{"id":159,"date":"2019-09-18T21:41:57","date_gmt":"2019-09-18T21:41:57","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/podcasts.la.utexas.edu\/cepa\/?post_type=podcast&p=159"},"modified":"2021-11-03T10:30:11","modified_gmt":"2021-11-03T15:30:11","slug":"policymccombs-david-schmidtz","status":"publish","type":"podcast","link":"https:\/\/podcasts.la.utexas.edu\/cepa\/podcast\/policymccombs-david-schmidtz\/","title":{"rendered":"David Schmidtz on Corruption"},"content":{"rendered":"

David Schmidtz is Kendrick Professor of Philosophy in the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Eller Chair of Service-Dominant Logic in the Eller College of Management. He is editor-in-chief of Social Philosophy and Policy. He was founding Head of the Department of Political Economy and Moral Science.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"David Schmidtz is Kendrick Professor of Philosophy in the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Eller Chair of Service-Dominant Logic in the Eller College of Management. He is editor-in-chief of Social Philosophy and Policy. He was founding Head of the Department of Political Economy and Moral Science.","protected":false},"author":13,"featured_media":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_genesis_hide_title":false,"_genesis_hide_breadcrumbs":false,"_genesis_hide_singular_image":false,"_genesis_hide_footer_widgets":false,"_genesis_custom_body_class":"","_genesis_custom_post_class":"","_genesis_layout":"","episode_type":"audio","audio_file":"http:\/\/podcasts.la.utexas.edu\/cepa\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/21\/2019\/09\/19-09-13-Policy-at-McCombs-Podcast-David-Schmidtz.mp3","podmotor_file_id":"","podmotor_episode_id":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"45.6M","filesize_raw":"47813888","date_recorded":"18-09-2019","explicit":"","block":"","itunes_episode_number":"","itunes_title":"","itunes_season_number":"","itunes_episode_type":""},"tags":[20,30,17,31,29],"categories":[],"series":[2],"class_list":{"0":"post-159","1":"podcast","2":"type-podcast","3":"status-publish","5":"tag-business","6":"tag-economics","7":"tag-mccombs","8":"tag-philosophy","9":"tag-policy","10":"series-policymccombs","11":"entry"},"acf":{"related_episodes":"","hosts":[{"ID":693,"post_author":"38","post_date":"2020-10-29 17:58:44","post_date_gmt":"2020-10-29 17:58:44","post_content":"\n

Carlos M. Carvalho is an associate professor of statistics at McCombs. Dr. Carvalho received his Ph.D. in Statistics from Duke University in 2006. His research focuses on Bayesian statistics in complex, high-dimensional problems with applications ranging from finance to genetics. Some of his current projects include work on large-scale factor models, graphical models, Bayesian model selection, particle filtering and stochastic volatility models.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before moving to Texas Dr. Carvalho was part of the faculty at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and, in 2009, he was awarded The Donald D. Harrington Fellowship by The University of Texas, Austin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dr. Carvalho is from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and before coming to the U.S. he received his Bachelor's degree in Economics from IBMEC Business School (Rio de Janeiro) followed by a Masters's degree in Statistics from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ).<\/p>\n","post_title":"Carlos Carvalho","post_excerpt":"","post_status":"publish","comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","post_password":"","post_name":"carlos-carvalho","to_ping":"","pinged":"","post_modified":"2020-10-29 17:59:59","post_modified_gmt":"2020-10-29 17:59:59","post_content_filtered":"","post_parent":0,"guid":"http:\/\/podcasts.la.utexas.edu\/cepa\/?post_type=speaker&p=693","menu_order":0,"post_type":"speaker","post_mime_type":"","comment_count":"0","filter":"raw"},{"ID":580,"post_author":"42","post_date":"2020-07-03 19:53:40","post_date_gmt":"2020-07-03 19:53:40","post_content":"\n

Mario Villarreal-Diaz is CEPA\u2019s Managing Director and Senior Scholar. Mario joins CEPA from the University of Arizona where he was an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Economy and Moral Science and taught in the Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and Law undergraduate major.<\/p>\n","post_title":"Mario Villarreal-Diaz","post_excerpt":"","post_status":"publish","comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","post_password":"","post_name":"mario-villarreal-diaz","to_ping":"","pinged":"","post_modified":"2020-07-03 19:53:41","post_modified_gmt":"2020-07-03 19:53:41","post_content_filtered":"","post_parent":0,"guid":"http:\/\/podcasts.la.utexas.edu\/cepa\/?post_type=speaker&p=580","menu_order":0,"post_type":"speaker","post_mime_type":"","comment_count":"0","filter":"raw"}],"guests":[{"ID":584,"post_author":"42","post_date":"2020-07-03 20:03:54","post_date_gmt":"2020-07-03 20:03:54","post_content":"\n

