Episode 16: Military Pension Policy (with Dr. Brandon Archuleta)

[0:00:06 Speaker 0] Hi and welcome to the policy agendas podcast. My name is Brooke Shannon on the policy manager of the P A P. Housed here at UT Austin today. I’m joined with Laura De Castro Quaglia. Hey, Laura. Hi, Brooke. Thanks for having me. Absolutely. And our guest today is Dr Brandon Archuletta. He is Be a sorry. He is a U S. Army strategist. He’s a Clement Center national security fellow. He’s a council on Foreign Relations International affairs fellow. And he got his PhD here at UT as well. Welcome, Random. Thanks so much for being here.

[0:00:42 Speaker 1] Yeah, Broken. Laura. Thanks so much for having me. I really appreciate it.

[0:00:46 Speaker 0] Absolutely. So we’re here today to discuss your new book called 20 Years of Service. The Politics of Military Pension Policy and The Long Road to Reform.

[0:00:56 Speaker 1] Yeah, I’m really excited before we get started. Let me just say that we’re discussing my book. These views are my own and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U. S. Army, the Department of Defense or the U. S. Government.

[0:01:11 Speaker 0] Well, right. So, like to start, I guess we wanted to know. How did the idea of the book come about. Were you interested in military pensions policy before joining the PhD program? Or was this like an idea that you developed as you learn more about subsystems, theory and tragically been theory.

[0:01:29 Speaker 1] So it was. It started in its in its incipient form as a seminar paper in, uh, course on defense policy, the LBJ School, uh, public public Affairs, UT Austin, and, um, I was broadly interested in in military personnel policy writ large. And what I found is that you can’t really addressed the problems with the military personnel system until you address and understand the military pension system, because the military’s rigid up and out promotion system is tied to its, uh uh, 20 year cliff vested pension policy. And so I thought if you if you really wanted to understand personnel, you really you really have to dig into pension policy. Onda. As I started to do that in our Mutual mentor, Brian Jones, is, uh, graduate seminar on public policy process. I started to realize that that’s what I have Here is a subsystem story, and that’s really where I wanted to go with this. Uh, because the book is as much about policy Stasis as it is about policy change.

[0:02:39 Speaker 0] Mhm, awesome. I think that’s a really great place to start talking about subsystems and policy change. Um, so I think it was really brilliant at the beginning of the book, you talk about how military pensions fit into this policy world at an intersection of social policy, economic and defense policy. Um, so how do military pensions, like, fit into the larger the larger story? This subsystem? How is it affected by the larger story of policy? Particularly like this top down hierarchy that characterizes defense, the Department of Defense and military policy in

[0:03:18 Speaker 1] general? Yes. So the Pentagon is often, uh, considered this like five side of five sided puzzle palace on ditz. You know, the policy making process in the Pentagon is really mysterious, and and so few people have access to the Pentagon and understand the the machinations of senior Pentagon officials and defense policy makers. And so, in trying to understand how the Pentagon puts policy together, especially as it relates toe military pension policy, which, as you rightly note, is at this really interesting intersection of of U. S. Defense, social and economic policy. I thought that I had to get inside the subsystem and understand the processes by which the subsystem, uh, delivers policy outputs and outcomes for it’s a target population, in this case, military retirees, veterans and their families on DSO. What I found is that rather than a a top down driven, uh, policy making process that you know, directed from upon high by by senior Pentagon officials, what I found was a much more of a a closed network of of stakeholders in the military pension policy space. And that is essentially what a policy subsystem is on gets the push and pull within the subsystem that maintained the pension policy status quo from 1948 to the 2018. And in examining military pension policy, uh, there seem to be so many problems with the system as it stood for so long with regard to affordability, uh, equity and, uh, re sourcing that. It just seemed to me strange that despite all these apparent problems, there have been no substantive policy change in 70 years on. So that’s when I decided toe get inside the subsystem and understand policy Stasis. What are the forces that play that maintained the pension policy status quo for for 70 years. And that’s essentially that. The research question for the book. But as I was completing the dissertation in 2015, lo and behold, Congress and its infinite wisdom changed military pension policy. And so when I was adapting the dissertation into the book manuscript, I realized here that I had to tell the story of policy change. And so the second research question that I explore in the book is is how to these subsystems breakdown Andi and lead to policy change by way of information over supply and blue ribbon commissions and so forth. So it really is a story of both Stasis and change.

