This is Democracy – Episode 45: Iran: the Evolution of its Foreign Policy and the Implications for the United States

Unknown Speaker 0:05
This is Democracy,

Unknown Speaker 0:07
a podcast that explores the

Unknown Speaker 0:08
interracial intergenerational and intersection of unheard voices living in the world’s most influential democracy.

Jeremi Suri 0:20
Welcome to our new episode of This is Democracy. Today we’re going to discuss Iranian us relations and particular trying to understand the sources and nature of Iranian policymaking and the history of Iranian society as it relates to the United States. And we’re trying to get a better historical understanding of why the United States and Iran who were once allies seem to be so close to war repeatedly. In our current moment, we have with us an individual who’s doing some of the most exciting new rules

research on the history of the Middle East and Iranian policymaking in particular. This is Carl Forsberg. Carl is a PhD candidate here at the University of Texas. He has spent an extensive amount of time doing research in the Middle East, and he’s also spent time in Afghanistan and elsewhere, both as a scholar and as a policy advisor Carl, welcome.

Carl Forsberg 1:27
Thank you, Jeremy. Thanks for having me. I’m looking forward to our conversation. We are to before we turn to our discussion with Carl we have of course our scene setting poem for Mr. Zachary Siri. exactly what’s the title of your poem today? so wrong? so wrong okay. You’re not talking about me but about about the subject right. Okay. Let’s Let’s hear your poem.

Zachary Suri 1:51
When Cyrus the Great freed the Jews from Babylon, did he know how to mind international oil tankers. Does he know how to get millions of dollars taken away by American

bankers, when Persia was the only place where there was freedom carrying on wherever the Saudis the Qatar is the boom and bust riches, where it was the black gold the thousand foot ditches. When the world was vast and new and Persia built the bridges. Windsor seas lost their monopoly Windsor seas lost the Spartans images. When I was new in Persia through could they see the makings of drones shot down? With the makers of 1000 masterpieces the series of 1000 sites the writers of 1000 nights, were they plotting the terrorist bombings, the nuclear atomic frites to this year fearful faces today await the American frown? Do they see an American future in the mountains, the deserts and the fertile ground for the desert oasis of billionaire oligopolies our future bound, a realistic seek stability in the raging deserts of nomadic eternity, and the instant rise of glass torch towers that source in the sky and the decaying of carcasses of the dinosaurs that died? Are we doomed to ignore them?

diversity of our enemies for the comfort of outrageous maternity, Doom to wander fully armed between the oil rigs in the sand dune riches to fight for ages? First, the sand stretches between the pipelines that cross desertion? And how can we sit in our ignorant hatred stand in the muck of our fears inflated? How can we be so wrong about Arad, when I can taste the past and the future in the Persian food of an Iranian Los Angeles restaurant? When I can taste the sweet the spice of a people so misunderstood?

Jeremi Suri 3:28
I like exactly how you go from Cyrus and the history of Iran’s to contemporary cuisine. I like those connections, what is your poem about?

Zachary Suri 3:41
my poem is really about how, how much of around and around history and diverse culture we just ignore. And we think of around such simple terms. And we think of it all as something that is malicious and out to get us. But but we don’t understand how diverse how varied and also how how vast event is how different it is from countries like Saudi Arabia, which are simply organized around? Well, sure. Sure.

Jeremi Suri 4:10
Well, that’s the perfect place to turn to our expert Carl Forsberg, Carl, how should we understand as Americans, the roots of Iranian foreign policy making and Iran’s view of its larger region?