David Schmidtz is\u00a0Kendrick Professor of\u00a0Philosophy<\/a>\u00a0in the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences. \u00a0He also is\u00a0Eller Chair of Service-Dominant Logic<\/a>\u00a0in the Eller College of Management. He\u00a0is editor-in-chief of\u00a0Social Philosophy & Policy<\/em><\/a>.\u00a0He was founding Head of the\u00a0Department of Political Economy & Moral Science<\/a>. \u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dave directed the Arizona Center for Philosophy of Freedom, then housed in the College of Social & Behavioral Sciences, from its founding in 2010 until 2019. Following the Center's 5-year review in 2019, the Center was promoted to the status of University Center at the recommendation of the external review committee. It is now housed in the Office of Research, Innovation, and Impact<\/strong><\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

See Dave's cv in the \"Contact Information\" box on your right. His work has been reprinted 101 times in 15 languages. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dave aspires to pick up where the Scottish Enlightenment left off, treating Ethics as a subject that begins and ends with observation: specifically, observation of the human condition and of what tends to improve it. Today's moral theories often focus on questions of what to do, whereas David Hume and Adam Smith were more focused on what works\u2014that is, which social circumstances have a history of leading people to live in ways that make their communities better off with them than without them.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here is a 16 minute digest of Dave's talk in Moscow on \"The Return of Ethics.<\/a>\" The interviewer is prominent local actor and producer Robert Anthony Peters. (See Robert's short film Tank Man<\/a>.) The executive producer is Patrick Reasonover. See his film They Say It Can't Be Done<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here is a 50 minute talk at La Sierra University on Adam Smith<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here is a suite of 4 x 4 minute videos on equality<\/a> hosted by the Institute for Humane Studies and the John Templeton Foundation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here are reflections on the academic job market in two 15 minute parts. The first part is here<\/a>. The second part is here<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here are samples of Dave's essays on moral theory<\/a>, property<\/a> rights, on corruption<\/a>, on Adam Smith<\/a>, and on realistic idealism (here<\/a> and here<\/a>).  He still works on the nature of humanly rational choice in the real world (humanly rational strategies<\/a>, humanly rational ends<\/a>, realistically rational altruism<\/a>) and on the contingent but robust connections between real rationality<\/a> and real morality<\/a>. And he still ponders the meaning of life.<\/a><\/p>\n","post_title":"David Schmidtz","post_excerpt":"","post_status":"publish","comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","post_password":"","post_name":"david-schmidtz","to_ping":"","pinged":"","post_modified":"2020-07-03 20:03:55","post_modified_gmt":"2020-07-03 20:03:55","post_content_filtered":"","post_parent":0,"guid":"http:\/\/podcasts.la.utexas.edu\/cepa\/?post_type=speaker&p=584","menu_order":0,"post_type":"speaker","post_mime_type":"","comment_count":"0","filter":"raw"}],"transcript":"

Welcome to the policy of McCollum’s podcast, a data driven conversation on the economic
\nissues of today in this series. We invite guests into our studio to provide a highlight
\nof their work presented during a visit to the University of Texas at Austin Policy.
\nEmma Combs is produced by the Center for Enterprise and Policy Analytics at the McCombs School of Business.
\nI am your co-host, Carlos Carvalho, with my colleague Mario Villarreal.
\nOur guest today is Professor David Schmidt from University, Arizona. David, is it true that in the philosophy
\ndepartment it is also the director of the Center for the Philosophy of Freedom while with the Policy McCombs?
\nGreat to be here, Carlos. Thanks for having me. So today they’ve joining us, talking about his work on on
\ncorruption. So I guess let’s start with the basic question of what is corruption?