[0:06:12 Speaker 0] Yeah, absolutely, um, in the development of this policy, Stasis right. Like over this 70 years of the pension system, seeming to be like this unchanging status quo. Unchangeable, Um, it seemed as though, like the parts of the subsystem, they effectively minimized the scope of the conflict and the and the voices in the conversation as, um as like, leaders in the conversation typically do right by. They really consolidated the actors they removed, like change agents in a way, um outside of these, like the small group of actors that you mentioned. So by removing change agents like social movements and and protests and things, Um, is that sort of the cause for the Stasis? Or is it sort of like like an organizational like identification with the means, etcetera. What do you

[0:07:10 Speaker 1] think? I think it’s both, you know, structural and institutional, and one senses you alluded. And then there’s also this, um uh ah story here about minimizing policy conflict which is is absolutely right and part parcel to the the pension policy story throughout American history. So what we find is that the subsystem has, uh, basically framed military pensions over the course of American history. In terms of recruiting citizens in the military service. They framed it as a means to retain mid career professionals in the ranks. Uh, especially during wartime. They’ve framed it as separating the senior most service members from the military in orderto refresh the ranks and and, you know, promote the new blood and keep the military service young and vigorous, so to speak. And also it’s a means by which to reward veterans and service members for their, um for their their service and sacrifice almost like a sacred obligation. And so the in terms of the institutional structural forces at play they have. They have leveraged the policy image of an advantage target population over the course of American history to frame the pension system in a way that is most advantageous to whatever the defense community needs at that given point in time. So is it a Is it a means to recruit soldiers in the service in the in the midst of war as, uh, President Lincoln and Congress did in 18 61 toe build a Union Army? Or is it a means by which to retain? Uh, you know, the ranks in the midst of a conflict like General Washington and the Continental Continental Congress used during the harsh Valley Forge winter of 17 76 17 77 eso These are some of the the questions that I that I deal with in the book, Um, and in terms of the policy conflict, what we find is that these subsystems are basically a means by which stakeholders close access to two other uh interested parties. And so Daniel Cool, whose work I cite in the book quite extensively, has essentially argued that an autonomous policy subsystem is one that virtually contains policy on one side of an issue in the face of of weak opposition. And so what we find repeatedly throughout American history is that there are few opposing forces willing thio or interested in standing up to the military personnel policy subsystem and say that veterans air getting, uh, too much support from the government. They’re benefiting from too much government largesse. And you know, we shouldn’t thank them for their service and and all the rest of it. That just doesn’t happen. It’s a political loser in American politics today. In fact, more often than not, people are falling all over themselves to think veterans for their service and to provide the military and veterans with even mawr government largesse and benefits, even in the face of, uh, tough budget. Ah, tough budget environment. And so that’s how the autonomous policy subsystem basically minimizes policy conflict. It’s by excluding uh, opposition, uh, from the policy making process.

[0:10:35 Speaker 0] So what changed in all of that, then, to sort of forced to change by Congress after 40 years of Stasis?