Carl Forsberg 4:26
Right, well, that was a great film, Zachary. I really enjoyed that. I look forward to reading it again. Yeah, that’s a great question. Jeremy, what are really the roots of Iranian foreign policy? Well, obviously before 1979 Iran was around was a strong allies, United States. And that changed very abruptly, during and after the Iranian Revolution. Iranian foreign policy today’s like the foreign policy of any country has multiple traditions, right? I’ll talk about to the dominant would be the traditional call feminism, legacy, evangelist, Khomeini, but there’s also a more pre medical, more pragmatic tradition in contemporary Iranian foreign policy making. Ayatollah Khomeini really is the founding father of Islamic Republic of Iran and had a deep impact on some Republic’s foreign policy. There’s several poverty principles to his foreign policy vision. One was a genuine non alignment, there were plenty of leaders in the Cold War, who called themselves not aligned. But how many took that I think, more seriously took that power than most did. This is a leader who actually refuse the help of both Soviets and knighted states at various points in fighting an existential war for survival with iraq during the 1980s. And I think there are very few Cold War leaders who went that far and there was not alignment. Another premise of commanders foreign policy was the principle of warning artists, essentially American hostility, Khomeini saw America as the successor to the Imperial traditions of Russia, the Soviet Union and the English as an imperialist force that sought not just to weaken Iran and make it economically independent, but also that pose a threat to Iran’s culture, to Iran authenticity to its very identity. In the terminology of Khomeini and the revolution, United States was the great Satan, the satanic resort, supported, of course, by little Satan of Israel. And so built into that tradition, there is this hostility, this sense that there is a conflict United States, the corollary of that is an attempt to break a perceived American hegemony in the Middle East, right, and attempt to essentially break the American Alliance system in Middle East on the premise that America uses its regimes in the region to weaken Iran. And the final premise else related to this of communism as a foreign policy tradition. Isn’t attempt to export the public revolution. Right? Yeah. Iraq and export the revolution, it will break America’s whole nother Middle Eastern countries. So just focusing on

Jeremi Suri 7:09
just focusing for a second carlon communism, to what extent was Islam or is Islam a motivating factor for for these three elements that you’ve covered? So well, particularly the anti Americanism?

Carl Forsberg 7:23
Right? Certainly, integral elements from any foreign policy committee was an Islamic cleric. His political vision had a number of influences, including actually he was a devotee of Plato, and is conceptually running constitution came from, in some ways, from places perception of the the guardians and the Republic. Wow. But as it as not running correct. He really was. his foreign policy thinking was connected to a belief that she is in the sheer religion was integral to Iran, the density that had to be protected if Iran was going to maintain its authenticity, if was going to resist the forces of foreign imperialism. So that that is really a shot through his vision of Iranian foreign policy, it’s shot through his vision of Iran influence in the region, because he did see Islam as a mechanism by which Iran could turn other Muslim countries in the Middle East away from United States and instead, reorient them towards the new regional order that had Iran at its center. I see.

Jeremi Suri 8:30
I see. So what about the pragmatic strain the other strain?

Carl Forsberg 8:35
Right. So the running constitution is a is a very interesting, fascinating thing from the standpoint of, of a podcast on democracy, because it’s sort of partially democratic and partially not. In addition to the Supreme Leader, Iran has elected president. And since 19, since the early 1990s. Three of a run for president Rafsanjani to somebody and more. So Mohammed Kazumi and Cassandra honey, have, in many ways, tried to develop a foreign policy alternative to that of humanism, which is sort of embodied by the Supreme Leader of the company since 1989. And by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard score, they want its president’s there, their elected leaders, and their foreign policy is focused much more on Iran economic growth on building good relations with the region, they still have a commitment to its not alignment, not entering alliances with other powers. But they focus much more pragmatic foreign policy that increases our arms trade, its access to markets across Asia in particular. And that sought these decent relations with us in order to remove a lot of the the crippling effects of neurons of the isolation that the communist tradition has brought on Iran through some segments and with the United States. So there’s been this struggle from the 1990s, between Iran president and the Supreme Leader over to some with different visions of foreign policy.

Jeremi Suri 10:11
And has this Carl been a reason why, at times, Iranian foreign policy seems to go in two directions at once. Both negotiating and continuing to support terrorism.

Carl Forsberg 10:24
That’s right. That’s a key part of it. A key part of it is in the constitutional structure of the Republic of Iran, the way that it gives, basically, think about the American Supreme Court given half of the prerogative of the American president, right, and it sort of weekend president, the other half of those prerogatives. And you get a even more convoluted foreign policy from the US House

Jeremi Suri 10:46
today. It’s hard to imagine.

Carl Forsberg 10:50
Right? Yeah, so the Iranian Revolutionary Guard score has a foreign policy that is completely independent cruelty free from the foreign policy that’s pursued by Iran, presidents.

Jeremi Suri 11:00
I see. And how has the this bifurcated arranging approach to the world changed over time and its relationship with the United States? Obviously, before Khamenei before 79, Iran? Is it close ally of the US for reasons you described? So well, post 79? There’s the beginnings of major conflict between the US and Iran. How has that story of us American us Iranian rivalry, how has that varied or evolved in the last four decades?

