Into the COLAverse – Episode 4: Kiril Avramov

[00:00:00] Intro: Welcome to Into the Colaverse, a podcast that takes us on the unique journeys of faculty in the College of Liberal Arts at UT Austin. Join me your host, Frederick Luis Aldama as we learn of the many ways that our faculty and their cutting edge work is transforming the world today.

[00:00:23] Frederick: It is my great pleasure to be here with Kiril Avramov, assistant professor in the Department of SL and UAN studies, as well as co-director of the Global Disinformation Lab and non-resident fellow to the Intelligence Studies Project at the University of Texas. Austin, welcome, Kiril

[00:00:41] Kiril: Thank you very much.

[00:00:42] Kiril: It’s a pleasure of being here, and thank you for having.

[00:00:46] Frederick: My goodness. I know. Kiril, you, I’m sure your email is kind of ringing off the hook, as we might say. Um, you must be very busy these days. We have been living, um, of course there’s the, the invasion that happened, but even before that, all of your important work with students and colleagues at the university and around the world, In this post truth world, as some have called it, um, maybe even before we get to that, um, Let me ask you what, what drove you here?

[00:01:28] Frederick: Like where, I know you got your PhD in political science from the University of Sophia Bulgaria. You did a BA at Gustava AFOs College. Um, you’ve done work at University of Aberdeen, Central European University. Kind of brought your focus to this place of information, disinformation, weaponizing, post truth, um, even before all of this was a thing.

[00:02:00] Kiril: Well, uh, thank you very much. Uh, it’s a very good question. First of all, um, as you were seeing in my cv, I consider myself a. Citizen of the world, if you will, although I’m a new Texas implant in for the, that past five years I’ve been, uh, here at the University of Texas at Austin, although this is not my first visit.

[00:02:21] Kiril: What brought me here initially, uh, was state lb uh, fellowship and, uh, with the department of, uh, SL and uh, ation studies, uh, and back then, um, I was working on a project which was called In Conspiracy with Trust. It’s interestingly, that was the year 2015 and, um, Some people, you know, on both sides of the pond were thinking of this as a, a rather hobby project.

[00:02:54] Kiril: Uh, but I had, uh, the man’s privilege to, um, to see certain things here at the University of Texas. Uh, as, as, um, A great opportunity to work with. First of all, uh, I was given the chance to, uh, interact and be part of the department. My professor, uh, Mary Newberger. And, uh, at that time, um, I benefited tremendously from the expertise of Professor Keith Lis, who is one of the few authors in the fielded conspiratorial.

[00:03:29] Kiril: We understanding the conspiratorial mythmaking in post Soviet Russia. Uh, he had, uh, he has actually published by Believe last year, uh, a really great book, uh, which is dedicated to it. Uh, so back then, think about 2014, you know, is that e you know, right after crime app? Um, 2015, you know, and things were not that much on the radar.

[00:03:53] Kiril: Uh, however, my understanding, I’ll tell you, you know, how this, you know, my interest, you know, like how I all went together that subsequently in 2018, I came as a postdoc intelligence studies project, a very great leadership of Professor Steve Slick. Uh, was something unique and you would say, Well, what’s the.

[00:04:13] Kiril: You know, connection between those two. And, uh, my answer is, uh, it is my very long standing interest, uh, in nonwestern political warfare in cohort action. Uh, and it’s two iterations, kinetic and non-kinetic. Um, by non-kinetic, we mean propaganda in information operat. And part of those operations obviously are the creation and craft conspiratorial narratives, uh, which are designed for, uh, internal use of Russian speaking world and what they call the near abroad.

[00:04:49] Kiril: And part of it, which American public was also exposed to. Uh, for external use for English speakers. But, uh, nowadays we see a spike actually, you know, in production with the Arabic and all kinds of languages, you know, um, coming from the central. Uh, outlets, which are actually elements of the Russian propaganda machine.

[00:05:12] Kiril: They’re not necessarily media in, in a strict senses, we would think here as, as media. Um, there are elements of what they self-proclaimed, kind of like the ministry of, um, of information operations, if you will. Um, so going back to 2015. So, um, I’m looking, uh, This time is really kind of the first, my first contact with ut and, uh, with some great people that we have here on campus.

[00:05:43] Kiril: They have been thinking systematically over, over this, uh, problem as to why all of a sudden, you know, we saw this spike of propaganda and, uh, Uh, how does it tie something that later on, I pursued that since 2018 with this integrated approach, which is connected to directly, we’re indirectly to the Russian Security and Intelligence services.