[0:10:42 Speaker 1] Yeah, so a few things happened. So in the, uh, you know, tail end of the Bush administration into the Obama administration. Uh, in the midst of the financial crisis of 2000 and 2009, we start to see, uh, the effects of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan take their toll on, uh, the U. S defense budget. And so this is having a multiplier effect on the pension system. So the Bush administration had had given service members consistent pay raises throughout the wars. Understandably so, uh, Thio to retain people in the ranks. And as we’re fighting the war on terror, uh, you know, all around the world, um and so what we see here is that the pension system is become so costly, it’s only second to basic pay for service members. Um, you know, across the O. D. And so the price of per soldier is skyrocketing in the midst of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Retirees or I should say, service members who are eligible for retirement end up staying longer, increasing their pension in the midst of the wars because they want to continue serving. Um, you know, the D. O. D. Board of actuaries, Makesem. Faulty actuarial assumptions about risk and rates of return. Um, the all these pay raises lead to a significant multiplier effect because the the pension at the time was, ah, product of a service members the average product or service members high three, uh, in salary. So somebody who had served, uh, for, you know, a lieutenant colonel who was retiring after 20 years of service was gonna be getting about $50,000 a year, Uh, in his annual pension, which would be adjustable to inflation and linked to the consumer price index over time. So, you know, over the course of his lifetime, you know, Lieutenant Colonel who retired, um, with 20 years of service at $50,000 in his pension, you know, he might be 80 years old, receiving, ah benefit from 40 years, uh, for just 20 years of service and his pension at that point might be, you know, could be close to 65 or $70,000 a year, depending on inflation and the consumer price index. Um, so the cost just got exorbitant. And then there’s this other question about equity and, uh, and justice, uh, so here we see the young service members in Iraq and Afghanistan doing, uh, multiple combat tours overseas. Many of them are coming back with their bodies broken and they’ve just had enough. They’ve served their country for, you know, 8, 10 years. They’ve done three or four combat tours, and they decided it’s time to move on with our lives. Well, they would leave the service with no pension benefit whatsoever, because at the time, the military pension was a 20 year, uh defined benefit program that cliff vested a 20 years of service. So, uh, anyone who left the service 19 years and 364 days, for whatever reason, would get no pension whatsoever. So there’s this question about equity for the 9 11 generation of veterans. So in the midst of the 2010 budget battles, Congress is looking for ways to, uh, address the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the subsequent sequestration, and what the budget chair chairs at the time. Senator Patty Murray of Washington and representative Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, before he becomes speaker, broker what was considered the Ryan Murray budget deal of 2013 and, uh, in the negotiations they agreed to a 1% reduction in the rate of growth in in military and veterans pensions. And the veterans community went nuts. Thieve veteran service organizations cried foul like said that this was, you know, breaking faith with the troops and Congress was, you know, defying their sacred obligation. And so Congress had at the same time decided to commission a blue ribbon Commission Charter Blue Room Commission titled The Military Compensation and Retirement, Modernization and Commission, otherwise known as the McCormick. And this McCormick was a ah standard blue ribbon commission. The president appointed the chair, and then members of Congress leadership appointed, uh, the bipartisan members to the commission. And so what we see is that the commission, uh, was under the control of an active activist chairman. They went about an inclusive information gathering process, and they had a coherent political strategy moving forward. And so what they did was they flooded the subsystem with new information. They changed the policy frames, they altered the policy. Um, is, uh, they focused on equity and affordability, um, at the expense of the service members who who served 20 years. Um and so what we see is that they reframed the policy discussion and their unanimous set of recommendations become the focal point for policy change. And in reshaping the reframing, the policy discussion and reframing these images, the McCormick as a you know, an information gathering commission is able to create a cleavage between the baby boom generation of veterans who are a retirees or benefiting from the, uh, the pensions policy status quo and the 9 11 generation of veterans who are not benefiting from the status quo. And in identifying that cleavage, they split the political opposition in the veterans community and set the conditions. Uh, you know, they essentially, uh, Aziz Kingdom would say, open the policy window for for change, right?

[0:16:48 Speaker 0] Right. Um so I guess like this, the subject of military pension policy falls into this really interesting intersection of issue ownership. And it says that traditionally, as faras issue ownership, coast Republicans were generally seen as fiscally conservative. But they tend to favor spending on defense, especially after 9 11. And on the other hand, we have Democrats that traditionally favor welfare spending, which touches on pension and benefits. So how do you see the current polarization and increased partisanship in US politics affect military personal budget in the near future. And I guess also in defense budget as a whole.

