03: Should we really be surprised by the election of President Trump?

[0:00:05 Speaker 1] Welcome to the American ingredient podcast that examines race in American society from an academic perspective focusing on the work from social scientists and legal scholars, the American ingredient demonstrates that race is not the only ingredient in making America. But in order to make America, you need two heaping spoonfuls. The creation and maintenance of the tea Party after the election of Barack Obama and the ascendancy of Donald Trump to the presidency has made many

[0:00:33 Speaker 2] Americans question what exactly happened in American politics. What changes have come about that a lot of these groups to gain so much power and influence so much so that they’re able to influence Congress, influence the Republican Party but also captured the presidency. Today we will speak with Professor Christopher Parker of the University of Washington. So they just here to discuss his book, Changed They can’t Believe in but Tea Party and reactionary politics in America. This book is cooperate Professor Matthew Barreto at the Universe of California, Los Angeles, and in this book they examine the rise of the Tea party and what this means for American politics and how they are similar to and different from what we’ve seen in the past and, furthermore, how they are similar to and different from understanding of American conservatism. In addition to talking about his book on the tea party, professors Parker and Barreto also engaged on a book project that examines the rise of Donald Trump to the presidency. To understand what shifts have seen in American public opinion that have created these major shifts in American politics, We begin today’s interview with Professor Parker, highlighting the purpose of his latest project and demonstrating how it’s linked to his earlier book project.

[0:01:46 Speaker 3] So first of all, thank you for the invitation, Professor McDaniel. Um so my current research project builds on, you know, the book on the tea party that Matt Barreto and I published in 2013 initially changed, they can’t believe in. And so the current research project, which is titled The Great White Hope Donald Trump Race in the Crisis of American Democracy, is It builds on that, and it builds on that in the following way. So we argue that you know, one of the main regions where Donald Trump was successful in his presidential bid is because he basically mobilized the tea party or tea partiers, you know, really K burst on the scene, maybe a couple months after President Obama was first elected and inaugurated.

[0:02:33 Speaker 4] So this book builds on that and not only

[0:02:35 Speaker 5] doesn’t build on that and that we’re looking at, you know, white folks who are ah, you know who are Trump supporters. But we’re also looking at people of color, which marks the departure from the Tea Party book in which he just made it. Look at whites in this book, we’re looking at whites and people of color. So we’re trying to illustrate this dynamic narrative in which you have, you know, whites and support Donald Trump. You know who’s or supporting him for various and sundry reasons. But we have one principle reason that I’ll get into a little bit later. And then we have the ways in which people of color or responding to the threat of trump. So the second book definitely builds on or adds on to the first book.

[0:03:13 Speaker 2] Now, first, could you give us a little more information about the first book? The change we can believe in?

[0:03:18 Speaker 4] Yes, Basically what motivated that book it was

[0:03:20 Speaker 5] Ah, Actually, my second book was supposed to be on patriotism. And then the tea party came along and I kept hearing all these pundits and all these other folks talking about Oh, you know, they’re just about small government and responsibility and stuff like that. And then you have the people on the left that

[0:03:39 Speaker 4] were saying that it’s just really all about racism, and and I didn’t think either one of them was really true. And so I said, Well, you know what? I run the survey research lab here, let me put together a survey, Matt through some questions on there, too, and we just went for it, and the results we got were astonishing. So what? The results show that even after we accounted for, let’s say partisanship and racism and ideology that there was still an impact or effect left over for people who supported the tea party and, you know, and so then had to go back to the drawing board and actually properly theorize that because we knew it had to be something beyond partisanship, racism, ideology, and we even accounted for some other things like authoritarianism, social dominance, orientation, ethno centrism. And so we knew that we had come up with something different. We just had to go back and theorizing, but basically what we did. And so so one of the motives

[0:04:37 Speaker 7] for the book and this, as far as I’m concerned, you know, was to be able to make room for, you know, these more establishment conservative types, you know, to be able to say Hey, like, look, you know, they’re these crazy people out there who are calling themselves conservative who aren’t really conservatives, right? And they don’t necessarily, you know, one. The status quo which most conservatives do. They’re really all about maintaining the status quo, among other things. Right? These tea party people are these tea party conservatives, if you will, these reactionaries, if you will actually want to go backwards in time to in America, in which, you know, white male, heterosexual, native born white man was the norm, right? They want to go back to that America. Hence, you know the slogan for the tea party back in the day was, take our country back. Well, that begs the question. Take our country back in time or take our country back from home. It really doesn’t matter because of the deaths of those are functionally equivalent terms. Right? So you have this temporal dimension. We have the same sort of temporal dimension with Trump. Make America great again.