[00:06:06] Kiril: So how does it tie all together? Well, it ties because I had this, as I said, very long, um, Time interest, uh, in several aspects of, um, international relations and security studies, and mainly the, in the field of Intel studies. Uh, it’s a bit of a cliche in our field. Uh, and I know a lot of people might not agree with me, uh, but we.

[00:06:31] Kiril: Quote often, you know, an author which says, Look, um, if you look at the history of international relations and politics, or even the events that are unfolding today, you are seeing only the visible part and this visible part, you know, is manifested into the executives, you know, meeting and having. Uh, talk and so on.

[00:06:52] Kiril: But there is this invisible part, which is called covert action, which every country has, and it’s also part of the political maneuvering and part of the, and it takes part in the calculus decision making and. Every country, you know, is conducting, uh, not only passive gathering of information about our countries in order to understand two things.

[00:07:17] Kiril: One of them is the capabilities, but also most importantly, to try to understand the intent and therefore predict, you know, what comes next. Um, so that, uh, of course leads, uh, this type of interest leads to, uh, sort of closer scrutiny of the ways, um, different governments and there, what we call model subandi operate, uh, when they employ.

[00:07:43] Kiril: Those kinetic and non-kinetic operations. So, uh, as you see, this is kind of a long lasting parallel, uh, interest because, um, in the past, uh, you know, my interest in political science always, some somehow was related to, uh, unfortunately. Um, Not so, uh, positive in effects of politics. I was interested in, in, um, corruption in state capture.

[00:08:09] Kiril: This is what my, you know, where initial is started. Uh, but this is a huge topic for Eastern Europe because there is, um, This element, uh, in the transition of those countries, uh, I would say transition assisted by the former intelligence officers, which were, uh, embedded all across. I mean, B himself, and I don’t wanna be cliche again, I was saying Oh yeah.

[00:08:33] Kiril: His KGB and so on. Uh, but e in each and every country, the problem of illustration and the connection between corruption, organized crime, and the intelligence services. Been a huge factor of the development of those new democracies. So naturally, um, from there, you know, when you pick up and you go forward, you know, as I came here, it’s one thing, you know, with, uh, in Intel studies of course, you know, cuz it’s heavily populated by historians and we political scientists are rar.

[00:09:06] Kiril: Uh, rather than anything else for a very obvious reason, uh, because it takes years to declassify, uh, certain type of documents in order to verify, uh, the, the sort of, the veracity of, of, of, uh, certain types of covered action. However, um, what is interesting is that, um, here my work. Making me think, you know, based on historical precedence of what we do have, uh, as a mother opera of, uh, post Russia based on the traditions and then the satellite states, you know, very logically, how does that expand in post times?

[00:09:43] Kiril: So that is post, um, you know, two thousands, uh, because, uh, I firmly believe that, uh, you will see certain pad dependency along the ray. Um, people in societies and countries do not change, uh, that easily. Their deep imprints in their cultural, organizational, um, behavioral approaches. And that informs, uh, my work today when I, uh, work with contemporary samples in the lab of, uh, Russian information in propaganda, be it that, uh, textual level or so on.

[00:10:18] Kiril: Previous work that I have done, uh, with the isp under the auspices of isp that is looking purely at the kinetic part of, um, you know, this, um, outreach, let’s call it this way, um, of Russian Federation back, you know, in 2018. Again, um, I don’t wanna sound any modest, but we were one of the few people, you know, with small group.

[00:10:41] Kiril: Um, you know, people that were thinking alike were, uh, investigating the phenomenon of, uh, productization of force, uh, and the emergence of the so-called mercenaries, you know, within the Russian world. So we were just, you know, very much looking at, um, The private military insecurity companies, uh, and how they related to phenomenon and back then was, you know, constantly, uh, discussed as, as probably not viable and so on.

[00:11:12] Kiril: And, uh, so as I have mentioned previously, the, um, logic of, uh, kinetic and non-kinetic operations are very, it’s often very closely intertwined. Um, Sometimes, um, you would see that those go in parallel. Uh, sometimes you see, uh, the propaganda kicking in, uh, covering certain operations or, uh, aiding them, uh, as they’re going along.