\nWell, like any word in the English language, it can get complicated and tracking
\nthe different ways its use can get complicated. But but going back several
\ncenturies, it emerged in the English language as
\na way of talking about things going rotten. And now what we mean is,
\nis a particular kind of rotten CI’s is when a person has
\nwhat we call a fiduciary responsibility, meaning a responsibility to act
\nas someone else’s agent. And and the person doesn’t handle
\nthat responsibility to act as someone else’s agent in a in a responsible
\nway, then that’s when we today start talking about corruption.
\nSo that sounds like a little bit more and more involved and more complex than just the idea of taking a bribe.
\nI think a lot of a lot of folks these days we might think about corruption as the quid pro quo. They can a bribe
\nto do something illegal. But but it seems like the definition is a little broader than that.
\nYeah, thanks for the thought. I I agree with that. I would say that say taking
\na bribe might be the classic example of corruption, but
\nit’s not the definition of corruption. The definition of corruption is being
\nin trust entrusted with discretionary power for one purpose
\nand then using it for a different purpose. So to say my job is to issue this permit
\nand you say I need it today. And I said, oh, that’s interesting. You need it today. Well, that’ll cost you a
\nhundred bucks. Otherwise I’ll get it to you in six weeks. And then there’s no
\nprocess for expediting it, it’s just you’ve decided yourself that you’re not going
\nto expedite it unless you get paid under the table. So that then we would start talking about corruption
\nbecause we would say your employer or the agency that employs you never intended for
\nyou to be collecting 100 hundred dollars to give out the license. You were paid a salary to
\ndo that. You’re not supposed to be collecting fees for yourself. So we call that corrupt.
\nThey’ve a common thought is that the center of these exchanges
\nis greed. That’s what is driving the behavior. What do you think
\nabout A. Well, again, I guess
\nI would say that you might say greed is the first example that we think
\nof, but it’s not the definition and greed is the it’s the classic
\nclassically corrupt mode. But it’s not the only corrupt motive. So
\nyou could have people who are just mean. Right. And they say,
\nwell, I’m supposed to help you. You’re here to fill out a form to get registered to
\nvote. And I don’t like you. I’m going to make it hard for you to get registered for a vote.
\nAnd then you say, okay, I’ll pay you 100 bucks and say, not, not got nothing to do with it. I’m not I’m not greedy.
\nI’m just mean. So that’s a different kind of motivation. That can be a kind of corruption where you say
\nyour job is to make it easy for people to get these licenses or permits or something like that.
\nAnd you’ve just decided to make it hard for certain people so that that kind
\nof laziness might be another kind of corruption where you say,
\nI don’t like your accent, I don’t like your long explanations of why you’ve got a problem. I’m just going
\nto shut my window now and stop listening to you because you’re boring me. Now, that would be another
\ninstance where you could start talking about about corruption
\nand just general ways of general reasons to misrepresent your
\nrole or the agency’s purpose or your job within the agency,
\nI guess. But but yeah, just just generally
\nhaving a fiduciary responsibility, a responsibility to provide a service
\nand then just deciding for reasons of your own to not be good
\nat providing that service. So there’s a lot of attempts
\nin economics, too, to work on problems that we call typically principal agent problems.
\nRight. Where where we know that the agent might not act in the best interests, interest of the principal.
\nAnd and we try to think about structures or institutions or incentives in place in order to
\nto stop that from happening and lining up their incentives. We
\ntry sometimes. Is that by fiat, by just saying trying to say, for example, now, you know, was a big, big thing in the country
\nof trying to make sure that every FNET financial adviser has a fiduciary duty with their with their
\nwith their clients. And and and, you know, that creates that expectation of
\nof a fiduciary responsibility, but might be very hard to to enforce and have the proper incentive. So
\nin your in your view, when you’re thinking about this, is it a matter of really trying hard
\nto think about institutions to correct or goes beyond that is not enough or we don’t
\nknow it. It’s too hard to try to solve the problem from the institutional framework.
\nYeah. Thanks, Carlos. I would say yes and yes. It’s it’s important
\nto think about this as centrally a an institutional issue
\nand it’s important to understand that it isn’t only an institutional issue. So
\nmany theories people have worked on how to align incentives, how to how to create
\na structure of rewards. So if you say, well, I’ll tell you what, I will give you
\na commission for selling this product, and then you say, but it’s important
\nfor you not to lie about the product, but that’s not going to work out well for us. So.