[0:05:43 Speaker 2] One of the major critiques within the racial ethnic politics literature is that in many times when we talk about race, it appears to be more about the attitudes of whites towards racial minorities and make sure minorities are treated as objects, not his actual agents, and appears in this project brings them in as agents. So can you tell us a little more about what drove that decision and what you’re finding? Never go?

[0:06:06 Speaker 4] Well, you know, I really could be completely honest after credit, Matt for that intervention because I was cool with just looking at white folks again, right? But Matt was like, No, we have to have people of color because we have to show this dynamic right on for similar reasons. You just said Professor McDaniel because, you know, people of car rarely were rarely seen as agents, right? Especially as it pertains toe white folks and our attitudes towards them. And so that’s what we did. But the problem waas is that it was damn near impossible theoretical challenge because I had to say to myself like, What am I gonna do so that I can use the same basic theory to explain what’s happening with Trump supporters and people of color because they’re coming from two different perspectives, right? And so since Matt was so set on it because I was intellectually lazy about it at first. And so since Matt was so set on it, I did, like, really think is through. And so what we found is that basically, it’s threat that underlies both groups, right people of color and Trump supporters. So what? Trump supporters. It’s about the sense of existential threat that’s rooted in symbolism. Like we’re losing our country, right? It has more to do with symbolism, and it does have to do with sort of this material threat jobs, economic anxiety. Matt and I showed that the Tea Party book that was bullshit, and we show it in this book as well. So But for people of color, the threat seems to be both symbolic and material. And so if we think about the sources of threat, let’s just say for black folks I know that best. Whenever you see these threats to voting right for us, that’s both symbolic. And this material. It’s symbolic in the sense that we’ve been fighting for this since we first got here. We first arrived here, so it means something to us. It carries with it this meaning of inclusion in the American experiment. You know, I talk about this in my first book, right where these black veterans are like a them one of the main reasons why they’re over there willing to fight for a country which you’re not really seen. His first class citizens is that it was about the right to vote. It had a lot more to do with what it meant that when it actually did the right to vote. And so there’s that symbolic component to it. Not a material component has a lot to do with continuing discrimination, because that affects us in a material way. So for people of color, the threat is symbolic and material, whereas for white or trump supporters who are white, it tends to b’more symbolic threat. And so what we find is is that the more people of colors that see Trump as a threat right, it increases the likelihood of turning out it just it just straight up turnout by at least 60%. So what we also show by way of simulation is you know, Matt conducted some simulations, and what he showed is is that in those three states that were key with a Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania. What we show in the book, you know through Matt Simulations is that if one changes the turnout for people of color by 10.78% not even a whole percentage point it flips those three states. If you change it by 1.5% points, Hillary flips Florida as well. So what does that tell us? It suggests that you know that people saw Trump as a threat, you know? I mean, it really mobilized people of color. But the fact is, is that Hillary Clinton lost in some key states that she should have one. What does that tell us? That tells us that, at least in those states that not enough people of color saw Trump as a threat. That’s what that tells

[0:09:36 Speaker 2] us. So what reasoning do you have for him not being proceed as a threat to certain groups of color

[0:09:42 Speaker 4] I just think he wasn’t seen as a threat because most people didn’t think he was a viable candidate. They saw him as a climb based on how much clout. Now we were to go back and collect data and do this. Now, nine months, 10 months into his presidency, I think the story will be different. You know, I think more people of color would see him as a threat, right? And so therefore, I think it’s possible that we will redo this again, as we should say back in the day, running back and I think he would probably lose. Could you go

[0:10:10 Speaker 2] into more detail about the symbolic threats that Trump supporters saw? So we talked about the symbolic of material threats for blacks or African Americans. What were the Trump supporters saying In terms of their symbolic threats? I know there’s the issue of immigration. There’s you kind of mentioned the idea of there will be a race and gender aspect to this. What are some of the major symbolic threat that they saw?