[0:17:28 Speaker 1] Yeah, that’s a great question, Laura. So I think one of the virtues of being, uh, the most respected institution America, you know, the U. S. Military benefits from bipartisan support across Congress and across the country. And that often does lead to generous defense budgets, generous defense spending, generous military personnel. Uh um uh, spending. And, um, it’s part of the cost of of fielding an all volunteer force for today’s military. So the virtue here is that this is a bipartisan issue. Everybody wants to support the troops. Everybody wants to thank the troops for their service. Everybody wants to make sure that service members and their families were taken care of because this is the 1% of American society that’s going to go and fight in our wars. You know, if there were called into action eso the challenge is not so much, um, breaking through the partisan, uh, infighting. Um, the challenge is to identifying the priorities for US national security policy moving forward, in which instruments three U. S. Government should, uh, leverage or employees or emphasize at any given point in time. Um, you know, over the past 20 years, Aziz, you said, uh, you know, the Republican Party has his favorite a military first approach to US foreign policy. And, uh, Democrats have favored a diplomacy and economic approach to US foreign policy. There’s no right or wrong answer. This is the policy making process that that give and take in the push to pull among the national security inteligencia, so to speak. Uh, so the challenge is, I think going forward is that the military has benefited from a great deal of budgetary support from the Trump administration for the past four years. Defense budgets upwards of $700 billion and what I think is clear that these air this is likely the high water mark for a long time in U. S. Defense spending. And it’s given defense policy makers an opportunity to, uh, uh, focus on modernization of equipment. It’s given defense of policymakers and opportunity to emphasize training and readiness for for threats over the horizon. And it’s also given us an opportunity to make sure that that veterans, the military servicemen and veterans and families were all taken care of with with the sort of, uh, compensation benefits that taken, you know, live a comfortable lifestyle and raise a family and and probably served their country. Um, now, the challenge as a Zaev alluded to going forward is going to be how we shape the defense budget for 2021 beyond. No matter who wins three election in November, Uh, the cove in 19 Pandemic has clearly place, um, physical constraints on the United States going forward and one, um, victim of that might be the U. S. Defense budget. So there are defense policy makers who are actively thinking about and discussing what defense cuts could look like going into the next decade, where the Pentagon needs to double down on the investments already made, uh, to see these modernization and readiness investments through to the end and where they can pull back on the gas step on the brake and put a pause on some programs or priorities that might be costly on, and not in the long term budget vision going forward. So I think there is bipartisan consensus around, um, the problems that the United States faces going forward I think obviously the rise of China is among them. Um, So the challenge here is is, uh, rallying policymakers from Capitol Hill in the Pentagon, you know, the State Department, Treasury Department, and and making sure that they see the problems that the same way and that there’s a new strategy going forward that that emphasizes the the diplomatic intelligence, military, economic instruments of national power accordingly, uh, to meet that strategic vision.

[0:21:55 Speaker 0] Yeah. So speaking of speaking of this sort of budget tension, right, like with the pensions within the defense budget, largely, I think the view of social policy in general, Um, like the typical view is really framed by Scotch Post book on soldiers and mothers. Right? Um, pushing back at the reputation of the US as, like a laggard and social policy showing that these pensions, actually, especially in their creation, right? Like we’re quite robust to ensure that people who have served for the necessary length of time, the 20 years can live in a like a nice way. Um, do you think that do you think that that stands like within this partisan or the larger subsystem question right? That the motivation and reputation sort of as pensions fits well into social policy. Or did you find in your piece in your book that that that was