Carl Forsberg 11:33
Right? In some ways, for decades, I will seem like a story of the same. The same dynamic of escalation and de escalation repeating itself. with only minor variation, the start, of course, 1979 with Iran hostage crisis, that was a study from the American public standpoint, that was a shocking event, which started America’s relationship. This is a republic on a very bad note. was interesting if you go back and actually look into the thinking of the Carter or the reagan administration’s is the extent to which at least until 1987, both of those administration’s hope that they could quickly get over the cynical effects of the Iran hostage crisis. And ultimately, Carter and Reagan both believes that the Khomeini wasn’t really going to be around long that he was an aberration they couldn’t conceive of this strange, difficult to understand Iranian correct, leading a modern government. And they were convinced that they would soon be a more pragmatic, straight and running in foreign policy that would take over and so they actually kept trying to find means to at least develop cordial relations, at least until around 1987. The failure of the Iran Contra effort did a lot to push the Reagan administration to a antagonistic relationship with Iran.

Jeremi Suri 12:58
And just just called it

Just to articulate for our listeners, the Iran Contra experience was the effort by the United States to negotiate with Iran for the release of American hostages held in Lebanon and elsewhere by sending secretly arms to Iran. And the revenue from those arms sales to Iran were not only used to help release hostages, but also to fund contract forces in Nicaragua. I just just wanted to articulate that not everyone knows the background of iran contra. Sorry about that continue. In addition, there were some within the National Security Council who believe that the arm sales to Iran in iran contra

Carl Forsberg 13:42
scandal were also a potential opening to the Iranian government rather, that they could start a diplomatic dialogue that might lead to better relationship. So that I mean, the current situation with Iranian mind sitting ships and Straits of Hormuz actually has some real parallel to the situation. 1987 1988 when run in the US were engaged in the so called tanker war, as Iran tried to cut Iraq’s exports of oil during the iran iraq war. The US saw that as a fundamental infringement on the rights of free navigation in the Persian Gulf and intervenes after there was an incident in which an Iranian mind struck and newly sunk in American destroyer. In retaliation. The United States Navy in the course of half a day sunk about half of the Iranian Navy, there was a huge blow to Iran militarily, which played some role in convincing Ayatollah Khomeini to find the end the eight year war with Iraq. I see. So the current situation has these interesting historical resonances with things that happened in the 1980s like the tank the war, like the American operation to disable you on NaVi JDs, right, and the continued to be some attempts at reproach month, as well as moves towards new sanction in the 1990s. Iran’s president Mohammed Kazemi, who was in office from 1997 to 2005, made a very serious effort to improve relations with the US. Initially, the US intervention in Afghanistan to drive up the Taliban to appear to offer a real opportunity for better us Iran relations. us in Iran collaborated in 2001, at a conference in Bonn, Germany, in putting in place a new Act and government that was acceptable to both Iran and the United States, and that appeared to be a real move forward. But several months later, President George W. Bush included Iran and the axis Axis of Evil, and that, in some ways started into this this potential opening. And then in the mid to end, around 2003 to 2005. The US war in Iraq and development Iranian nuclear program started another move towards towards confrontation and other development of escalation in the US wrong relationship. March 10 years very 10 us wrong relations until 2015, when the Obama administration negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, essentially, the Iran nuclear deal that has been in the news so much, which marked it seems in 2015, and potentially more positive phase in US Ron relations.

Jeremi Suri 16:32
Carl, it seems in this really thoughtful and informative overview you’ve given us here, that we seem stuck in this pattern of hostility, followed by a slight warming of relations and a return then to hostility. And it seems as if, in a sense, there’s similar factors on both sides that you haven’t ran as you’ve described, a bifurcated regime. And in the United States, you have a constant back and forth between different parties, and different conceptions of whether a Rand can be a partner or whether Iran is the foremost threat in the region to the United States. Why are we in this ping pong game?

Carl Forsberg 17:16
That’s right. I think there are certainly structural factors that are preventing any real reapportionment. As we discussed in the Iranian side that includes the legacy of communism in South Asian to the America to American power. The US side, there’s the built up, especially amongst those who call themselves Ron hawks have built up resentment of running actions over the past 40 years. Another real structural factor locking us in Iran and confrontation is the nature of us Alliance system, the Middle East. The US is chief allies, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, and also Egypt and Jordan, though they’re somewhat less concerned than

the Saudis numerati.