[0:10:33 Speaker 4] Well, this idea that they’re losing their country, right? They lose in their country

[0:10:36 Speaker 5] culturally, you know, when it comes to like same sex rights, right? They’re losing their country both racially and culturally when it comes to people of color, especially Latinos,

[0:10:46 Speaker 4] Right? They just see this as their country. Right now, whenever I give a talk on this stuff and they say, Well, only real Americans should vote. Are we talking about Native Americans we’re talking about here dog who done about it. So But they see this as their country, like they own it right and see. That’s one way in which they are. They are separate of their different species of quote unquote conservative, if you will. Because if you think about who conservatives are, conservatives are by nature very, very pragmatic people. They’re about there about cutting deals. No. Do they necessarily want to see a change to the status quo? No, But you know what? They rather have Incremental mawr organic control change. If it’s going to stave off revolution, you know the no change at all. And it leads to a revolution. Where is his reactionary conservative? They don’t really care about law and order, right? They don’t really care about the status quo. It actually want to go backwards in time, and they’re willing to do whatever it takes to maintain the prestige of their group on. When I’m referring to this group, I’m once again I’m making a reference to white male, Christian, native born straight men, right? And over time it is the same demographic that is always engendering or causing these reactionary movements. Think about the know nothing party in the 18 fifties, right? You think about the clan of the 19 twenties, right? And when I’m referring to our national reactionary movements, not not something that was local or regional, like the first plan with regional second Clan was national, right? So we think about the know nothing party. You think about the clan of the 19 twenties? Think about the John Birch Society in 1950 to think about the tea party. I think about the Trump supporters right every single time. It is the same demographic that is causing a problem, and so what happens? They always want to go backwards in time. It’s the best, and so therefore, they constitute a really tangible difference from or establishment conservatives. I mean, back in the day, like five years ago, Bob Dole observed that neither he nor Ronald Reagan would be fit for today’s conservative for. And so let me get to the point I was trying to make is that most conservatives tend to be rational. They want to cut deals right. Most conservatives would not agree that they own this country, that this country is theirs percent, but a reactionary figures that this country is theirs. And so what I’m trying to do right now, as they push the research forward, is to try to fit the condiment of diversity model of risk aversion, you know, to try to separate out, or if you will discriminate between reactionary and establishment conservatives in the following way. Because if you think about the kind of a condiment, diversity stuff, loss aversion or the Baylor endowment effect, think condiments.

[0:13:30 Speaker 2] Diversity there, Professor Parker’s referring to our Daniel condiment and almost diversity to psychologists who examined how individuals make decisions and how they may make decisions would seem irrational at the time. Their work has been pioneering in the area of social psychology and attempt to understand the decision making of individuals. It’s so pioneering, in fact, that a 2002 Professor, Kahneman, was awarded the Nobel Prize in regard to Professor Parker’s discussion of condiment diversity. What they found is that when individuals perceive a loss, they’re more likely to engage in risky behavior. So in the case of voting for President Trump, Professor Parker argues that if individuals perceive but they’re losing their nation or that they are in subways being relegated to a lower position, they’re more likely to engage in risky behavior, such as supporting risky policies or even a candidate. They may be seen as somewhat risking

[0:14:28 Speaker 4] economic. So this is what he finds, he says. Okay, he supposes. Okay, let’s say you buy $2 bottle of wine today if somebody wants to buy it from you for $200 2 years from that now, economic rationality will suggest that you would sell it right. But because you have the sense of ownership of it now, you don’t want to give it up. Well, I think the same thing applies to these reactionary conservative like they think they own the country, right? So even if the country is making progress otherwise, but that comes at a cost to them of racial diversity or cultural diversity, they don’t want to give it up. So That’s one way in which I think that they mark a departure from these more establishment conservatives. Where establishment conservative be like OK is longer, the country’s moving forward and it doesn’t form it revolutionary change. We’re cool. So that’s one of the things that we do in a tea party. Book is tryto show differences between establishment and reactionary types, and we essentially do the same thing here in the Trump book as well.

[0:15:25 Speaker 2] You know, there’s this argument about is this reaction in anger or is in fear? So you see a lot of the media talking about the role that fears played into this. But you also see on minimum academics talking about anger. So what emotion do you really think is is coming through on this?