\nSo you’ve got to you’ve got to play within the rules. But at some
\npoint, you say, no, this is what we rewarded people for doing. And sure enough,
\nthis is what people are actually doing. So you might say, well, I’m paying
\nyou to maximize the graduation rate in your unit. And so you say, well,
\nthat’s why we canceled the exams and just gave everybody A’s. And so you say,
\nyou know, actually, you’re doing exactly what we gave you an incentive to
\ndo. But you’re misunderstanding what the point was. I mean, that’s that’s
\na that’s a corrupt that’s a very literal but corrupt reading
\nof the incentives, the reward structure that we gave you. So. So
\nif you’re serious about if you’re serious, say just generally, if you’re serious
\nabout morality, you don’t set up people’s
\nincentives and motivations in ways that are contrary to morality as best you can. But that’s
\nnot easy. That’s a huge achievement to set up the rules of an institution
\nso that what it leads people to do is genuinely the right thing.
\nSo when I said that it isn’t only an institutional issue,
\nthere is a matter of what kind of culture you are building, not just
\nan incentive structure. Will, what’s your culture? What is your ethos? What are your principles?
\nWhat do you stand for? What is your mission and what can you do to get your agents to buy
\ninto your. And so. So at some point, those agents, those
\npeople have to say, I’m going to do what’s
\ngood for me and my family. I’m going to collect my
\ncommissions, my rewards and salary and so on. But there’s also a
\nmatter of pride beyond the incentive structure. And so that’s something
\nthat people have to teach each other and have to teach themselves. They have to say,
\nI at the end of the day, I don’t want to I don’t want to wake up and find out that
\nreally I’ve become a pawn of an incentive structure. Yes. Maybe I own a
\nFerrari now or something like that. But I’m a cheap hood, like.
\nAnd there’s no car in the world that can make up for the kind of person that I let myself
\nbecome. Now, a thought here is it seems
\nthat some societies have more corruption than others.
\nSure. So that is speaks a little bit, too, to your narrative about institutions. But it also speaks
\nto it seems that we can have a sense of the magnitude of the problem. So it’s a dual issue
\nhere. One is a Kennedy measure. Can it be assessed?
\nAnd if and if so, how would you try to explain why some societies have
\nmore of it than others? Well, one thing I would say as a preliminary
\nis you have to be careful what you measure, because measurements can be
\nvery misleading. The measures that you create are never going to perfectly
\ntrack the goals that you have in creating those measures,
\nthe kind of performance you’re trying to incentivize will. That’s just
\nsomething you kind of aim at with your with your incentive structure. Now,
\nas to what would make the difference between one
\nsociety and another, gee, that’s a big, hard question
\nwhich surely doesn’t have only one answer. It’s this is a complicated thing.
\nBut I guess I would say a couple of things. One is
\nyou have to you have to look at the what it is that makes
\ninformation available. What kind of information is available in
\nyour culture, in your society, in your organization? And so, you know, corruption
\nlike rottenness happens in the dark. It doesn’t happen in the bright light. So
\nso where where people can operate with
\na sense of knowing what’s going on, knowing who’s doing what. Knowing why they’re
\ndoing it. And knowing that whatever you do is going to come
\nto light some day, not only what you did, but probably even why you did it. To
\nsome extent, it’s going to come to light someday. So
\nyou can have feedback mechanisms and the feedback
\nwhere you get information from other people and where other people can see what you’re doing
\nand maybe you have a chance to explain what you’re doing. But that
\nhas that has a lot to do in general with how much corruption
\nyou’re going to see, the amount of oversight and the information that the overseers
\nhave is is going to make a difference. So there was a case
\nonce where the National Science Foundation GIV gave some people
\na very large grant to run conferences and they went and bought a yacht
\nwith the money and I’ll attend that. And will they? And they got caught and
\nthey said and there was a there was a story in The New York Times was writing it up. They said
\nthere’s this yacht. Like it’s got like rose and cherry paneling and it’s got
\ngold plated doorknobs and that kind of thing and gold plated toilets, whatever it was,
\nsomething like that. And and these and the people who got the grant said.
\nWow, this looks really bad, but if you just give us a second to explain.