Jeremi Suri 17:58
This is what your book is, the book you’re writing is about this. In fact,

Carl Forsberg 18:01
that’s why this is a system that develops the 1970s to constrain Soviet power and starts to pivot 1980s to constraining Iranian power in the Middle East. So there’s an entire US line system that increasingly is defined by its opposition to Iranian power in the Middle East. And so even if the US bilaterally attempt attempts to improve relations with Iran, there’s still that aligned system pulling the US back towards confrontation. And I think this was really evident in the aftermath of the 2015, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was violently imposed by the Saudis numerati and the Israeli government. And the opposition of those three governments. I think there’s a lot to explain why individuals in the Trump administration were so willing to walk away from the deal and to move back towards confrontation, because they had they had heard the opposition, the objections, the protest to these allies for several years before demonstration to power.

Jeremi Suri 19:01
I see. I see. I think Zachary has a question. Zachary.

Zachary Suri 19:04
You talked about how Iran and the United States have been in this sort of back and forth since the 1980s. How you explain that? A lot of it is the sort of bifurcation of the two for the two countries foreign policies. But is there also an issue of, of holdouts of foreign policy people from the 1980s, who are still locked themselves on on on the opposite country? Is that a serious problem now? foreign policy?

Carl Forsberg 19:40
Yeah, that’s an excellent question, Zachary. That’s, I think, a big issue for both Iranian and for American foreign policy. The individuals who are leading Iranian foreign policy wish those who were in the first generation of revolutionary leaders shape with experts in the 1980s, including the leaders of the Iranian Revolution guards corner, simply United States, neocons, the neoconservative move, the United States really rose in the 1980s. And a lot of neoconservatives paid very close attention to what Obama’s doing in the 1980s. And they remember, particularly clearly incidents like the 1983, embassy and barracks bombing in Beirut, which was linked to the Iranians, they remember the experience of the tanker wars. And so there’s an extent to which on both sides, there are a lot of policymakers who are still locked in the mindset of the 1980s. And that continues, those memories. And that perception of conflict continues to influence foreign policy on both sides.

Jeremi Suri 20:48
And Carl, do you see that changing? Is there? Evidence of generational changes, a lot of scholarship, of course, on the demographic changes within Iran itself. It’s a very young male population. And of course, the United States is moving into a moment. Now, we’ve talked about this a number of times on the podcast, where there’ll be more millennials than baby boomers within actually a few months in the United States. So do you see that really responding to and moving us out of this moment to do exactly I’ve been discussing where we have these holdouts from an older period always stuck where we are for the foreseeable future.

Carl Forsberg 21:28
Perhaps it offers change, I’m somewhat more pessimistic about there is a generational change, in large part because institutions often advance and change people from a younger generation, and they move through them. In the case of Iran. There’s the younger generation of people who will, assuming the current power structure stays in place who will take over are those who have come to the system who’ve gone to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards core and to step up to take the place of those older than, than that there’s a real question around what happens when the current supreme leader is or how many believe whether he’ll be replaced by some of the different view but I’m ultimately not entirely confident that his successor will be any different. On the side of America’s Middle Eastern allies, we’ve actually seen in the case of Saudi Arabia, that the new millennial generation is even more bellicose. Right, then right there forbearers? Certainly Mohammed Mohammed bin Solomon is, in some ways, is an aberration from a very constant tradition of Saudi Foreign Policy. His generation of Saudis that has led the state has King Feisal on his actually generally been pretty conscious. And Mohammed bin Solomon says none of the caution he says, recklessness. And you might even say the same facilities partners on the American side. Mr. Kitchener, our middle east envoys of the same duration and seems just share some of his studying or lock eaters. Taste for big grand confrontational, I guess. Yes. But it comes to the United side of relationship. So I’m not entirely sure that is going to be the solution to the current crisis in us around relations.

Jeremi Suri 23:24
Yeah, it’s a very good point about how institutions socialize new generations to, in a sense, replay many of the same issues. Exactly.

Zachary Suri 23:33
Why is the United States focused so much and and really drilled in on on Iran for its sponsoring of terrorism in the Middle East and abroad, when at the same time the United States is allied itself with Saudi Arabia who has supported such terrorist acts as even like 911? In the United States?