[0:15:41 Speaker 4] His anger and anxiety is not so much fear. I’m not saying that some of them don’t feel fear. But if you think about the emotional appraisal literature, their response to a fear based stimuli is to move away from from the stimuli. If it’s about feet right, visible anger okay, anxiety is a little different in so faras. There’s a sense of uncertainty, right, and you want to try to rid yourself of this uncertainty and in some cases that could be withdrawn away from the stimulus. Or it could be going towards the stimulus to try to get some closure. Right? Anger is a lot less ambiguous. Anger is a sense off. You’ve been violated in some kind of way, and you want to take action to correct its perceived violations. And so, in the present case, Trump people believe that they’re losing their country, their country is being stolen from them and they want to do something to recover it. And they see Trump. Trump symbolizes the only thing that’s standing between them and the loss of their country to social, cultural, racial change. So there’s is, ah, emotional reaction that is founded MAWR on anger than anything else because they’re doing something about

[0:16:49 Speaker 2] now. How does this research advance our understanding of political behavior and the American politics? Specifically, what types of contributions do you offer to the literature? Furthermore, how might this project lead us to question some of the things that we thought were true in the past?

[0:17:07 Speaker 4] Well, one of the things we’ve been able to challenge, or at least add to is that this sense of what symbolic predispositions they aren’t limited to party ideology or, more recently, ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. We show theoretically, that this what we call this reactionary, impulsive, reactionary conservative is also invalid source for social political attitudes and behaviour. So basically, we add to that literature and that what we do is we have all these other explanations for white attitudes and behavior in the model and were able to show that even with this relatively poorly measured proxy for reactionary, conservative, necessary support for Trump, that there still is a unique explanation at a cruise to that over and above all these other, more conventional explanation for social political attitudes and behaviour. So in the tea party books that most people have been writing about, you know, tea party members and Tea Party organizations. And so we want to say We want to say, Okay, look, we’re just talking about supporters, right? We’re not even talking about members we’re not talking about. Organizations were talking about supporters, and we did that for two reasons. One is because, you know, supporters are going to be a lot more wide ranging then members per se for a variety of reasons. One, you know, members are probably gonna be a little more committed than supporters. And to one another. Reason from membership over mere support

[0:18:34 Speaker 5] is that you know, for biological reasons. As Doug McAdam talks about in his book on Freedom Summer,

[0:18:39 Speaker 4] you know that there are some people that are more predisposed to be members than people that are just supporters because they have the means and aware with all the resources with which to be members. Right? And so so with Madden, I show Matt my show like, Look, you don’t necessarily have to be a member or part of one of these organizations you know, in order, you know, to be a part of a movement that affects change or challenges that status quo. So one of things we showing a tea party book, that if you look at tea party members, that was probably about 2% of the adult population. But if you look at tea party supporters, you know, that was a tenfold increase, about 20%. Okay, right. So we’re talking about a much larger group of people through their public opinion, right? That can affect change. So from a theoretical in substantive level. You know, we add to the social science, literature or social movements literature in that sense. So So I would say the principal things that we at or a this idea that you know that symbolic predispositions aren’t limited to, you know, the usual suspects, right? That we do think this reactionary, conservative, reactionary impulse is socialized during childhood. And another reason why we embedded within the symbolic predisposition literature is that we don’t always think it’s active. I think you know, according to Ceres, it has to be activated in the current political environment, right? These people are always there, right? It just has to be activated. And then the whole social movement stuff about supporters versus activist vs members, right? That’s another thing that we add to the literature as well.

[0:20:12 Speaker 2] You mentioned that this is in addition to the social movements letter. So could you elaborate on how how we should understand this as a social movement?

[0:20:20 Speaker 4] So a social movement, I think properly understood, is generally trying to challenge the status quo. When we normally think of a social movement, we normally think of a left wing social movement and left wing social movements. Challengers are typically the ones that are challenging the status. Quote, not a right wing social movement, is trying to maintain the status core, even go backwards in time, right? So if you look at the literature on right wing social movements in Europe, Visa vee the United States, the former dwarfs alive. We know all about left wing social movements in the United States, right? We know almost nothing about right wing social movements. So it’s also social movement in a sense that you have this massive people that a part of the polity, that air, trying to get something from government as a collective right. There’s a sense of identification among this mass of people that you have the sets of issues that are sewn together by this set of beliefs that mobilize them to try to get something from government. That’s one kind of loose way of thinking about what a social movement is. So, so an example of a kind of social movement that is more conservative, establishing conservative social movement that is trying to maintain the status quo. Now just think about you know what? What? Ronald Reagan, a power right? And on the way brought in Richard Nixon, the pop Well, you know, this already started in the 19 sixties with the failure of the Goldwater campaign right. They were basically trying to maintain the status quo. Now, the reason why Goldwater was so successful got the nomination of first place was because of this more right wing part of the Republican Party that was constituted from the John Birch Society. They’re the ones that actually put Goldwater to