\nThat’s where we hold our conferences and our conferences like per person,
\nlike they’re cheaper than having it at a downtown San Francisco convention center.
\nAnd then we’ve got the asset, which is which is appreciating in value. So
\nthey said, we’re sorry this we we see how bad this looks. And we.
\nAnd we probably shouldn’t have done it, but we were trying to do what we got the grant for. We were trying to
\nhold conferences. And that’s that’s what we did. We have the best conference location, like out on the water,
\nout in the bay that you could imagine. And and we thought that was a good thing. But we
\nrealized the optics are bad. So you and the National Science Foundation,
\nthey said. OK, we hear you, we understand we’re
\nstill going to come down on you pretty hard. We’re going to you’re going to have to return that
\nmoney. Your institution is going to have to return that money to us. But
\nbut we’re not saying you’re going to burn in hell or anything like that. We we understand why you
\ndid it. Yeah, it was a mistake. It and yeah, the optics are horrible. And yet
\nwe can’t afford optics like that. And yeah, you should have thought of that. So it’s
\ncomplicated, but information just makes a huge difference. And the and the ability
\nto have a certain equality so that. Right. If you accuse someone
\nof corruption and they say, oh, we’ll see. What you don’t understand is I’m upper class and
\nyour lower class. That’s the end of the conversation. You don’t criticize me. And if you have a situation
\nlike that where people have autocratic power based on class or
\nor gender or whatever it is, that also is going to be something that is going to create space
\nwithin which corruption can happen. Interesting thought that
\nI never. There’s a lot of information, there’s a lot more information in the world. And
\nright now there’s more ways for us to access information than then than we used to. So from that perspective, then,
\nas is potentially a very good thing, that by us being less in the dark about lots and lots
\nof different, different institutions and behaviors, you might be a path forward to two
\nto live in a potentially less corrupt ways because people
\nare going to be more aware of how bad they can look eventually. Right. But perhaps we need to learn
\nhow to deal with that more effectively still. Yeah. You have a you have a point. I mean, corruption
\nis something that we read about on the front page every week anyway.
\nAnd maybe the encouraging thing is to say, well, it’s news. It’s not business as usual. And it’s.
\nSo it may be that there are more stories than ever, but that doesn’t mean it’s more common than ever. It may
\nbe that it’s bigger news now because it’s less common than ever.
\nAnother thing you can think about institutions is, is to say, well, if you’ve
\ngot a salaried employee who’s supposed to be issuing licenses and
\nthe salaried employer starts collecting fees, taking bribes under the table,
\nthat’s corrupt. But you might say, well, what about before the time
\nwhen there were no computers? There was barely even paper.
\nThere were no pay rolls per say. If you worked for the king, you worked for the king
\nas a as a volunteer, basically saying, hey, if you give me a give me a, give
\nme knighthood and I’ll just take care of this service for you. I will. And this is a real case. I will
\nI will take care. I’ll just take sacks of gold coins from you. And I will take care of handling
\nthe Navy’s payroll. And I’ll
\nbe doing that, of course, as a as a volunteer. Like they’re no, they’re not going to be any pay stubs, they’re
\nnot going to be any W-2s or anything like that. It’s just a sack of coins and me and the sailors.
\nOkay. And then these people say, okay, there’s no such thing as salaries. Salaries won’t be invented for a
\ncouple of centuries. But I’m working for you now, dear sailor. And so
\nI’ve got your your pay. And
\nif you want me to put you at the head of the line, then we’re gonna have to. You’re
\ngoing to have to pay me a fee because I’ve got gotta make a living, too. Now,
\nyou might say, well, in a couple of centuries when the person’s on a salary and there’s not supposed to be any
\ncommission that will be known as corruption. What about now? What about now when like nobody’s
\non nobody’s getting a salary and everybody’s working on a hundred percent commission.
\nNow, are commissions corrupt? And you say, well, it’s what every. It’s what
\neverybody is expecting. Everybody knows that that’s how the system works.
\nAnd everybody knows that that’s the only way they have of making this system work. At this
\npoint, and if you talk to the sailors and you said should that person be collecting fees in order to
\ngive you your pay, they would say, well, yeah, because otherwise they don’t get paid. Otherwise
\nthe guy just doesn’t show up. So, yeah, of course, I want the person to get paid.