[0:22:56 Speaker 1] challenged? No, I think it falls. Um, but it’s all about framing. So some folks wanna wanna frame military pensions and compensation benefits as a defense only issue which in some halls of Congress and in some halls of Pentagon, makes perfect sense. But then there’s this broader defense intellectual community that sees thes socioeconomic linkages to, uh, of military pensions, compensation, G I, bill benefits and so forth to broader defense spending and broader defense issues. So it’s really all about framing. Um, And you know, I I was very much inspired and true from Scotch Falls work on protecting soldiers, mothers. And, um, you know, Laura Jensen has done some amazing work on this to, and what I found is that there’s a great deal of of American political development, uh, research that informs this this contemporary discussion and that that US social policy is very much, um, part and parcel to US military policy throughout American history. And what I think it’s so funny is that, um, you know, the U. S. Military is one of the most, if not the most socialized, uh, institutions in America. Uh, when a young recruit reports to basic combat training, they will be issued. Um ah, full set of clothing. They’ll be given a place to sleep. They’ll be given a three square meals a day. Uh, they’ll receive a generous government paycheck. Relatively speaking, they’ll they’ll be best it into a a pension. Uh, they’ll receive, uh, access to, ah, universal healthcare that covers you from head to toe, top to bottom. Um, and they’ll get access Thio education benefits that air, um, far superior, uh, than many states offer, you know, in state students. And so, uh, you know, the military in so many ways offers wraparound services. The social policy scholars might might call them because the military needs to recruit and retain, um, you know, a slice of Americans for um, U s national defense, and we have found that the best way to do that in a competitive market based economy is to provide them with with everything they could possibly need in order to go and fight when America’s wars, Um, and a service member whose head is back home worried about pocketbook issues, is not leaning forward in the foxhole prepared Thio to take on the fight on DSO. That’s why taking care of soldiers is so important. Take care of soldiers, sailors, Marines, Airman, Coast, Guardsman so forth. It’s so important to senior military officials, senior Pentagon officials, because they understand that that you might recruit the individual service member. But you’re going to retain the family, and you retain the family through robust social spending through ah, family programs through a a culture that is family friendly, that is patriotic, that value service and so many other things. So it is. It’s impossible to excites the socioeconomic issues from US defense policy because people who scholars should do so. Our policymakers should do so would do that at their peril, because the all volunteer force is the backbone of America’s military, and America’s military is one of the key elements of U. S national security policy.

[0:26:39 Speaker 0] Right. Um, so I guess going back a bit like the process of writing the book on like the research for the book. Um, I think like the chapter five offers the main empirical contribution of the book. Right, because you delve into the military personnel sub sub system through elite interviews. Eso can you talk a bit about, like the process of getting those interviews? How easy was it to get access to these thes elites? And how do you think civilian scholars could go about getting similar access?

[0:27:14 Speaker 1] Yeah, that’s a great question. So when I first conceived of the project that I thought that this should be a mixed methods, um, research agenda that, you know, there’s probably data out there I could put together unique data set or I could I can scrape the data from here. There I can I can look at the policy agendas project for interesting, um, data points about roll call votes and, uh, media attention and headlines and so forth. Um, and then when I, uh or public opinion, so to speak was also one of my ideas. And then I spoke to our mutual friend and colleague Sam Workmen, who’s now at the University of Oklahoma. And he said, Well, what’s the story here who really matters? And I said, This is an elite story and in my view, and he said, Well, then dispense all the quantitative, um, portions of the manuscript and focus on on the the elites because if the elites make the policy, then that’s where the story is. And so it’s just so refreshing. Toe Have a, uh, you know, a scholar of Sam’s caliber who, uh, whose own work is rooted very much in, uh, in quantitative methods. But Thio encourage me actively encouraged me to go out and tell the qualitative story. And of course, Brian Jones was supportive on that front as well. And, um So in trying to understand the subsystem, I really had to, uh, to build a network. And what I realized is that the military personal policy subsystems I call it is really this insular Kabbalah actors and institutions that that maintain sort of like an ironclad grip on military pension policy. And so I began reaching out to different people. Uh, professor at Dorn at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, is a former undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness. So and he was on my dissertation committee and and I had taken his graduate seminar. And so having came in my corner was really helpful because I would I would reach out toe some of his old colleagues in Washington and let them know I was a student of adorns and they were really eager to talk to me. And so that creates sort of a snowball effect whereby you talked to one person and then you just asked them at the end of the interview. Who else should I talk to you? And they point you in different directions. And before you know it, you you you met everybody in the subsystem and nobody wants to be left out of the conversation. Uh, because they want to make sure that their narrative is shared. Um, in the book, they want to make sure that their institutional perspective is represented in the book. And, um, there were people who were reluctant to speak with me. But then, after they had heard that I had spoken to one of their colleagues and on Capitol Hill, or that I had spoken to somebody in the veteran service organizations, they’ve suddenly became very eager to talk to me because they realized that that everyone was talking to me, and so they needed to be part of this. And so, uh, what I find is that the the autonomous military personal policy subsystem, as I call it, you know, it’s, uh, composed of congressional staffers and members of the relevant committees of jurisdiction on Capitol Hill. Uh, Pentagon bureaucrats and Pentagon bureaucrats are twofold, right? There’s the civilian, uh, career civil servants and the civilian political appointees. And then also there’s the military bureaucracy, the uniform military bureaucracy, which is really important. Um, and within the Pentagon, there’s Undersecretariat for personal readiness, and all the services have their own manpower reserve affairs organizations. So those are the sub bureaus within the Pentagon they had to get to know. And then there were a number of intellectuals in the defense community at various think tanks in Washington D. C on what I found was that all these defense think tanks only employ one or two people who do person in military personal issues. Um, and then the veteran service organizations like the Military Officer Association, America, the Veterans of Foreign Wars or the American Legion. Um, those were all folks that I had to talk to and then and then the defense media, and that ranged from niche outlets like defense one or war on the rocks or, uh, these sort of national security. Uh uh, bloggers and websites that are really for the, you know, defense insiders, then also major national media outlets like The Washington Post, The New York Times. You know, they have columnists who cover national security defense issues who I spoke to for my book and so and doing the research. What I found is that too often policy scholars neglect the formation of policy subsystems. They see them as having occurred in a vacuum being formed in a vacuum, and and and we just see them, um, for what they are from afar. But when you actually get into the subsystem and you track, it’s its’s institutional development Over the course of American history, as I do in one of the chapters in the book, um, you can see how subsystems, uh, organized evolve and transform over time to take their present form. And I think that’s actually a contribution that that I make here in the book is that, uh, scholars who want to understand subsystems really have to understand how we how we got here. What’s the story that leads up to the present day subsystem and to do so, you gotta you gotta, uh, do some, uh, gum shoe leather investigating Thio. Get out into the subsystem and meet these elites and understand what they’re working on.