[0:22:04 Speaker 2] power. The John Birch Society, which was founded in 1958 is a self described conservative advocacy group. It was its strongest in the 19 sixties as a group that spoke out against communism and what it saw as, ah, changing of American values. And while it has faded away from the Americas attention, it is evidence that it is growing. In particular, the group has been able to influence policy regarding the U. S relationship of international organizations such as the United Nations or international trade agreements such as NAFTA. Further, they have called for a drastic change in immigration opposing the dreamer act and called for the U. S. Return to which traditional values, and it further argued that the federal government has drastically overstepped its constitutional rights and has violated states rights. They have called for a drastic reduction in the size of the federal government, with the hope being that the new nation can return to what they believe is traditionally what it’s supposed to be. And so while the group has decayed over time, there are signs that it is growing. And these are the concerns of many on the left who are concerned that the rise of Donald Trump is also seen as a resurrection of the John Birch Society, which has been seen as the antithesis of many of the progressive Lawrence.

[0:23:26 Speaker 4] Those were folks in the John Birch Society who actually want to go backwards in time, who actually thought that that President Eisenhower was a Communist dupe and he was in bed with the Soviet Union, right? That that Justice Chief Justice Earl Warren was also in a Communist camp in cahoots with Communists, and they also start the civil rights movement was part of a larger communist conspiracy to take over the United States. So here now we start think we start discussing this conspiratorial discourse at these reactionary movements pedal way we could see it with the John Birch Society, which saw it with the clan. We saw it with the tea party. You know that that Obama was trying to destroy the country, and now we’re seeing it with Donald Trump. So So, you know, this is, you know, one of things. You know, we argue in this book, and I’m certainly arguing in the trade press book on which I’m currently at work is that Look, this Donald Trump thing is nothing new, right? This has been happening for a long time. And one of the things I argue in my separate my trade press book is that one of the reasons why damn near all these pundits blew it. You know, blue this prediction when it came to Trump and why they were so surprised because they fell to put him in historical perspective. If you put it in historical perspective, as you know, this reaction or racial retrenchment to racial progress, it’s not hard to miss.

[0:24:45 Speaker 2] We could think of reconstruction, post reconstruction. We can think of the reaction to the civil rights movement, and it appeared that, you know, it was very swift. So if you think of Obama in office for eight years, then a very swift, negative reaction. Do you think the retrenchment came faster than we’ve seen in the past or around About the same amount of time? And you think I

[0:25:08 Speaker 4] think it came? I think it came much faster. Okay, take it game much faster. Okay. The only other time retrenchment happened this fast is was during redemption. After after reconstruction. Does that happen immediately? Yeah. I mean, like, there was like, no break, right? Yeah, it was It was I mean, think about it Actually started happening right after Obama took office, and it culminated with with Trump’s election. But think about what happened. 2010 you know, led by the tea party. You know, Republicans retake the house 2014. They retake the Senate 2016. They retake the White

[0:25:41 Speaker 2] House. One of things you’ve talked about. Concept you talked about. It’s symbolic predispositions. Can you go in a little detail about what a symbolic predisposition is?

[0:25:49 Speaker 4] Yes. And by the predisposition Is this idea that we have these values for lack of a better term that guy, or inform the way that we see the world especially the way in which we react to political phenomena. And these are things. According to David Sears, that air been socialized since childhood, right? And they’re they’re more or less latent, but they become activated and what he will call the current political environment. Whatever the political environment is, they become activated by some stimulus. And so these, when these things were activated, these participations air activated, they help inform the way we see the political world.

[0:26:25 Speaker 2] So I know they’ve been a number of people who, you know, I’m talking about the symbolic predispositions who made this pushback. There are some people have argued that they are counties that voted for Obama but then voted for Trump if they have these reactionary uh, yeah, be symbolic predispositions while working, activated in 08 but were activated in 2016.