\nSo you might say there are things that we do in effect
\nto set the table for corruption as well. We have more information now, but maybe
\nnow we we expect people to ignore opportunities
\nto collect extra fees or something like that, whereas there was a time when there were no
\nextra fees because everything was the fee. So it’s just
\nit’s just food for thought. Anyway, I don’t know whether to forgive those people centuries ago who who
\nmade their living that way. And I don’t forgive the people now who who agree to take a
\ncertain salary for providing this service and then just decide they’re gonna give themselves a raise.
\nI’m not sure if this is a follow up, but certainly in my in my mind, there’s someone to go for it.
\nIf you’re you’re citing some sort of like convention, it’s the way things where
\nat the moment and it seemed that he was a service was being provided. Maybe we’re gonna
\nbe suspect of it nowadays. But in the context of then he
\nprobably was expected like what if an exchange that he’s kind
\nof suspect on on those grounds or order grounds? Dave, what if it is
\nlegal? Like, think about something like lobbying is perfectly legal.
\nThere is a framework to do it. There is rules about any information needed in order to engage
\nin that activity, that their information is public is out there. Yet some
\nof us may think that there is something problematic with a lot of
\nactivities where firms or industry seek privilege and regulators grant those privileges.
\nYou may not be legal. I don’t know if it’s corruption, but certainly there is something
\nto say there. What would you say? Well, obviously,
\nthat’s a really hard question, Mario. And it’s it’s one of the hard questions of our time.
\nPractically speaking. So what I said before when Carlos
\nand I were talking about it is, is I said you can’t expect
\nyour institutional incentive structures to be perfect. You can’t expect your legal
\nstructures to be perfect. Another way to put it is to say you can’t be a good neighbor
\njust by obeying the law. Good neighbors have a kind of alertness
\nand considerate ness that goes beyond obeying the law.
\nAnd all kinds of things are going to be legal that are irritating to your neighbors. And you wouldn’t want
\nto pass laws against every form of irritation. But what you need
\nis neighbors to say, I just need to check like up. I know I was playing music pretty loud.
\nDid that disturb you? Was that. Was that a problem? If so, just tell me. Because I don’t I don’t need to play
\nafter 10 o’clock. I don’t need to have parties on Tuesday night. Just just tell me if it’s a problem. And if you want
\nto come over, just come over. So that’s how neighbors work things out. You do
\nthings beyond the rules. You do things beyond the legal requirements
\nand incentive structures. You have to go the extra mile. So
\nwhat I would say in addition about that,
\nI suppose, is, is that there are there are cases
\nthat really make you have to think. About.
\nAbout how you’re going to handle it. So in the in the in the lobby case, you mean it?
\nWell, yeah. Thanks. So in the lobbying case, I mean, there
\nwas a there was a person a few years ago who who got put in jail
\nfor various kinds of bribery and things that
\nthat we’re involved in in this person’s lobbying effort. And the person went to jail
\nand then was on television and said, I I was guilty. I absolutely I was convicted
\nof a crime. I committed it. What I want to say is and he says, I don’t mean
\nto be making excuses for myself, but I want to. What I want to say is for some
\nsomehow it’s incredible to me now. I didn’t see it at the time. I didn’t get it. He said
\nI I swear I honestly thought I was one of the good guys. So I was collecting 80
\nmillion dollars in fees for brokering deals between politicians
\nand and and and firms and CEOs, that sort of thing.
\nAnd and I gave 80 percent of of that to charity.
\nAnd I thought that that made me one of the good guys. I. And then later on when I realized,
\nno, I actually personally all by myself did serious
\ndamage to the political culture of this country. He said, I can’t believe it in
\nretrospect. But I at the time, it was invisible to me. I honestly didn’t see it.
\nAnd he said, I do see it now, though. So that’s something to think
\nabout. It’s so this person was doing things. Many
\nof the things that this person was doing were legal then some of them were
\nrich. Right. Retroactively made illegal. And he didn’t complain about that. He said,
\nnah, it was it was criminal. Even if the law hadn’t exactly been interpreted
\nthat way yet, even if it was conventional to do what I was doing. You said I
\ndon’t want to say everybody did it. I was the biggest I was the biggest criminal of the bunch at
\nin my heyday, I was the worst. But yeah, a lot of people were doing that and that.