[00:11:41] Kiril: And in order not to be abstract, uh, just think about, uh, the very fact that now emerged very clearly in the public eye. Back then it was, it was not so clear, especially outside of special ed circles. Uh, the very person that was, uh, bankrolling and sponsoring the so-called IRA Troll, for instance, St.

[00:12:02] Kiril: Petersburg is the very same person, uh, who acted as a proxy of the Russian mod to bankroll, uh, the bag. Uh, and this is a model. You know, uh, that is interesting in itself. You know, that we’re investigating, uh, a model of, um, political, um, phenomenon that occurs in post Soviet Russia, along the line of the, of Russia, Russian, uh, where you do have privatization of foreign policy when you do have privatization.

[00:12:40] Kiril: Um, elements of the propaganda, uh, and so on. And honestly, as I’ve written back down in certain articles, um, you know, even for the whiter public, uh, the problem for the observers specifically from, you know, Western perspective is you don’t know where, uh, the state ends and where the private begins. Um, and this of course, remember, uh, I was talking about corruption.

[00:13:06] Kiril: I was talking about incorporation of private. Uh, uh, especially, you know, if you consider the history of post Soviet, Russian, you know, the wild nineties where, you know, the laws were very elastic, stretchy, and so on, and this is something, you know, that can be, you know, argued for other countries as well in their early transitions in, in Eastern Europe.

[00:13:28] Kiril: Uh, that became a significant part of, uh, this new landscape. Uh, and this again, fast forward to, uh, 2014, 15. Remember I said, uh, we were dealing, you know, initially I was interested in this very particular, um, in very significant culturally, historically sociologically, um, psychologically, uh, the iterations of, uh, discretion.

[00:13:56] Kiril: Conspiratorial myth making, if you will, uh, which features very heavily by the way. Uh, you know, even curing propaganda like gives us a good basis. Uh, but it was seen as odd, uh, from my perspective. However, nothing is odd because my argument even back then in 2015, Was that Eastern Europe, uh, has been a, for a very long time, has been used for, obviously for historical purposes and it’s cold war history and belonging to the other side of the, the ING curtain as a lab test, early testing lab, um, for.

[00:14:35] Kiril: All kinds of, um, info operations, you know, mainly, you know, direct elites and non elites, population control and so on. So, I, I would argue that some of us have elevated, um, sensitivity towards the phenomenon. Uh, and we’re in a relatively good position, not better than anyone else. Johns. Sensitive, especially, you know, if you operate in multiple languages like I do and like my colleagues do, as to what, uh, sometimes this old well and double speak would, would mean, and to whom it is directed.

[00:15:10] Kiril: So, um, again, from my perspective, I, I, you know, I would of course, you know, sound ridiculous if I said everything is connected. Uh, but I definitely. See what we call method in the madness. Um, and, uh, a lot of people might be, uh, baffled, you know, by, by what, uh, the current government. I also want to make very clear, you know, that we always separate, uh, Russian and Russian people.

[00:15:37] Kiril: You know, from its current form of government, uh, because unfortunately a lot of people fall into the trap that’s been set, uh, for it previously. When we call the Russo phobia, regardless of what you do, actually, we admire, uh, you know, fresh culture, literature, all scientific, uh, achievements. After all, we were center of Russian Eastern European studies at ut.

[00:16:01] Kiril: Uh, And we think, uh, you know, the politics is simply not represented necessarily of, of what Russian people, uh, think, feel, and so on. Uh, it is just a face of autocratic, very oppressive regime, uh, which has. Uh, different instrumentation. Its, its disposal, uh, and in it’s what we call near peer competition is using it in different iterations, uh, be it in, uh, what we, what is known in our narrow circles as the gray zones.

[00:16:34] Kiril: So this is the phase that is neater piece World, World War. That was up to February this year. Uh, and, uh, all of those operations, you know, they stand on different fronts. Remember I was like telling you about the spectrum, and this is the spectrum of cover action. So on one end, you would have agents of influence, you would have, uh, information operations, you would have the propaganda.

[00:16:57] Kiril: You would have, um, constant strategic message. And all the way down to use of force in targeted killings when necessary. And those are, um, all part of, uh, you know, a similar phenomenon that is, uh, worked in investigating and understanding, uh, from two perspectives, one. You know, remember when I said it’s hard always in Intel study because you need documents to be declassified.

[00:17:24] Kiril: And that was a brief window, uh, in the past where you had direct access to Russian archives. Not anymore, uh, Soviet, uh, archives. Uh, so, however, we are still lucky that other, uh, former communist states had their, um, archives, uh, open. So, um, you know, so when I mean, uh, archives not only the general archives, Specifically the one that are from their former security service, uh, whatever they classified.