[0:26:45 Speaker 4] So that’s a really good point. First of all, with the literature show that these people weren’t necessarily Democrats to begin with, right, that they were independence, right? There were essentially free agent. So that’s a B is that I don’t think these people saw Obama as a straight up black man like they see the rest of us. Okay, so him and exceptional, right? He wouldn’t like the rest of us. They saw him as except they saw him as let me just I would just say it. The Magic Negro Write it like the rest of us, right? There have been some. There have been some studies in the social cycle literature that show that, you know, there many whites who did not see Obama, you know, as as a part of the black community called the black community. They saw his exceptional and because he was exceptional in some cases they were. These people were harder on the black community and so far as they would say, Well, one of the Almeida How come the rest of you guys can’t do as well or can’t do what? Right. So? So in that sense, I think that they saw him is exceptional.

[0:27:45 Speaker 2] And so when do you think you begin to see the flip where he becomes connected to the black community?

[0:27:51 Speaker 9] Who?

[0:27:52 Speaker 4] Man a man? Wait, what? We’re talking about different folks. If we’re talking about these tea party people, he’s always part of the black community, right? If we’re talking about these Obama thes Obama trump people. When did that? When did that happen? I’m not so sure he ever did become part of black community when it comes to for them. When we’re talking about these Obama trump flippers,

[0:28:12 Speaker 2] Okay. But the idea is the racial threat became realized for them.

[0:28:17 Speaker 4] Yeah, I think I think it became more realized to them. But also, I don’t think all of these I can’t believe I’m going to say this, but I don’t think all these Trump supporters were motivated by race. Right? So I do think some of these trump supporters, you know, they hated Hillary thes Trump supporters and flip, they hated Hillary. They wanted some kind of change. Some people have single issue voters, right? They could have been voting on the basis of national security. They could have been voting for Trump, thinking that will shape up once he takes office. Right. So there. So there are various reasons why, you know, you could have some of these people who voted for Trump, especially the flippers who weren’t races. But they voted for him for other reasons.

[0:28:55 Speaker 2] What kind of challenges did you face in pursuing this project? I mean, because this could be extremely controversial. What types of challenges did you face,

[0:29:05 Speaker 4] man? Who? Man? I have, man. Right up to now, I’ve really had the muzzle on as I think about this, Professor. It is pretty, man. Oh, my God. If you sat mat and I down and talk to us about all the Bookman, you wouldn’t Maybe you wouldn’t be surprised at all the hate mail. I know that I have received, you know, since since 2000 to 2010 when the tea party data first started hitting and getting published, right? I mean, I got so much hate mail, I got so mad I had to get a put on blood pressure meds. Oh, okay. Oh, no. I was really upset. It got to the point where these people would email me or call me and I’m like, Here’s my phone number. Here’s my address. Come get something. So it got really bad. Barreto and I got attacked in the Wall Street Journal. No surprise, but the way that the attack took place by this guy named James Toronto’s editorial writer. He said these two guys wrote this book on the tea party. He says once a black man, Once a Latino man, what do you expect they’re gonna find? Okay, I’m talking about even presenting this stuff. I don’t shy away from challenges or conflicts, so So and I know it’s presented some professional challenges for me as well, right? I mean, it’s like it’s like I’m unapologetic about who I am is a black man. I’m unapologetic. And so when I present it and you know, when these white men look at the demographic to which I refer, write it like that’s me or somebody I know and they get defensive and I get that right, I get that. Let me give you one example presenting a sociology department, right? And so the sociologist asked me a question after the tea party book it just come out, man. And so I’m showing all these signs that people, you know, people were saying about Obama calling what kind of name and stuff like that. So a Q and A is very senior professor there, sociology, there he goes. So let me get this straight, he says. He says, Are you trying to tell me that that Obama was mawr disrespected than President Bush and I had to calm myself down. I was like, Did you just hear what you said? You refer to Bush as President Bush and to President Obama as Obama. So I’ll let you figure that one out. So So? So it’s these kind of challenges, professor. Right? And you just don’t let it get to me anymore.

[0:31:21 Speaker 2] Well, Professor Parker, thank you so much for participating. We really appreciate you taking the time to speak with us.

[0:31:29 Speaker 4] No worries, Professor McDaniel. Thank you for the invitation.

[0:31:31 Speaker 2] All right. Have a good day.

[0:31:38 Speaker 1] Thank you for listening to the American ingredient. American Daniel, a professor in the department government. The University of Texas. I would like to think Michael Heidenreich and Jacob Weiss their assistance along with the Department of Government, University of Texas and the University of Texas El E. I. T s development studio