Carl Forsberg 23:58
Right, that’s another great question, Zachary. Certainly. The Saudis have generally have links to Sunni terrorist groups, which are generally very hostile to Iran. So all kinds of for example, is a group that hostile to Iran, ISIS, it was a group that the Iranian government solves a tremendous threat, right. I mean, part of part of this, of course, is that nations fixate more on the labeled terrorists to describe groups that they’re politically opposed to the part of it developed for the influences once again, of the US line system, Middle East, the influence of our allies, in shaping our perceptions of what our terrorist threats are. Much of our alarm about terrorism by hoody militias in Yemen is the direct result of Saudi paranoia about the situation in Yemen. The same goes I mean, some of the groups that are being described as subversive actors in Iraq are, in fact, elements of the Iraqi military that the United States itself helped create, right, in the early 2000s. So yeah, it’s I think it’s a large part because our allies, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Israel and the case of Hezbollah have played an important role in focusing our attention on these heavy back groups.

Jeremi Suri 25:29
Right. And then there’s the assumption, it seems this is in your own research, Carl, that even if Saudi elements have supported certain terrorist groups, there’s a belief that the Saudi leadership is on the side of the United States where there’s the opposite view of Iran. So we accept more Saudi bifurcation of policymaking than we will in the case of Iran, it seems to me, right.

Carl Forsberg 25:53
That’s right. And the Saudis are very effective at putting forth their view, for over 50 Saudi foreign policies and fixated above all on keeping it states as a dependable protector of the kingdom. And so they’re able to go to great lengths. They understand the political system very well, and are very good at convincing united states that ultimately, they are on our side, and they are serving our interests in the Middle East and across the globe.

Jeremi Suri 26:18
Right. Right. And and just to come back to something Zachary said in his excellent question, we should be clear that for 911, there were Saudi citizens who were involved, but but it does not appear the Saudi government was responsible for that. And that’s also what makes this complicated, but the Saudi fingerprints on a lot of things. But it’s harder to attribute Saudi responsibility than it sometimes is to Iran, when we know that, as you said, for reasons related to Iranian foreign policy, going back to the 1970s has been support for groups groups like Hezbollah, and others. Carl, how do we move forward out of this moment, our podcast is about as you’ve done so well, in your discussion, elucidate how history explains the moment we’re in. But we also seek historical knowledge to help move out of the moments of difficulty that we’re in. So how do you see this vast historical experience that you’ve studied and elucidated? How does it help us to think about Pathways Forward for us Iranian relations?

Carl Forsberg 27:20
Right. Right. Well, sometimes, statesmen ultimately have to wait for the right historical moments to make strides forward in remedying a antagonism is deepest step between the US and Iran. I’m not sure this isn’t a special moment, maybe I’m wrong, maybe they’ll be a breakthrough in the next couple of years. So in part, it might just be waiting to the right moment is interesting question whether 2014 to 15 was one of those moments, and whether the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action could really have led to a fundamental change in us wrong relation, but obviously didn’t maybe it could have. My view is that a real rapprochements the US and Iran ultimately requires not just a bilateral reconciliation, but also requires reconciling Iran with us is regional Alliance system. And the reality is, as much as some would like for us to walk away from Saudi Arabia, the Emirati, it’s probably not going to happen anytime soon, at least in the US, and they won’t walk away from Israel. These are deeply institutional institutionalized alliances. I had the questions whether the US can actually instead of allowing its allies and sort of hide behind the ages of American protection, push them to actually have more investment in more of a state in some sort of a regional improvement relations with Iran. It’s not unprecedented the 1990s there was a genuine improvement in Irani Iranian Saudi relation. So it’s happened even under the Islamic Republic. And and I think, because of the power of these allies over over American foreign policy, there needs to be some attempt to get them invested in a regional settlement of the myriad outstanding points of conflict between the US Alliance system and, and Iran.

Jeremi Suri 29:10
And do you see the changes in the uses of hydrocarbons in the United States, the movement toward what really is a return, in fact, to American greater independence from energy resources from the region? Do you see that as contributing to this process?

Carl Forsberg 29:29
It could, it certainly decreases America’s dependence on oil producing states in the Middle East. Of course, in the 1950s, and 60s, America was also energy independent, but still had a very strong stake in protecting Saudi Arabia simply because oil is a global commodity. And even if the US is an oil independent, there’s still a stake in the question of global stability and energy prices. So I’m not sure that that yesterday and pen is completely reorient the US is relations with Saudi Arabia and Emirates and other regional oil producing countries. But it does offer us I think, a bit more policy flexibility.