[00:17:53] Kiril: So you have a pretty good picture, uh, of the MOS opera, Randi, the relationships and the invisible parts of politics, uh, and, you know, description of major events. So in order to compare those, You need to follow, uh, you know, the, the current events and iterations of those kinetic and non-kinetic. And remember now I was talking about the novelties versus the tradition.

[00:18:17] Kiril: Im propaganda, but also in the use of, of force. So it’s all from this, uh, spectrum. Uh, so one of the main questions which we’re interested is, you know, how does. Evolutionary, um, change, you know, uh, takes over time in their approach. Um, so is it similar, Is it because the pressure, when it’s put on them, do they change methods and tactics?

[00:18:42] Kiril: What has changed in, in what ways? Because only then you can create, in my opinion, sound policy recommendations. Um, do we detect any patterns? And how do they evolve, evolve over time. Uh, so this is kind of the bulk of the interest that we have, unfortunately, just as the, uh, Chinese proverb goes, you know, we’ll, we, we are to live in interesting times and, uh, this is how we started our conversation.

[00:19:14] Kiril: Uh, there is. Again, as I, we talked, uh, with you previously, um, it is the, on one end, it’s, it’s kind of like the purely analytical side where we have to be dispassionate and uh, not take sight. But as I’ve told you, we do have multiple Ukrainian American students, people that live close by in the region, um, and when you meet them daily on campus, Uh, and of course, you know, what we follow constantly is an information streaming that’s, uh, coming from Ukraine, from Russia itself, from laboring countries.

[00:19:47] Kiril: Um, I mean, look, you know, the refugee flows, the tragedy, the destruction and so on. It gets you after a while. Um, so yes, we do have a passion, and the passion is that, um, if we can help even you. One person, you know, then, you know, in the practical world, uh, then, you know, it’s not only, uh, purely academic exercise, that it’s for the, you know, art for the sake of art.

[00:20:12] Kiril: Uh, this is very important, you know, because the, our mission here at UT to advance the state of art and understanding. But there is the human side as well.

[00:20:24] Frederick: Well, let me ask you a couple of follow up. Really fascinating and very important work. Um, two questions. Um, one, I know that the Global Disinformation Lab is an interdisciplinary collaborative academic space, and I wonder what you’ve been learning from your colleagues and from your own work in terms of.

[00:20:50] Frederick: Susceptibility, cognitive, uh, behavioral susceptibility, habits, patterns. You mentioned cultural, um, regional behaviors, patterns, but I’m just wondering what is it about us as human beings that wants to, we want to believe, uh, misinformation seems to grab hold and root very seemingly, very easily.

[00:21:21] Kiril: Yes. Uh, well, this is, uh, you were asking kind of the million dollar question, you know, that Uh, absolutely.

[00:21:28] Kiril: First of all, GDO is a, a great experiment, uh, and I’m very grateful to the leadership of our college, uh, our department, and everyone who’s involved from different departments that are joining us as we speak. Uh, For inputs that are not necessarily always connected. I mean, traditionally you’d find such labs, mainly in data science or engineering.

[00:21:53] Kiril: Uh, our idea was actually to, uh, turn and change the optics, um, to show that a, uh, a lot of our students, undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate, uh, from very different fields can have a platform which is, uh, actually the College of Liberal Arts where they can utilize. Their linguistic, uh, skills, their, uh, you know, subjects to become subject matter experts in the fields that they’ve been taught at history, sociology, literature, and to have a practical implications, uh, to work on what we call, um, Live projects in our internal, uh, parlance.

[00:22:33] Kiril: And those are actually, uh, projects that, uh, we have, um, doing in collaboration with external partners. Um, Which we’re, um, very proud, uh, of those accomplishments. And we have the chance, you know, uh, people to work not only on abstract level, but actually work on very practical level. And some of the work is visible on our webpage, uh, and it’s been acknowledged, um, all the way to the office of old and.

[00:23:04] Kiril: Um, so what, what we learn, you know, from those daily interactions, you know, if I can stay away from the technical descriptions, but rather, you know, share my impressions. Well, first of all, uh, remember I was talking about how much. The interest and, um, the chances of people buying inter conspiratorial thinking.