[0:32:50 Speaker 0] Yeah, that’s that’s a very interesting approach that you think. I think it works really well for for the book, Thio do it qualitatively Andi brought a lot of, like new information that you know, like e guess the national security policy studies field like step field. Very niche field. I guess, uh, is not really doesn’t really have or didn’t really have until you until this book. Um, look,

[0:33:15 Speaker 1] I I think you’re actually right, and that’s ah, that’s a problem with I think with, uh, policy studies field large is that we assume policy scholars have seated thes questions of foreign policy, defense policy, national security policy, thio ir scholars. Um and I think that’s problematic because our methods are approach. Our research questions are literature would have a great deal to say about, you know, the the institutions that and the actors that the process is, uh, that generate defense, foreign and national security policy. Eso I hope that this serves as some inspiration for scholars like you who are interested many of the same things to get out there and do the hard work because we shouldn’t, uh, see this sort of research toe ir scholars because, uh, you know, they’re not interested in the same questions that we are. They don’t have the same perspectives that we do. Um, so I think there’s there’s complimentary work to be done here.

[0:34:12 Speaker 0] Yeah, definitely, I guess. I think it was Amy’s eggert that sat in her in her 1999 book. Um, flawed by design that, you know, national security policy is really, uh should be studied by public policy scholars. But it’s as you said, dominated by ir ir scholars. And and we have this weird, uh, in this weird niche that we end up not really finding, Ah, I guess that answers to the questions that we have until we go out and do it. So I think like in the past 20 years, there has been some some development in that. But I think your book definitely contributes a lot for this because it’s not only, uh, very informative. It’s very accessible, like the language. Brooke and I were talking about this before. How, like the language is very approachable to political science scientists. Um, not only people who only focus on defense studies S O. Yeah, good job on writing, writing it that way. You think?