\nAnd it was legal and they they were and people knew that they were doing it.
\nAnd so that’s a that’s a that’s another issue where you
\nwhere there’s a personal responsibility for saying, what’s the law? I need
\nto stay within the law. But wait a minute. That’s that’s not the key to being a good person.
\nThe key to being a good person is to say, what should people what what would good
\npeople expect from each other? What would good people do here? What should the law
\nbe? And and we’re you know, we’re a long way.
\nWe’ve always been a long way and maybe always will be a long way from being in a position
\nto just create all the laws, pass all the laws that we imagine would be good things.
\nThe problem’s always changing. And so the thing that it’s going to take to solve it is going
\nto be something that we don’t see coming right now. So there’s all kinds of,
\nyou know, costs to freedom of thought and freedom of expression, freedom of speech,
\nwhere you say, yeah, at some point we’ll be paying a cost that we didn’t imagine paying
\nand we will be tempted to curtail and censor. And you say it’s it’s
\nalways pretty much been a mistake. Maybe it always will be a mistake. But we don’t
\nwe don’t know what’s around the corner. So you write about self-awareness, be a very important
\naspect of this person being aware of trying to be a good person and be able to engage and try
\nto find out or do the things that they are supposed to do, as opposed to just follow literally the letter of
\nthe law, of the rule, of the incentive and so on. I think one of the most
\ndisturbing examples when I read it here is, is that there’s that the idea that what happens
\nwhen one loses the self-awareness. And can you tell us a little bit about that, what you have in mind when you talk about that?
\nYeah, well, it in fact, the birth of Western
\nphilosophy basically goes back. I mean,
\nthe first huge text in the history of philosophy, Western philosophy
\nwas Plato’s Republic. And that’s what Plato’s Republic was about. Plato’s Republic
\nwas about many things, but among them was the the
\nidea of tyranny and the idea of of
\nof justice and political power not coming apart.
\nAnd so when he talked about injustice, really, he
\nwas talking about corruption. But it was about not about a city going
\nrotten, but an individual soul going rotten. And he talked about the city as well,
\nbecause, in his words, the the city was just a magnified case of the
\nsoul. And so by magnifying the soul in the form of the city,
\nthen you get a closer look at what’s going on. But but he thought the fundamental corruption
\nwas letting the parts of yourself fall apart so that the
\nso that you’re your character and your intellect and your set of physical
\nskills and capacities say these are different aspects of your soul.
\nAnd if if you lose touch with yourself,
\nthat’s a form of going rotten. That’s a form of of having your soul
\nfall apart. And that’s what rotten is, is falling apart. So when your soul falls
\napart, you’re corrupt. And when your city falls apart and doesn’t know what it’s doing,
\nit has no purpose. Then your city is becoming corrupt. And
\nnow I think there are ways in which we should quarrel with that analogy and
\nsay cities and cities are not just big souls. There there’s
\na sense in which the parts of a of the soul of a city,
\nthey they really don’t need to be on the same page. And you don’t want
\nthem to be on the same page. You don’t want everybody to have a common mission. What you what you
\nwant is for people to be like drivers in a organized
\ntraffic system where you say, excuse me, sir, you have a red light and then the person
\nstops. But what never happens is you you roll up
\nto the intersection and say, which of you have lower class destinations in which
\nof you have upper class destinations because the people with the better destinations get to go first.
\nThe people with the low class stuff destinations have to wait that you never
\nsee a traffic management system managed that way. And in fact, that would be if you tried
\nto be that organized and that integrated and that self knowing as a city
\nthat would be really corrupt. I mean, that would be something where you would be sorting
\nthe world into, you know, winners and losers and upper-class and lower class. And so
\nit’s it’s the genius of a of a city to become
\nthat integrated. But no more integrated than that. Like so everybody knows whose
\nturn it is. But everybody knows also that your destination
\nis your business. You just have to take your turn and wait when it’s somebody
\nelse’s turn. But your destination that’s up to you know, that that’s the essence
\nof liberalism is it’s not needing to dictate other people’s destinations.
\nDavid, but I sympathize with the notion that there is something about corruption
\nthat. To the soul. So there’s something about the character of
\nthose that who come or give up to the temptation of
\ndoing what is not correct. What is not right. But you also talked about institutions and rules and
\nincentive structures. So I can imagine a perfectly
\ndecent human being that is not drowning too, that a spiral of rottenness
\nof the soul facing a choice where is just too costly
\nto do the right thing for various reasons. There life is at risk.