[00:23:30] Kiril: Unfortunately, we’ve seen iterations in internationally, uh, especially, you know, with, of, um, for very, um, specific reason. And that is, uh, conspiracy theories in themselves are manifestation of, um, Theory of power because they usually, you know, the narrative goes about the non corrupted, uh, people and the corrupted elite and, you know, the, the nefarious plots.

[00:24:05] Kiril: So why do we buy into, uh, this information and so on? One explanation is that usually you’d see, um, this inform. Speaking, uh, and conspiratorial explanations as to what is going on around in times of monumental shifts, economic, political times of conflict, um, the in something major is happening around us and people need to locate.

[00:24:34] Kiril: Um, the explanation, especially in processes which are complex in transparent, uh, and not necessarily could be pinpoint, think about globalization, for instance. Um, think about, um, various. So kind of, uh, monumental construction buildings such as European Union or, uh, foundational events that surround, um, conflicts or, uh, conflicts, uh, and so on.

[00:25:06] Kiril: So people want to have a clear answer, uh, and it has to do with, uh, aid, this sense of loss of agency. Uh, Also is the understanding or rather the horror, that nobody might be in control as we haven’t imagined, uh, necessarily. So we need, um, a coherent explanation, which leads me to the second part. Um, human beings, our brains, uh, more or less, uh, are hardwired to seek patterns.

[00:25:40] Kiril: We’d love to make patterns out of the chaos. And sometimes we’re inclined to see patterns even when they’re none. Uh, or we try to overlay or overlap, you know? Non related events, uh, where we can have a coherent, uh, explanation again, uh, connected to our anxieties to, you know, the sense of control, the sense of, um, danger, um, uncertainty mainly, uh, where we think that, uh, either us or by delegation is of figure.

[00:26:17] Kiril: Of power that we trust, you know, can control those and predict, um, you know, therefore you don’t have more predictable future, reduce the uncertainty. It is also, you know, from narrative point of theory, because there are so many entry points to, to this problem. Uh, it is easy to easier. I mean, some of the studies, you know, that have done, you know, estimations is to the speed of traveling and.

[00:26:43] Kiril: False information versus fruitful information. Uh, as the one that became very notorious in the past several years. Uh, you know that this information is estimated, you know, like on platforms that it travels more or less, you know, six times faster than factual information. The question is why? Well, one of the explanation is that just as like every good story, it satisfies our need.

[00:27:09] Kiril: You know, it’s interesting, it’s suspenseful. Uh, it is contains the element of surprise. You know, It’s just, you know, has all of those elements of the stories that will make you watch the fat. Film or pick up, uh, a good story, fictional story. Uh, so, uh, having said that, you know, truth might be hard, mundane, um, you know, not necessarily, you know, as straightforward as we want to see it in, in categories, you know, like very well defined in terms.

[00:27:40] Kiril: Colors, you know, so we can put those neatly into boxes. And again, think about what I was talking about, control, anxiety and also, uh, the sense of old, uh, own significance. Uh, this is a scary top right. You know, I mean, we are just a small grains of sand in this. Cosmos. So we want to know, you know, uh, to those, you know, answers to those, you know, key philosophical questions as to why are we here, you know, what’s the purpose?

[00:28:08] Kiril: And so on. And some of this, um, narration, you know, and math narratives that occur in, in this, this information actually do provide, you know, whether in the form of national myths, Or simply explanations, you know, which fit very well. Now this of course, is an excellent way for the politicians and, uh, as scrupulous people to manipulate, uh, this type of instrumentation.

[00:28:33] Kiril: And it’s been ever since Roman times with us, you know, propaganda has very different iterations, you know, from coins and statues for architecture, all the way to words and altered words and images, deep fakes today. So we do, you know, we, we, we, we sometimes unfortunately crave it now different, you know, uh, psychological types and different people with, uh, different political inclinations with consume different types of stories, but no one’s really immune.

[00:29:06] Kiril: Uh, what we have seen is that, Yeah, ever since Hosh head I was thinking about, you know, conspiratorial thinking as a marginal phenomenon. It just affects one small fraction. I would say that conspiracy has gone more and more mainstream, uh, be it true political rhetoric, be it true propaganda, or even if you think about, uh, popular culture.

[00:29:32] Kiril: And this is very similar processes on the both sides of the pond, uh, Russian culture as well. Uh, you do have. Production of, you know, back in the eighties, you know, like from the X files, so on, uh, and previously, you know, all the way back to the red skater, you know, they’re very logical wagon effects, which happened, you know, body snatch shares, loss of autonomy and so on.