[0:35:14 Speaker 1] Thank you very much. And as I mentioned earlier, this is a ah subsystem story. So any any scholar who’s interested in policy subsystems, Um, what would find this interesting and accessible? And I think that you know, any any good policy scholarship needs to be broad and General Izabal in scope. And and that’s what I love about policy subsystems is that when you understand how they form and how they operate, uh, for someone like me who who’s spending his his career in government, um, you see them all around you, You understand how how toe get inside a subsystem, how the players work, how they operate, who pulls the levers of power. And so it’s really, uh, it’s really quite fascinating,

[0:35:59 Speaker 0] right? And I think it. Oh, sorry. Go ahead. Work. Oh, no, it’s OK. I was just going to say we were saying that like, especially this chapter, right? The subsystem signals and stovepipes, Chapter five, where you go and, um, you do the deep dive talking to folks from all over the subsystem, thinking about things like institutional memory and how like influence and power is it is different by the character of the larger institution that it’s like situated within. But I was telling Laura I was really nervous, actually an approaching this book because I was like, I know nothing about military policy, defense policy. But it was really, really great to read this policy book that is applied to a military subsidy. A defense subsystem, Andi. It could be taught in policy classes, institutions, all kinds of things. So I really learned so much from broke this.

[0:36:55 Speaker 1] Yeah, well, thanks. I’m certainly hopeful that that, you know, some some of our colleagues in the field well adopted for courses and and then it all, you know, make the rounds here in Washington and, you know, on college campuses, Um, but I think you you actually lead to a really nice segue and discussing some of the key findings about autonomous policy subsystems. And and so one of the things I do in the book is try to, uh, reach a unique characterization about autonomous policy subsystems. I had mentioned what you know Daniel McCool’s work earlier in his inspiration for me. Uh, but I take it a step further, Um, and argued that that these autonomous policy subsystems are characterized by expert based channels of information, specialized media attention, parochial interest groups on day politically, uh, politically inactive yet advantaged target population. And so it’s just, uh, in this, um, insular couple of actors and institutions. It’s what maintains that, that the tight grip on policy outcomes to maintain the status quo and in so doing my 60 elite interviews across the subsystem onto your point. Laura I was I did interviews from 2013 to 2019. I mean, it took me six years to get all these interviews on, but I think that’s what’s daunting for so many policy scholars to think that they’ve got to spend, uh, so much time out in the field doing this this qualitative work. But, um, you know, five key findings that that I draw out in this particular chapter, uh, is that first and foremost that high rates of congressional bureaucratic turnover are harmful. Thio the subsystems. Institutional memory. There’s just a great deal of turn and burn on Capitol Hill in the Pentagon. Uh, that’s problematic. Second, the Pentagon marginalized itself in the policy making process by stovepiping. It’s expert information through bureaucratic hierarchies, often leaving the Pentagon unresponsive to demands for information from, uh, from other subsystem actors. Next, I find that there’s actually a clear distinction between power and influence within the subsystem. I think oftentimes, policy scholars think that power and influence are, um, synonymous. And that’s not necessarily the case, because what I find is that all of these issues have to be legislated. As one of my interview respondents said, So Congress really wields the power. But it’s the veteran service organizations and and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that will be influence on these issues because Congress isn’t going to make any substantive change to these thieves policy issues that affect military personnel. Unless the veteran service organizations and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, um, are on board. Next, I find that substance um, actors are often searching for in prioritizing, uh, signals from the policy environment. Um, and this was especially apparent when Thea Obama administration was was moving forward on uh uh the, uh Defense of Marriage Act on Vice President Biden’s, uh, public mentioned about, you know, supporting gay marriage. And so what substance factors in the Pentagon at the time saw that as a signal from the policy environment that that they need to get hot on repealing. Don’t ask, don’t tell, um, and then issues of social military policy to my previous point finally attract a whole new set of actors on institutions into the policy making fray. Um so while these veteran service organizations were really active in in bread and butter military personnel spending issues like compensation of benefits, they often stayed out of the policy making process when it came to L G B T Q issues, Um, and as a consequence, the Pentagon, the White House and Capitol Hill, uh, would invite a whole another set of actors and institutions into the into the discussion because they were stakeholders in L G B T Q issues. Um, whereas, you know, the veterans service organizations like, uh, like V f W in the American Legion. Uh, you know, they had competing views on this within their chapters across the country, and they didn’t. They didn’t necessarily put forth strong policy positions in some cases, and so they just stayed out of the policy making process. And so, you know, it’s sort of redefines the contours of the subsystem as the issues are refrained from defense oriented to socioeconomic.