\nThere are many, many order order possibilities. So
\nsometimes good people act badly. And they act badly because the incentive
\nstructure induce them to do so. Is there a contradiction there? Or actually those two
\nthings work together. Yeah. Well, realistically, practically, that
\nalso is a really interesting question, Mario. So I guess I
\nwould put it this way is in times of desperation,
\npeople grasp at straws. That’s you know, people will do whatever they
\nneed to do to survive when they think survival is the issue.
\nSo you can only expect so much of people when you you don’t
\ngive them a dignified way forward. So I would say that
\nthe other thing I would try to do. Say,
\nyou know, when when just explaining to people, explaining to young people the road ahead
\nof them and what what it is they have to look out for, as I would say,
\nbe careful about exaggerating the stakes when you’re being bullied. You will say,
\nI have to do whatever it takes to get through this. I have to go along to get along.
\nAnd it’s we live in a pretty affluent society. You can be in the bottom 10
\npercent of the income I have been. And it’s not that bad. It’s not. It’s
\nit’s got your attention. And there are things that you have to do. There
\nare there are plans that you have to make and budgets that you have to observe.
\nAnd it’s and it’s tricky and sometimes dangerous. But when you exaggerate
\nthe stakes, then you’re on the road to making excuses for
\nbehavior that you yourself don’t condone. And so I would I think it’s
\nvery important to to teach
\npeople, to teach oneself to be realistic about what the risks actually are
\nhere and what the costs actually are here, because we we are emotionally geared
\nto view ourselves as in any in an emergency, like we have to do what’s
\nwe have to keep this job, because if we don’t keep this job, then we become outsiders
\nwho are not part of the tribe anymore. And that means we’re going to be food for somebody
\nelse. We’re not going to be protected by the tribe. And that that feeling makes
\nus capitulate to corrupt bosses and become part of corrupt schemes. And and
\nso very often I would want to say to people, it’s just a job.
\nAnd I admire people who say, I’m done here. It’s just a job. It’s not worth
\nmy soul. It’s not worth my pride. It’s not worth not being able to look
\nmy kids in the eye. It’s not worth having to explain to them why I’m on parole. And by
\nthe way, my boss never got he arranged for me to be the one who is taking the risk.
\nSo don’t exaggerate the stakes. I think that’s an important life lesson. Our guest today has
\nbeen Dave Dave Schmidts from the inverse of Arizona. Dave, thanks for joining us. Apolicy McCombs.
\nI have really enjoyed my time here. Thanks so much for having me.
\nBefore we wrap up, you can get more information in our medium page. Thanks for listening to Policy
\nImogen’s. See you next time.<\/p>\n"},"episode_featured_image":false,"episode_player_image":"https:\/\/podcasts.la.utexas.edu\/cepa\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/21\/2021\/05\/SC_PolicyMcCombs_Art-scaled.jpg","download_link":"https:\/\/podcasts.la.utexas.edu\/cepa\/podcast-download\/159\/policymccombs-david-schmidtz.mp3","player_link":"https:\/\/podcasts.la.utexas.edu\/cepa\/podcast-player\/159\/policymccombs-david-schmidtz.mp3","audio_player":null,"episode_data":{"playerMode":"light","subscribeUrls":{"apple_podcasts":{"key":"apple_podcasts","url":"","label":"Apple Podcasts","class":"apple_podcasts","icon":"apple-podcasts.png"},"google_play":{"key":"google_play","url":"","label":"Google Play","class":"google_play","icon":"google-play.png"},"google_podcasts":{"key":"google_podcasts","url":"","label":"Google Podcasts","class":"google_podcasts","icon":"google-podcasts.png"},"spotify":{"key":"spotify","url":"","label":"Spotify","class":"spotify","icon":"spotify.png"},"itunes":{"key":"itunes","url":"","label":"iTunes","class":"itunes","icon":"itunes.png"}},"rssFeedUrl":"https:\/\/podcasts.la.utexas.edu\/cepa\/feed\/podcast\/policymccombs","embedCode":"

David Schmidtz on Corruption<\/a><\/blockquote>