[00:29:55] Kiril: So, I mean, imagination works. Um, having said that, um, it is really hard, however, when you enter the post route world, uh, to be in the same page, if you will, and have a conversation, uh, which is coherent, uh, with people that do not recognize. Factual re or refuse to, uh, recognize factual information. Uh, so it takes very different approaches.

[00:30:23] Kiril: Uh, and they’re not necessarily, you know, because everyone’s like, Oh yeah, fact checking and so on. Yeah, that’s true. Um, but, uh, if you want to engage people, you know, into a conversation about effect and the eventual consequences. Propaganda can have horrific consequences. Right. You know, I mean, it can lead to genetic real world results.

[00:30:47] Kiril: We don’t need proof of death. We’ve seen it all around and currently what we’re see in the, in the war, in the Russian, Ukraine, just mind boggling. Especially if you look at how, uh, intensively the Russian population was bombarded, you know, uh, in order to perform what is known rally around the flag. Uh, and Indiana state of constant modernization.

[00:31:10] Kiril: So, and elsewhere as well. You know, like in the world we’re seeing this recently. Uh, so if, if, if you, uh, think about how do we approach people like that, right? I mean, there are classical approaches of interactions, which is, you know, not what we do right now, but it’s known to science, you know, um, whether it’s going to be debunking, whether it’s going to be engaging, whether it’s going to.

[00:31:34] Kiril: Ridicule, uh, or empathy. And instinctively I would say that not only instinctively, but you know, every time I would pick empathy and understanding as opposed to polarization, because we are seeing, you know, that, you know, the kind of like the falling apart of the public discourse is precisely that you do have.

[00:31:54] Kiril: Um, groups of people that do not talk, uh, to each other whatsoever. They, you know, they might live in the same physical space, but they don’t share the same public discourse. Uh, and this is precisely the golden opportunity for, let’s say hostile. Operators state in non-state now to intervene, to interject into poison.

[00:32:14] Kiril: You know, the conversation, the well be it true techniques that we investigate, such as doubt, uh, such as, uh, specific rhetorical approaches, uh, as to how to target. And then later on, micro target specific groups of people. Uh, but, um, It’s, um, you know, the future of propaganda, you know, more or less is tied to microtargeting and, uh, kind of psychological traits of people and yeah, um, Cambridge analytic of science might have been bad.

[00:32:47] Kiril: Uh, a lot of criticism and so on, but it gives you a kind of hint and flavor of the direction is where we are going in the future. Don’t forget that, uh, with the advanced machine learning, And the ability to produce at the insignificant cost text, which is produced by nonhuman, uh, and, uh, altered images. Uh, and sounds deha.

[00:33:13] Kiril: You know, like we, I think a lot of people had talked to the certainly Na University, you know, professors, Bobby Chesney and number of other people associated with Law Fair have been talking about the profound consequences of what deep defects can have and so on. Uh, for, um, the real life effects that we’re having.

[00:33:32] Kiril: So, very long route to tell you that, uh, there are, you know, there are multiple factors that makes those very susceptible. Uh, some of them are very traditional, is, you know, what Cast EEN and his colleagues were. Talking about the rumors and rumor cascades and, you know, they’ve investigated all the way back to all ports since, uh, World War ii.

[00:33:54] Kiril: Uh, and some of it is the new technology, you know, that is, uh, adding to the element of perception. Mm-hmm. .

[00:34:01] Frederick: Absolutely. Yeah. Absolutely. It’s, um, the presentation of truth, um, or the reconstruction. Of untruth as truth. Let me ask you, uh, just as we kind of begin to wind this down. You published co co-authored a piece on weaponized sexuality and gender based narratives and contemporary Russian and pro Russian disinformation.

[00:34:25] Frederick: And of course that had me thinking, um, you mentioned just now as we were talking about pop culture and I thought about Pussy Riot, um, in particular, but. Um, maybe you could speak to that or, or other elements, um, where you see this kind of weaponizing happening. Um, and then finally, maybe we can end with kind of a, um, you know, I, I, I did watch the Alexi Navalny.

[00:34:51] Frederick: You know, documentary and I see and saw that he had a team that was using social media platforms to push back, actually add the disinformation, um, you know, industrial complex if you will. So yeah, maybe we can talk a little bit about both and, and,

[00:35:11] Kiril: yeah. Try to make it short as I’ve been very verbose, I suppose.