[0:41:39 Speaker 0] Right? I think what we’ve been discussing now and your book really highlights is that defense policy is often made by this meso and high level bureaucrats and politicians and are often divorced from the target population of this policies. Right. Um, so in this sense, how was this new patient plan received among the military personal? And is there an expectation that will it will like in either way affect enlistment and enrollment in the military?

[0:42:10 Speaker 1] Um, no, I I don’t think so. The, um what’s so interesting is that when people are looking to and listen the service, they’re they’re usually in their in their late teens, early twenties. They’re young, there are interested in education benefits. They’re interested in a paycheck. They’re looking for action and adventure opportunity just to travel on things like that. Rarely are they considering a ah, long term pension or retirement benefit. In fact, one of my interview respondents equipped that the pension system as it as it was from 1948 to 2018 was, ah, policy in place that 40 year olds thought that 20 year olds should adopt. And that’s just not necessarily the case. While while 40 year olds and six year olds might benefit from the military pension, uh, in their post retirement years, the you know 20 year old recruits are aren’t actively thinking about it. So I don’t think it’s gonna have any major, um, impact on recruiting. Now there are questions about tension. Mid career Attention, Um, and the Pentagon, in the wake of this policy change in 2018, has adopted a blended retirement system is basically a hybrid defined benefit defined contribution pension with vesting. After just two years of service, Eso service member would contribute up to 5% of the paycheck. There would be a government match up to 5% and that would be scrolled away in a thrift savings plan, sort of like a 401 K. And then when they reached 20 years of service, they would still get a 20 year pension. But it would be at a lower multiplier rate. So while service members under the old system would receive 50% of their pay service. Members of the new system would receive 40% of their pay that combined with their contribution. Uh, you know, the service member could could make more money in retirement under the new system, depending on their their contribution level on their risk appetite, um, than than service members under the old system. But the Congress and its and its wisdom understood that there is a key inflection point in every service member’s career. And it comes right about 8 to 12 year mark, where service members have have have done all the they have led soldiers, sailors and airmen, Coast Guardsmen and in their youth and their at the mid career point where they’re looking for for staff positions and command positions down the road. And they’re deciding what they want to do with the rest of their lives. And so this new system places a career retention bonus at about the 10 to 12 year mark to retain, uh, these service members basically to pull them to the mid career point and then to push them to the 20 year point s. So I don’t think this is gonna have any major impact on recruiting, but it’s yet to be seen what impact this new policy is gonna have on retention.

[0:45:09 Speaker 0] Awesome. God, this is so interesting. Brandon, thank you so much for sitting down with us today. No,

[0:45:15 Speaker 1] I’m happy to do it. Thank you, Brooke. Thank you, Laura. This has been terrific. I really have enjoyed it. And I’m obviously a huge supporter of the policy agendas project. And I love the podcast, though, so thank you so much.

[0:45:26 Speaker 0] Yeah. Thank you. No, thank you. Um, so our last question is something that we ask of everyone. Um, so it doesn’t have to be aligned with your research interests at all. But what’s one new book Sort of relevant to policy studies, though, that you’ve read recently that you’d like to recommend to the

[0:45:47 Speaker 1] listeners a new book that I read recently that I’d like to recommend to listeners? Um e

[0:45:55 Speaker 0] just happy about that with it can be a revisit of a class

[0:45:59 Speaker 1] revisit. I’ll tell you what. There is this this great book that I that I really enjoyed reading that gives you, ah, window into the defense policy making process. And it’s called Victory on the Potomac by gym locker and the book chronicles the 1986 Goldwater Nichols reforms Thio to the U. S. Military and in the Department of Defense. And it’s a great insight into how defense policy is made.

[0:46:25 Speaker 0] Amazing. Thank you so much. Andi, Thanks again for joining us today and we wish you all the best and come back and talk to us again sometime. We can’t wait to talk about your next project. Alright.

[0:46:37 Speaker 1] Sounds great. Thanks so much, Brooke. Laura. I really appreciate

[0:46:39 Speaker 0] it. Thanks, Brendan. Okay. Bye bye. Mm