Jeremi Suri 30:16
Right. Right. What What is your advice, Carl, for young people, young citizens who are interested in these issues? First, how can they stay better informed? Because what you’ve done is, is really described a more complex world than one really can understand even reading major newspapers. And then second, what can one do to encourage a movement toward a rethinking of the Alliance system in the way that you’re describing it?

Carl Forsberg 30:49
Right? Well, I would certainly make the case for reading history as first step for people of my generation. But answer the are extremely complex questions which have extremely convoluted histories, which even even a 30 minute podcast is hard pressed to fully make sense of. And so I think just understanding a lot of these complexities, is a place to begin understanding the broad history of the region, not just the last 50 years, Middle Eastern history, but understanding the last several centuries, it changes our perspective from seeing the Middle East as the region, as many people do that’s inherently violent. If you look at the last three 400 years, actually, the Middle East is the region that’s been, as hadn’t more constantly piece than Western Europe has been Yes, good point. And, and so I think that broader perspective is also important to understand the diversity of the Middle East, but it is an extremely diverse, complicated society is a good place to start. And I think I mean, that just that basic understanding of the a fundamental starting point, as well as they’re traveling to the region, when it comes down to it, I’ve certainly found that Middle East is not half as dangerous as Americans often think it is, right? And then that travel allows you to engage with people in the region, share perspectives, both epsilon help them understand American perspectives, as well, and perhaps do something to defuse Middle Eastern beliefs and all sorts of conspiracies about the nature of American and power and intentions in the region. So I think I think travel to the middle is another great thing that people generation can do.

Jeremi Suri 32:40
And it sounds like what you’re saying, and this is this is really been a theme throughout all of your comments, is that we have to move beyond many of the simplified categories and stereotypes many surrounding views of Islam of use of societies like Iran, and try to push ourselves to at the very least understand why they do what they do. Before we think about how we should react and comment on it really to empathize with these incredibly sophisticated societies.

Carl Forsberg 33:12
That’s right, right. And the way they see our society is often very different in the way we see it. That’s absolutely critical.

Jeremi Suri 33:18
Absolutely. Zachary, do you see your generation of young up and comers capable of seeing and understanding the region in a more sophisticated way? Or are we as Carl said earlier, recreating old views in our institutions,

Zachary Suri 33:35
I think there is a, there is a chance that our generation can be changed makers, I think, simply because we’re a much more connected generation and not connected among leaders, but connected among ordinary people. And I think, once united people in America are able to start connecting on a very personal level with people in countries like Iran, or Saudi Arabia, I think will really understand their society, he’s better, but at the same time, I really do think that because of the lack of education, and many of these issues, many young Americans like myself feel and play to those stereotypes and, and think of and think of the United States as a benevolent actor solely in the, in the, in the Middle East, and ignore the complications of the societies. And, and, and, and don’t see the history of how the United States has has interfered in the region, but at the same time interacted with other countries. Right.

Jeremi Suri 34:37
Right, right. So in a sense, our agenda should involve finding a way to better educate ourselves and make this a part of our daily understanding and learning with regard to the wider world that if we’re going to be global, we need to be better informed

Zachary Suri 34:50
well, to make American foreign policy, something that’s taught in history class, even when we’re not at war, right, when it’s not about either skipping from war to war, when it’s actually about what is American foreign policy bit.

Jeremi Suri 35:02
Right. Well, and this is where your work, Carl is so important, really opening our understanding to this region in a way that if you have before and providing access through your writing, Carl Forsberg, we’ve been very fortunate to have you on today. Thank you for joining us.

Carl Forsberg 35:21
Thank you so much, Jeremy, for having me. It’s been a pleasure.

Jeremi Suri 35:23
Ours as well and Zachary, thank you as always for your poem and your comments. I think today we’ve learned the importance of digging deeper, beyond the headlines and really looking for historical roots that can also be roots of forward movement in combative and contested relations between major societies like the US and around, and there is an optimistic future based upon a more sophisticated understanding of the democratic and non democratic elements of the societies. Thank you for joining us today on this is democracy.

Unknown Speaker 36:06
This podcast is produced by the liberal arts development studio and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin.

Unknown Speaker 36:13
The music in this episode was written and recorded by Harrison Lemke and you can find his music at Harrison lemke.com.

Unknown Speaker 36:20
subscribe and stay tuned for a new episode every Thursday featuring new perspectives on democracy