[00:35:17] Kiril: But, um, yes, uh, I believe that one particular feature is very interesting and, uh, this is why, uh, we worked, uh, and we continue working on looking at this very specific angle. Uh, and it is tied to the promotion of so-called traditional values, uh, by the current, um, leadership directional federations. Or can the informational offense set.

[00:35:41] Kiril: The reason why we looked at it is that, um, when we were collecting data and we’re making Ty some of the cases, uh, that were known as active operations, um, that were targeting non Russian speakers, and, uh, you know, you can think of the case of the little Lisa that, uh, for instance, I’m, you know, more people might be familiar or that is the reported, um, non-existent, actually rape of a teenage girl of Russian.

[00:36:11] Kiril: Descent, uh, in Germany by back then, you can imagine, fill in the blanks, you know, who has done this, You know, that will be Muslim rent men. Uh, and of course the idea was to drive a, a wedge and put the pressure and it did work. You know, because you had all the way up to Merkel back then as a chance to know way in in this controversy.

[00:36:34] Kiril: But the idea is that, um, It has the potential, you know, to, uh, just as, because it’s connected to some of our basic feelings, fear discussed, and uh, so on. Um, it has the potential, uh, to make. Certain type of this information work both in harmful than others. Also, it carries a symbolic value. Uh, it more or less, you know, is creating a map for people to worry themselves is what exactly what Russian propaganda currently is trying to explain.

[00:37:12] Kiril: And this is what they call the eschatological, even battle of good Evil. You know, you have two sides. You can’t, you can’t stay, um, on, uh, Uh, just on the fence or just observing? Uh, you have to take, uh, you have to partake and choose sides because this is kind of a historical event, and of course it has. You know, so many historical references about the more is about the traditional family, about the morale, about the role of the Orthodox Church, uh, about the decadence and the times and so on.

[00:37:48] Kiril: So it is really fascinating. Is, is it how it is used and also it, it’s a multi-purpose instrument. Unfortunately. It’s not only about targeting people outside, but actually aids the repression of people. Uh uh. Back in the Russia Federation, you know, because of their sexual orientation. And just think about the worst, no iteration that will be, uh, people like Kro and, uh, you know, his so quote unquote gay purchase, you know, which were horrific.

[00:38:15] Kiril: Uh, so this is why we think, you know, this is one of the very significant, um, themes that occur. And if it’s very well. You know, if you look at its structural or content or any other, you know, way where, you know, my techniques that we are analyzing it and, uh, it belongs to that. So kind of family of approach, uh, it is used because unfortunately it works.

[00:38:40] Kiril: Uh, so don’t be surprised if you read yet another story about drinking American soldiers on deployment. You know, harassing i d. BIC women or something like this, You know, I mean, most of them, what we have discovered, you know, with Michael Outter actually they’re built on a template basis. So people can simply, you know, the proxies can just use them in the different location by just exchanging, you know, the characters and so on.

[00:39:04] Kiril: So this is very kind of handy, you know, coming from narrative theory. So you think weapon is relatively easy, uh, this type of. Approach. Uh, and to your last question, um, think about that. Um, uh, the case with Naval, which I want to remind is what our colleagues, you know, and friends in Belling cat, you know, have been pointed out for such a long time.

[00:39:27] Kiril: You know, I mean, these are people we had, even Mr. Kra out here as a guest, ut, and he went back to Russia. He got imprisoned. Uh, and you know, almost immediately upon return, precisely because, you know, The idea that he’s sharing, uh, you know, false information, the integration of the Russian Armed Forces. Uh, but you know, all of these people, first of all, they’ve been, you know, targets for assassination attacks poisoning.

[00:39:54] Kiril: Uh, and not once, uh, they do present a tangible. Alternative, Uh, you know, and I know that, you know, immediately, you know, the Russian propaganda jumps into it and says like, Oh, about their popularity and, you know, moral values and so on. But the very fact that. Take so much, uh, time, you know, and resource, you know, uh, state resource to eliminate these people to, um, take them off the political scene to remove, uh, an option.

[00:40:30] Kiril: For, for, for the people, you know, to, to see a different, uh, face route. An alternative for this country, uh, tells us a lot. And it tells us also a lot about the skill of what this new generation uses in their communication. Uh, with, uh, the electorate, you know, with the people and look no further. Uh, if you look at the, you know, the documentaries that they have produced about the corrupt.

