as interdependent as we have in Texas and other parts of the world. Markets are part of it, and you know, there’s lots of and markets are creations of policies, and when you have this type of supply and demand and pricing mechanism, they’re also all sorts of constraints that go together with it. So it is not as I pay, you know, here’s some demand and here’s some supply. Just go figure it out. There are lots of other things that are going going on, and when that happens, it’s important to keep in mind that the layered complexities can make it very difficult to anticipate and address extreme events like like what we saw a few days ago and what we have learned. And, you know, this is not surprising. We have known this that, you know, just leaving it all for again layered, complex market systems to figure it out. Extreme events, you know, are are harder to address using that, so, you know, they’re certainly need to be taught and worked in terms of understanding and designing corner solutions that can take care of these extreme events. But, you know, I’ll fall short of saying, Hey, you know, we went too far there. There are other gaps, and they’re not just gaps in the market design. But there are other other gaps that did exist, and at the same time it was not as if you know, there’s It’s purely, you know, based on price and demand and supply. There are all sorts of other complexities that are layered on top of it.

[0:29:24 Speaker 1] Absolutely. And this is This is one of the themes of our podcast each week, of course, which is that that our world has become very complex and our understanding and application of democratic principles has to change. Uh, in that it is not enough to understand how one thought of democracy in the 18th century one has to update our thinking for this complexity that you articulated so so eloquently. Uh, I think this takes us really to to where we always like to close, which is, you know, what have we learned and what can we do differently? And I wonder if it might be worth focusing for a second on the question of government policy reform, institutional reform, what are the things that we as a state and that as a as a larger democracy, we should be thinking about. What kind of institutions did we not have that maybe we should consider building right now?

[0:30:16 Speaker 0] Thank you, Jeremy. And many of these came up already. And so I’ll highlight a few, uh, again here the interconnected and fragility of our systems. I mean, these are highly complex systems, and they need constant vigilance at at all levels. You know, you can’t step aside and and hope it exists because, you know, these systems exist in within natural systems right there, constantly being, you know, bombarded if you will buy, You know, all kinds of unexpected and and rare events which are increasing in frequency. Right. And, you know, again we have to keep in mind that we are a summer Peking system. Typically, we encounter in our archive grid in taxes. Typically, our issues are in summer, and we know for sure. You know, summer events are going to get more and more extreme, and we have struggled every almost every single year in the last several years. And we have been on the edge on our toes every year. Behave and we have enough resources to meet, meet. And now we’re seeing really the ugliness of it play out in a in a winter. And that just tells you, you know, that that here in this system, we are going to be dealing with both ends of it. It raises all sorts of very important and challenging technology, engineering and design questions. It’s it’s a It’s a topic for detailed discussion some other time. But, you know, that’s that’s something that certainly is very relevant in terms of, you know, lessons learned planning and preparation ahead of time. I, you know, already alluded to that prediction and precaution. Uh, you know, at different time scales, right? You know, not just years and months ahead, but also in leading, you know, days into it, right in knowing, I mean what this is told us that things can go wrong and layer onto each other very quickly. And so every single part of the system needs to be mobilized and what was not what was least mobilized, and it will keep everybody wondering and shaking their heads, you know, could we just only we had bank more on demand or try to bring demand more into the picture days off. No, I’m not talking longer. term. So you know that you know, for customers, you know, it’s very hard to can get customers behavior change and messaging communication coordination, right? Individuals like, Hey, everybody else can cut and you know, why should I? But in events like this, there are ways to manage that. There are ways to communicate that there are ways to leverage that community field, which would you wouldn’t be able to do you normally in regular constructs. We already talked about market design there. There are great features to it. Yet extreme events like this require us to pay different types of attention, bring different types of, you know, constructs and potentially solutions to that. And and if that is what it takes to get the level of reliability that this community our society expects, then and then, so be it. And that’s that’s primal. It’s not, you know, it can be ideology of We must have, uh, completely regulated, or we must have a completely deregulated. That’s not where we start. We start at What is it that we want and expect from our in terms of reliability and quality of service, and then what it takes to get there and then finally, you know the resilience and fortitude of of our households and communities. We learn Germany that you know, we as households are resilient and be as individuals and and neighbors are connected and we care about our communities. And Zac’s poem really brings that to the fore in terms of you know, how. Events like this really make us go back and identify and connect back to our our nature to our existence and and bring everything we have within ourselves to get through this ourselves. But but also it’s a great reminder that we we are survivors. And but then also we also care of not just ourselves also about our communities.

[0:34:17 Speaker 1] That’s that’s so well said. And it’s another theme that we highlight every week and you’ve you’ve highlighted it so beautifully, Varun, which is that democracy is about freedom. But it’s also about the management of different interests and the balancing of different needs and the role of government in sometimes limiting some elements of freedom for the larger experience and and, um, enjoyment of freedom by by a larger number. Zachary Do you and your generation of intelligent emerging citizens how how has this event affected you gave us some insights into that in your poem. I think it would be helpful to close with the learning that’s occurred in the inspiration, perhaps for your generation from hearing maroon and understanding these issues. Yeah, I think that we’re in a very interesting period. I think that a lot of young people right now are really seeing how how these systems that have been in place since before our grandparents really, really, uh, came into the world, how those systems are really not permanent and how they can so easily change and and and how dependent they are on on outside factors. And and on the one hand, that’s very scary. It shows us how vulnerable our society is. But it’s also very hopeful because there’s a lot of space to change these systems and to make them more resilient and to innovate. And I think young people today are not going to take these old traditional systems for granted. I think we’re really going to bring a different perspective to these issues, right. I think you’ve learned that the power just doesn’t magically emerge in your house. It doesn’t just magically get their Veru and I think, like like Zachary and like me. And like many of our listeners, you’re you’re an optimist. It’s one of the reasons I love being your colleague and friend. Um, just to close. What are you most optimistic about right now?

[0:36:12 Speaker 0] I’m optimistic that, you know, we will learn from this this deep crisis, you know, as as communities, we have to take this experience and come out of this in terms of designing our system, better going back to what Zach said. It is something that we all forget. Is it? I mean, you know, our our utilities are workers, people who take care of this system. It is a very difficult and important job. It’s it’s a It’s a great reminder of the complexity but also of the commitment it is required at all single moments, every single time, and we take it for granted. And it’s a great reminder that what it takes to do that so for for us to both understand and engage more. And that is the one thing that you know, I really hope Jeremy comes out of. This is as individuals, households, families, neighbors as communities that v take the time and thought to understand and engage better in the system. And we don’t slide back into the comfort right and we will not and keeping engaged with our decision makers with our policymakers having our voices heard. You know, I mean this this series, this is democracy is a is a recognition of how important and how you know the foundational bedrock of everything is how individuals connecting and engaging with the system. And and I think this is deep enough that this will lead to some fundamental realignment and rethinking and re engagement, if you will, which which shortly is given the comfort and luxury we all have all the time. It works most of the time, so I think that is what I really hope our our level of engagement and commitment and a collective responsibility in taking this to a better place.

[0:38:10 Speaker 1] It’s such a vital point and and the perfect point to close on maroon. Many, many people who write about democracy across different time periods have made the point that the democracies are susceptible, uh, two crises, and they are susceptible to catastrophe because it’s such a complex system, it’s much more complex than an authoritarian system would be where you have one person in charge. But democracies also have historically an extraordinary capacity to learn, and they learn for just the reasons that you described and that you model Varun, which is the clear headed and really focused analysis of the events and taking from those events lessons to adjust, reform, experiment and not stay in the same place one was before. And I think this is such an exciting moment, stressful but also exciting moment for institutional reform. And it’s of course, what would you and I and so many scholars think about? And it’s what’s so exciting, I think for so many citizens right now to think about how we can reform and improve our democracy and energy is, I think, one of the most important areas. Varun. Thank you so much for sharing your insights with us sharing your experiences. I hope our our listeners will pay attention to your work and in particular to the work of the UTI Energy Institute, which is easy to find on the Web and always has exciting and interesting events. Thank you for joining us for.

[0:39:33 Speaker 0] Thank you so much, Jeremy. Thank you so much. Zach, your poem was very inspiring and I really enjoyed the discussion. Thank you for having

[0:39:41 Speaker 1] our pleasure. And yes, thank you to Zachary for his insightful poem. As always and thank you most of all to our listeners for joining us for this week of this is Democracy. Mhm. This podcast is produced by the Liberal Arts I. T s Development Studio and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. Music in this episode was written and recorded by Harris Komotini. Stay tuned for a new episode Every week you can find this is democracy on apple podcasts, Spotify and stitcher See you next time