[00:40:56] Kiril: So there, here we go. Another full circle since the beginning of our conversation of, uh, of, uh, Putin, his inner circle about the abuses of power, about, uh, the democratic deficits, about this alternative reality now of, uh, so-called sovereignty. Um, those are all elements as to why these people become so undesirable.

[00:41:22] Kiril: Uh, Of course, you know, it’s a huge irritant to the Russian state, and I would say other authoritarian countries, you know, China as well. You know, you take strong digital measures, you know, to stifle, uh, any type of meaningful, uh, alternative communication because people sooner or later start asking the question, why

[00:41:44] Kiril: As to why are we doing this, You know? Why, you know, certain things, you know, should not be, you know, I mean, there is a cognitive distance. And again, um, you know, at the end of our conversation, I, I always, um, like to remind, you know, our, our students and our colleagues, uh, you know, that we looked at those. So, you know, subjects that we deal with in, in two particular ways, right?

[00:42:12] Kiril: One of them is, uh, what needs silver , uh, used to, used to call picking the signal from the noise. Uh, first of all, you know, to discern what’s the signal, what’s the noise? You know, because sometimes you would see the propaganda would just create a lot of this information, a lot of noise in order to confuse people and to drive them into inaction or suppress their actions or so on, depending on the.

[00:42:35] Kiril: Um, but then, uh, all of us have system one and system two think, you know, fast and slow, very canen. So most of it are attacks on our emotional way of how we process, uh, what’s going around us, uh, deep systematic thinking. Uh, requires time and it’s cultivated. And, uh, this is one of the great missions I believe of UTS in, which makes it fantastic place to work, uh, because we have the opportunity to approach it from very, very different angles, think systematically, and try to see, uh, what are the most harmful effects and hopefully propose solutions to deal.

[00:43:16] Kiril: Yeah,

[00:43:17] Frederick: absolutely. Oh my goodness. Yeah, we need deeply informed and yet kind of simple maybe simply. Laid out steps as consumers for being able to bring in that slowness that you’re talking about, to assess and evaluate before the kind of the reflex emotion, you know, sets in. Um mm-hmm. is, you know, I, I’ve watched Agents of Chaos, the, of course Navalny documentary, Putins Row to War.

[00:43:51] Frederick: Is there. Is there anything as we close this, um, career that you would recommend either reading or watching that might continue to provide useful, um, depth of insight into, you know, weaponizing of misinformation information? Um, it, it, you know, these patterns you’ve just so beautifully laid out and that have been used in extremely destructive ways.

[00:44:19] Kiril: Well, um, as you pointed out, uh, some of those, you know, cover pretty well, you know, the mindset. Uh, but I would recommend, um, if, um, our listeners have a chance for auditor and to look at the patterns of past operations. Uh, specifically operation infection. Um, so that there were, uh, very good sort of, uh, pieces, uh, done by, I believe New York Times, uh, you know, short videos that were outlining, so-called active measures, uh, operations of the Russian, the Soviet back then intelligence, uh, connected to the, uh, HIV parts, uh, because that, you know, this type of well documented.

[00:45:03] Kiril: Operations because they were joint venture between, uh, kgb, stai, uh, S stb, the check back then intelligence, Bulk, Ear in intelligence, uh, those active measures and some of the documents, you know, produced here by the committee, um, that was the, like with active measures, uh, is a shorthand to understand. How those operations work.

[00:45:27] Kiril: Uh, so operation, infection, uh, as I said, uh, and any type of videos would be, you know, connected, uh, in kind of recap, uh, would be a good reference point as to why. Um, those type of, um, very powerful, um, instruments of disinformation work, uh, and most likely will continue to work. Uh, as you know, we have a.

[00:45:54] Frederick: Wow.

[00:45:55] Frederick: Kiril Avramov, thank you so much for taking the time to go. Take us on this very important journey of yours and the work that you’re doing to provide depth of knowledge plus actual. Countermeasure policy making based on this important research you’re doing in a post truth world. Thank you, Carll.

[00:46:22] Kiril: Thank you very much for having me.

[00:46:23] Kiril: Thank you very much. It was wonderful conversation

[00:46:30] Outro: Into the Colaverse is produced by the University of Texas at Austin’s College of Liberal Arts. Sound engineering by the Liberal Arts Instructional Technology Services. You can find into the Colaverse Podcasts on Apple Podcasts, Spotify and Stitcher. Thanks for listening and see you next time.